共查询到20条相似文献,搜索用时 15 毫秒
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John MacFarlane 《Synthese》2009,170(3):443-456
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Brad Thompson 《Synthese》2008,160(2):203-213
Most philosophers who have endorsed the idea that there is such a thing as phenomenal content—content that supervenes on phenomenal
character—have also endorsed what I call Standard Russellianism. According to Standard Russellianism, phenomenal content is
Russellian in nature, and the properties represented by perceptual experiences are mind-independent physical properties. In
agreement with Sydney Shoemaker [Shoemaker, S. (1994). Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 54 249–314], I argue that Standard Russellianism is incompatible with the possibility of spectrum inversion without illusion.
One defense of Standard Russellianism is to hold that spectrum inversion without illusion is conceivable but not in fact possible.
I argue that this response fails. As a consequence, either phenomenal content is not Russellian, or experiences do not represent
mind-independent physical properties. 相似文献
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Adam Toon 《Synthese》2010,172(2):301-315
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Russellianism and Referential Uses of Descriptions 总被引:1,自引:0,他引:1
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Gary Ostertag 《Philosophical Studies》2009,146(2):249-267
Russellianism is characterized as the view that ‘that’-clauses refer to Russellian propositions, familiar set-theoretic pairings
of objects and properties. Two belief-reporting sentences, S and S*, possessing the same Russellian content, but differing in their intuitive truthvalue, are provided. It is argued that no
Russellian explanation of the difference in apparent truthvalue is available, with the upshot that the Russellian fails to
explain how a speaker who asserts S but rejects S* can be innocent of inconsistency, either in what she says or, at least,
in what she implicates. Yet, while there is no semantic or pragmatic explanation of the substitution failure consistent with
Russellianism, there remains the possibility of a purely psychological explanation that is, nonetheless, Russellian. This
is an attractive option. It comes at a cost, however, since, in abandoning the project of providing a semantic or pragmatic
explanation of anti-substitutivity intuitions, the Russellian is no longer in the business of explaining how a rational, well-informed
speaker, with no incentive to mislead, can avoid inconsistency in reporting the facts as they appear. 相似文献
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DAVID J. BENNETT 《Philosophy and phenomenological research》2011,83(2):345-365
I develop a Russellian representationalist account of size experience that draws importantly from contemporary vision science research on size perception. The core view is that size is experienced in ‘body‐scaled’ units. So, an object might, say, be experienced as two eye‐level units high. The view is sharpened in response to Thompson’s (forthcoming) Doubled Earth example. This example is presented by Thompson as part of an argument for a Fregean view of size experience. But I argue that the Russellian view I develop handles the Doubled Earth example in a natural and illuminating way, thereby avoiding the need to posit irreducible experiential ‘modes of presentation’. I also address a kind of neo‐Fregean ‘reference‐fixing’ view of size experience, that shares features with the Russellian view developed. I give reasons for favoring the latter. Finally, I argue that Peacocke’s claim that spatial experience is ‘unit free’ is not persuasive. 相似文献
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Paul Blackledge 《Studies in East European Thought》2006,58(1):1-31
Trotsky’s contribution to historical materialism has been subject to two broadly defined critical assessments. Detractors
have tended to dismiss his interpretation of Marxism as a form of productive force determinism, while admirers have tended
to defend his Marxism as a voluntarist negation of the same. In this essay I argue that both of these opinions share an equally
caricatured interpretation of Second International Marxism against which Trotsky is compared. By contrast, I argue that Trotsky’s
Marxism can best be understood as a powerful application and deepening of the strongest elements of Second International methodology
to a novel set of problems. Thus, against Trotsky’s admirers, I locate his Marxism as both emerging out of, in addition to
breaking with, Second International Marxism; while, against his critics, I argue that it was precisely the strengths of this
earlier interpretation of Marxism that informed Trotsky’s powerful contributions to historical materialism: his concept of
combined and uneven development and his discussion of the role of individual agents within the Marxist interpretation of history. 相似文献
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Sandy Berkovski 《Synthese》2011,181(1):63-77
I examine Reichenbach’s theory of relative a priori and Michael Friedman’s interpretation of it. I argue that Reichenbach’s
view remains at bottom conventionalist and that one issue which separates Reichenbach’s account from Kant’s apriorism is the
problem of mathematical applicability. I then discuss Hermann Weyl’s theory of blank forms which in many ways runs parallel
to the theory of relative a priori. I argue that it is capable of dealing with the problem of applicability, but with a cost. 相似文献
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Ross P. Cameron 《Synthese》2007,156(1):143-159
In this paper I argue that warrant for Lewis’ Modal Realism is unobtainable. I consider two familiar objections to Lewisian
realism – the modal irrelevance objection and the epistemological objection – and argue that Lewis’ response to each is unsatisfactory
because they presuppose claims that only the Lewisian realist will accept. Since, I argue, warrant for Lewisian realism can
only be obtained if we have a response to each objection that does not presuppose the truth of Lewisian realism, this circularity
is vicious. I end by contrasting Lewis’ methodology with Forrest’s in order to illustrate a rival method that does not fall
victim to the objection I lay against Lewis. 相似文献
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Burleigh T. Wilkins 《The Journal of Ethics》2007,11(2):147-159
This paper explores some of the problems which arise from Immanuel Kant’s commitment to both human rights and the rights of
states. Michael Doyle believed it was contradictory for Kant to defend both human rights and non-intervention by states in
the affairs of other states, but I argue that for Kant there was no such contradiction, and I explore Kant’s claim that the
state is “a moral personality.” I also discuss Kant’s belief that “Nature guarantees” that perpetual peace will obtain, and
I consider Kant as a teleologist. 相似文献