Independent influences of verbalization and race on the configural and featural processing of faces: a behavioral and eye movement study

Describing a face in words can either hinder or help subsequent face recognition. Here, the authors examined the relationship between the benefit from verbally describing a series of faces and the same-race advantage (SRA) whereby people are better at recognizing unfamiliar faces from their own race as compared with those from other races. Verbalization and the SRA influenced face recognition independently, as evident on both behavioral (Experiment 1) and eye movement measures (Experiment 2). The findings indicate that verbalization and the SRA each recruit different types of configural processing, with verbalization modulating face learning and the SRA modulating both face learning and recognition. Eye movement patterns demonstrated greater feature sampling for describing as compared with not describing faces and for other-race as compared with same-race faces. In both cases, sampling of the eyes, nose, and mouth played a major role in performance. The findings support a single process account whereby verbalization can influence perceptual processing in a flexible and yet fundamental way through shifting one's processing orientation.     

Dissociating positive and negative influences of verbal processing on the recognition of pictures of faces and objects

Four experiments investigated the role of verbal processing in the recognition of pictures of faces and objects. We used (a) a stimulus-encoding task where participants learned sequentially presented pictures in control, articulatory suppression, and describe conditions and then engaged in an old-new picture recognition test and (b) a poststimulus-encoding task where participants learned the stimuli without any secondary task and then either described or not a single item from memory before the recognition test. The main findings were as follows: First, verbalization influenced picture recognition. Second, there were contrasting influences of verbalization on the recognition of faces, compared with objects, that were driven by (a) the stage of processing during which verbalization took place (as assessed by the stimulus-encoding and poststimulus-encoding tasks), (b) whether verbalization was subvocal (whereby one goes through the motions of speaking but without making any sound) or overt, and (c) stimulus familiarity. During stimulus encoding there was a double dissociation whereby subvocal verbalization interfered with the recognition of faces but not objects, while overt verbalization benefited the recognition of objects but not faces. In addition, stimulus familiarity provided an independent and beneficial influence on performance. Post stimulus encoding, overt verbalization interfered with the recognition of both faces and objects, and this interference was apparent for unfamiliar but not familiar stimuli. Together these findings extend work on verbalization to picture recognition and place important parameters on stimulus and task constraints that contribute to contrasting beneficial and detrimental effects of verbalization on recognition memory.     

Face recognition and emotional valence: processing without awareness by neurologically intact participants does not simulate covert recognition in prosopagnosia

Covert face recognition in neurologically intact participants was investigated with the use of very brief stimulus presentation to prevent awareness of the stimulus. In Experiment 1, skin conductance response (SCR) to photographs of celebrity and unfamiliar faces was recorded; the faces were displayed for 220 msec and for 17 msec in a within-participants design. SCR to faces presented for 220 msec was larger and more likely to occur with familiar faces than with unfamiliar faces. Face familiarity did not affect the SCR to faces presented for 17 msec. SCR was larger for faces of good than for faces of evil celebrities presented for 17 msec, but valence did not affect SCR to faces displayed for 220 msec. In Experiment 2, associative priming was found in a face familiarity decision task when the prime face was displayed for 220 msec, but no facilitation occurred when primes were presented for 17 msec. In Experiment 3, participants were able to differentiate evil and good faces presented without awareness in a two-alternative forced-choice decision. The results provide no evidence of familiarity detection outside awareness in normal participants and suggest that, contrary to previous research, very brief presentation to neurologically intact participants is not a useful model for the types of covert recognition found in prosopagnosia. However, a response based on affective valence appears to be available from brief presentation.     

Repetition Priming Follows Spontaneous but not Prompted Recognition of Familiar Faces

Reaction times to make a familiarity decision to the faces of famous people were measured after recognition of the faces in a pre-training phase had occurred spontaneously or following prompting with a name or other cue. At test, reaction times to familiar faces that had been recognized spontaneously in the pre-training phase were significantly facilitated relative to an unprimed comparison condition. Reaction times to familiar faces recognized only after prompting in the pre-training phase were not significantly facilitated. This was demonstrated both when a name prompt was used (Experiments 1 and 3) and when subjects were cued with brief semantic information (Experiment 2).

