What Do You Do with Misleading Evidence?

Gilbert Harman has presented an argument to the effect that if S knows that p then S knows that any evidence for not- p is misleading. Therefore S is warranted in being dogmatic about anything he happens to know. I explain, and reject, Sorensen's attempt to solve the paradox via Jackson's theory of conditionals. S is not in a position to disregard evidence even when he knows it to be misleading.     

What Do We Do Unconsciously? And How?

In this reply, we endorse Chartrand's (2005) taxonomy of conscious awareness for different stages of consumer decisions affected by environmental cues. In addition, we attempt to broaden the scope of this taxonomy by discussing its usefulness for consumer decisions in general. We generally support Simonson's (2005) claim that research based on consumers as conscious decision makers is indeed predictive of a wide variety of behavior. However, we also argue that the importance of consciousness should not be overstated. Conscious processes observed in a research laboratory are not representative of conscious processes in real life. The alternative model to describe effects of the environment on behavior by Janiszewski and van Osselaer (2005) may be useful to explain automaticity in goal‐directed behavior, but it poorly describes other automatic behaviors.     

Do Scholarships Help?

Some 897 successful and unsuccessful applicants for support from the Citizens Scholarship Foundation of America were surveyed. Responses from 515 applicants suggest that these relatively small awards do not change the educational plans of the recipients. Students most frequently report that such awards diminish the financial burden placed on student and family; post-secondary educational choices usually are unchanged by the availability or absence of small scholarships. Even if the scholarships were larger, it appears that the effect would be similar. Fewer than one-third of the students report that a larger scholarship would cause a significant change in post-secondary education.     

Forgiveness: Who Does It and How Do They Do It?

Forgiveness is a suite of prosocial motivational changes that occurs after a person has incurred a transgression. People who are inclined to forgive their transgressors tend to be more agreeable, more emotionally stable, and, some research suggests, more spiritually or religiously inclined than people who do not tend to forgive their transgressors. Several psychological processes appear to foster or inhibit forgiveness. These processes include empathy for the transgressor, generous attributions and appraisals regarding the transgression and transgressor, and rumination about the transgression. Interpreting these findings in light of modern trait theory would help to create a more unified understanding of how personality might influence forgiveness.     

Do phenomenal concepts misrepresent?

Many contemporary physicalists concede to dualists that conscious subjects have distinctive “phenomenal concepts” of the phenomenal qualities of their experiences. Indeed, they contend that idiosyncratic characteristics of these concepts facilitate responses to influential anti-physicalist arguments. Like some some other critics of this approach, James Tartaglia (2013 Tartaglia, J. (2013). Conceptualizing physical consciousness. Philosophical Psychology, 26(6), 817–838.[Taylor &; Francis Online], [Web of Science ®] , [Google Scholar]) maintains that phenomenal concepts express contents that conflict with physicalism, but as a physicalist, the moral he distinctively draws from this is that phenomenal concepts misrepresent. He contends further that the contemporary physicalists’ account cannot accommodate this feature, and that in consequence, physicalists should abandon phenomenal concepts and return to the identity theory championed by Place and Smart in the 1950s. I respond to Tartaglia by identifying lacunae in his interpretation of contemporary physicalism and arguing that phenomenal concepts as conceived by the contemporary physicalists do not express contents that support either dualist or physicalist metaphysics: they are “metaphysically neutral.”     

How Do Logics Explain?

Anti-exceptionalists about logic maintain that it is continuous with the empirical sciences. Taking anti-exceptionalism for granted, we argue that traditional approaches to explanation are inadequate in the case of logic. We argue that Andrea Woody's functional analysis of explanation is a better fit with logical practice and accounts better for the explanatory role of logical theories.     

Do Things Look Flat?

Does a penny viewed at an angle in some sense look elliptical, as though projected on a two‐dimensional surface? Many philosophers have said such things, from Malebranche (1674/1997) and Hume (1739/1978), through early 20^lh‐century sense‐data theorists, to Tye (2000) and Noë' (2004). I confess that it doesn't seem this way to me, though I'm somewhat baffled by the phenomenology and pessimistic about our ability to resolve the dispute. 1 raise geometrical complaints against the view and conjecture that views of this sort draw some of their appeal from over‐analogizing visual experience to painting or photography. Theorists writing in contexts where vision is typically analogized to less‐projective media–wax signet impressions in ancient Greece, stereoscopy in introspective psychology circa 1900 – are substantially less likely to attribute such projective distortions to visual appearances.     

Do infant rats cry?

In the current revival of interest in the emotional and mental lives of animals, many investigators have focused attention on mammalian infants that emit distress vocalizations when separated from the home environment. Perhaps the most intensively studied distress vocalization is the ultrasonic vocalization of infant rats. Since its discovery, this vocalization has been interpreted both as a communicatory signal for the elicitation of maternal retrieval and as the manifestation of emotional distress. In contrast, the authors examined the cardiovascular causes and consequences of the vocalization, and on the basis of this work, they hypothesized that the vocalization is the acoustic by-product of the abdominal compression reaction (ACR), a maneuver that results in increased venous return to the heart. Therefore, the vocalization may be analogous to a sneeze, serving a physiological function while incidentally producing sound.     

Individualism and Collectivism: What Do They Have to Do With Counseling?

The author defines individualism and collectivism before examining how they are integral parts of the counseling process for clients and counselors. Although individualism has been assumed to be the norm for the counseling culture in the United States, recent work notes the influence of collectivism on professionals and clients in the counseling system. El autor define el individualismo y el colectivismo antes de examinar cómo ellos son partes esenciales del proceso que aconseja para clientes y consejeros. Aunque el individualismo se haya asumido para ser la norma para la cultura que aconseja en los Estados Unidos, el trabajo reciente nota la influencia del colectivismo en profesionales y clientes en el sistema que aconseja.     

Do We Decide Intentionally?

In a recent article in this journal, Joshua Shepherd presents and rejects a new argument for the sceptical conclusion that everyday decisions aren't intentional actions. After relating his focal argument to a different argument for the same conclusion that is presented and rejected by Alfred Mele, I defend these arguments from extant criticisms, and develop new objections that shed light on the intentionality of typical decisions.     

Do Good Feminists Compete?

In this paper I argue against the view widely held among feminists that nurturing and competition are incompatible. I also explore the following two more specific objections against competition: (1) competitions are “mini-wars” which encourage hatred; (2) while not “miniwars,” competitions foster a war-like mentality. Underlying these objections is the fear that too strong a sense of self makes war likely by severing connection with others. I argue that because patriarchy encourages women to have too little sense of self, some competition may be useful.