The integration of spatial information across different viewpoints

The integration of spatial information perceived from different viewpoints is a frequent, yet largely unexplored, cognitive ability. In two experiments, participants saw two presentations, each consisting of three targets—that is, illuminated tiles on the floor—before walking the shortest possible path across all targets. In Experiment 1, participants viewed the targets either from the same viewpoint or from different viewpoints. Errors in recalling targets increased if participants changed their viewpoints between presentations, suggesting that memory acquired from different viewpoints had to be aligned for integration. Furthermore, the error pattern indicates that memory for the first presentation was transformed into the reference frame of the second presentation. In Experiment 2, we examined whether this transformation occurred because new information was integrated already during encoding or because memorized information was integrated when required. Results suggest that the latter is the case. This might serve as a strategy for avoiding additional alignments.     

From recognition to decisions: Extending and testing recognition-based models for multialternative inference

The recognition heuristic is a noncompensatory strategy for inferring which of two alternatives, one recognized and the other not, scores higher on a criterion. According to it, such inferences are based solely on recognition. We generalize this heuristic to tasks with multiple alternatives, proposing a model of how people identify the consideration sets from which they make their final decisions. In doing so, we address concerns about the heuristic’s adequacy as a model of behavior: Past experiments have led several authors to conclude that there is no evidence for a noncompensatory use of recognition but clear evidence that recognition is integrated with other information. Surprisingly, however, in no study was this competing hypothesis—the compensatory integration of recognition—formally specified as a computational model. In four studies, we specify five competing models, conducting eight model comparisons. In these model comparisons, the recognition heuristic emerges as the best predictor of people’s inferences.     

Forethoughts from the editor

Conclusion  Perhaps the fundamental question involved in assessing research can best be summarized as follows: On the basis of what criteria must the long-term accountability of public funds allocated for research be measured, and who should determine these criteria? Should these criteria be based on the quality or the quantity of research produced; on the actual utilization of the research results; on the relevance of research to one or more aspects of “development”; or on the medium- or long-range “potential” impact of research results? Should these criteria be in accordance with “international” standards or reflect primarily national goals and objectives? In addition, there is the complex issue of knowledge integration, an understanding of which is a prerequisite for the generation of a “generic frame-work” designed to focus on the organization of communication between science and the social environment. Given that research and knowledge generation are becoming increasingly international in scope and impact, it is insufficient to merely contend that knowledge integration must occur through various forms of collaboration involving cross fertilization and interdisciplinary perspectives. This is already complicated at the national—let alone the international—level. Unfortunately, none of these issues have thus far been solved by the ever-expanding range of tools available for assessing research.     

Hedonia, eudaimonia, and well-being: an introduction

Research on well-being can be thought of as falling into two traditions. In one—the hedonistic tradition—the focus is on happiness, generally defined as the presence of positive affect and the absence of negative affect. In the other—the eudaimonic tradition—the focus is on living life in a full and deeply satisfying way. Recognizing that much recent research on well-being has been more closely aligned with the hedonistic tradition, this special issue presents discussions and research reviews from the eudaimonic tradition, making clear how the concept of eudaimonia adds an important perspective to our understanding of well-being.     

The epistemological challenge to metanormative realism: how best to understand it,and how to cope with it

Metaethical—or, more generally, metanormative—realism faces a serious epistemological challenge. Realists owe us—very roughly speaking—an account of how it is that we can have epistemic access to the normative truths about which they are realists. This much is, it seems, uncontroversial among metaethicists, myself included. But this is as far as the agreement goes, for it is not clear—nor uncontroversial—how best to understand the challenge, what the best realist way of coping with it is, and how successful this attempt is. In this paper I try, first, to present the challenge in its strongest version, and second, to show how realists—indeed, robust realists—can cope with it. The strongest version of the challenge is, I argue, that of explaining the correlation between our normative beliefs and the independent normative truths. And I suggest an evolutionary explanation (of a pre-established harmony kind) as a way of solving it.     

Country-specific or convergent? A typology of immigrant policies in Western Europe

This article raises the question as to whether European immigrant policies are shaped by country-specific traditions of nation-state building or whether, on the contrary, they are converging toward the same policy goals. On the basis of four case studies of 30 years of policy development (United Kingdom, France, Germany, and the Netherlands), the authors develop a broad typology of immigrant policies in Western Europe. This typology shows that in the shadow of the debate on different “integration models”, Western European countries have implemented a whole range of similar immigrant policies. However, in policy fields touching the core of historically established notions of how state and society should relate to each other—notably the struggle against discrimination and the opening of public institutions to immigrants—significant differences persist.     

