The two time vectors of Nachträglichkeit in the development of ego organization: Significance of the concept for the symbolization of nameless traumas and anxieties1

The author describes Freud ’s conception of Nachträglichkeit as an active process that bridges the gap between past affective vicissitudes and the cognitive present by way of meaning. Symbolization is thereby subsequently [nachträglich] conferred on early traumatic events, which thus become susceptible to omnipotent control. The two time vectors of Nachträglichkeit are discussed: the first is a causal process operating in the forward direction of time against the background of a factual reality, while the second is a backward movement that permits an understanding of unconscious scenes and phantasies taking place at primary-process level. This twofold temporal motion was observed and described by Freud early on. However, its significance often remained hidden prior to his study of Moses. It was mostly overlooked in English and French translations, thus giving rise to a one-sided understanding of the concept in the various psychoanalytic cultures, as either deferred action or après-coup. Freud ’s Moses study addresses both temporal aspects of Nachträglichkeit, seeking not only to reconstruct a past event on a causal, deterministic basis, but also to understand the subjective truth of that event in the transference along the retrograde time line. The decisive criterion for the conceptual and clinical separation of the two time vectors is the development of ego organization and the capacity for symbolization. The two vectors should not be separated on the factual level, as both aspects of Nachträglichkeit are essential to the understanding of unconscious processes, combining as they do in a relationship of circular complementarity.     

Some reflections on the unique time of Nachträglichkeit in theory and clinical practice

Of the various forms that the matter of time assumes in analysis, Nachträglichkeit represents Freud’s first intuition on the subject. The focus of this article is directed toward the specific temporal dimension that the concept of Nachträglichkeit expresses, and how that dimension, which overturns linear time, is expressed in clinical work. The concept of Nachträglichkeit is approached from a theoretical point of view, tracing back the role and development that this notion has had in psychoanalytic Freudian and post‐Freudian thinking. The goal of this article is to demonstrate how Nachträglichkeit represents the unique temporal movement of the analytic session and the characteristic positioning of the mind of the analyst at work. Three clinical examples are presented. The analytic scene is formulated as occurring in two times, and through the working through that takes place, patients can recover the enigmatic ‘remainder’, which is consequently traumatic and which has compulsively accompanied them through the various times of their existence. Nachträglichkeit, as a non‐linear temporality, introduces a unique dimension into the clinical work that influences listening to and interpretation of the material. The recognition of that (trauma, infantile sexuality, non‐linear temporality) has consequences for the analyst’s way of working in session and on the interpretation of clinical material, as I will try to show through my theoretical exposition and clinical examples.     

THE “AS‐YET SITUATION” IN WINNICOTT'S “FRAGMENT OF AN ANALYSIS”: YOUR FATHER “NEVER DID YOU THE HONOR OF”… YET

The author proposes a new hypothesis in relation to Winnicott's “Fragment of an Analysis”: that as early as 1955, in the case described in this text, Winnicott is creating the paternal function in his patient's psychic functioning by implicitly linking his interpretations regarding the father to the Freudian concept of Nachträglichkeit. The author introduces an original clinical concept, the as‐yet situation, which she has observed in her own clinical work, as well as in Winnicott's analysis of the patient described in “Fragment of an Analysis” (1955).     

Infantile sexuality and Freud's legacy

The topic of sexuality and infantile sexuality, though less frequently discussed by psychoanalysis in recent decades, has received renewed attention for some years. The intention of this paper is to share some reflections around the role of infantile sexuality in our thinking, how we encounter it in our work with patients and in clinical material. Through reference to questions put forward by Freud (1905) in Three Essays, this paper takes into consideration some areas of the debate that has developed on the subject of infantile sexuality, starting from Freud's original intuition, including various hypotheses on the genesis of the sexual drive. The author will concentrate on two specific points. Firstly, how infantile sexuality – as a permanent dimension of the subject's existence – unfolds in the relationship and is deeply influenced by it. And that is how in childhood and adolescence, infantile sexuality ushers in parental sexuality – just as, in the case of our patients, infantile sexuality ushers in the analyst's sexuality. The second point pertains to the temporal dimension within which infantile sexuality is inscribed. The hypothesis that the author proposes is that infantile sexuality may be understood in the specific time of psychoanalysis [Nachträglichkeit], distinct and different with respect to the linear, evolutionary dimension.     

