Academics,practitioners and the Journal of Occupational and Organizational Psychology: Reflecting on the issues

Gelade's (2006) paper raises some very important points about the continuing role and development of JOOP that will encourage critical reflection and debate in our discipline. However, it also contains various assumptions that should be further explored before committing JOOP to action. Here I argue that we have to reflect more carefully on: the nature of the ‘problem’ with JOOP, and its causes; the characteristics of the claimed divide between ‘academics’ and ‘practitioners’, and its effects; and what constitutes ‘practical concerns’. I suggest that we need to investigate the current situation more systematically before committing to action but that any intervention should discourage the greater sedimentation of an academic‐practitioner divide. As an initial development, I recommend that we reflect more on the review process as this is the most direct influence on the nature of JOOP publications.     

Maximizing journal impact: Moving from inspections of topics to scans for techniques,populations and actions

The comments offered in this article are intended to maximize the benefits and impact of JOOP content for both practitioners and academicians. Specifically, I argue that because practitioners and academicians alike are ‘time‐poor’ when it comes to reading journal articles, we inevitably end up conducting ‘topical scans’ in which we scan the titles of an issue for relevant topics. In order to maximize the impact of JOOP content, in addition to these topical scans, we also need to include scans for: (a) relevant techniques, (b) relevant populations, and (c) relevant actions that may be applicable even if the specific topic is not. I also discuss the importance of practitioners becoming more involved in the publication process and describe a matchmaking mechanism for research‐practitioner publication collaborations. Finally, I argue that scientist‐practitioners are the true heroes of our profession and should therefore be held in high regard.     

Is JOOP of only academic interest?

Garry Gelade's paper offers some helpful suggestions and insights regarding how JOOP and other academic journals might strengthen their appeal to practitioners. His comments fall into two areas: (i) research agenda, and (ii) communication of research. I agree that most of his recommendations could lead to valuable improvements, and note that some of them are being tried elsewhere. However, I disagree with Gelade regarding his call for less emphasis on research method. The call for occupational psychologists to make their work more accessible to practitioners can be sensibly extended to making it relevant to policy.     

But what does it mean in practice? The Journal of Occupational and Organizational Psychology from a practitioner perspective

The author offers some personal reflections on the relevance of the Journal of Occupational and Organizational Psychology (JOOP) to human resource (HR) practitioners. Suggestions are made for how JOOP articles could be more relevant, and how their relevance could be made more explicit. These include (i) framing the research questions/hypotheses in terms that appeal to practitioner concerns as well as theoretical issues, (ii) more analysis of practical implications in the discussion section, (iii) more use of target articles with commentaries rather than special issues/sections, (iv) redirection of articles that focus primarily on method or instrument development to other journals and (v) making use of the World Wide Web. The arguments are illustrated with reference to papers recently published in JOOP.     

The Good,the Bad,and the Vacuous: Wittgenstein on Modern and Future Musics

This article explains Wittgenstein's distinction between good, bad, and vacuous modern music which he introduced in a diary entry from January 27, 1931. I situate Wittgenstein's discussion in the context of Oswald Spengler's ideas concerning the decline of Western culture, which informed Wittgenstein's philosophical progress during his middle period, and I argue that the music theory of Heinrich Schenker, and Wittgenstein's critique thereof, served as an immediate link between Spengler's cultural pessimism and Wittgenstein's threefold distinction. I conclude that Wittgenstein's distinction between bad and vacuous modern music is analogous to Schenker's distinction between the compositional fallacies of the progressive and the reactionary composers of his time. Concomitantly, Wittgenstein's philosophically problematic notion of good modern music transcended the conceptual framework of both Schenker and Spengler. In this context, I examine Wittgenstein's remarks on Gustav Mahler as well as his remark on the music of the future as monophony, which, I conclude, should be understood ultimately as an ellipsis of his much later view of musical meaning and intelligibility.     

Aesthetic Judging and The Intentionality of Pleasure

I point out some unclarities in Allison's interpretation of Kant's aesthetic theory, specifically in his account of the free play of the faculties. I argue that there is a tension between Allison's commitment to the intentionality of the pleasure involved in a judgment of beauty, and his view that the pleasure is distinct from the judgment, and I claim that the tension should be resolved by rejecting the latter view. I conclude by addressing Allison's objection that my own view fails to accommodate judgments of non-beauty or ugliness.     

