$${\in_K}$$: a Non-Fregean Logic of Explicit Knowledge

We present a new logic-based approach to the reasoning about knowledge which is independent of possible worlds semantics. \({\in_K}\) (Epsilon-K) is a non-Fregean logic whose models consist of propositional universes with subsets for true, false and known propositions. Knowledge is, in general, not closed under rules of inference; the only valid epistemic principles are the knowledge axiom K _i φ → φ and some minimal conditions concerning common knowledge in a group. Knowledge is explicit and all forms of the logical omniscience problem are avoided. Various stronger epistemic properties such as positive and/or negative introspection, the K-axiom, closure under logical connectives, etc. can be restored by imposing additional semantic constraints. This yields corresponding sublogics for which we present sound and complete axiomatizations. As a useful tool for general model constructions we study abstract versions of some 3-valued logics in which we interpret truth as knowledge. We establish a connection between \({\in_K}\) and the well-known syntactic approach to explicit knowledge proving a result concerning equi-expressiveness. Furthermore, we discuss some self-referential epistemic statements, such as the knower paradox, as relaxations of variants of the liar paradox and show how these epistemic “paradoxes” can be solved in \({\in_K}\). Every specific \({\in_K}\)-logic is defined as a certain extension of some underlying classical abstract logic.     

Turing–Taylor Expansions for Arithmetic Theories

Turing progressions have been often used to measure the proof-theoretic strength of mathematical theories: iterate adding consistency of some weak base theory until you “hit” the target theory. Turing progressions based on n-consistency give rise to a \({\Pi_{n+1}}\) proof-theoretic ordinal \({|U|_{\Pi^0_{n+1}}}\) also denoted \({|U|_n}\). As such, to each theory U we can assign the sequence of corresponding \({\Pi_{n+1}}\) ordinals \({\langle |U|_n\rangle_{n > 0}}\). We call this sequence a Turing-Taylor expansion or spectrum of a theory. In this paper, we relate Turing-Taylor expansions of sub-theories of Peano Arithmetic to Ignatiev’s universal model for the closed fragment of the polymodal provability logic \({\mathsf{GLP}_\omega}\). In particular, we observe that each point in the Ignatiev model can be seen as Turing-Taylor expansions of formal mathematical theories. Moreover, each sub-theory of Peano Arithmetic that allows for a Turing-Taylor expansion will define a unique point in Ignatiev’s model.     

Propositional Epistemic Logics with Quantification Over Agents of Knowledge

The paper presents a family of propositional epistemic logics such that languages of these logics are extended by quantification over modal (epistemic) operators or over agents of knowledge and extended by predicate symbols that take modal (epistemic) operators (or agents) as arguments. Denote this family by \({\mathcal {P}\mathcal {E}\mathcal {L}}_{({ QK})}\). There exist epistemic logics whose languages have the above mentioned properties (see, for example Corsi and Orlandelli in Stud Log 101:1159–1183, 2013; Fitting et al. in Stud Log 69:133–169, 2001; Grove in Artif Intell 74(2):311–350, 1995; Lomuscio and Colombetti in Proceedings of ATAL 1996. Lecture Notes in Computer Science (LNCS), vol 1193, pp 71–85, 1996). But these logics are obtained from first-order modal logics, while a logic of \({\mathcal {P}\mathcal {E}\mathcal {L}}_{({ QK})}\) can be regarded as a propositional multi-modal logic whose language includes quantifiers over modal (epistemic) operators and predicate symbols that take modal (epistemic) operators as arguments. Among the logics of \({\mathcal {P}\mathcal {E}\mathcal {L}}_{({ QK})}\) there are logics with a syntactical distinction between two readings of epistemic sentences: de dicto and de re (between ‘knowing that’ and ‘knowing of’). We show the decidability of logics of \({\mathcal {P}\mathcal {E}\mathcal {L}}_{({ QK})}\) with the help of the loosely guarded fragment (LGF) of first-order logic. Namely, we generalize LGF to a higher-order decidable loosely guarded fragment. The latter fragment allows us to construct various decidable propositional epistemic logics with quantification over modal (epistemic) operators. The family of this logics coincides with \({\mathcal {P}\mathcal {E}\mathcal {L}}_{({ QK})}\). There are decidable propositional logics such that these logics implicitly contain quantification over agents of knowledge, but languages of these logics are usual propositional epistemic languages without quantifiers and predicate symbols (see Grove and Halpern in J Log Comput 3(4):345–378, 1993). Some logics of \({\mathcal {P}\mathcal {E}\mathcal {L}}_{({ QK})}\) can be regarded as counterparts of logics defined in Grove and Halpern (J Log Comput 3(4):345–378, 1993). We prove that the satisfiability problem for these logics of \({\mathcal {P}\mathcal {E}\mathcal {L}}_{({ QK})}\) is Pspace-complete using their counterparts in Grove and Halpern (J Log Comput 3(4):345–378, 1993).     

