Can an agent's false belief be corrected by an appropriate communication? Psychological reasoning in 18-month-old infants

Do 18-month-olds understand that an agent's false belief can be corrected by an appropriate, though not an inappropriate, communication? In Experiment 1, infants watched a series of events involving two agents, a ball, and two containers: a box and a cup. To start, agent1 played with the ball and then hid it in the box, while agent2 looked on. Next, in agent1's absence, agent2 moved the ball from the box to the cup. When agent1 returned, agent2 told her "The ball is in the cup!" (informative-intervention condition) or "I like the cup!" (uninformative-intervention condition). During test, agent1 reached for either the box (box event) or the cup (cup event). In the informative-intervention condition, infants who saw the box event looked reliably longer than those who saw the cup event; in the uninformative-intervention condition, the reverse pattern was found. These results suggest that infants expected agent1's false belief about the ball's location to be corrected when she was told "The ball is in the cup!", but not "I like the cup!". In Experiment 2, agent2 simply pointed to the ball's new location, and infants again expected agent1's false belief to be corrected. These and control results provide additional evidence that infants in the second year of life can attribute false beliefs to agents. In addition, the results suggest that by 18 months of age infants expect agents' false beliefs to be corrected by relevant communications involving words or gestures.     

A reaction time advantage for calculating beliefs over public representations signals domain specificity for ‘theory of mind’

In a task where participants’ overt task was to track the location of an object across a sequence of events, reaction times to unpredictable probes requiring an inference about a social agent’s beliefs about the location of that object were obtained. Reaction times to false belief situations were faster than responses about the (false) contents of a map showing the location of the object (Experiment 1) and about the (false) direction of an arrow signaling the location of the object (Experiment 2). These results are consistent with developmental, neuro-imaging and neuropsychological evidence that there exist domain specific mechanisms within human cognition for encoding and reasoning about mental states. Specialization of these mechanisms may arise from either core cognitive architecture or via the accumulation of expertise in the social domain.     

Belief-based action prediction in preverbal infants

Successful mindreading entails both the ability to think about what others know or believe, and to use this knowledge to generate predictions about how mental states will influence behavior. While previous studies have demonstrated that young infants are sensitive to others’ mental states, there continues to be much debate concerning how to characterize early theory of mind abilities. In the current study, we asked whether 6-month-old infants appreciate the causal role that beliefs play in action. Specifically, we tested whether infants generate action predictions that are appropriate given an agent’s current belief. We exploited a novel, neural indication of action prediction: motor cortex activation as measured by sensorimotor alpha suppression, to ask whether infants would generate differential predictions depending on an agent’s belief. After first verifying our paradigm and measure with a group of adult participants, we found that when an agent had a false belief that a ball was in the box, motor activity indicated that infants predicted she would reach for the box, but when the agent had a false belief that a ball was not in the box, infants did not predict that she would act. In both cases, infants based their predictions on what the agent, rather than the infant, believed to be the case, suggesting that by 6 months of age, infants can exploit their sensitivity to other minds for action prediction.     

The embodied self: Making a fist enhances men’s power-related self-conceptions

In line with recent theories of embodied cognition, the authors propose that the self-concept may be embodied in sensory-motor representations. To test this notion, two studies investigated the effects of bodily feedback from a gesture associated with power (making a fist) on the self-concept. As expected, making a fist led male participants to perceive themselves as more assertive and esteemed (Study 1) and to display stronger associations between the self-concept and power (Study 2), while these effects were absent among female participants. The gender difference may reflect that men are more prone to use physical force to gain social influence. The results indicate that people’s conceptions of themselves are partly grounded in bodily experiences.     

Moving arms: the effects of sensorimotor information on the problem-solving process

Embodied cognition postulates a bi-directional link between the human body and its cognitive functions. Whether this holds for higher cognitive functions such as problem solving is unknown. We predicted that arm movement manipulations performed by the participants could affect the problem-solving solutions. We tested this prediction in quantitative reasoning tasks that allowed two solutions to each problem (addition or subtraction). In two studies with healthy adults (N?=?53 and N?=?50), we found an effect of problem-congruent movements on problem solutions. Consistent with embodied cognition, sensorimotor information gained via right or left arm movements affects the solution in different types of problem-solving tasks.     

