Over‐imitation in children with autism and Down syndrome

Typically developing children have been shown to imitate the specific means used by an adult to achieve an object‐directed outcome, even if a more efficient method is available. It has been argued that this behaviour can be attributed to social and communicative motivations. The purpose of this study was to investigate whether children with autism spectrum disorders (ASD), relative to children with Down syndrome (DS), show a reduced tendency to copy the exact means used by an adult to produce a novel outcome. To achieve this a sample of 34 children (22 with ASD and 12 with DS) were given a test of object‐directed imitation. Contrary to expectation, children in both groups imitated the specific method of the model to the same high extent. This finding is in line with suggestions that object‐directed imitation is relatively spared in children with autism but is surprising given arguments linking such imitation to socially based motivations. Nevertheless, children's ability to successfully copy the model was associated with their communicative ability, providing some support for the link between imitation and communication.     

The representational status of pretence: Evidence from typical development and autism

The question of whether understanding pretend play requires meta‐representational skill was examined among typically developing children and individuals with autism. Participants were presented with closely equated true and false pretence trials in which they had to judge a protagonist's pretend reading of a situation, which either matched or differed from their own. Results showed that individuals' theory of mind abilities determined their performance on false, but not true, pretence trials. These findings imply that meta‐representation is involved when an individual has to make sense of a pretend state of mind that differs from their own, but, crucially, they also show that pretend play can often be understood without meta‐representational competence.     

Differences in Theory of Mind and Pretend Play Associations in Children with and Without Specific Language Impairment

Children with specific language impairment (SLI) have difficulty engaging in social pretend play, which cannot be explained exclusively by their deficient language skills. Alternatively, the ability to represent mental states (Theory of Mind [ToM]) might be important in appreciating peers' perspectives during pretend play. This study investigated whether ToM was associated with pretend play abilities in children with and without SLI. Forty‐four children (22 with SLI, 22 with typical development [TD]) between 4 and 6 years of age participated in ToM tasks and a dyadic role play activity. Children with SLI performed significantly more poorly on ToM tasks than children with TD; however, there were no significant group differences in children's role play abilities. Partial correlations revealed a positive and significant association between ToM and social pretend play in children with TD but a negative and not significant association in children with SLI. These findings suggest that not all forms and aspects of pretend play require mental representation in order to understand or engage in pretend play. Further, children with SLI may differ in their mental representational abilities from children with TD. Copyright © 2015 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Assessing different aspects of pretend play within a play setting: Towards a standardized assessment of pretend play in young children

The present study suggests a method with which to assess the interrelations between different types of pretend play. In contrast to standard methods in this area, the various types of pretend play were measured within an interactive play scenario. The pretend play tasks were included in a semi‐structured play sequence and presented to young children between 24 and 30 months of age (N=30). Self‐ and doll‐directed pretence, object substitution, pretence with realistic objects, and self‐initiated pretend play, as well as the understanding that an object had been given two identities was tested. The capacity for dual representation was assessed by asking for the real and pretend identity of an object. Age differences were found in the overall score for elicited pretence but not for all items separately. Individual items also differed in difficulty and thus are of potential use for assessing intraindividual differences in pretend play. Findings are discussed in the context of current theories and methods concerning the development and assessment of pretend play.     

Adult modelling facilitates young children's generation of novel pretend acts

The present work investigated the effect of modelling on children's pretend play behaviour. Thirty‐seven children aged between 27 and 41 months were given 4 min of free play with a dollhouse and associated toy props (pre‐modelling phase). Using dolls, an experimenter then acted out a series of vignettes involving object substitutions, imaginary play and attribution of properties. Children were subsequently provided with an additional 4 min free play (post‐modelling phase). Consistent with past research, more pretence was exhibited after modelling than before. Furthermore, in the post‐modelling phase, children were as likely to generate their own novel pretence as they were to copy the actions demonstrated by the experimenter. They also increased the number of novel symbolic acts involving imaginary play from the pre‐ to the post‐modelling phase. This study highlights how young children will not only imitate a model's demonstration of pretend acts but also use this demonstration to catalyze the creation of their own pretence. Copyright © 2008 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Young children's understanding of multiple object identity: appearance, pretense and function

