From Freud’s dream-work to Bion’s work of dreaming: The changing conception of dreaming in psychoanalytic theory

Bion moved psychoanalytic theory from Freud's theory of dream-work to a concept of dreaming in which dreaming is the central aspect of all emotional functioning. In this paper, I first review historical, theoretical, and clinical aspects of dreaming as seen by Freud and Bion. I then propose two interconnected ideas that I believe reflect Bion’s split from Freud regarding the understanding of dreaming. Bion believed that all dreams are psychological works in progress and at one point suggested that all dreams contain elements that are akin to visual hallucinations. I explore and elaborate Bion’s ideas that all dreams contain aspects of emotional experience that are too disturbing to be dreamt, and that, in analysis, the patient brings a dream with the hope of receiving the analyst’s help in completing the unconscious work that was entirely or partially too disturbing for the patient to dream on his own. Freud views dreams as mental phenomena with which to understand how the mind functions, but believes that dreams are solely the ‘guardians of sleep,’ and not, in themselves, vehicles for unconscious psychological work and growth until they are interpreted by the analyst. Bion extends Freud's ideas, but also departs from Freud and re-conceives of dreaming as synonymous with unconscious emotional thinking – a process that continues both while we are awake and while we are asleep. From another somewhat puzzling perspective, he views dreams solely as manifestations of what the dreamer is unable to think.     

On the Patient's Becoming an Individual: The Importance of the Analyst's Personal Response to a Deprived Patient and Her Dreams

What patients mainly want—which Ferenczi noted as early as 1932 in his clinical diary and which Bion later expressed in his Cogitations (1992)—and what some patients need, is to experience how the analyst lives and processes the interpersonal events that lie at the origin of their affective and mental suffering. This is especially true with schizoid patients who were profoundly emotionally deprived in childhood. In this paper, the author investigates this crucial aspect of the intersubjective analytic relationship in his treatment of just such a patient, an extremely silent and inert young woman. Through a detailed examination of clinical material from various stages of her analysis, he explores how the analyst's unconscious emotional response serves as both a tool for comprehension and a key element of environmental facilitation—a “new beginning,” to use Balint's phrase—that may help the patient attain a level of development and emancipation that he or she has never experienced before.     

Breakdown in communication: On finding the child in the analysis of an adult

SUMMARY

In this paper a patient is described in whom communication with parts of herself and with her objects, internal and external, had broken down. I suggest that her way of communicating was achieved by projective identification, as described by Klein (1946) and Bion (1962). The only way she could deal with and communicate her own very “bothered” feelings was to “put them” into the analyst. In this way she “bothered” the maternal or analytic mind in such a way as to make the analyst experience feeling like a “bothered” child.

I have tried to show how the analyst holds or contains these feelings, and to show the gradual establishment in the patient of a different way of communicating with the analyst and with the more primitive parts of herself.     

Distinction between mental pain and psychic suffering as separate entities in the patient's experience

Abstract

Mental pain and psychic suffering are herein defined as two separate concepts in psychoanalysis. The concept of mental pain lies at the core of psychoanalysis; it was introduced by Freud and was further elaborated by a number of investigators, mostly by Bion. Mental pain refers to a pain that the patient reports as being impossible to describe in words, and lacking any associations, whereas psychic suffering can be both named and described by the patient. Mental pain is derived from non-tolerance on the part of the psychic apparatus when it is harmed by very painful emotions. In contrast to psychic suffering, mental pain resists elaboration and transformation by dream-work. How to address and transform the patient's mental pain is a major challenge facing the analyst in his clinical work because mental pain may halt or slow the progression of the analytical process. To overcome this hindrance, the work of the analyst is focused on helping patients to modify their mental pain into psychic suffering, that is, to reactivate in the patient the chain of transformations that generates thought. The analyst is also challanged with the mental pain of the patients because he has himself to tolerate the mental patient induced by counter transference. Suggestions for the analyst on how to deal with the mental pain of the patient during psychoanalytic therapy are proposed.     