Simulating sensorimotor metaphors: Novel metaphors influence sensory judgments

Embodied cognition theory proposes that individuals’ abstract concepts can be associated with sensorimotor processes. The authors examined the effects of teaching participants novel embodied metaphors, not based in prior physical experience, and found evidence suggesting that they lead to embodied simulation, suggesting refinements to current models of embodied cognition. Creating novel embodiments of abstract concepts in the laboratory may be a useful method for examining mechanisms of embodied cognition.     

具身认知研究述评

具身认知是以身体为解释核心的新的研究视角。来自具身认知实证研究的证据表明,身体的生理属性、运动经验和现实环境影响认知的形成与发展。目前的具身认知实证研究主要采用传统认知的实验范式,集中于研究身体的结构属性和静态动作对认知的影响。未来,具身认知与传统认知将会相互吸收和融合,更多关注身体的机能属性和动态属性。     

Larger,smaller, odd or even? Task-specific effects of optokinetic stimulation on the mental number space

Previous studies have shown that number processing can induce spatial biases in perception and action and can trigger the orienting of visuospatial attention. Few studies, however, have investigated how spatial processing and visuospatial attention influences number processing. In the present study, we used the optokinetic stimulation (OKS) technique to trigger eye movements and thus overt orienting of visuospatial attention. Participants were asked to stare at OKS, while performing parity judgements (Experiment 1) or number comparison (Experiment 2), two numerical tasks that differ in terms of demands on magnitude processing. Numerical stimuli were acoustically presented, and participants responded orally. We examined the effects of OKS direction (leftward or rightward) on number processing. The results showed that rightward OKS abolished the classic number size effect (i.e., faster reaction times for small than large numbers) in the comparison task, whereas the parity task was unaffected by OKS direction. The effect of OKS highlights a link between visuospatial orienting and processing of number magnitude that is complementary to the more established link between numerical and visuospatial processing. We suggest that the bidirectional link between numbers and space is embodied in the mechanisms subserving sensorimotor transformations for the control of eye movements and spatial attention.     

Item type,occlusion, and gender differences in mental rotation

Two experiments were conducted to examine the role of item type in mental rotation. In each experiment, participants completed two computerized mental rotation tasks, one with blocks as stimuli and one with human figures as stimuli. The tasks were formatted either as a multiple-choice psychometric test (Experiment 1) or as a same–different type task (Experiment 2). Aside from the expected replication of a decreased effect of occlusion on women's accuracy when processing human figures compared to block figures, it was hypothesized that response times would increase when processing the complex but familiar human figures, compared to the simple but unfamiliar block figures. In Experiment 1, the results relevant to occlusion were replicated. However, the presence of a speed–accuracy trade-off suggested that participants processed human figures faster but less accurately than block figures. In Experiment 2, both men and women performed faster and more accurately when processing occluded human figures than when processing nonoccluded human figures. The effect of item type, its potential link to embodied cognition, and the role of strategy selection on gender differences in mental rotation are discussed.     

The benefits of sensorimotor knowledge: body-object interaction facilitates semantic processing

This article examined the effects of body–object interaction (BOI) on semantic processing. BOI measures perceptions of the ease with which a human body can physically interact with a word's referent. In Experiment 1, BOI effects were examined in 2 semantic categorization tasks (SCT) in which participants decided if words are easily imageable. Responses were faster and more accurate for high BOI words (e.g., mask ) than for low BOI words (e.g., ship ). In Experiment 2, BOI effects were examined in a semantic lexical decision task (SLDT), which taps both semantic feedback and semantic processing. The BOI effect was larger in the SLDT than in the SCT, suggesting that BOI facilitates both semantic feedback and semantic processing. The findings are consistent with the embodied cognition perspective (e.g., Barsalou's, 1999 , Perceptual Symbols Theory), which proposes that sensorimotor interactions with the environment are incorporated in semantic knowledge.     