Beyond Reduction and Pluralism: Toward an Epistemology of Explanatory Integration in Biology

The paper works towards an account of explanatory integration in biology, using as a case study explanations of the evolutionary origin of novelties—a problem requiring the integration of several biological fields and approaches. In contrast to the idea that fields studying lower level phenomena are always more fundamental in explanations, I argue that the particular combination of disciplines and theoretical approaches needed to address a complex biological problem and which among them is explanatorily more fundamental varies with the problem pursued. Solving a complex problem need not require theoretical unification or the stable synthesis of different biological fields, as items of knowledge from traditional disciplines can be related solely for the purposes of a specific problem. Apart from the development of genuine interfield theories, successful integration can be effected by smaller epistemic units (concepts, methods, explanations) being linked. Unification or integration is not an aim in itself, but needed for the aim of solving a particular scientific problem, where the problem’s nature determines the kind of intellectual integration required.     

Effects of cage mesh on pointing: hand shapes in chimpanzees (<Emphasis Type="Italic">Pan troglodytes</Emphasis>)

It has been speculated that cage mesh exerts a shaping influence on reaching behavior by captive apes, which is then misconstrued as pointing by human observers. Although this notion is clearly falsified by the pointing of captive language-trained apes—who point in the absence of intervening cage mesh—nevertheless, the degree to which cage mesh might influence pointing hand shapes by captive great apes in other housing environments remains relatively unexplored. We examined 259 pointing gestures displayed in archival footage from over 18 h of observation by three nonlanguage-trained chimpanzees housed at a biomedical research center. We coded points in relation to how close to the boundaries of the diamond-shaped cage mesh their points were displayed. We found that points with the whole hand were significantly more likely to be displayed away from the mesh boundaries, relative to points with the index finger or other single-digit points. However, points of each hand shape were displayed at each location, demonstrating that these physical parameters do not fully account for the number of fingers extended while pointing by chimpanzees.     

The Epistemological Roots of Ecclesiastical Claims to Knowledge

In theoretical matters, ecclesiastical claims to knowledge have lead to various conflicts with science. Claims in orientational matters, sometimes connected to attempts to establish them as a rule for legislation, have often been in conflict with the justified claims of non-believers. In addition they violate the Principle of Autonomy of the individual, which is at the very heart of European identity so decisively shaped by the Enlightenment. The Principle of Autonomy implies that state legislation should not interfere in the life of individual citizens, as long as his or her actions do not violate the rights of others. This paper—using the example of the theory of evolution—rejects ecclesiastical claims to theoretical knowledge as completely unfounded and preposterous. In the case of orientational knowledge—using the example of euthanasia—ecclesiastical claims to (universalizable) knowledge are shown to be unfounded as well. The Church’s position with respect to euthanasia and a range of other bio-ethical topics, such as pre-marital sex, contraception, abortion, indissolubility of marriage, and homosexuality, rests on a very peculiar ethical position. This ethical position is the natural right theory, which—far from being universalizable—is shared by very few people. Among other things, this position presupposes the belief in God as the creator of nature, and the assumption that ethical norms can be derived from this premise. Thus ecclesiastical knowledge claims, cannot be justified in a way which could be reasonably supposed to be universally acceptable. Kant (see the quote) was the first to require this sort of justification. Claims that fail to implement Kant’s stipulations should be eliminated by what I would like to call “Kant’s razor”.     

The fate of the forgotten: Chamberlain’s work reconsidered

This article discusses the early psychological traditions developed at Clark University under the guidance of G. Stanley Hall. Anthropology and cultural psychology are both rooted in the notion that humans are social beings. That idea constituted a brief moment of theoretical unity between psychology and anthropology in the study of human language in its psychological functions. In that context, the work of Alexander Chamberlain is explored as a major contribution. Chamberlain—if viewed in the jargon of our contemporary social scientists—was deeply “interdisciplinary” in his work. Despite the positive meaning of the term “interdisciplinary” in contemporary discourse about the social sciences, the realities of social organization of any science entail separation rather than integration. Chamberlain’s work took place in parallel in anthropology and in developmental psychology under the interdisciplinary emphasis of “child study” as set up by G. Stanley Hall. Hall made child study the distinctive feature of the “Clark tradition” of psychology. Chamberlain’s work constituted both the beginning and the end of the (miniscule) “Clark tradition” in anthropology.     