What's true and whose idea was it?

In this paper, the author explores the idea that psychoanalysis at its core involves an effort on the part of patient and analyst to articulate what is true to an emotional experience in a form that is utilizable by the analytic pair for purposes of psychological change. Building upon the work of Bion, what is true to human emotional experience is seen as independent of the analyst's formulation of it. In this sense, we, as psychoanalysts, are not inventors of emotional truths, but participant observers and scribes. And yet, in the very act of thinking and giving verbally symbolic 'shape' to what we intuit to be true to an emotional experience, we alter that truth. This understanding of what is true underlies the analytic conception of the therapeutic action of interpretation: in interpreting, the analyst verbally symbolizes what he feels is true to the patient's unconscious experience and, in so doing, alters what is true and contributes to the creation of a potentially new experience with which the analytic pair may do psychological work. These ideas are illustrated in a detailed discussion of an analytic session. The analyst makes use of his reverie experience-for which both and neither of the members of the analytic pair may claim authorship-in his effort to arrive at tentative understandings of what is true to the patient's unconscious emotional experience at several junctures in the session.     

A 'quantum' of truth in a field of lies: the investigation of emotional truth in a child analysis

Following Bion’s ideas of analytical research the author intends to consider the need to pursue emotional truth between patient and psychotherapist in order to produce a psychological development. It is shown through the analysis of a child how emotional falsification can distort first of all the definition of the child identity. Successively the attention is focused on how lies, as an unconscious element that twist the research of the truth, obstruct the development of thoughts able to transform emotions.Using a quantisation physical model of space, the author hypothesises that the transformation of β elements in α elements is always in an unstable equilibrium. The distortion of emotional truth co‐produced by lies affects the oscillation β?α at a primitive level of transformation, changing the “physical” state of the analytical field from conductor to insulator. The most important consequence of the particular point of view suggested by the quantistic model is that in the third analytical space the same definition of α elements or β elements depends on the analyst’s point of view. This change of perspective can vitalise the analytical thinking of patient and analyst during an impasse.     

Power cut in the countertransference

This paper is an attempt to describe and understand a certain type of defence that I shall call a 'power cut' because of its crippling and anti-relational nature. I will take extracts from a baby observation to show how this type of defence can be adopted from the beginning of life, followed by vignettes from my work with a young child and an adult patient which addresses the particular kind of difficulty the analyst has to face with patients who resort to such a defence. I am arguing that while defending from another, the patient is able to destabilize not only the connection between himself and this other, the analyst, but also that between the analyst and the analyst's internal world. I understand this as the violent re-enactment of the patient's uncontained and split off primitive experience. I see recovery from 'power cuts' as the main challenge for the analyst who is helping the patient to recover from an early failure in containment which has led to defective splitting. Only when the unthinkable experience of 'power cut' can become an experience that can be lived through and converted into a deintegrate, may integration be achieved.     

On talking-as-dreaming

Many patients are unable to engage in waking-dreaming in the analytic setting in the form of free association or in any other form. The author has found that 'talking-as-dreaming' has served as a form of waking-dreaming in which such patients have been able to begin to dream formerly undreamable experience. Such talking is a loosely structured form of conversation between patient and analyst that is often marked by primary process thinking and apparent non sequiturs. Talking-as-dreaming superficially appears to be 'unanalytic' in that it may seem to consist 'merely' of talking about such topics as books, films, etymology, baseball, the taste of chocolate, the structure of light, and so on. When an analysis is 'a going concern,' talking-as-dreaming moves unobtrusively into and out of talking about dreaming. The author provides two detailed clinical examples of analytic work with patients who had very little capacity to dream in the analytic setting. In the first clinical example, talking-as-dreaming served as a form of thinking and relating in which the patient was able for the first time to dream her own (and, in a sense, her father's) formerly unthinkable, undreamable experience. The second clinical example involves the use of talking-as-dreaming as an emotional experience in which the formerly 'invisible' patient was able to begin to dream himself into existence. The analyst, while engaging with a patient in talking-as-dreaming, must remain keenly aware that it is critical that the difference in roles of patient and analyst be a continuously felt presence; that the therapeutic goals of analysis be firmly held in mind; and that the patient be given the opportunity to dream himself into existence (as opposed to being dreamt up by the analyst).     