On the relation between spontaneous perspective taking and other visuospatial processes

Common processes and representations engaged by visuospatial tasks were investigated by looking at four frequently used visuospatial research paradigms, the aim being to contribute to a better understanding of which specific processes are addressed in the different paradigms compared. In particular, the relation between spontaneous and instructed perspective taking, as well as mental rotation of body-part/non-body-part objects, was investigated. To this end, participants watched animations that have been shown to lead to spontaneous perspective taking. While they were watching these animations, participants were asked to explicitly adopt another perspective (Experiment 1), perform a mental object rotation task that involved a non-body-part object (Experiment 2), or perform a mental rotation of a body-part object (Experiment 3). Patterns of interference between the tasks, reflected in the reaction time patterns, showed that spontaneous and instructed perspective taking rely on similar representational elements to encode orientation. By contrast, no such overlap was found between spontaneous perspective taking and the rotation of non-body-part objects. Also, no overlap in orientation representation was evident with mental body-part rotations. Instead of an overlap in orientation representations, the results suggest that spontaneous perspective taking and the mental rotation of body parts rely on similar—presumably, motor—processes. These findings support the view that motor processes are involved in perspective taking and mental rotation of body parts.     

Sweatshop labor is wrong unless the shoes are cute: Cognition can both help and hurt moral motivated reasoning

The present research investigated the dual role of cognition as either an enabler of moral reasoning or self-interested motivated reasoning for endorsing sweatshop labor. Experiment 1A showed motivated reasoning: participants were more likely to endorse the use of sweatshop labor when considering a Caribbean vacation with questionable labor practices for themselves than for their friends. Experiment 1B demonstrated that endorsement of sweatshop labor mediated the relationship between product desirability and purchase intention. Experiment 2 found that cognitive resources were recruited to enhance motivated reasoning regarding sweatshop labor, the latter of which was reduced under cognitive load. Experiments 3A and 3B found that when cognitive resources were specifically directed in a comparative joint evaluation, participants offered harsher views on the ethicality of a favored company, and were less influenced by motivated factors than when under separate evaluations.     

生成认知与具身机能主义的比较——表征的取舍

在具身认知不同的思潮中，生成认知以其激进的观点反对表征和计算主义，可以称之为是具身认知思潮中的最为激进的一部分。另一方面，由于标准认知中表征和计算的解释力和影响力，具身认知诞生出各种不同程度上的“妥协”性理论，其中，以克拉克为代表的具身的“机能主义”为目前具身认知的主流观点。表征尽管在当前阶段中表现出强大的生命力，但依然无法在所有领域中都得到运用。随着表征的改造与发展，未来的激进具身认知工作者应该将更多的精力投入到具身认知与更多学科的融合研究中。     

The cost of thinking about false beliefs: evidence from adults' performance on a non-inferential theory of mind task

Much of what we know about other people's beliefs comes non-inferentially from what people tell us. Developmental research suggests that 3-year-olds have difficulty processing such information: they suffer interference from their own knowledge of reality when told about someone's false belief (e.g., [Wellman, H. M., & Bartsch, K. (1988). Young children's reasoning about beliefs. Cognition, 30, 239-277.]). The current studies examined for the first time whether similar interference occurs in adult participants. In two experiments participants read sentences describing the real colour of an object and a man's false belief about the colour of the object, then judged the accuracy of a picture probe depicting either reality or the man's belief. Processing costs for picture probes depicting reality were consistently greater in this false belief condition than in a matched control condition in which the sentences described the real colour of one object and a man's unrelated belief about the colour of another object. A similar pattern was observed for picture probes depicting the man's belief in most cases. Processing costs were not sensitive to the time available for encoding the information presented in the sentences: costs were observed when participants read the sentences at their own pace (Experiment 1) or at a faster or a slower pace (Experiment 2). This suggests that adults' difficulty was not with encoding information about reality and a conflicting false belief, but with holding this information in mind and using it to inform a subsequent judgement.     

Acting and planning on the basis of a false belief: its effects on 3-year-old children's reasoning about their own false beliefs

This study examined 3-year-olds' explanations for actions of theirs that were premised on a false belief. In Experiment 1, children stated what they thought was inside a crayon box. After stating "crayons," they went to retrieve some paper to draw on. Children were then shown that the box contained candles and were asked to (a) state their initial belief and (b) explain their action of getting paper. Children who were unable to retrieve their false belief were unable to correctly explain their action. Experiments 2 and 3 ruled out several alternative interpretations for these findings. In Experiment 4, children planned and acted on their false belief. Again, children who were unable to retrieve their false belief were unable to correctly explain their action.     