DEN TÄNKANDE KROPPEN

In this paper, the author thematizes guilt through a reading of Camus' novel “The Fall”. The first part of the novel is presented as describing a state of mind in which the main character has not been able to become his own self, and this is conceptualised through Kierkegaard's concepts “sickness unto death” and “sickness of despair”. The second part of the novel is described as picturing a “fall”, i.e., the coming into being of a self that realizes itself and becomes conscious of its own guilt. This guilt is finally described through Freud's “scientific myth” of patricide, and the “nachträglich” realization of this ancient deed.     

ON THE ACTIVITIES OF THE SCANDINAVIAN PSYCHOANALYTIC SOCIETIES

This article discusses some basic problems of the theory of science connected with understanding the psychoanalytic process. The epistemology of psychoanalysis is seen in relation to the specific status of time, space and causality. It is argued that in psychic life, time and space cannot be a priori categories in the Kantian sense because they are constituted in psychic development and in the dynamics of the psyche and can be abolished in psychopathological conditions as well as in the unconscious. Psychic causality is discussed in relation to Freud's concepts of Nachträglichkeit and overdetermination and remarks are made on the necessity to consider the complex nature of psychic causality when doing research.     

Winnicott's rejection of the basic concepts of Freud's metapsychology1

In this paper, the author attempts to show how Winnicott rejected the basic concepts of Freud's metapsychology, namely the concepts of Trieb(instinct/drive), psychical apparatus and libido. To that purpose, he first elucidates what metapsychology is, according to Freud. Freud describes metapsychology as a speculative superstructure of psychoanalysis in which the aforementioned concepts correspond to the dynamic, topographical and economic viewpoints. The author then presents an explanation of what metapsychology means in Winnicott's view, and examines his criticism of this kind of speculative theorization in psychoanalysis, as well as his suggested substitute for each of those basic concepts. Subsequent analysis shows that Winnicott replaced the main concepts of the metapsychological theory, which have no correlation whatsoever in the phenomenal world, with a set of other, non‐speculative concepts, thereby favouring a factual theorization.     

Commentary on ‘The arms of the chimeras’ by Béatrice Ithier

In this Commentary I will first of all summarise my understanding of the proposal set out by Béatrice Ithier concerning her concept of the ‘chimera’. The main part of my essay will focus on Ithier's claim that her concept of the chimera could be described as a ‘mental squiggle’ because it corresponds to Winnicott's work illustrated in his book ‘Therapeutic Consultations’ (1971). At the core of Ithier's chimera is the notion of a traumatic link between analyst and patient, which is the reason she enlists the work of Winnicott. I will argue, however, that Ithier's claim is based on a misperception of the theory that underpins Winnicott's therapeutic consultations because, different from Ithier's clinical examples of work with traumatised patients, Winnicott is careful to select cases who are from an ‘average expectable environment’ i.e. a good enough family. Moreover, Winnicott does not refer to any traumatic affinity with his patients, or to experiencing a quasi‐hallucinatory state of mind during the course of the consultations. These aspects are not incorporated into his theory. In contrast (to the concept Ithier attempts to advance), Winnicott's squiggle game constitutes an application of psychoanalysis intended as a diagnostic consultation. In that sense Winnicott's therapeutic consultations are comparable with the ordinary everyday work between analyst and analysand in a psychoanalytic treatment. My Commentary concludes with a question concerning the distinction between the ordinary countertransference in working with patients who are thinking symbolically in contrast to an extraordinary countertransference that I suggest is more likely to arise with patients who are traumatised and thus functioning at a borderline or psychotic level.     

Notes on ‘Bemächtigungstrieb’ and Strachey’s translation as ‘instinct for mastery’

This short paper looks at Freud’s use of the term ‘Bemächtigungstrieb’ and its translation by Strachey as ‘instinct for mastery’ when Freud was describing the motives behind his grandson’s game with the wooden reel and string in Beyond the Pleasure Principle. The word ‘Macht’ [power], which is contained in the word ‘Bemächtigung’ points to Freud’s difficult relationship with Alfred Adler, whose early theories on the aggressive drive and later theories on ‘striving for power’ were initially rejected by Freud. Looking at the changes in Freud’s reception of Adlerian terms, some of which he later integrated into his own theory, throws light on his choice of the word ‘Bemächtigungstrieb’ in 1920, when he was just beginning to introduce his thoughts on the death instinct. A slightly different translation of the word ‘Bemächtigungstrieb’, one which takes these historical and theoretical aspects into account, could make these connections clearer for the English reader.     