Repetition priming was not found to depend on prior spontaneous recognition per se. In Experiment 3, spontaneously recognizing a familiar face did not prime subsequent familiarity judgements when the same face had only been identified following prompting on a prior encounter. In Experiment 4, recognition memory for faces recognized after cueing was found to be over 90% accurate. This indicates that prompted recognition does not yield repetition priming, even though subjects can remember the faces. A fusion of “face recognition unit” and “episodic record” accounts of the repetition priming effect may be more useful than either theory alone in explaining these results.     

Verbal facilitation effects instead of verbal overshadowing in face memory of 4- to 6-year olds

Research on eye witness memory in older children and adults revealed that verbally describing unfamiliar faces impairs later recognition of these faces, known as the “verbal overshadowing effect”. The aim of this study was to investigate whether a verbal overshadowing effect occurs in 4- to 6-year olds, too, and whether visualization (i.e., drawing the seen face) might elicit a visual overshadowing effect. Instead of a verbal overshadowing effect, a verbal facilitation effect was revealed with verbal intelligence being a significant predictor for recognition accuracy in the verbalization group but not in the control group. No effect of visualization was observed on recognition accuracy. Potential explanations for the results are discussed.     

More Inaccurate But Not More Biased: Anxiety During Encoding Impairs Face Recognition Accuracy But Does Not Moderate the Own‐Ethnicity Bias

Heightened state anxiety can have a deleterious impact on memory for faces. In this paper we investigated whether anxiety: (i) moderates the own‐ethnicity bias (OEB) and (ii) impairs face recognition accuracy at the encoding or retrieval phase of an OEB face‐recognition task. Using a typical OEB task, anxiety was induced during encoding and retrieval in Experiment 1, but only during retrieval in Experiment 2. An OEB was found in both experiments, but anxiety did not moderate the OEB in either experiment. In Experiment 1, anxious participants were poorer at face recognition for both own‐ and other‐ethnicity faces. In Experiment 2 anxiety did not impair face recognition. Together, these studies suggest that anxiety impaired participants' encoding, but not retrieval, of faces. The implications of these findings are discussed. Copyright © 2015 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Social appraisal influences recognition of emotions

The notion of social appraisal emphasizes the importance of a social dimension in appraisal theories of emotion by proposing that the way an individual appraises an event is influenced by the way other individuals appraise and feel about the same event. This study directly tested this proposal by asking participants to recognize dynamic facial expressions of emotion (fear, happiness, or anger in Experiment 1; fear, happiness, anger, or neutral in Experiment 2) in a target face presented at the center of a screen while a contextual face, which appeared simultaneously in the periphery of the screen, expressed an emotion (fear, happiness, anger) or not (neutral) and either looked at the target face or not. We manipulated gaze direction to be able to distinguish between a mere contextual effect (gaze away from both the target face and the participant) and a specific social appraisal effect (gaze toward the target face). Results of both experiments provided evidence for a social appraisal effect in emotion recognition, which differed from the mere effect of contextual information: Whereas facial expressions were identical in both conditions, the direction of the gaze of the contextual face influenced emotion recognition. Social appraisal facilitated the recognition of anger, happiness, and fear when the contextual face expressed the same emotion. This facilitation was stronger than the mere contextual effect. Social appraisal also allowed better recognition of fear when the contextual face expressed anger and better recognition of anger when the contextual face expressed fear.     

Features are also important: contributions of featural and configural processing to face recognition

It has been suggested that face recognition is primarily based on configural information, with featural information playing little or no role. We investigated this idea by comparing the prototype effect for face prototypes that emphasized either featural or configural processing. In Experiment 1, participants showed a tendency to commit false alarms in response to nonstudied prototypes, and this tendency was equivalent for featural and configural prototypes. Experiment 2 replicated this finding, and provided support for the assumption that the two types of prototypes differed in terms of featural and configural processing: Face inversion eliminated the prototype effect for configural prototypes but not for featural prototypes. These results suggest that both featural and configural processing make important contributions to face recognition, and that their effects are dissociable.     

