‘Bound in a nutshell’: Thoughts on complexity,reductionism, and ‘infinite space’1

Pluralism is the hallmark of 21st century psychoanalytic discourse. Nevertheless, an unpleasant byproduct of pluralism is a tendency in some quarters to retreat into orthodoxy, stemming from a perceived need to shore up theoretical boundaries in the service of differentiating one theory from another. The delineation of borders places us at a risk of losing sight of the fact that genuine psychoanalytic thinking is fundamentally non‐reductionistic. Moreover, the core psychoanalytic notion of overdetermination, which Freud never abandoned throughout his career, has recently been neglected as authors argue in their communications that one point of view is better than another. Both analysts and their patients secretly are drawn to simple formulations that eschew complexity. The need to remain open to the ‘infinite space’ of meaning, motive, and causation should be a hallmark of clinical psychoanalytic practice. The author considers the implications for technique, and provides case material to illustrate some of the challenges inherent in approaching psychoanalytic work as a complex phenomenon.     

Clinical theory at the border(s): Emerging and unintended crossings in the development of clinical theory

The author provides some scaffolding for thinking about emerging and unintended integrative developments in clinical theory. The emergent theory to which the author refers works at a different level of theoretical discourse than explicit attempts at comparative translation of psychoanalytic concepts or theories. In contrast, most of the theory that is explored in this paper involves clinical discourse aimed at solving important common clinical problems. The work of a group of authors (Jay Greenberg, John Steiner, Anton Kris, Michael Feldman and Charles Spezzano) is described as simultaneously embedded within a particular orientation while demonstrating a kind of unwitting reach to a broad swathe of analysts. Distinctions are made between this kind of linking of clinical theory versus self‐consciously syncretic and integrative approaches to theory development. The author also discusses the educational implications of this emergent theory for teaching and learning during psychoanalytic training.     

Semiotic aspects of the countertransference: Some observations on the concepts of the ‘immediate object’ and the ‘interpretant’ in the work of Charles S. Peirce1

The fi eld of semiotics, established by Charles S. Peirce, is characterised by its recognition of non‐linguistic signs and embedment in a communicative interaction; for this reason, it is especially well suited for a semiotic investigation of intersubjective processes. In this paper, the authors show how these intersubjective processes can be understood in semiotic terms within the transference‐countertransference setting. Based on a case vignette, the relationship between the ‘real object’ (e.g. an unconscious fantasy) and the sign (e.g. a particular facial expression) is fi rst demonstrated. In this mediation between sign and referent, an important role is played by the ‘immediate object’, by which Peirce understood the mental concept of a sign. However, a further component of the Peircian sign is responsible for the emergence of the countertransference, namely, the ‘interpretant’. The core of Peircian semiotics, namely the concept of an (infi nite) process of signifi cation, sheds light in semiotic terms on the dialectical movement between transference‐signs and countertransference‐signs, the interpretation and encounter between two subjects. The paper concludes with a discussion of both the interdisciplinary applicability of Peircian semiotics, for example in the context of the neurosciences, and the differences between the Peircian epistemological position and psychoanalytical conceptions of the objective cognition of mental processes.     

From bastion to enactment: The ‘non‐dream’ in the theatre of analysis1

In this paper, the author's objective is to discuss models that express what occurs in the analytical situation. He demonstrates how early models relating to painting and sculpture, to history and archaeology, develop into other models that refer to the relationship between two people. He studies in depth the Barangers analytical eld with its obstructive bastions as a background to understanding what is currently valued as intersubjectivity in psychoanalysis. The container contained model and the phenomenon of recruitment are also discussed. The author uses clinical material to demonstrate how these models are linked to enactment, and a study of this concept provides evidence of the importance of the visual image, the dream and non‐dream, the affective pictogram, as privileged aspects for the understanding and evolution of thought in the analytical process. Its importance leads to a proposal of a model that uses the theatre as a metaphor for the analytical process. In this model, analyst and patient both participate as characters in the scenes, and simultaneously as their co–authors. The analyst should also be responsible for the direction of scenes, as well as acting as critic. His task is to prevent obstructive conspiracies (the non‐dream) and new meanings for the scenes, thus allowing the development of new scenes and plots, and the enlarging of the mental universe.     

