Do infants show social preferences for people differing in race?

Do infants develop meaningful social preferences among novel individuals based on their social group membership? If so, do these social preferences depend on familiarity on any dimension, or on a more specific focus on particular kinds of categorical information? The present experiments use methods that have previously demonstrated infants’ social preferences based on language and accent, and test for infants’ and young children’s social preferences based on race. In Experiment 1, 10-month-old infants took toys equally from own- and other-race individuals. In Experiment 2, 2.5-year-old children gave toys equally to own- and other-race individuals. When shown the same stimuli in Experiment 3, 5-year-old children, in contrast, expressed explicit social preferences for own-race individuals. Social preferences based on race therefore emerge between 2.5 and 5 years of age and do not affect social choices in infancy. These data will be discussed in relation to prior research finding that infants’ social preferences do, however, rely on language: a useful predictor of group or coalition membership in both modern times and humans’ evolutionary past.     

Do "mudsplashes" induce tactile change blindness?

The phenomenon of change blindness (the surprising inability of people to correctly perceive changes between consecutively presented displays), primarily reported in vision, has recently been shown to occur for positional changes presented in tactile displays as well. Here, we studied people's ability to detect changes in the number of tactile stimuli in successively presented displays composed of one to three stimuli distributed over the body surface. In Experiment 1, a tactile mask consisting of the simultaneous activation of all seven possible tactile stimulators was sometimes presented between the two to-be-discriminated tactile displays. In Experiment 2, a "mudsplash" paradigm was used, with a brief irrelevant tactile distractor presented at the moment of change of the tactile display. Change blindness was demonstrated in both experiments, thus showing that the failure to detect tactile change is not necessarily related to (1) the physical disruption between consecutive events, (2) the effect of masking covering the location of the change, or (3) the erasure or resetting of the information contained within an internal representation of the tactile display. These results are interpreted in terms of a limitation in the number of spatial locations/events that can be consciously accessed at any one time. This limitation appears to constrain change-detection performance, no matter the sensory modality in which the stimuli are presented.     

Do “mudsplashes” induce tactile change blindness?

The phenomenon of change blindness (the surprising inability of people to correctly perceive changes between consecutively presented displays), primarily reported in vision, has recently been shown to occur for positional changes presented in tactile displays as well. Here, we studied people’s ability to detect changes in the number of tactile stimuli in successively presented displays composed of one to three stimuli distributed over the body surface. In Experiment 1, a tactile mask consisting of the simultaneous activation of all seven possible tactile stimulators was sometimes presented between the two to-be-discriminated tactile displays. In Experiment 2, a “mudsplash” paradigm was used, with a brief irrelevant tactile distractor presented at the moment of change of the tactile display. Change blindness was demonstrated in both experiments, thus showing that the failure to detect tactile change is not necessarily related to (1) the physical disruption between consecutive events, (2) the effect of masking covering the location of the change, or (3) the erasure or resetting of the information contained within an internal representation of the tactile display. These results are interpreted in terms of a limitation in the number of spatial locations/events that can be consciously accessed at any one time. This limitation appears to constrain change-detection performance, no matter the sensory modality in which the stimuli are presented.     

Is attention needed for word identification? Evidence from the Stroop paradigm

One of the most robust findings in attention research is that the time to name a color is lengthened markedly in the presence of an irrelevant word that spells a different color name: the Stroop effect. The Stroop effect is found even when the word is physically separated from the color, apparently indicating that words can be read outside the focus of spatial attention. The present study critically evaluated this claim. We employed several stringent measures within a Stroop paradigm to prevent participants from attending to the irrelevant words (e.g., limiting exposure duration to prevent attention capture). Nonetheless, residual Stroop effects were obtained for both color words and semantic associates (e.g., sky to blue). These data suggest that lexical processing can sometimes occur outside the focus of spatial attention.     