The unconscious

A discussion of the unconscious leads naturally to Freud and to a theory on subjectivity we may designate as de-centred. The unconscious reminds us that not only do we not know ourselves. In the core of our subjectivity, we have to acknowledge the notion of otherness. Re-reading Freud's text, The Unconscious, from 1915, the current author emphasises the character and function of the unconscious as radically different from what we know about conscious processes. This allows for the concept of the preconscious, which the author links to Winnicott's intermediary area and Green's tertiary processes. Taking as point of departure Freud's differentiation of word presentation and thing presentation, the author points to Freud's introduction of the term thing-cathexies of the object as designating the primal psychic representation. The Freudian perspective is broadened, encompassing the notion of otherness as discussed by Laplanche and Aulagnier. Concluding the paper, the author draws some implications for psychoanalytic technique, focusing especially on transference.     

Mysticism,Reality, Illusion,and the Freudian Critique of Religion

Freud's critique of religion cannot be fully understood if his ontogenetic perspective is explored outside of his phylogenetic perspective. The former allows for illusionistic thought processes that are orthogonal to reality claims. The latter requires consideration of empirical claims to truth within a social psychological perspective. It is only the phylogenetic perspective that allows Freud to maintain that religion is delusional, whether or not it is also illusional. Freud's rejection of "as if" philosophies as exemplified by Vaihinger is based upon his refusal to allow religious truth claims to escape their empirical, social foundations. Recent efforts to revive psychological theories of religion rooted only in illusionistic thought, as exemplified in the use of Winnicott's conceptualization, must confront social psychological issues similar to those articulated within Freud's phylogenetic view. A mystical reading of Freud is suggested in which claims to truth within psychoanalysis, science, and religion can be confronted in an empirical and inherently social manner.     

Something Was Lost in Freud’s <Emphasis Type="Italic">Beyond the Pleasure Principle</Emphasis>: A Ferenczian Reading*

Freud’s Beyond the Pleasure Principle (1920) brought a lot of new possibilities to psychoanalytic theory, but also a series of losses. While I recognize the importance of the death drive as a metapsychological construct, I argue that the first thing that went missing with the arrival of this groundbreaking Freudian text is the theorization of the ego instincts or the self-preservative drives. Freud never articulated some plausible inheritors of the ego instincts. I follow the Budapest School, and especially the voice of Sándor Ferenczi, for addressing this loss. The second thing that went missing after Beyond the Pleasure Principle is our openness in thinking through repetition. With the seductive formulation of the “daemonic” repetition in this 1920 text, our theoretical imagination around repetition seems to have been affected. I draw on the work of Sándor Ferenczi for exploring new forms of repetition. Finally, I offer a Ferenczian re-reading of the Freudian Nachträglichkeit, which I see as crucial in the process of pluralizing our thinking on repetition.     

The name of the Piggle: Reconsidering Winnicott's classic case in light of some conversations with the adult ‘Gabrielle’

On the 40th anniversary of its publication, the author re‐reads Winnicott's The Piggle – a case of ‘on demand analysis’ with a child suffering from psychotic night terrors – in light of new information about the patient. Conversations between the author and ‘Gabrielle’ explore two areas not regarded as priorities by Winnicott: the transgenerational transmission of pathology/trauma, and the ways that language, in general – and given names, in particular – organize individual subjectivity. The question raised is to what degree Winnicott – who described the treatment as “psychoanalysis partagé [shared]” due to the parents’ involvement – thought of the pathology itself as ‘shared.’ The goal is not to supplant but to expand Winnicott's understanding of the case, borrowing insights from the work of Lacan and others.     

BOOKS RECEIVED

Abstract

Since the concept of imaginative elaboration of body functioning, which is essential to Winnicott's idea of psyche-soma, has rarely been investigated up to now, this article sets out to do this and tries to pursue the meaning and articulation of that concept in the corpus of Winnicott's theory. In this way, it contributes to bringing the body to the core of psychoanalytical theory.     