Is face distinctiveness gender based?

Two experiments were carried out to study the role of gender category in evaluations of face distinctiveness. In Experiment 1, participants had to evaluate the distinctiveness and the femininity-masculinity of real or artificial composite faces. The composite faces were created by blending either faces of the same gender (sexed composite faces, approximating the sexed prototypes) or faces of both genders (nonsexed composite faces, approximating the face prototype). The results show that the distinctiveness ratings decreased as the number of blended faces increased. Distinctiveness and gender ratings did not covary for real faces or sexed composite faces, but they did vary for nonsexed composite faces. In Experiment 2, participants were asked to state which of two composite faces, one sexed and one nonsexed, was more distinctive. Sexed composite faces were selected less often. The results are interpreted as indicating that distinctiveness is based on sexed prototypes. Implications for face recognition models are discussed.     

Verbal overshadowing of visual memories: some things are better left unsaid

It is widely believed that verbal processing generally improves memory performance. However, in a series of six experiments, verbalizing the appearance of previously seen visual stimuli impaired subsequent recognition performance. In Experiment 1, subjects viewed a videotape including a salient individual. Later, some subjects described the individual's face. Subjects who verbalized the face performed less well on a subsequent recognition test than control subjects who did not engage in memory verbalization. The results of Experiment 2 replicated those of Experiment 1 and further clarified the effect of memory verbalization by demonstrating that visualization does not impair face recognition. In Experiments 3 and 4 we explored the hypothesis that memory verbalization impairs memory for stimuli that are difficult to put into words. In Experiment 3 memory impairment followed the verbalization of a different visual stimulus: color. In Experiment 4 marginal memory improvement followed the verbalization of a verbal stimulus: a brief spoken statement. In Experiments 5 and 6 the source of verbally induced memory impairment was explored. The results of Experiment 5 suggested that the impairment does not reflect a temporary verbal set, but rather indicates relatively long-lasting memory interference. Finally, Experiment 6 demonstrated that limiting subjects' time to make recognition decisions alleviates the impairment, suggesting that memory verbalization overshadows but does not eradicate the original visual memory. This collection of results is consistent with a recording interference hypothesis: verbalizing a visual memory may produce a verbally biased memory representation that can interfere with the application of the original visual memory.     

An initial search for visual overshadowing

A consistent, albeit fragile, finding over the last couple of decades has been that verbalization of hard-to-verbalize stimuli, such as faces, interferes with subsequent recognition of the described target stimulus. We sought to elicit a similar phenomenon whereby visualization interferes with verbal recognition—that is, visual overshadowing. We randomly assigned participants (n?=?180) to either concrete (easy to visualize) or abstract (difficult to visualize) sentence conditions. Following presentation, participants were asked to verbalize the sentence, visualize the sentence, or work on a filler task. As predicted, visualization of an abstract verbal stimulus resulted in significantly lower recognition accuracy; unexpectedly, however, so did verbalization. The findings are discussed within the framework of fuzzy-trace theory.     

Eye Remember What Happened: Eye‐Closure Improves Recall of Events but not Face Recognition

Eye‐closure improves event recall. We investigated whether eye‐closure can also facilitate subsequent performance on lineup identification (Experiment 1) and face recognition tasks (Experiment 2). In Experiment 1, participants viewed a theft, recalled the event with eyes open or closed, mentally rehearsed the perpetrator's face with eyes open or closed, and viewed a target‐present or target‐absent lineup. Eye‐closure improved event recall, but did not significantly affect lineup identification accuracy. Experiment 2 employed a face recognition paradigm with high statistical power to permit detection of potentially small effects. Participants viewed 20 faces and were later asked to recognize the faces. Thirty seconds before the recognition task, participants either completed an unrelated distracter task (control condition), or were instructed to think about the face with their eyes open (rehearsal condition) or closed (eye‐closure condition). We found no differences between conditions in discrimination accuracy or response criterion. Potential explanations and practical implications are discussed. Copyright © 2015 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Influence of emotional facial expressions on 3-5-year-olds’ face recognition