Presentism and the Myth of Passage

Presentism is held by most to be the intuitive theory of time, due in large part to the view's supposed preservation of time's passage. In this paper, I strike a blow against presentism's intuitive pull by showing how the presentist, contrary to overwhelming popular belief, is unable to establish temporal change upon which the passage of time is based. I begin by arguing that the presentist's two central ontological commitments, the Present Thesis and the Change Thesis, are incompatible. The main problem is that satisfying the Change Thesis to establish passage requires the existence of more than one moment. This conflicts with the Present Thesis that only the present moment exists. The presentist's response is to appeal to surrogates to stand proxy for the past, so as to account for the difference between what does exist and what did exist. I argue that, for this surrogate strategy to be successful, the proposed surrogates must track what actually happened. I demonstrate that there is no guarantee that this is the case. As a result, the presentist's preservation of temporal change fails, which means that there is no passage in presentism. In the end, we should rethink just how intuitive presentism happens to be.     

The Problem of Modernism and Critical Refusal: Bradley and Lamarque on Form/Content Unity

In this article I revisit A. C. Bradley's account of form/content unity through the lens of both Peter Kivy's and Peter Lamarque's recent work on Bradley's lecture “Poetry for Poetry's Sake.” I argue that Lamarque gives a superior account of Bradley's argument. However, Lamarque claims that form/content unity should be understood as an imposition applied by the reader to poetry. Working with the counterexample of modernist poetry, I throw doubt on both this claim and some associated presuppositions found in Lamarque's account. Modernist poetry appears to intermittently fail to exhibit form/content unity; its unique value also appears bound up with this intermittent failure. However—against the moderates, like Kivy and Kelly Dean Jolley, who this counterexample may seem to support—I claim Lamarque is nonetheless correct that form/content unity is intrinsic in response to poetic value. I argue form/content unity should be seen as a demand, which poems (like modernist poetry) can intentionally frustrate.     

The role of JOOP (and other scientific journals) in bridging the practitioner‐researcher divide in industrial,work and organizational (IWO) psychology

Reflecting upon recent debates concerning the practitioner‐researcher divide in the field of industrial, work and organizational (IWO) psychology, Garry Gelade advocates a series of changes to the publication policy of the Journal of Occupational and Organizational Psychology (JOOP), in an attempt to increase its appeal to HR practitioners. While his overall intention ‐ the increased application of psychological knowledge, tools and techniques to the enhancement of productivity and well‐being in workplace settings ‐ is to be welcomed, unfortunately, several of his recommendations are misplaced, reflecting a number of misconceptions concerning the nature and role of scientific journals in the science and practice of IWO psychology. Taken as a whole, the package of policy changes he advocates is likely to prove counterproductive. Accordingly, modifications to his recommendations are offered, with a view to ensuring that JOOP continues to meet the needs of its prime constituents.     

Kant's Account of Nature's Systematicity and the Unity of Theoretical and Practical Reason1

In this paper I argue that if one is to do justice to reason's unity in Kant, then one must acknowledge that reason's practical ends are presupposed in every theoretical investigation of nature. Thus, contrary to some other commentators, I contend that the notion of the metaphysical ground of the unity of nature should not be attributed to the “dynamics of reason” and its “own practical purposes.” Instead, the metaphysical ground of the unity of nature is in fact an indispensable and necessary notion for reason in both its theoretical and practical functions, but this need of reason to presuppose such a notion can only find its adequate proof in the practical. By offering a synopsis of Kant's accounts of nature's systematicity in the Transcendental Ideal of the Critique of Pure Reason (Part I), the Appendix to the Dialectic of the Critique of Pure Reason (Part II), and in the Critique of Judgment (Part III), I identify in each section Kant's theoretical and practical arguments for reason's presupposition of the “unconditioned,” demonstrate their structural interdependence, and show a general continuity in Kant's position on this issue throughout his critical system.     

‘The Zone of the Carcass and the Knacker'—On Adorno's Concern with the Suffering Body

Adorno's moral philosophy is famously problematic. One of the main reasons for this is that it revolves around the moral addendum: a physical impulse of solidarity with suffering beings that, he argues, cannot and should not be rationalized. I show that, since this moral addendum remains vague and since Adorno's radical negativity forces him to dismiss as uncritical all other approaches to morality, he deliberately places his thought in danger of relapsing into irrationality. Most commentators therefore disagree about the manner in which Adorno's references to the moral addendum can be translated into a moral theory. In this paper, I bring in some often overlooked material to form a more complete overview of the issues at hand and to adjudicate this contested area. I do this by briefly discussing Schopenhauer's moral observations on Mitleid and by focusing on Adorno's references to animal cruelty and corporeality. Although this interpretation stays close to Adorno's observations on the moral addendum, it forces us to accept that his moral philosophy is rather weak. I conclude, however, that this weakness reflects a disturbing aspect of reality and in that sense has critical value.     