Full and empty spaces in the analytic process2

In this paper the author discusses two categories of patients which differ in terms of the impact they have in the countertransference. On the one hand, there are patients who create an empty space in the analyst's mind. The response they provoke is a kind of depressive feeling that remains after they leave. The patient may bring dreams and associations, but they do not reverberate in the analyst's mind. The experience is of dryness, a dearth of memory, which may‐at times‐leave the analyst with a sense of exclusion from the patient's internal world. At the other extreme, there are patients who fill the consulting room. They do that with their words, dreams and associations but also with their emotions and their actions. The experience is that the analyst is over‐included in the patient's world. They have dreams that directly refer to the analyst and the analyst feels consistently involved in the patient's analysis. The pathway through which the analyst can understand both these types of patients is via the countertransference or, to put it another way, the analyst's passion. In ‘Analysis terminable and interminable’ Freud suggested that the bedrock of any analysis is the repudiation of femininity. The author believes this statement may be viewed as lying at the crossroads of the discussion about the limits of the theoretical and clinical psychoanalytic formulations which she refers to. In the examples presented the author relates the repudiation of femininity in its connections to the gaps implicit in psychoanalytic understanding.     

‘Though he slay me,yet will I trust in him’: a critical reconstruction of Winnicott's theory of value

This paper extrapolates an outline for a theory of value from Winnicott's reflections on war in ‘Discussion of war aims’ (1940). The author treats Winnicott's discussion as an occasion for a critical reconstruction of his theory of life‐values. He discerns an implicit set of distinctions in Winnicott's reflections on war, including different orders of value (existential, ethical, and psychosocial); a distinction between maturity and necessity; and a yet more fundamental distinction between violence and brutality. The paper argues, on the basis of these distinctions, that Winnicott allows for an understanding of one's encounter with the enemy as an ethical relation. The main argument of the paper is that the ethical attitude underpins recognition of the enemy's humanity. On a more critical note, the author argues that Winnicott doesn't adhere consistently to the ethical attitude he presupposes, that in certain passages he privileges the maturity of combatants over the humanity of the enemy.     

MOTILITY,AGGRESSION, AND THE BODILY I: AN INTERPRETATION OF WINNICOTT

Among the central ideas associated with the name of Winnicott, scant mention is made of motility. This is largely attributable to Winnicott himself, who never thematized motility and never wrote a paper specifically devoted to the topic. This paper suggests both that the idea of motility is nonetheless of central significance in Winnicott's thought, and that motility is of central importance in the development and constitution of the bodily I. In elaborating both these suggestions, the paper gives particular attention to the connections between motility, continuity, aggression, and creativity in Winnicott's work.     

CLINICAL WINNICOTT: TRAVELING A REVOLUTIONARY ROAD

The author contends that, contrary to the usual perception that Winnicott followed a linear progression “through pediatrics to psychoanalysis,” Winnicott's vision was always a psychoanalytic one, even during his early pediatric work. His place in the development of psychoanalytic theory is highlighted, and the author discusses such key Winnicottian concepts as transitional space, the false self, and the use of the object. Winnicott's unique approach to the form and value of analytic interpretation is particularly emphasized, and his thoughts on the treatment of depression are also addressed, as well as his distinction between regression and withdrawal. Included is a summary of convergences and divergences between Winnicott's thinking and that of Bion.     

Fear of breakdown and the unlived life

Winnicott's Fear of breakdown is an unfinished work that requires that the reader be not only a reader, but also a writer of this work which often gestures toward meaning as opposed to presenting fully developed ideas. The author's understanding of the often confusing, sometimes opaque, argument of Winnicott's paper is as follows. In infancy there occurs a breakdown in the mother–infant tie that forces the infant to take on, by himself, emotional events that he is unable to manage. He short‐circuits his experience of primitive agony by generating defense organizations that are psychotic in nature, i.e. they substitute self‐created inner reality for external reality, thus foreclosing his actually experiencing critical life events. By not experiencing the breakdown of the mother–infant tie when it occurred in infancy, the individual creates a psychological state in which he lives in fear of a breakdown that has already happened, but which he did not experience. The author extends Winnicott's thinking by suggesting that the driving force of the patient's need to find the source of his fear is his feeling that parts of himself are missing and that he must find them if he is to become whole. What remains of his life feels to him like a life that is mostly an unlived life.     

Sexuality and meaning in Freud and Merleau‐Ponty

This article analyzes the links between the conception of the body and of sexuality found in Freud and Merleau‐Ponty. The French philosopher refers to Freud in various of his works, and performs a reading of Freud through which he rescues the meaning that the latter gives to sexuality as he integrates it into the totality of the person, without making it into a blind or merely instinctive force. As a consequence of this integration, the notions of the unconscious and of instinct or drive are interpreted in the light of the meaning or signification that they have in the person's behavior. Merleau‐Ponty's notion of pre‐reflective knowledge plays a decisive role in this understanding of meaning. In the same way, it allows important contemporary analysts to use these studies in their therapeutic work and also in psychological studies.