Evidence from theory-of-mind tasks suggests that young children have substantial difficulty thinking about multiple object identity and multiple versions of reality. On the other hand, evidence from children's understanding of pretense indicates that children have little trouble understanding dual object identity and counterfactual scenarios that are involved in pretend play. Two studies reported here show that this competence is not limited to pretend play. Three-year-olds also understand the dual identity involved in unusual functional use (X is being used as Y), even though they have difficulty understanding deceptive appearance (X looks like Y). We suggest that children are able to distinguish extrinsic object properties from intrinsic ones (function vs. category-membership) better than they can distinguish superficial object properties from deep ones (appearance vs. category-membership).     

Children infer affiliative and status relations from watching others imitate

We investigated whether young children are able to infer affiliative relations and relative status from observing others' imitative interactions. Children watched videos showing one individual imitating another and were asked about the relationship between those individuals. Experiment 1 showed that 5‐year‐olds assume that individuals imitate people they like. Experiment 2 showed that children of the same age assume that an individual who imitates is relatively lower in status. Thus, although there are many advantages to imitating others, there may also be reputational costs. Younger children, 4‐year‐olds, did not reliably make either inference. Taken together, these experiments demonstrate that imitation conveys valuable information about third party relationships and that, at least by the age of 5, children are able to use this information in order to infer who is allied with whom and who is dominant over whom. In doing so, they add a new dimension to our understanding of the role of imitation in human social life.     

Learning without representational change: development of numerical estimation in individuals with Williams syndrome

Experience engenders learning, but not all learning involves representational change. In this paper, we provide a dramatic case study of the distinction between learning and representational change. Specifically, we examined long‐ and short‐term changes in representations of numeric magnitudes by asking individuals with Williams syndrome (WS) and typically developing (TD) children to estimate the position of numbers on a number line. As with TD children, accuracy of WS children's numerical estimates improved with age (Experiment 1) and feedback (Experiment 2). Both long‐ and short‐term changes in estimates of WS individuals, however, followed an atypical developmental trajectory: as TD children gained in age and experience, increases in accuracy were accompanied by a logarithmic‐to‐linear shift in estimates of numerical magnitudes, whereas in WS individuals, accuracy increased but logarithmic estimation patterns persisted well into adulthood and after extensive training. These findings suggest that development of numerical estimation in WS is both arrested and atypical.     

Dramatic pretend play games uniquely improve emotional control in young children

Pretense is a naturally occurring, apparently universal activity for typically developing children. Yet its function and effects remain unclear. One theorized possibility is that pretense activities, such as dramatic pretend play games, are a possible causal path to improve children's emotional development. Social and emotional skills, particularly emotional control, are critically important for social development, as well as academic performance and later life success. However, the study of such approaches has been criticized for potential bias and lack of rigor, precluding the ability to make strong causal claims. We conducted a randomized, component control (dismantling) trial of dramatic pretend play games with a low‐SES group of 4‐year‐old children (N = 97) to test whether such practice yields generalized improvements in multiple social and emotional outcomes. We found specific effects of dramatic play games only on emotional self‐control. Results suggest that dramatic pretend play games involving physicalizing emotional states and traits, pretending to be animals and human characters, and engaging in pretend scenarios in a small group may improve children's emotional control. These findings have implications for the function of pretense and design of interventions to improve emotional control in typical and atypical populations. Further, they provide support for the unique role of dramatic pretend play games for young children, particularly those from low‐income backgrounds. A video abstract of this article can be viewed at: https://youtu.be/2GVNcWKRHPk     

Gaze,goals and growing up: Effects on imitative grasping

Developmental differences in the use of social‐attention cues to imitation were examined among children aged 3 and 6 years old (n = 58) and adults (n = 29). In each of 20 trials, participants watched a model grasp two objects simultaneously and move them together. On every trial, the model directed her gaze towards only one of the objects. Some object pairs were related and had a clear functional relationship (e.g., flower, vase), while others were functionally unrelated (e.g., cardboard square, ladybug). Owing to attentional effects of eye gaze, it was expected that all participants would more faithfully imitate the grasp on the gazed‐at object than the object not gazed‐at. Children were expected to imitate less faithfully on trials with functionally related objects than those without, due to goal‐hierarchy effects. Results support effects of eye gaze on imitation of grasping. Children's grasping accuracy on functionally related and functionally unrelated trials was similar, but they were more likely to only use one hand on trials where the object pairs were functionally related than unrelated. Implications for theories of imitation are discussed.     