Do people automatically track others’ beliefs? Evidence from a continuous measure

Recent findings suggest that tracking others’ beliefs is not always effortful and slow, but may rely on a fast and implicit system. An untested prediction of the automatic belief tracking account is that own and others’ beliefs should be activated in parallel. We tested this prediction measuring continuous movement trajectories in a task that required deciding between two possible object locations. We independently manipulated whether participants’ belief about the object location was true or false and whether an onlooker’s belief about the object location was true or false. Manipulating whether or not the agent’s belief was ever task relevant allowed us to compare performance in an explicit and implicit version of the same task. Movement parameters revealed an influence of the onlooker’s irrelevant belief in the implicit version of the task. This provides evidence for parallel activation of own and others’ beliefs.     

What Do You Do with Misleading Evidence?

Gilbert Harman has presented an argument to the effect that if S knows that p then S knows that any evidence for not- p is misleading. Therefore S is warranted in being dogmatic about anything he happens to know. I explain, and reject, Sorensen's attempt to solve the paradox via Jackson's theory of conditionals. S is not in a position to disregard evidence even when he knows it to be misleading.     

Do children with grapheme-colour synaesthesia show cognitive benefits?

Grapheme-colour synaesthesia is characterized by conscious and consistent associations between letters and colours, or between numbers and colours (e.g., synaesthetes might see A as red, 7 as green). Our study explored the development of this condition in a group of randomly sampled child synaesthetes. Two previous studies (Simner & Bain, 2013, Frontiers in Human Neuroscience, 7, 603; Simner, Harrold, Creed, Monro, & Foulkes, 2009, Brain, 132, 57) had screened over 600 primary school children to find the first randomly sampled cohort of child synaesthetes. In this study, we evaluate this cohort to ask whether their synaesthesia is associated with a particular cognitive profile of strengths and/or weaknesses. We tested our child synaesthetes at age 10–11 years in a series of cognitive tests, in comparison with matched controls and baseline norms. One previous study (Green & Goswami, 2008, Cognition, 106, 463) had suggested that child synaesthetes might perform differently to non-synaesthetes in such tasks, although those participants may have been a special type of population independent of their synaesthesia. In our own study of randomly sampled child synaesthetes, we found no significant advantages or disadvantages in a receptive vocabulary test and a memory matrix task. However, we found that synaesthetes demonstrated above-average performance in a processing-speed task and a near-significant advantage in a letter-span task (i.e., memory/recall task of letters). Our findings point to advantages for synaesthetes that go beyond those expected from enhanced coding accounts and we present the first picture of the broader cognitive profile of a randomly sampled population of child synaesthetes.     

Do updating tasks involve updating? Evidence from comparisons with immediate serial recall

Updating tasks require participants to process a sequence of items, varying in length, and afterwards to remember only a fixed number of the elements of the sequence; the assumption being that participants actively update the to-be-recalled list as presentation progresses. However recent evidence has cast doubt on this assumption, and the present study examined the strategies that participants employ in such tasks by comparing the serial position curves found in verbal and visuo-spatial updating tasks with those seen in standard serial recall tasks. These comparisons showed that even when the same number of items are presented or recalled, participants perform less well in an updating than a serial recall context. In addition, while standard serial position effects were observed for serial recall, marked recency and reduced or absent primacy effects were seen in updating conditions. These findings suggest that participants do not typically adopt a strategy of actively updating the memory list in updating tasks, but instead tend to wait passively until the list ends before trying to recall the most recently presented items.     

Do updating tasks involve updating? Evidence from comparisons with immediate serial recall

Updating tasks require participants to process a sequence of items, varying in length, and afterwards to remember only a fixed number of the elements of the sequence; the assumption being that participants actively update the to-be-recalled list as presentation progresses. However recent evidence has cast doubt on this assumption, and the present study examined the strategies that participants employ in such tasks by comparing the serial position curves found in verbal and visuo-spatial updating tasks with those seen in standard serial recall tasks. These comparisons showed that even when the same number of items are presented or recalled, participants perform less well in an updating than a serial recall context. In addition, while standard serial position effects were observed for serial recall, marked recency and reduced or absent primacy effects were seen in updating conditions. These findings suggest that participants do not typically adopt a strategy of actively updating the memory list in updating tasks, but instead tend to wait passively until the list ends before trying to recall the most recently presented items.     