Three experiments examined 3- and 5-year-olds’ recognition of faces in constant and varied emotional expressions. Children were asked to identify repeatedly presented target faces, distinguishing them from distractor faces, during an immediate recognition test and during delayed assessments after 10 min and one week. Emotional facial expression remained neutral (Experiment 1) or varied between immediate and delayed tests: from neutral to smile and anger (Experiment 2), from smile to neutral and anger (Experiment 3, condition 1), or from anger to neutral and smile (Experiment 3, condition 2). In all experiments, immediate face recognition was not influenced by emotional expression for either age group. Delayed face recognition was most accurate for faces in identical emotional expression. For 5-year-olds, delayed face recognition (with varied emotional expression) was not influenced by which emotional expression had been displayed during the immediate recognition test. Among 3-year-olds, accuracy decreased when facial expressions varied from neutral to smile and anger but was constant when facial expressions varied from anger or smile to neutral, smile or anger. Three-year-olds’ recognition was facilitated when faces initially displayed smile or anger expressions, but this was not the case for 5-year-olds. Results thus indicate a developmental progression in face identity recognition with varied emotional expressions between ages 3 and 5.     

Sad people are more accurate at face recognition than happy people

Mood has varied effects on cognitive performance including the accuracy of face recognition (Lundh & Ost, 1996). Three experiments are presented here that explored face recognition abilities in mood-induced participants. Experiment 1 demonstrated that happy-induced participants are less accurate and have a more conservative response bias than sad-induced participants in a face recognition task. Using a remember/know/guess procedure, Experiment 2 showed that sad-induced participants had more conscious recollections of faces than happy-induced participants. Additionally, sad-induced participants could recognise all faces accurately, whereas, happy- and neutral-induced participants recognised happy faces more accurately than sad faces. In Experiment 3, these effects were not observed when participants intentionally learnt the faces, rather than incidentally learnt the faces. It is suggested that happy-induced participants do not process faces as elaborately as sad-induced participants.     

Recognizing rotated faces and Greebles: What properties drive the face inversion effect?

The fact that faces are strongly affected by picture-plane inversion has often been cited as evidence for face-specific mechanisms. It is unclear, however, whether this “face inversion effect” is driven by properties shared by faces or whether the effect is specific to faces as a category. To address this issue, we compared the recognition of faces and novel Greebles, which were specifically matched to faces along various stimulus dimensions. In two experiments, participants were required to name individual faces or Greebles following training at either single or multiple orientations. We found that performance systematically decreased with increasing misorientation from either the upright (Experiment 1) or nearest trained orientation (Experiment 2). Importantly, the magnitude of this orientation effect was similar for both faces and Greebles. Taken together, these results suggest that the face inversion effect may be a consequence of the visual homogeneity of the stimulus category, regardless of the category.     

Effects of geometric distortions on face-recognition performance

The importance of 'configural' processing for face recognition is now well established, but it remains unclear precisely what it entails. Through four experiments we attempted to clarify the nature of configural processing by investigating the effects of various affine transformations on the recognition of familiar faces. Experiment 1 showed that recognition was markedly impaired by inversion of faces, somewhat impaired by shearing or horizontally stretching them, but unaffected by vertical stretching of faces to twice their normal height. In experiment 2 we investigated vertical and horizontal stretching in more detail, and found no effects of either transformation. Two further experiments were performed to determine whether participants were recognising stretched faces by using configural information. Experiment 3 showed that nonglobal vertical stretching of faces (stretching either the top or the bottom half while leaving the remainder undistorted) impaired recognition, implying that configural information from the stretched part of the face was influencing the process of recognition--ie that configural processing involves global facial properties. In experiment 4 we examined the effects of Gaussian blurring on recognition of undistorted and vertically stretched faces. Faces remained recognisable even when they were both stretched and blurred, implying that participants were basing their judgments on configural information from these stimuli, rather than resorting to some strategy based on local featural details. The tolerance of spatial distortions in human face recognition suggests that the configural information used as a basis for face recognition is unlikely to involve information about the absolute position of facial features relative to each other, at least not in any simple way.