Reinhold Niebuhr in Contemporary Scholarship

Recent studies of Reinhold Niebuhr's life and work demonstrate his continued importance in theology, ethics, and political thought. Historical studies by Heather Warren, Mark Kleinman, and Normunds Kamergrauzis provide new assessments of Niebuhr's role as a political and religious leader in his own time and trace the consequences of the movements in which he participated. They also show us more clearly how his work was connected to the ideas and programs of his contemporaries. Colm McKeogh offers a more systematic treatment of Niebuhr's political realism in relation to just war theory. Niebuhr's intellectual legacy remains disputed, with Stanley Hauerwas and Langdon Gilkey offering radically different assessments of his theology. Hauerwas sees in Niebuhr a close connection to the religious liberalism of William James that precludes any authentic Christian witness. Niebuhr's empiricism reduces God to a necessary feature of human consciousness. Gilkey notes Niebuhr's early use of James' psychology, but discerns a theology of history that is central to Niebuhr's mature work. In that theology, the ground of hope necessarily lies beyond human consciousness, and indeed beyond history itself.     

The Neo‐Barthian Critique of Reinhold Niebuhr

The author notes an unclarity in David Novak's defense of Reinhold Niebuhr against Stanley Hauerwas's critique and identifies some issues left unsettled in the exchange between Novak and Hauerwas over Niebuhr's ethics. Specifically, the author proposes that the Barthian‐Hauerwasian communitarian rejection of Niebuhrian natural theology and natural law ignores the historical abuse of biblical theology in the German Christian response to the Nazis, fails to account for the fact of general moral revulsion against Nazism, and flirts itself with a conventionalist form of nihilism.     

Reading Reinhold Niebuhr against Himself Again: On Theological Language and Divine Action

Since 1937, when Reinhold Niebuhr articulated his most developed understanding of the function of theological language, there has been debate about how his approach should be understood. Recent readings of Niebuhr have assumed that Niebuhr's account of theological language rests upon dualistic presuppositions. While acknowledging manifestations of post‐Cartesian dualism in Niebuhr's thought, this article argues that Niebuhr's thought also reflects a more compelling strain of Augustinian/Kierkegaardian anti‐dualism, and that reading Niebuhr through the lens of this anti‐dualism allows for a fruitful account of his treatment of theological language.     

A Reminder and a Suggestion

… concerned with the whole of man's life … dignity of a human being … develop harmoniously their physical, moral, and intellectual endowments … acquire a sense of responsibility in striving endlessly to form their own lives properly … foster a sense of values … to prepare for professional life … as they develop their own personality … stimulate students to act for themselves….     

美国基督教界的"新保守派之父"尼布尔的复活

美国政治神学家莱因霍尔德·尼布尔有"新保守派之父"之称.在9.11事件之后,他的思想再次得到了人们的关注.但由于尼布尔思想的复杂性,也导致了对他的种种误读.要想真的理解他的复活,就必须进入到他后期的应用政治神学中去.尼布尔对美国力量在世界事务中的使用的看法具有一体两面,即对美国历史的反讽和对帝国力量的承担的思考.作为一个公共哲学家,尼布尔的思考很能代表美国基督教思想,特别是不同于欧洲基督教界的特点.     

用生命演绎"自我与历史的戏剧"——美国现代思想家尼布尔思想综述

莱茵霍尔德·尼布尔是美国20世纪的神学政治哲学家.他的大量著述在当今的神学、伦理学、政治哲学等领域产生了很大的影响.对于这个人,国内学界关注较少,本文旨在对尼布尔的思想历程进行概要的介绍.     

Niebuhr One More Time

In this essay Stanley Hauerwas offers a response to Edmund Santurri's review of Reinhold Niebuhr's An Interpretation of Christian Ethics.     

Defeasibility and Gettierization: A Reminder

For some of us, the defeasibility theory of knowledge remains the most plausible approach to the Gettier Problem. Epistemological fashion and faded memories notwithstanding, persuasive objections to the theory are very hard to find. The most impressive of those objections to the theory that have hitherto gone unanswered are examined and rejected here. These are objections put forward by Richard Feldman, Richard Foley, and John Turri. While these are all interesting, the objection recently put forward by Turri is, we think, by far, the most serious threat to the theory that we have seen in a long time. A successful reply to it requires a surprising amount of care, as it turns out. If tenable, Turri's objection deals a devastating blow to the theory developed by Roderick Chisholm, Keith Lehrer, Peter Klein, Marshall Swain, Risto Hilpinen, John Pollock, and Paul Moser, among others. Under scrutiny, however, the threat proves illusory. It results from inattention to a crucial, but relatively subtle, aspect of the theory. Interestingly, there is only one source in the defeasibilist literature for a precise account of this crucial feature of the theory: one of the most neglected passages in Peter Klein's work on the issue. That crucial feature is put under the spotlight here. Our response to three major objections to the defeasibility theory requires a brief introduction to the theory as an anti-Gettier weapon, an introduction aimed at countering the numbing simplicity that characterizes most introductions to the topic. Following this brief introduction, those three objections are tackled. We conclude, on that basis, that anybody who fails to notice how resilient the defeasibility theory has proven to be for the last fifty years has a seriously deficient understanding of the current state of play in the debate over the Gettier Problem.     

Anselm's Quiet Radicalism

It is characteristic of Anselm to adopt the formulations of his authorities while giving them meanings of his own, hiding conceptual disagreement by means of verbal echoes. Anselm's considerable originality sometimes goes unnoticed because readers see the standard Augustinian language and miss the fact that Anselm uses it to state un-Augustinian views. One striking instance of Anselm's quiet radicalism is his understanding of free choice and the fall. He seems to uphold standard Augustinian privation theory when he affirms that injustice is merely an absence of justice where justice should be; he seems also to be committed to the standard Augustinian view that everything that has being is created by God. A closer examination, however, shows that Anselm clearly has qualms about whether privation theory can do all of the work to which Augustine had tried to put it; and Anselm actually affirms that every free choice has being and yet is not created by God. I begin by showing that Anselm regards unjust acts as being ontologically on a par with just acts. Injustice itself is nothing, a privation; but an unjust volition is something, and indeed no less something than a just volition. Moreover, creatures have their volitions solely from themselves, not from God. So Anselm must deny that God is the creator of everything that has being: free choices have being, and creatures are the sole causes of those choices. Anselm explicitly draws this radical conclusion, but he does so quietly, without fanfare, taking care to provide ways in which he can still say all the traditional things but mean something radical.