At‐one‐ment,intuition and ‘suchness’1

Many senses exist for perceiving sensory experience; there are in turn others which make it possible to perceive emotional experience: intuition is one of these. The author, using W. R. Bion's work, studies intuition psychoanalytically, considering it to be a powerful ‘sense’ in clinical work. He describes the metapsychology of intuition, and proposes models that make it possible to think—from different perspectives— about how to make use of it in an analysis. To this end, he examines a series of useful processes and concepts: growth, tolerance, ‘suchness’, suffering and courage. The author defi nes the intuitive mechanism as a derivation of the renunciation of memory, desire and understanding; such a renunciation, learning from the experience of suffering the pain of facing the Truth in at‐one‐ment, makes it possible to tolerate the frustrations associated with observing the analysand ‘such‐as‐he‐is’. Finally, once immersed in the intelligence of intuition, the author considers ways in which intuition might be linked with concepts, with a view to interpreting the facts that must be transformed in the analysis.     

On the edge: The psychoanalyst's transference1

Countertransference is a central topic in analytic work and in the literature. The concept of countertransference includes a basic question which has been understood in different ways. The author attempts to differentiate between the psychoanalyst's transference and his countertransference in the analytic process. It is hard to draw a line between them; analysts are always on the edge. The analyst's transference will be explored and described using three approaches: narcissism, regression profile and the analyst's phase of life. Regression profile is a new concept developed by the author, which may help us to understand the core of the analyst's transference in the analytic situation. She illustrates the topic by clinical vignettes.     

Delving into the ‘emotional storms’: A thematic analysis of psychoanalysts’ initial consultation reports

Psychoanalysts’ written reports on initial consultations are a window into the complexities of a crucial aspect of psychoanalytic work. However, systematic research in this area has largely focused on patients’ demographic factors or standardized measures. The present study looked at reports of all the consultations taking place at the London Clinic of Psychoanalysis over one calendar year (N = 100). The aim was to explore psychoanalysts’ different explicit styles of working and reporting as well as further understanding implicit processes used in thinking and writing about each particular consultation experience. A thematic analysis revealed a set of themes that related to a style of working and thinking about the consultation process as a dyadic experience, where the interaction, affective reactions and contact made between the two are the focus when thinking of making a recommendation for psychoanalysis. The majority of the reports had an open, exploratory quality. The writing of reports appears to give the analyst an opportunity to process the consultation experience and arrive at a more triangular position. Writing reports is a more valuable part of the consultation process than has formally been recognized and acknowledged. The limitations of this study as well as the relevance of these findings for future research are discussed.     

The countertransference: When painful traumatic traces sustain the countertransference and reveal themselves to the psychoanalyst … 14 years later!

Although she experienced, as did the many psychoanalysts before her, the countertransferential dynamics of disgust towards a patient presenting great deficiency in terms of mentalization capacity, the author strives to understand what urged her to tolerate the patient, to invest in her and lead her to develop a capacity for internalization, after 6 years of analytic work filled with transgressive‐transferential acting‐out. Fourteen years later, she becomes aware of the way in which the revival of some grief related to traumatic traces in her own lived experience, sustained, without her knowledge, a saviour/countertransference, creating a specific transferential‐countertransferential spiral which rescued a situation whose advent could have been compromised. This could happen thanks to what she refers to as the unique inter‐relation between her and this particular patient.     