Elster on the Emotions

Don Mannison levels three criticisms at the claims I make in ‘Faking Nature’. First, he claims that I argue from (1) X is valued to (2) X has value. I do not. Second, he criticizes an argument of Nelson Goodman's to which I allude. While his criticism has point he misrepresents the role I assign to Goodman's argument. Third, he suggests that there is no need for me to count environmental evaluations as evaluations of the moral kind. However, he offers no account of why I should not and ignores an important consideration that requires that I should.     

On the Sensible Application of Familywise Alpha Adjustment

This essay responds to Daniel O'Keefe's “Against Familywise Alpha Adjustment.” Whereas O'Keefe maintains that one should never attempt to control Type I error introduced when many statistical tests are conducted, this essay argues that alpha adjustment should be applied only in the narrowly circumscribed instance when the researcher wants to make a strong claim that there is no Type I error in a specific collection of tests.     

Mark Sacks Lecture 2013: Spinoza on Goodness and Beauty and the Prophet and the Artist

Some critics have claimed that Spinoza's philosophy has nothing to offer aesthetics. I argue that within his conception of an ars vivendi one can discern a nascent theory of art (ars). I bring the figure of the prophet in relation to that of the artist and, alongside a consideration of Spinoza's views on goodness and beauty, show that the special talent of the artist should be understood in terms of the entirely natural expression of the conatus.     

Second‐Personal Respect,the Experiential Aspect of Respect,and Feminist Philosophy

I argue that Stephen Darwall's account of second‐personal respect should be of special interest to feminists because it opens up space for the development of certain feminist resources. Specifically, Darwall's account leaves room for an experiential aspect of respect, and I suggest that abilities related to this aspect may vary along with social position. I then point out a potential parallel between the feminist critique of epistemology and a budding feminist critique of moral philosophy (specifically relating to respect).     

Speaking of the Spirit1

Since Gregory Nazianzus called it the “special difficulty” in the fourth century, we should not be surprised that speaking of the Holy Spirit still challenges theologians today. In this article I attempt definitions of the Spirit's activity in the church and the world, and its role within the life of the Trinity. I look for help in Paul's Letter to the Romans, from the Christian tradition, and from Luther's teaching, inviting all to this conversation about the Spirit's identity and place in an ecumenical context.     

Kierkegaard on the Problems of Pure Irony

Søren Kierkegaard's thesis, The Concept of Irony, contains an interesting critique of pure irony. Kierkegaard's critique turns on two main claims: (a) pure irony is an incoherent and thus, unrealizable stance; (b) the pursuit of pure irony is morally enervating, psychologically destructive, and culminates in bondage to moods. In this essay, first I attempt to clarify Kierkegaard's understanding of pure irony as “infinite absolute negativity.” Then I set forth his multilayered critique of pure irony. Finally, I consider briefly a distinctly theological component in Kierkegaard's critique. I argue that this feature of Kierkegaard's account can and should be distinguished from the broadly ethical critique of pure irony that I sketch in the second section, even if these components of Kierkegaard's position are found together as a unified whole in The Concept of Irony. My overall goal in this essay is to reveal the subtlety and plausibility of Kierkegaard's critique of pure irony. I also attempt to disclose the richness of the Hegelian account of ethical life to which Kierkegaard recurs in his thesis.     

When and How Does a Person's Relationship With Environments Begin and Continue to Play a Role in Psychological Functioning?: Reply to Paper and Commentaries by Bodnar and Roth

Bodnar and I urge therapists to understand and address not only a person's conflicted desires, which Roth advocates should be the only focus of psychoanalytic treatment, but also the role space and place play in a person's psychology. The psychoanalysts Bodnar cites, who advocate the importance of understanding environments, follow the positivistic assumptions of ecopsychology. I argue why the dialectical-relational model I outlined should be followed. From the viewpoint of this model, I discuss Bodnar's patients who are wasting environments and commend Bodnar for addressing the role body experiences with places and spaces play in the conflicts of these individuals. I explain why I disagree with Roth's opinion that Bodnar and I are romanticizing nature in our discussions of environments. I join Bodnar's challenge that treatment should include helping a person learn how he or she can repair and recover the ability to interact and negotiate with all environments. I also challenge therapists to understand the embodied metaphors they carry that give meaning to human and nonhuman environments and to explore why, when, and how therapy should be conducted in different environments.     

Calling Solomon’s Bluff: Ethics,Aspect-Perception and the Unity of the Tractatus

In this paper, I consider how we ought to read the aspect-perception passages in the Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus (TLP) in the light of its ethics. I engage with a recent proposal, of Genia Schönbaumsfeld's, that we should replace the TLP account of aspect-perception with that which Wittgenstein puts forward in the Philosophical Investigations (PI). I show that, far from helping us to grasp the ethical vision contained in the TLP, this proposal obscures it. I go on to draw some conclusions from this as to how to read the TLP in its relation to Wittgenstein's other work.