Action across emptiness

This paper examines how autism may affect the processing and containing of emotions and sensations. At the beginning of life we can hypothesise that the baby develops two means of processing experience: containment that involves a sensory and mimetic trace of relational experience (proto-containment) and containment which, through the α function and projective and introjective functions translates feelings into meaning (♀/♂). Both these means of processing emotional experience remain active throughout life but oscillate the one with the other. The main hypothesis of this work is that the autistic child is not able to oscillate between real containment (♀/♂) and a primitive form of proto-containment. The author aims to explore, through clinical material, the factors which may promote this oscillation. Autistic children often use non-verbal communication. The author examines how a particular type of action can cross the relational void in the therapeutic relationship through a process that can transform feelings of great distress in the analyst via acts that can be described as an Act of Faith, as described by Bion. This form of action that can cross the void is like an artistic performance.     

Destruction reconceived: On Winnicott's ‘The Use of an Object and Relating through Identifications’

‘The Use of an Object and Relating through Identifications’ is a landmark contribution that I find very difficult to write about because so much of what lies at its core is merely suggested. It is necessary for the reader not only to read the paper, but also to write it. In my reading/writing of the paper, the mother becomes real for the infant in the process of his actually destroying her as an external object (destroying her sense of herself as an adequate mother), and his perceiving that destruction. She also becomes a real external object for the infant in the process of his experiencing the psychological work involved in surviving destruction, a form of work that does not occur in the world of fantasied objects. The analyst or mother may not be able to survive destruction. It is essential that the analyst be able to acknowledge to himself his inability to survive and, if necessary, to end the analysis because of the very damaging effects for both patient and analyst of prolonged experience of this sort. The author presents clinical discussions of analyses in which the analyst survives destruction and is unable to survive destruction.     

To know or not to know: an application of Bion’s K and –K to child treatment1

The authors discuss an application of Bion’s conceptualisation of thinking and non-thinking states (K and –K links) to the treatment of a nine-year-old girl. The authors consider Bion’s interrelated concepts such as K and –K, container/contained, maternal reverie, and the development of thinking through alpha function to be highly applicable to child treatment. The afore-mentioned conceptual elements are used to elucidate case material over two consecutive hours. A K link is established between therapist and patient, the fragility of which link is then demonstrated by its deterioration into a –K link. Complex issues about knowing and not knowing are central in this girl’s clinical presentation. She was conceived through in vitro fertilisation (IVF), and subsequently diagnosed with cerebral palsy. The authors consider the emotional impact of this origin story and how the parents relate to it. The authors discuss how parents sometimes cope with perceived losses by wishing to shield or protect their children. This can have repercussions for children’s efforts to know (K) and not to know (?K). The fear that emotional knowledge will be too painful to bear can interfere with ‘learning from experience’. Bion’s premise that the purpose of analysis is the growth of the mind is synonymous with the child analyst’s goal of fostering development and understanding impediments to development.     

EDUCATION SECTION: Infant observation in Britain:The Tavistock approach

The author draws attention to something distinctive in the psychoanalytic 'air' from the early 1960s onwards: the strong emphasis upon the very early psychological, emotional and cognitive view of infants and young children. She focuses on the work of two analysts in particular, Esther Bick and Wilfred Bion, and the comparable, though differently expressed, centrality of the observational method in their work. Each explored not only the pathological picture but also the nature and integrative function of psychic containment in earliest mental life. Each also shared a preoccupation with what constituted a psychoanalytic attitude and with the process of becoming a psychoanalyst and, in Bick's case, a child analyst or psychotherapist. The author provides an historical background to the idea of observation, followed by an account, with detailed examples, of the nature of infant observation and the observational method as taught and practised at the Tavistock Clinic, London since the late 1940s, and subsequently in many other training institutions. Here the themes of Bick and Bion are constantly interrelated such that the prototype or model for the creation of emotional meaning and thought can be appreciated and learning from experience can take place.     