The effect of social engagement on 24-month-olds' imitation from live and televised models

To date, developmental research has rarely addressed the notion that imitation serves an interpersonal, socially based function. The present research thus examined the role of social engagement on 24-month-olds' imitation by manipulating the social availability of the model. In Experiment 1, the children were more likely to imitate the exact actions of a live socially responsive model compared to a videotaped model who could not provide socially contingent feedback. In Experiment 2, the children were more likely to imitate the exact actions of a model with whom they could communicate via a closed-circuit TV system than a videotaped model who could not provide interactive feedback. This research provides clear evidence that children's imitative behavior is affected by the social nature of the model. These findings are discussed in relation to theories on imitation and the video deficit.     

Video reminders in a representational change task: memory for cues but not beliefs or statements

Two experiments investigated the effect of video reminders on 3-year-olds' performance in a representational change task. In Experiment 1, children in a video support condition viewed videotapes of their initial incorrect statements about a misleading container prior to being asked to report their initial belief. Children in a control condition viewed an irrelevant videotape. Despite reporting what they had said on the videotape, children in the video support condition typically failed the representational change task. Experiment 2 replicated the main findings from Experiment 1 and also revealed that a video reminder failed to increase the likelihood that children would correctly report what they had said about the object. Results are discussed in terms of the processes whereby mnemonic cues might affect performance on tasks assessing theory of mind.     

Imitative interaction increases social interest and elicited imitation in non‐verbal children with autism

Recent studies indicate that being intensely imitated for a brief period of time increases social interest among children with autism. The aim of this study was to replicate and extend these findings. Twenty children with an autism spectrum disorder (ASD) were randomly assigned to one of two interaction strategies: imitation (n=10) or contingent (n=10). The children had little or no functional speech, and their developmental age averaged 25 months (mean chronological age =6:5 years). Both conditions were presented with repeated sessions of a modified version of Nadel's ‘still‐face’ paradigm (still‐face/intervention/still‐face/spontaneous play). The analysis revealed a significant increase of both proximal and distal social behaviours (touch and look at person) for the imitation condition, which confirms previous reports. In addition, an increase in elicited imitation, as measured with the PEP‐R developmental assessment procedure, was also observed for children in the imitation condition, but not in the contingent condition. This finding extends earlier reports in that it suggests that the social expectancies unlocked by imitation also spread to tasks outside the experimental setting. Copyright © 2006 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Imitation of Gestures in Children is Goal-directed

The view that the motor program activated during imitation is organized by goals was investigated by asking pre-school children to imitate a set of hand gestures of varying complexity that were made by an experimenter sitting in front of them. In Experiments 1 and 3, children reached for the correct object (one of their own ears or one of two dots on a table) but preferred to use the ipsilateral hand. This ipsilateral preference was not observed when hand movements were made to only one ear (Experiment 2), or when movements were diercted at space rather than physical objects (Experiment 3). The results are consistent with the notion that imitation is guided by goals and provide insights about how these goals are organized.     

Exploring the correlates of impaired non‐word repetition in Down syndrome

Non‐word repetition, in which participants hear and repeat unfamiliar verbal stimuli, is thought to provide a particularly sensitive measure of verbal short‐term memory capacity. However, performance on this task can also be constrained by hearing and speech production skills, and by an individuals' linguistic knowledge. This study examined real word and non‐word repetition in a sample of 18 children and adolescents with Down syndrome, and compared their performance to that of a control group of 18 typically developing children in order to determine the extent of any impairment in repetition performance in Down syndrome, and the correlates of performance in each group. Individuals with Down syndrome were impaired in repetition performance, although both groups showed similar benefits of linguistic knowledge on repetition accuracy. An analysis of the correlates of non‐word repetition revealed a double dissociation between the patterns of associations seen in the two groups. Among typically developing individuals, non‐word repetition was related to an independent measure of verbal short‐term memory but not to vocabulary knowledge. However, among individuals with Down syndrome, performance was related to vocabulary knowledge but not verbal short‐term memory span. This contrast is consistent with the view that impairment to verbal short‐term memory prevents this system from fully supporting non‐word repetition in Down syndrome.     