The Hope,Promise, and Possibility of Psychotherapy

In this paper, five values—diversity, science, education, practice, and spirit—(a) are examined within the professional context of psychotherapy, (b) are presented as forming the foundation of much if not all that is psychotherapy, and (c) are considered as binding values that join us as a community of practicing, theorizing, and researching psychotherapists. Some of the positives of each value are reviewed. Diversity has heightened our sensitivity to and respect for individual and cultural differences. Science has kept us focused on empirically challenging and empirically informing our practice. Education has maintained emphasis on providing solid training/supervision in psychotherapy and transmitting its culture. Practice has provided us with opportunities to increasingly implement and expand on our role as helpers and healers. Spirit has been the guiding light—the heart and soul—that supports, infuses and informs all of our therapeutic endeavors and gives them meaning. What follows is a celebration of sorts—(a) capturing some of what we have done and are doing right in psychotherapy, (b) reflecting some of the weight of those “right” efforts, and (c) conveying some of the inherent hope, promise, and possibility that forever guide us in our work.     

Nothingness and the Human Umwelt

In the paper I argue that the great impact of empiricism on psychology and the enclosed dualist agenda traps psychological phenomena into subjectivism. By discussing the phenomena of nothingness in biological and cultural life it is argued that meaning must be considered as a phenomenon that represents both a fit and a misfit of the individual with the environment. By stressing the overall presence of nothingness phenomena it is argued how the reduced ontology of empiricism—and its blindness to relations and transformations out of which meaning grows—should be overcome. In human cultural life, transformations are constitutive and ongoing changes are being produced to make sure that continuity as well as discontinuity will happen. The analysis of especially one case—the removal of an Amish school after a shooting episode—serves to prove how meaning grows out of cultural processes as people produce their own conditions of life. From a cultural-ecological point of view, analyzing meaning at the level of individual phenomenology, hence, means analyzing the ‘total psychological situation’ (legacy of Kurt Lewin). This may for instance include analyzing how people live, what they consider important and worth preserving, what must be changed, what are their core values and how do institutional arrangements contribute to keeping up that which is valued or to changing that which is not, etc. Meaning may be viewed the lived-out experience—the domain of self-generativity in human life.     

What is an emotional feeling? Lessons about affective origins from cross-species neuroscience

Cross-species affective neuroscience aspires to provide an evidence-based foundation for understanding the primary-process emotional networks that concurrently control instinctual emotional actions and affective feelings—direct emotional circuit mediated ‘rewards’ and ‘punishments’. In humans and other mammals, the ancestral subcortical regions of the brain are central to such affective BrainMind functions (a monistic term, here used synonymously with MindBrain, depending on stylistic needs). Although these circuits cannot be ‘identical’ across species (that would be incompatible with evolutionary principles) they are sufficiently similar, anatomically, neurochemically and functionally, to allow animal brain research to illuminate (yield testable predictions) about homologous human mind functions. Primal emotional feelings (affects) are inbuilt value functions of the brain that energize and inform the rest of the mental apparatus about basic survival values, thereby promoting secondary-process learning/memory functions and tertiary-process cognitive thinking-ruminative functions, yielding bottom-up evolutionary controls that ultimately allow top-down regulatory controls. As we envision how such “nested” hierarchies—two-way paths of causality—reflecting both bottom-up and top-down functions—we will need disciplined distinctions between cognitions and emotions at the primary-process level, while also accepting total interpenetrance of cognitions and affects at the tertiary-process level of MindBrain organization. This allows full and synergistic integration of basic and dimensional approaches to emotions. Here the primal emotional networks, so critically important for understanding ‘human-nature’ and psychiatric disorders, are discussed didactically in ways that can minimize dilemmas that non-evolutionary, non-hierarchical perspectives are subject to in modern emotion research.     

Knowability and bivalence: intuitionistic solutions to the Paradox of Knowability

In this paper, I focus on some intuitionistic solutions to the Paradox of Knowability. I first consider the relatively little discussed idea that, on an intuitionistic interpretation of the conditional, there is no paradox to start with. I show that this proposal only works if proofs are thought of as tokens, and suggest that anti-realists themselves have good reasons for thinking of proofs as types. In then turn to more standard intuitionistic treatments, as proposed by Timothy Williamson and, most recently, Michael Dummett. Intuitionists can either point out the intuitionistc invalidity of the inference from the claim that all truths are knowable to the insane conclusion that all truths are known, or they can outright demur from asserting the existence of forever-unknown truths, perhaps questioning—as Dummett now suggests—the applicability of the Principle of Bivalence to a certain class of empirical statements. I argue that if intuitionists reject strict finitism—the view that all truths are knowable by beings just like us—the prospects for either proposal look bleak.     