Constructing the truth From ‘Confusion of tongues’ to ‘Constructions in analysis’1

The author hypothesizes that the papers Freud wrote in the period 1934‐9 constitute a fi nal turning point in his work resulting from an attempt to work through, by means of self‐analysis, early traumatic elements reactivated by the conditions of his life in the 1930s. The author emphasizes that the ups and downs of Freud's relationship with Sándor Ferenczi and the mourning which followed his death in 1933 played an important role in this traumatic situation. He suggests that through these last works, Freud pursued a posthumous dialogue with Ferenczi. This working through led Freud, in Moses and monotheism, to an ultimate revision of his theory of trauma, a revision which the author examines in full, in the light of the works of the Egyptologist, Jan Assmann. A new analytical paradigm emerges: that of constructions in analysis developed in the article of the same name. The activity of construction appears as an alternative to the mutual analysis proposed by Ferenczi and is closely bound up with the notion of historical truth. In psychoanalysis, it would mean constructing a historical truth whose anchoring in the material truth of the past is essential, though it should not be confused with it.     

External and internal reality: The impact of the current socio‐economic crisis on the analytic dyad

This paper addresses the impact of the current economic crisis on the psychic functioning of the patient and the analyst, their relationship and collaboration. This intrusion of ‘external reality’ is multidimensional, and thus with multiple meanings. The critical role of the economic factor brings various dimensions of money into play, such as self‐preservation, power as well as aspects of psychosexual development. In addition, the crisis involves symbolic loss of basic ideals such as honesty and social responsibility. Patient and analyst are affected in similar and different ways in their respective roles as well as according to the specific intrapsychic functioning of each. Moreover, unique characteristics of the crisis often create a crisis in the analysis. In order to avoid deformation of the analytic relationship, the analytic dyad must examine and work through the multiple meanings of the crisis as well as the meaning of the impact of the crisis on the analytic relationship for both patient and analyst. This complex transference‐ countertransference interplay poses specific challenges to the analyst. After discussion of these issues, clinical material is presented that demonstrates how they appear in analytic practice today.     

Commentary on ‘The arms of the chimeras’ by Béatrice Ithier

In this Commentary I will first of all summarise my understanding of the proposal set out by Béatrice Ithier concerning her concept of the ‘chimera’. The main part of my essay will focus on Ithier's claim that her concept of the chimera could be described as a ‘mental squiggle’ because it corresponds to Winnicott's work illustrated in his book ‘Therapeutic Consultations’ (1971). At the core of Ithier's chimera is the notion of a traumatic link between analyst and patient, which is the reason she enlists the work of Winnicott. I will argue, however, that Ithier's claim is based on a misperception of the theory that underpins Winnicott's therapeutic consultations because, different from Ithier's clinical examples of work with traumatised patients, Winnicott is careful to select cases who are from an ‘average expectable environment’ i.e. a good enough family. Moreover, Winnicott does not refer to any traumatic affinity with his patients, or to experiencing a quasi‐hallucinatory state of mind during the course of the consultations. These aspects are not incorporated into his theory. In contrast (to the concept Ithier attempts to advance), Winnicott's squiggle game constitutes an application of psychoanalysis intended as a diagnostic consultation. In that sense Winnicott's therapeutic consultations are comparable with the ordinary everyday work between analyst and analysand in a psychoanalytic treatment. My Commentary concludes with a question concerning the distinction between the ordinary countertransference in working with patients who are thinking symbolically in contrast to an extraordinary countertransference that I suggest is more likely to arise with patients who are traumatised and thus functioning at a borderline or psychotic level.     

Identification of objects in 9‐month‐old infants: integrating ‘what’ and ‘where’ information

Following Leslie, Xu, Tremoulet and Scholl (1998) , we distinguish between individuation (the establishment of an object representation) and identification (the use of information stored in the object representation to decide which previously individuated object is being encountered). Although there has been much work on how infants individuate objects, there is relatively little on the question of when and how property information is used to identify objects. Experiment 1 shows that 9‐month‐old infants use shape, but apparently not color, information in identifying objects that are each moved behind spatially separated screens. Infants could not simply have associated a shape with a location or a screen without regard to objecthood, because on alternate trials the objects switched locations/screens. Infants therefore had to bind shape information to the object representation while tracking the objects’ changing location. In Experiment 2, we tested if infants represented both objects rather than ‘sampled’ only one of them. Using the same alternation procedure, infants again succeeded in using shape (but not color) information when only one of the screens was removed – the screen that occluded the first‐hidden object (requiring the longer time in memory). Finally, we relate our behavioral findings both to a cognitive model and to recent neuroscientific studies, concluding that ventral ‘what’ and dorsal ‘where’ pathways may be functionally integrated by 9 months.     