Do individuals with autism process words in context? Evidence from language-mediated eye-movements

It is widely argued that people with autism have difficulty processing ambiguous linguistic information in context. To investigate this claim, we recorded the eye-movements of 24 adolescents with autism spectrum disorder and 24 language-matched peers as they monitored spoken sentences for words corresponding to objects on a computer display. Following a target word, participants looked more at a competitor object sharing the same onset than at phonologically unrelated objects. This effect was, however, mediated by the sentence context such that participants looked less at the phonological competitor if it was semantically incongruous with the preceding verb. Contrary to predictions, the two groups evidenced similar effects of context on eye-movements. Instead, across both groups, the effect of sentence context was reduced in individuals with relatively poor language skills. Implications for the weak central coherence account of autism are discussed.     

Do emotional stimuli interfere with response inhibition? Evidence from the stop signal paradigm

Participants performed a stop signal task in which an emotional picture preceded a neutral stimulus. They were asked to respond on the basis of the identity of the neutral stimulus unless an auditory tone was presented, in which case participants should try to withhold their response. In Experiment 1, we used positive, neutral and negative pictures. Results demonstrated that the presentation of an emotional stimulus prolonged both response and stopping latencies regardless of the valence of the emotional stimulus. This suggested that the degree of arousal could modulate the interference effect. In Experiment 2, high- and low-arousing pictures with a positive or negative valence were used. In line with the arousal hypothesis, high-arousal pictures interfered more with responding and stopping than low-arousing pictures whereas the valence of the pictures had little or no effect. These findings support the hypothesis that emotional stimuli interrupt ongoing cognitively controlled activities because they attract attention away from these ongoing activities.     

Does dividing attention become harder with age? findings from the divided attention questionnaire

Abstract

We developed a self-assessment scale, the Divided Attention Questionnaire (DAQ), to investigate whether adults report that dividing attention between two activities becomes more difficult with increasing age, as would be predicted by a model of age-related reductions in inhibition (Hasher & Zacks, 1988). the DAQ difficulty rating scale produced satisfactory estimates of internal consistency and test-retest stability. Older adults, relative to young adults, rated most combinations of activities as more difficult, and also reported that most combinations had become more difficult over time. However, self-perceptions of ability in old age varied with task domain, such that activities that involved monitoring of novel information became increasingly difficult with advanced age, while routine activities and those involving speech processing showed little change across the older groups studied. We suggest that belieft about self-efficacy under conditions of divided attention can have important consequences for the behavior of the elderly.     

Is the Cogmed program effective for youths with attention deficit/hyperactivity disorder under pharmacological treatment?

The primary objective of this study was to examine the effects of the Cogmed training program on working memory among youths 7 to 13 years old, with attention deficit/hyperactivity disorder (ADHD) type and comorbidity controlled for. A secondary objective was to examine the generalization of effects to ADHD symptoms, nonverbal reasoning, attentional and executive functions, inhibition, reading comprehension, and mathematical reasoning. Participants were under pharmacological treatment for ADHD combined type and a comorbidity. They were randomized into an experimental group that received the Cogmed program and an active control group that received a low-intensity comparison version of the training. They were evaluated at three time points: 6 weeks prior to intervention onset (T1), immediately prior to onset (T2), and 1 week following intervention completion (T3). Results indicate no significant effect attributable to the Cogmed program. The fact that participants were on medication at the time of training and evaluation normalized their performances and limited the detection of effects. Moreover, cognitive training did not lead to a reduction in ADHD symptoms or to an improvement in the other cognitive functions measured or in academic performance. The results of this study do not demonstrate the effectiveness of the Cogmed program for youths with ADHD combined type and a comorbidity when they receive the training while under pharmacological treatment.     

Is attention necessary for object identification? Evidence from eye movements during the inspection of real-world scenes

Eye movements were recorded during the display of two images of a real-world scene that were inspected to determine whether they were the same or not (a comparative visual search task). In the displays where the pictures were different, one object had been changed, and this object was sometimes taken from another scene and was incongruent with the gist. The experiment established that incongruous objects attract eye fixations earlier than the congruous counterparts, but that this effect is not apparent until the picture has been displayed for several seconds. By controlling the visual saliency of the objects the experiment eliminates the possibility that the incongruency effect is dependent upon the conspicuity of the changed objects. A model of scene perception is suggested whereby attention is unnecessary for the partial recognition of an object that delivers sufficient information about its visual characteristics for the viewer to know that the object is improbable in that particular scene, and in which full identification requires foveal inspection.     