A Second Pretabular Classical Relevance Logic

Pretabular logics are those that lack finite characteristic matrices, although all of their normal proper extensions do have some finite characteristic matrix. Although for Anderson and Belnap’s relevance logic R, there exists an uncountable set of pretabular extensions (Swirydowicz in J Symb Log 73(4):1249–1270, 2008), for the classical relevance logic \( \hbox {KR} = \hbox {R} + \{(A\,\, \& \sim A)\rightarrow B\}\) there has been known so far a pretabular extension: \({\mathcal L}\) (Galminas and Mersch in Stud Log 100:1211–1221, 2012). In Section 1 of this paper, we introduce some history of pretabularity and some relevance logics and their algebras. In Section 2, we introduce a new pretabular logic, which we shall name \({\mathcal M}\), and which is a neighbor of \({\mathcal L}\), in that it is an extension of KR. Also in this section, an algebraic semantics, ‘\({\mathcal M}\)-algebras’, will be introduced and the characterization of \({\mathcal M}\) to the set of finite \({\mathcal M}\)-algebras will be shown. In Section 3, the pretabularity of \({\mathcal M}\) will be proved.     

Matching Topological and Frame Products of Modal Logics

The simplest combination of unimodal logics \({\mathrm{L}_1 \rm and \mathrm{L}_2}\) into a bimodal logic is their fusion, \({\mathrm{L}_1 \otimes \mathrm{L}_2}\), axiomatized by the theorems of \({\mathrm{L}_1 \rm for \square_1 \rm and of \mathrm{L}_2 \rm for \square_{2}}\). Shehtman introduced combinations that are not only bimodal, but two-dimensional: he defined 2-d Cartesian products of 1-d Kripke frames, using these Cartesian products to define the frame product\({\mathrm{L}_1 \times \mathrm{L}_2 \rm of \mathrm{L}_1 \rm and \mathrm{L}_2}\). Van Benthem, Bezhanishvili, ten Cate and Sarenac generalized Shehtman’s idea and introduced the topological product\({\mathrm{L}_1 \times_{t}\mathrm{L}_2}\), using Cartesian products of topological spaces rather than of Kripke frames. Frame products have been extensively studied, but much less is known about topological products. The goal of the current paper is to give necessary and sufficient conditions for the topological product to match the frame product, for Kripke complete extensions of \({\mathrm{S}4: \mathrm{L}_1 \times_t \mathrm{L}_2 = \mathrm{L}_1 \times \mathrm{L}_2 \rm iff \mathrm{L}_1 \supsetneq \mathrm{S}5 \rm or \mathrm{L}_2 \supsetneq \mathrm{S}5 \rm or \mathrm{L}_1, \mathrm{L}_2 = \mathrm{S}5}\).     