Where are We When We are At-One? Discussion of Bion’s O and His Pseudo-Mystical Path

Civitarese’s demystification and reinvigoration of the Bion concept of O (this issue) are applauded for its effective re-grounding of the concept in the experience of unison. Yet the paper leaves ambiguous the question of whether the experience of unity in O depends upon how language brings us together; or whether, on the contrary, O reflects events occurring sub-symbolically, unmediated by language and self-reflectivity, through performative engagement in the communal world of psycho-sensorial experience. Eloquent references in the paper to non-linguistic and sensory-based phenomena seem to suggest that O might happen precisely where language does not, which Bion himself seemed to be pointing to in his insistence that O cannot be known, but only experienced. But in then reasserting the primacy of words and the oneiric functions of the mind, does Civitarese undercut the most radical insight of this reimagining of the concept of O, namely that O is the experience of living beyond our individual identities, unarticulated by language? Distinguishing three terms - the linguistic, the emotional, and the sensory – might allow us to consider that O is not a meeting of minds, nor even the consecration of an emotional event, but is a realization of the profound pre-reflective experience of de-subjectification, where one’s existence is affirmed beyond one’s individual identity by entering the world of shared sensory perception.     

Memory in dreams1

In this paper the author discusses a specific type of dreams encountered in her clinical experience, which in her view provide an opportunity of reconstructing the traumatic emotional events of the patient’s past. In 1900, Freud described a category of dreams – which he called ‘biographical dreams’– that reflect historical infantile experience without the typical defensive function. Many authors agree that some traumatic dreams perform a function of recovery and working through. Bion contributed to the amplification of dream theory by linking it to the theory of thought and emphasizing the element of communication in dreams as well as their defensive aspect. The central hypothesis of this paper is that the predominant aspect of such dreams is the communication of an experience which the dreamer has in the dream but does not understand. It is often possible to reconstruct, and to help the patient to comprehend and make sense of, the emotional truth of the patient’s internal world, which stems from past emotional experience with primary objects. The author includes some clinical examples and references to various psychoanalytic and neuroscientific conceptions of trauma and memory. She discusses a particular clinical approach to such dreams and how the analyst should listen to them.     

ATTACKS ON LINKING OR A DRIVE TO COMMUNICATE? TOLERATING THE PARADOX

The notion of attacks on linking, as described by Bion, may depict a patient's drive to communicate the internalization of a destructive relationship between a primary object and an infant. This may be enacted between patient and analyst in the here and now of the analysis, whereby fragmentation and numbing of thinking may point to a primitive catastrophe relived in the psychoanalytic setting. The patient's material may seem incoherent, but incoherence might be the communication the patient is unconsciously trying to convey. Thus, the notion of attacks on linking depicts a paradoxical, caesural experience in which the attack on linking is itself a link.     

Psychoanalytic process and thought: Convergence of Bion and Matte‐Blanco1

Using the convergence between Bion and Matte‐Blanco, in this article the author attempts to stress the view of the psychoanalytical method as promoter of expansion of the ability of the patient to think his emotional experiences. After a brief résumé of the ideas of both Bion and Matte‐Blanco, certain points of congruence between the two are emphasised: the way of perceiving the range of phenomena observed by psychoanalysis, intuition as a method for observing this field, the feelings as the raw material for thinking, and the importance of the concept of infinity in psychoanalysis. The way in which the ideas of Matte‐Blanco assist in the understanding of Bion's propositions is highlighted. Following these correlations, the author discusses certain questions pertinent to the psychoanalytical method and proposes a model in which the analyst acts as a mediator/catalyst in the process of revision of the ways in which the patient has organised his emotional experiences and the theories constructed to support these hypotheses. Samples of clinical material are presented.     