Embodied cognition and health persuasion: Facilitating intention-behavior consistency via motor manipulations

The present research examines health persuasion from an embodied cognition perspective by proposing that engaging the motor system during health persuasion will lead individuals to engage in healthier behavior and have greater consistency between their intentions and behavior. In two studies, participants watched a health video while either imaging themselves performing the behavior or imaging themselves performing the behavior while also engaging their motor systems with minimal, relevant behaviors. In Study 1, after watching a flossing video, females (but not males) flossed more times in the following week after touching a floss and in Study 2, all participants (males and females) exercised more in the week after watching an exercise video while walking in place. In both experiments, participants who engaged the motor system had stronger intention-behavior consistency than those who merely imagined themselves performing the health behavior. Implications of the findings are discussed for theories of embodied cognition, intention-behavior consistency, and health persuasion.     

Social cognition is not reducible to theory of mind: When children use deontic rules to predict the behaviour of others

The objective of this paper is to discuss whether children have a capacity for deontic reasoning that is irreducible to mentalizing. The results of two experiments point to the existence of such non‐mentalistic understanding and prediction of the behaviour of others. In Study 1, young children (3‐ and 4‐year‐olds) were told different versions of classic false‐belief tasks, some of which were modified by the introduction of a rule or a regularity. When the task (a standard change of location task) included a rule, the performance of 3‐year‐olds, who fail traditional false‐belief tasks, significantly improved. In Study 2, 3‐year‐olds proved to be able to infer a rule from a social situation and to use it in order to predict the behaviour of a character involved in a modified version of the false‐belief task. These studies suggest that rules play a central role in the social cognition of young children and that deontic reasoning might not necessarily involve mind reading.     

The developmental paradox of false belief understanding: a dual-system solution

We explore the developmental paradox of false belief understanding. This paradox follows from the claim that young infants already have an understanding of false belief, despite the fact that they consistently fail the elicited-response false belief task. First, we argue that recent proposals to solve this paradox are unsatisfactory because they (i) try to give a full explanation of false belief understanding in terms of a single system, (ii) fail to provide psychological concepts that are sufficiently fine-grained to capture the cognitive requirements for the various manifestations of false belief understanding, and (iii) ignore questions about system interaction. Second, we present a dual-system solution to the developmental paradox of false belief understanding that combines a layered model of perspective taking with an inhibition-selection-representation mechanism that operates on different levels. We discuss recent experimental findings that shed light on the interaction between these two systems, and suggest a number of directions for future research.     

Embodied cognition and skilled health behaviour

The present research examines health persuasion from an embodied cognition perspective by proposing that engaging the motor system during presentation of a health message will lead individuals to become more skilled at performing the prescribed behaviour. Participants watched a video on the importance of flossing while either imaging themselves flossing or imaging themselves flossing while minimally engaging the motor system (i.e. touching a piece of floss). Females (but not males) who touched an individual floss while watching the video demonstrated better flossing skills 1 week later. Over time, participants (both males and females) who engaged the motor system also developed more accessible attitudes and had a stronger relationship between their perceived flossing efficacy and actual flossing skill. Implications for the theories of embodied cognition and health interventions are discussed.     

Embodied cognition and skilled health behaviour

The present research examines health persuasion from an embodied cognition perspective by proposing that engaging the motor system during presentation of a health message will lead individuals to become more skilled at performing the prescribed behaviour. Participants watched a video on the importance of flossing while either imaging themselves flossing or imaging themselves flossing while minimally engaging the motor system (i.e. touching a piece of floss). Females (but not males) who touched an individual floss while watching the video demonstrated better flossing skills 1 week later. Over time, participants (both males and females) who engaged the motor system also developed more accessible attitudes and had a stronger relationship between their perceived flossing efficacy and actual flossing skill. Implications for the theories of embodied cognition and health interventions are discussed.