Does auditory streaming require attention? Evidence from attentional selectivity in short-term memory

R. P. Carlyon, R. Cusack, J. M. Foxton, and I. H. Robertson (2001) have argued that attention is crucial for auditory streaming. The authors review R. P. Carlyon et al.'s (2001) arguments and suggest that a pertinent literature, the irrelevant sound paradigm--demonstrating preattentive auditory streaming--has been overlooked. In illustration of this alternative approach, the authors include a novel single experiment demonstrating the impact of preattentive auditory streaming on short-term serial memory. It is concluded that R. P. Carlyon et al.'s (2001) results do not definitively demonstrate that auditory streaming processes are dependent on attention; indeed, they are compatible with alternative accounts of the relationship between perceptual organization and attention.     

Self-focused attention,performance expectancies,and the intensity of effort: Do people try harder for harder goals?

Many theories argue that goal striving is more intense when people have optimistic expectancies for achieving the goal and when attention is self-focused. Brehm’s motivational intensity theory, however, predicts that the intensity of motivation is only as high as necessary, so people will try harder for difficult tasks than for easy tasks, all else equal. The present experiment compared these two approaches by manipulating two levels of self-focused attention (low and high self-awareness, via a mirror) and two levels of task difficulty (easy and difficult). Effort was assessed as cardiovascular reactivity, particularly change in systolic blood pressure. Neither high self-focus nor an easy task per se caused increased effort; instead, high self-focus significantly increased systolic reactivity when the task was difficult. Effort was thus higher despite less optimistic goal expectancies, a finding that is predicted by Brehm’s motivational intensity theory but not by traditional self-regulation models.     

Is position "special" in visual attention? Evidence that top-down processes guide visual selection.

The role of spatial position in selective visual processing has been the source of recent debate. Experiments by Tsal and Lavie (1988) and van der Heijden et al. (1996) have been designed to establish the status of position in visual selection. Tsal and Lavie found that observers tend to select letters from a briefly presented array according to position. Using the same paradigm, van der Heijden et al. found that observers tend to select according to colour, except under conditions of low contrast and unrestricted eye movements. The present study attempted to reconcile these findings by exploring the influence of top-down processes (task instructions) while explicitly controlling for eye movements. Experiment 1 demonstrated there was no inherent selection bias for stimuli similar to those used by van der Heijden et al., suggesting that the tendency to select according to colour found by van der Heijden et al. was due to task demands. Experiment 2 further established the role of top-down factors by replicating the results of van der Heijden et al. with our stimuli. Experiment 3 demonstrated that selection can be switched from colour to position by changing the demands of the task. These results suggest that selection may be accounted for by task demands (e.g., instructions) with no priority access for position information.     

Does heart rate differentiate neurotic from normal people in a conditional reflex test?

This study is to compare heart reactivity between normals and anxiety neurotic patients. Five male and five female patients with anxiety neurosis and four male and five female normal persons were submitted to classic delayed conditional reflexes with different probabilities of reinforcement (shock), to a defensive instrumental conditional reflex, and to a neutral nonreinforced stimulus. The basal heart frequency was higher in neurotics and in women than in normals and men. The conditional stimulus (CS) associated with a shock generally produced a bradycardia in normal individuals and in neurotic men, but a tachycardia in neurotic women (effects most pronounced in cases with 100% shock probability). The instrumental CS caused a tachycardia in all of the groups, with highest values in neurotic women. The neutral stimulus produced bradycardia in all persons. The aftereffect of the light stimulus depended on whether a shock was administered and on the CS. The differences between neurotics and normals are explained as caused by the heightened excitatory level of the CNS of the neurotic group, produced by the unspecific activating effect of chronic anxiety, and differences of plastic processes in both groups, resulting in different effects of phasic anxiety on the heart. Complex inhibitory-excitatory interactions of the sympathetic and the vagal system underlying the heart rate changes may be assumed. Possible mechanisms leading to sex differences are discussed.