Developmental profiles for multiple object tracking and spatial memory: typically developing preschoolers and people with Williams syndrome

The ability to track moving objects, a crucial skill for mature performance on everyday spatial tasks, has been hypothesized to require a specialized mechanism that may be available in infancy (i.e. indexes). Consistent with the idea of specialization, our previous work showed that object tracking was more impaired than a matched spatial memory task in individuals with Williams syndrome (WS), a genetic disorder characterized by severe visuo‐spatial impairment. We now ask whether this unusual pattern of performance is a reflection of general immaturity or of true abnormality, possibly reflecting the atypical brain development in WS. To examine these two possibilities, we tested typically developing 3‐ and 4‐year‐olds and people with WS on multiple object tracking (MOT) and memory for static spatial location. The maximum number of objects that could be correctly tracked or remembered (estimated from the k‐statistic) showed similar developmental profiles in typically developing 3‐ and 4‐year‐old children, but the WS profile differed from either age group. People with WS could track more objects than 3‐year‐olds, and the same number as 4‐year‐olds, but they could remember the locations of more static objects than both 3‐ and 4‐year‐olds. Combining these data with those from our previous studies, we found that typically developing children show increases in the number of objects they can track or remember between the ages of 3 and 6, and these increases grow in parallel across the two tasks. In contrast, object tracking in older children and adults with WS remains at the level of 4‐year‐olds, whereas the ability to remember multiple locations of static objects develops further. As a whole, the evidence suggests that MOT and memory for static location develop in tandem typically, but not in WS. Atypical development of the parietal lobe in people with WS could play a causal role in the abnormal, uneven pattern of performance in WS. This interpretation is consistent with the idea that multiple object tracking engages different mechanisms from those involved in memory for static object location, and that the former can be particularly disrupted by atypical development.     

Becoming a high‐fidelity – super – imitator: what are the contributions of social and individual learning?

In contrast to other primates, human children's imitation performance goes from low to high fidelity soon after infancy. Are such changes associated with the development of other forms of learning? We addressed this question by testing 215 children (26–59 months) on two social conditions (imitation, emulation) – involving a demonstration – and two asocial conditions (trial‐and‐error, recall) – involving individual learning – using two touchscreen tasks. The tasks required responding to either three different pictures in a specific picture order (Cognitive: Airplane→Ball→Cow) or three identical pictures in a specific spatial order (Motor‐Spatial: Up→Down→Right). There were age‐related improvements across all conditions and imitation, emulation and recall performance were significantly better than trial‐and‐error learning. Generalized linear models demonstrated that motor‐spatial imitation fidelity was associated with age and motor‐spatial emulation performance, but cognitive imitation fidelity was only associated with age. While this study provides evidence for multiple imitation mechanisms, the development of one of those mechanisms – motor‐spatial imitation – may be bootstrapped by the development of another social learning skill – motor‐spatial emulation. Together, these findings provide important clues about the development of imitation, which is arguably a distinctive feature of the human species.     

Young children's understanding of pretend crying: The effect of context

Reasoning about another's pretend and real crying is related to ma'ny important social cognitive abilities (e.g., emotional understanding, appearance–reality, and theory of mind). This study investigated whether children aged 6 years and younger could distinguish between instances of pretend crying and real crying as presented in stories. Sixty‐five Japanese children aged 4–6 years were given stories within two contexts (Play and Non‐play). In the Play context, the protagonist of the story was pretending to cry or really crying during a pretend play activity. In the Non‐play context, the protagonist was also pretending to cry or really crying after his/her toy had been hidden by another child. The children answered questions about these crying events. The results showed that the 4‐ and 5‐year‐olds showed significantly better understanding of pretend crying in the Play context compared to the Non‐play context. In the Non‐play context, they were significantly less likely to understand the cause of pretend crying compared to the 6‐year‐olds. The results suggest that the context of pretend play facilitates the children's understanding of pretend crying.