Justification as faultlessness

According to deontological approaches to justification, we can analyze justification in deontic terms. In this paper, I try to advance the discussion of deontological approaches by applying recent insights in the semantics of deontic modals. Specifically, I use the distinction between weak necessity modals (should, ought to) and strong necessity modals (must, have to) to make progress on a question that has received surprisingly little discussion in the literature, namely: ‘What’s the best version of a deontological approach?’ The two most obvious hypotheses are the Permissive View, according to which justified expresses permission, and the Obligatory View, according to which justified expresses some species of obligation. I raise difficulties for both of these hypotheses. In light of these difficulties, I propose a new position, according to which justified expresses a property I call faultlessness, defined as the dual of weak necessity modals. According to this view, an agent is justified in \(\phi\)-ing iff it’s not the case that she should [/ought] not \(\phi\). I argue that this ‘Faultlessness View’ gives us precisely what’s needed to avoid the problems facing the Permissive and Obligatory Views.     

Making sense of (in)determinate truth: the semantics of free variables

It is argued that truth value of a sentence containing free variables in a context of use (or the truth value of the proposition it expresses in a context of use), just as the reference of the free variables concerned, depends on the assumptions and posits given by the context. However, context may under-determine the reference of a free variable and the truth value of sentences in which it occurs. It is argued that in such cases a free variable has indeterminate reference and a sentence in which it occurs may have indeterminate truth value. On letting, say, x be such that \(x^2=4\), the sentence ‘Either \(x=2\) or \(x=-2\)’ is true but the sentence ‘\(x=2\)’ has an indeterminate truth value: it is determinate that the variable x refers to either 2 or \(-2\), but it is indeterminate which of the two it refers to, as a result ‘\(x=2\)’ has a truth value but its truth value is indeterminate. The semantic indeterminacy is analysed in a ‘radically’ supervaluational (or plurivaluational) semantic framework closely analogous to the treatment of vagueness in McGee and McLaughlin (South J Philos 33:203–251, 1994, Linguist Philos 27:123–136, 2004) and Smith (Vagueness and degrees of truth, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2008), which saves bivalence, the T-schema and the truth-functional analysis of the boolean connectives. It is shown that on such an analysis the modality ‘determinately’ is quite clearly not an epistemic modality, avoiding a potential objection raised by Williamson (Vagueness, Routledge, London, 1994) against such ‘radically’ supervaluational treatments of vagueness, and that determinate truth (rather than truth simpliciter) is the semantic value preserved in classically valid arguments. The analysis is contrasted with the epistemicist proposal of Breckenridge and Magidor (Philos Stud 158:377–400, 2012) which implies that (in the given context) ‘\(x=2\)’ has a determinate but unknowable truth value.     

Public announcement logic with distributed knowledge: expressivity,completeness and complexity

While dynamic epistemic logics with common knowledge have been extensively studied, dynamic epistemic logics with distributed knowledge have so far received far less attention. In this paper we study extensions of public announcement logic (\(\mathcal{PAL }\)) with distributed knowledge, in particular their expressivity, axiomatisations and complexity. \(\mathcal{PAL }\) extended only with distributed knowledge is not more expressive than standard epistemic logic with distributed knowledge. Our focus is therefore on \(\mathcal{PACD }\), the result of adding both common and distributed knowledge to \(\mathcal{PAL }\), which is more expressive than each of its component logics. We introduce an axiomatisation of \(\mathcal{PACD }\), which is not surprising: it is the combination of well-known axioms. The completeness proof, however, is not trivial, and requires novel combinations and extensions of techniques for dealing with \(S5\) knowledge, distributed knowledge, common knowledge and public announcements at the same time. We furthermore show that \(\mathcal{PACD }\) is decidable, more precisely that it is \(\textsc {exptime}\)-complete. This result also carries over to \(\mathcal{S 5\mathcal CD }\) with common and distributed knowledge operators for all coalitions (and not only the grand coalition). Finally, we propose a notion of a trans-bisimulation to generalise certain results and give deeper insight into the proofs.     