Modality and domain specific components in auditory and visual working memory tasks

In the tripartite model of working memory (WM) it is postulated that a unique part system—the visuo-spatial sketchpad (VSSP)—processes non-verbal content. Due to behavioral and neurophysiological findings, the VSSP was later subdivided into visual object and visual spatial processing, the former representing objects’ appearance and the latter spatial information. This distinction is well supported. However, a challenge to this model is the question how spatial information from non-visual sensory modalities, for example the auditory one, is processed. Only a few studies so far have directly compared visual and auditory spatial WM. They suggest that the distinction of two processing domains—one for object and one for spatial information—also holds true for auditory WM, but that only a part of the processes is modality specific. We propose that processing in the object domain (the item’s appearance) is modality specific, while spatial WM as well as object-location binding relies on modality general processes.     

Time-Course of Semantic Composition: The Case of Aspectual Coercion

We examine the time-course of semantic structure formation during real-time sentence comprehension. We do this through the lens of aspectual coercion, a semantic combinatorial operation that lacks morpho-syntactic reflections, yet is indispensable for sentence interpretation. We describe two experiments. Experiment 1 replicates the results of a previously published study (Piñango, Zurif, & Jackendoff, Journal of Psycholinguistic Research, 28(4), 395–414 1999) showing that the cost of implementing aspectual coercion is detectable as late as 250 ms after the operation is licensed. Experiment 2 expands the window of observation by revealing that the implementation of aspectual coercion is not detectable immediately upon its being licensed, that is, at the point at which the syntactic representation is assumed to be fully formed. These findings suggest a dissociation in the integration of information, in which semantic composition—even mandatory and automatic semantic composition—takes time to develop after it is syntactically licensed to do so.The research reported here was supported by NIH Grant DC 03660.     

Representationalism and Husserlian Phenomenology

According to contemporary representationalism, phenomenal qualia—of specifically sensory experiences—supervene on representational content. Most arguments for representationalism share a common, phenomenological premise: the so-called “transparency thesis.” According to the transparency thesis, it is difficult—if not impossible—to distinguish the quality or character of experiencing an object from the perceived properties of that object. In this paper, I show that Husserl would react negatively to the transparency thesis; and, consequently, that Husserl would be opposed to at least two versions of contemporary representationalism. First, I show that Husserl would be opposed to strong representationalism, since he believes the cognitive content of a perceptual episode can vary despite constancy of sensory qualia. Second, I then show that Husserl would be opposed to weak representationalism, since he believes that sensory qualia—specifically, the sort that he calls “kinesthetic sensations”—can vary despite constancy in representational content.     

On logic of complex algorithms

An algebraic approach to programs called recursive coroutines — due to Janicki [3] — is based on the idea to consider certain complex algorithms as algebraics models of those programs. Complex algorithms are generalizations of pushdown algorithms being algebraic models of recursive procedures (see Mazurkiewicz [4]). LCA — logic of complex algorithms — was formulated in [11]. It formalizes algorithmic properties of a class of deterministic programs called here complex recursive ones or interacting stacks-programs, for which complex algorithms constitute mathematical models. LCA is in a sense an extension of algorithmic logic as initiated by Salwicki [14] and of extended algorithmic logic EAL as formulated and examined by the present author in [8], [9], [10]. In LCA — similarly as in EAL-ω ⁺ -valued logic is applied as a tool to construct control systems (stacks) occurring in corresponding algorithms. The aim of this paper is to give a complete axiomatization. of LCA and to prove a completeness theorem. Logic of complex algorithms was presented at FCT'79 (International Symposium on Fundamentals of Computation Theory, Berlin 1979)     

Time and Money

This article analyzes the simultaneous determination of economic satisfaction and leisure satisfaction, separately for women and for men. Different hypotheses are tested; including the hypothesis that leisure satisfaction depends on both the quantity and quality of leisure—where quality is proxied by good intensiveness and social intensiveness. Evidence suggests that gender matters, such that good intensiveness is more important for men (e.g. housing conditions), whereas social intensiveness is more important for women (e.g. the presence of children and participation in leisure-time activities). Conversely, concerning economic satisfaction men appear more directly affected by income levels than women. In addition, we find that intra-household effects and especially individual characteristics are more pronounced for women than for men for both domain satisfactions.