The meaning of ‘life’ and other abstract words: Insights from neuropsychology

There are a number of long‐standing theories on how the cognitive processing of abstract words, like ‘life’, differs from that of concrete words, like ‘knife’. This review considers current perspectives on this debate, focusing particularly on insights obtained from patients with language disorders and integrating these with evidence from functional neuroimaging studies. The evidence supports three distinct and mutually compatible hypotheses. (1) Concrete and abstract words differ in their representational substrates, with concrete words depending particularly on sensory experiences and abstract words on linguistic, emotional, and magnitude‐based information. Differential dependence on visual versus verbal experience is supported by the evidence for graded specialization in the anterior temporal lobes for concrete versus abstract words. In addition, concrete words have richer representations, in line with better processing of these words in most aphasic patients and, in particular, patients with semantic dementia. (2) Abstract words place greater demands on executive regulation processes because they have variable meanings that change with context. This theory explains abstract word impairments in patients with semantic‐executive deficits and is supported by neuroimaging studies showing greater response to abstract words in inferior prefrontal cortex. (3) The relationships between concrete words are governed primarily by conceptual similarity, while those of abstract words depend on association to a greater degree. This theory, based primarily on interference and priming effects in aphasic patients, is the most recent to emerge and the least well understood. I present analyses indicating that patterns of lexical co‐occurrence may be important in understanding these effects.     

Tattoo and taboo: on the meaning of tattoos in the analytic process

Tattooing projects a visual image in transference to form a backdrop for the most salient unconscious inner conflicts arising during an ongoing analytic process. Like a snapshot, the tattoo is a dialectic record of the mother-father relationship, of desires for closeness and distance, commonality and difference, identification and individuation. As Walter Benjamin famously stated about the nature of visual images in his Arcades Project, the tattoo represents "dialectics at a standstill." What seems paramount to the patient who participates in the act of tattooing is the need for stasis and immutability, as if bringing unconscious conflicts to "standstill" were to deliver a sense of stability. Unconsciously, the need is triggered by a threat to the inner stability resulting from fear of violating a taboo escalating to the point that fears of abandonment and fusion become unbearable. On the one hand, the tattoo is a visual symbolization of a taboo transgression; on the other hand, it activates the same through an act of self-injury that resembles the magical ritual acts of indigenous peoples' use of tattoos. The taboo thus serves as an ersatz for the actual violation of the taboo in real life, so that the tattoo may be ascribed a magical significance or totemic function. And yet the tattoo's success as a vehicle for constructing a transitional object is always contingent on the tangible manipulation of the skin conjoined with the creation of a symbolizing visual image. The image then acts like a "patch" to repair holes blown into Winnicott's "potential space" and to reconstruct it.     

‘Though he slay me,yet will I trust in him’: a critical reconstruction of Winnicott's theory of value

This paper extrapolates an outline for a theory of value from Winnicott's reflections on war in ‘Discussion of war aims’ (1940). The author treats Winnicott's discussion as an occasion for a critical reconstruction of his theory of life‐values. He discerns an implicit set of distinctions in Winnicott's reflections on war, including different orders of value (existential, ethical, and psychosocial); a distinction between maturity and necessity; and a yet more fundamental distinction between violence and brutality. The paper argues, on the basis of these distinctions, that Winnicott allows for an understanding of one's encounter with the enemy as an ethical relation. The main argument of the paper is that the ethical attitude underpins recognition of the enemy's humanity. On a more critical note, the author argues that Winnicott doesn't adhere consistently to the ethical attitude he presupposes, that in certain passages he privileges the maturity of combatants over the humanity of the enemy.