On psychic elements in a case of autistoid perversion

The paper explores the formation of psychic elements from an epistemological point of view, drawing on the work of Bion to examine a clinical case of autistoid perversion. Distinguishing the qualification of psychic elements from the realization of pre‐conceptions, the paper argues that psychical elements are constituted through a mutually shared experience of presence, and so they should be understood in a paradoxical way – through being‐O and transformations into K. These ideas are explored via a clinical case concerning a patient with an autistoid–perverse organization. The patient had been denied any bodily contact with her parents during her first year of life due to an infection; in later life she exhibited an autistoid coprophilic perversion. During the course of her treatment, as it became possible to break down the autistoid organization, the nameless contents surfaced in a mutually shared experience of presence. The analyst was able to hold on to their meaning, which was unavailable to the patient. The absent analyst, however, turned into the mother who ‘put the child down’ and was experienced by the patient as a suicidal threat. In being‐O, the analyst was able to endure the paradox of being the one who ‘put her down’ in order not to put her down; the paradox of being‐O functioned as a container for the destructive objectal dimension of the state of ‘being put down’.     

Now Streaming: On Unconscious Communications in the Analytic Process

ABSTRACT

In this article, I illustrate the concept of unconscious communication by means of a clinical example in which a patient was able to recover the memory of a key adolescence experience as the result of the interplay of unconscious messages transmitted between himself and his analyst. When the patient spotted the analyst driving an old, beat-up family car, this triggered an unconscious memory of this painful adolescent episode, one that epitomized and stood for his troubled and disappointing relationship with his father. This memory, which was expressed nonverbally, in turn, evoked a memory in the analyst from his own adolescence that put him in touch with the patient‘s traumatic, adolescent experience, material that had come up previously in the analysis but had not been adequately dealt with or worked through. By grasping the meaning of the interplay of these unconscious messages, the analyst was able to help the patient get in touch with, better understand, and work through, an experience that had an enduring impact on his future life.     

The day the clock stopped. Primitive states of unintegration,multidimensional working through and the birth of the analytical subject

This paper is based on one idea and built around one clinical experience that helped me to broaden my comprehension of it. The idea, underlying the work of several authors, is that when the analytic field is saturated with primitive and unintegrated mental contents, the analyst’s somatic countertransference is a precious indicator of a deep, dissociated form of communication. The clinical experience concerns the difficult elaboration of a complex, multifaceted countertransference that took place during the early stages of the analysis of a sensitive patient who used to communicate in a very dissociated way and that I found hard to contain. This experience, closely described in the article, led me to formulate the clinical idea that the transference field may be made of distinct layers (psychoid, affective, verbal), and that each one of them may potentially convey dissociated, even contrasting bits of information. The corollary of this is that the analyst should be ready to accept contrasting sensations, feelings and thoughts at the same time, as they might be the basic ingredients of a complex reverie. The analyst could find himself/herself in front of his/her own internal unelaborated multiplicity before a symbolic image may emerge to link the scattered pieces of the experience. Nevertheless, the heart of this paper is not about suggesting an idea, but in the sharing of a complex working through, which fostered the birth of a new, more human relational perspective: the capacity of being together in time, in a transitional space where there is neither total separation nor fusion.     

From “disciplined subjectivity” to “taming wild thoughts”: Bion's elaboration of the analysing instrument

Abstract

Freud encouraged the analyst to use his unconscious “as an instrument of the analysis,” but did not elaborate on how this should be done. This recommendation opened the door to a consideration of unconscious communication between the analyst and patient as an intersubjective exchange. Both Wilfred Bion and Erik Erikson emphasised the importance of the analyst's intuition, and the author compares and contrasts these two approaches. Erikson advocated a more cautious attitude regarding the analyst's subjectivity, while Bion promoted a broader application of the analyst's various private reactions to the analysand. A brief vignette from the analysis of a five-year-old boy is offered to illustrate the importance of the analyst's reveries, the mutual process of containment and transformation between analyst and patient, and the co-creation of an analytic narrative.