Factor analysis models via I-divergence optimization

Given a positive definite covariance matrix \(\widehat{\Sigma }\) of dimension n, we approximate it with a covariance of the form \(HH^\top +D\), where H has a prescribed number \(k<n\) of columns and \(D>0\) is diagonal. The quality of the approximation is gauged by the I-divergence between the zero mean normal laws with covariances \(\widehat{\Sigma }\) and \(HH^\top +D\), respectively. To determine a pair (H, D) that minimizes the I-divergence we construct, by lifting the minimization into a larger space, an iterative alternating minimization algorithm (AML) à la Csiszár–Tusnády. As it turns out, the proper choice of the enlarged space is crucial for optimization. The convergence of the algorithm is studied, with special attention given to the case where D is singular. The theoretical properties of the AML are compared to those of the popular EM algorithm for exploratory factor analysis. Inspired by the ECME (a Newton–Raphson variation on EM), we develop a similar variant of AML, called ACML, and in a few numerical experiments, we compare the performances of the four algorithms.     

Correia Semantics Revisited

Despite a renewed interest in Richard Angell’s logic of analytic containment (\({\mathsf{AC}}\)), the first semantics for \({\mathsf{AC}}\) introduced by Fabrice Correia has remained largely unexamined. This paper describes a reasonable approach to Correia semantics by means of a correspondence with a nine-valued semantics for \({\mathsf{AC}}\). The present inquiry employs this correspondence to provide characterizations of a number of propositional logics intermediate between \({\mathsf{AC}}\) and classical logic. In particular, we examine Correia’s purported characterization of classical logic with respect to his semantics, showing the condition Correia cites in fact characterizes the “logic of paradox” \({\mathsf{LP}}\) and provide a correct characterization. Finally, we consider some remarks on related matters, such as the applicability of the present correspondence to the analysis of the system \({\mathsf{AC}^{\ast}}\) and an intriguing relationship between Correia’s models and articular models for first degree entailment.     

Arithmetical Completeness Theorem for Modal Logic $$\mathsf{}$$

We prove that for any recursively axiomatized consistent extension T of Peano Arithmetic, there exists a \(\Sigma _2\) provability predicate of T whose provability logic is precisely the modal logic \(\mathsf{K}\). For this purpose, we introduce a new bimodal logic \(\mathsf{GLK}\), and prove the Kripke completeness theorem and the uniform arithmetical completeness theorem for \(\mathsf{GLK}\).     

Arithmetical Soundness and Completeness for $$\varvec{\Sigma }_{\varvec{2}}$$ Numerations

We prove that for each recursively axiomatized consistent extension T of Peano Arithmetic and \(n \ge 2\), there exists a \(\Sigma _2\) numeration \(\tau (u)\) of T such that the provability logic of the provability predicate \(\mathsf{Pr}_\tau (x)\) naturally constructed from \(\tau (u)\) is exactly \(\mathsf{K}+ \Box (\Box ^n p \rightarrow p) \rightarrow \Box p\). This settles Sacchetti’s problem affirmatively.     

Reconstructing the Topology of the Elementary Self-embedding Monoids of Countable Saturated Structures

Every transformation monoid comes equipped with a canonical topology, the topology of pointwise convergence. For some structures, the topology of the endomorphism monoid can be reconstructed from its underlying abstract monoid. This phenomenon is called automatic homeomorphicity. In this paper we show that whenever the automorphism group of a countable saturated structure has automatic homeomorphicity and a trivial center, then the monoid of elementary self-embeddings has automatic homeomorphicity, too. As a second result we strengthen a result by Lascar by showing that whenever \({\mathbf {A}}\) is a countable \(\aleph _0\)-categorical G-finite structure whose automorphism group has a trivial center and if \({\mathbf {B}}\) is any other countable structure, then every isomorphism between the monoids of elementary self-embeddings is a homeomorphism.     

Contextual-Hierarchical Reconstructions of the Strengthened Liar Problem

In this paper we shall introduce two types of contextual-hierarchical (from now on abbreviated by ‘ch’) approaches to the strengthened liar problem. These approaches, which we call the ‘standard’ and the ‘alternative’ ch-reconstructions of the strengthened liar problem, differ in their philosophical view regarding the nature of truth and the relation between the truth predicates T r ⁿ and T r ⁿ⁺¹ of different hierarchy-levels. The basic idea of the standard ch-reconstruction is that the T r ⁿ⁺¹-schema should hold for all sentences of \(\mathcal {L}^{n}\). In contrast, the alternative ch-reconstruction, for which we shall argue in section four, is motivated by the idea that T r ⁿ and T r ⁿ⁺¹ are coherent in the sense that the same sentences of \(\mathcal {L}^{n}\) should be true according to T r ⁿ and T r ⁿ⁺¹. We show that instances of the standard ch-reconstruction can be obtained by iterating Kripke’s strong Kleene jump operator. Furthermore, we will demonstrate how instances of the alternative ch-reconstruction can be obtained by a slight modification of the iterated axiom system KF and of the iterated strong Kleene jump operator.     

Sequent Calculi for Semi-De Morgan and De Morgan Algebras

A contraction-free and cut-free sequent calculus \(\mathsf {G3SDM}\) for semi-De Morgan algebras, and a structural-rule-free and single-succedent sequent calculus \(\mathsf {G3DM}\) for De Morgan algebras are developed. The cut rule is admissible in both sequent calculi. Both calculi enjoy the decidability and Craig interpolation. The sequent calculi are applied to prove some embedding theorems: \(\mathsf {G3DM}\) is embedded into \(\mathsf {G3SDM}\) via Gödel–Gentzen translation. \(\mathsf {G3DM}\) is embedded into a sequent calculus for classical propositional logic. \(\mathsf {G3SDM}\) is embedded into the sequent calculus \(\mathsf {G3ip}\) for intuitionistic propositional logic.     

Human Psychophysical Functions,an Update: Methods for Identifying their form; Estimating their Parameters; and Evaluating the Effects of Important Predictors

Stevens’ power law for the judgments of sensation has a long history in psychology and is used in many psychophysical investigations of the effects of predictors such as group or condition. Stevens’ formulation \(\varPsi = {aP}^{n}\), where \(\varPsi \) is the psychological judgment, P is the physical intensity, and \(n\) is the power law exponent, is usually tested by plotting log \((\varPsi )\) against log (P). In some, but by no means all, studies, effects on the scale parameter, \(a\), are also investigated. This two-parameter model is simple but known to be flawed, for at least some modalities. Specifically, three-parameter functions that include a threshold parameter produce a better fit for many data sets. In addition, direct non-linear computation of power laws often fit better than regressions of log-transformed variables. However, such potentially flawed methods continue to be used because of assumptions that the approximations are “close enough” as to not to make any difference to the conclusions drawn (or possibly through ignorance the errors in these assumptions). We investigate two modalities in detail: duration and roughness. We show that a three-parameter power law is the best fitting of several plausible models. Comparison between this model and the prevalent two parameter version of Stevens’ power law shows significant differences for the parameter estimates with at least medium effect sizes for duration.     

A Categorical Equivalence Motivated by Kalman’s Construction

An equivalence between the category of MV-algebras and the category \({{\rm MV^{\bullet}}}\) is given in Castiglioni et al. (Studia Logica 102(1):67–92, 2014). An integral residuated lattice with bottom is an MV-algebra if and only if it satisfies the equations \({a = \neg \neg a, (a \rightarrow b) \vee (b\rightarrow a) = 1}\) and \({a \odot (a\rightarrow b) = a \wedge b}\). An object of \({{\rm MV^{\bullet}}}\) is a residuated lattice which in particular satisfies some equations which correspond to the previous equations. In this paper we extend the equivalence to the category whose objects are pairs (A, I), where A is an MV-algebra and I is an ideal of A.