Arguing about definitions

What are the implications of taking seriously Chaïm Perelman's proposition that “definitions are rhetorical”? Efforts to find Real Definitions are dysfunctional to the extent they direct argumentation toward pseudo “is” claims and away from explicit “ought” claims about how words are to be used. Addressing definitional disputes explicitly as propositions ofought rather thanis could put on the agenda the pragmatic concerns of definitional choice that might otherwise remain tacit.     

The rationality of faith and the benefits of religion

Religions don’t simply make claims about the world; they also offer existential resources, resources for dealing with basic human problems, such as the need for meaning, love, identity, and personal growth. For instance, a Buddhist’s resources for addressing these existential needs are different than a Christian’s. Now, imagine someone who is agnostic but who is deciding whether to put faith in religion A or religion B. Suppose she thinks A and B are evidentially on par, but she regards A as offering much more by way of existential resources. Is it epistemically rational for her to put her faith in A rather than B on this basis? It is natural to answer No. After all, what do the existential resources of a religion have to do with its truth? However, I argue that this attitude is mistaken. My thesis is that the extent to which it is good for a certain religion to be true is relevant to the epistemic (rather than merely pragmatic) rationality of faith in that religion. This is plausible, I’ll argue, on the correct account of the nature of faith, including the ways that emotion and desire can figure into faith and contribute to its epistemic rationality.     

Practical rationality for pluralists about the good

I argue that if a normative theory of practical rationality is to represent an adequate and coherent response to a plurality of incommensurable goods, it cannot be a maximising theory. It will have to be a theory that recognises two responses to goods as morally licit – promotion and respect – and one as morally illicit – violation. This result has a number of interesting corollaries, some of which I indicate. Perhaps the most interesting is that it makes the existence of a plurality of incommensurable goods incompatible with consequentialism.     

Arguing about tobacco and its effects on social representations

This study analysed the influence of social debate (group discussion) on previously held antagonistic social representations about tobacco. In the first phase of our study, we contacted 130 subjects in order to know what type of social representations they held. Two representations were found: a ‘psychopathological’ representation and a ‘critical’ one. After obtaining these results, and in a second phase, we randomly divided 100 subjects into 10 discussion groups, whilst another 30 subjects were assigned to the control condition (non-discussion group). The group discussion (social debate) led to a convergence of previously held representations. Debate emerged as a mechanism which could reduce the distance between groups who hold previously opposing representations.     

关于“宗教与文化关系”问题的思考

近年来,关于＂宗教与文化关系＂问题的讨论引起人们的关注和议论,宗教文化的内涵是什么、怎样认识宗教与文化的关系、执政党如何对待和处理宗教与文化的关系问题……对这一涉及宗教工作的重要理论问题,还需要进一步从马克思主义宗教观角度进行较为深入系统的基础性研究。     

Teaching about teaching sexuality and religion

Classroom instructors implementing pedagogical strategies for embodied learning about sexuality and religion need institutional support and assistance from colleagues and mentors to be successful. One means of providing institutional and peer support for classroom instructors is to host and lead a pedagogy workshop. Building on the work of Ott and Stephens on embodied learning and other articles and teaching tactics found throughout this issue of Teaching Theology and Religion, this article presents a sample design for a two‐hour workshop with faculty and/or graduate teaching assistants on the topic of teaching sexuality and religion. Non‐expert facilitators can lead this workshop and it is intended to start a conversation about pedagogy rather than to provide definitive answers to end the discussion. The goals are to demystify a taboo topic and to provide concrete strategies for teaching that will promote responsible engagement and a better‐integrated learning experience for students.     

Arguing about the ethics of past actions: An analysis of a taped conversation about a taped conversation

In the face of widespread cynicism as regards the possibilities for reasoned and reasonable adjudication of ethical differences in the postmodern age, this essay proposes a dialogic, reconstructive rhetoric as a vehicle for jointly arguing about the ethics of past actions, and looks to the friendship circle as a model arena for the playing out of such a rhetoric. Analyzed by way of illustration is a conversation among four good friends about the ethics of another, surreptitiously taped, conversation between two of those friends.The author wishes to thank Barbie Zeltzer and Micheal Krippondorf, both of Temple University, fot thier comments. Abridged versions of this paper were presented at the Iowa Conference on Narrative in the Human Sciences,1990 and at the England Symposium in Narratives in the Social Sciences. Commentaries at these conferences were also very useful.     

Arguing Anselm's Argument

Interpretation surrounding Saint Anselm's celebrated Proslogion often divides across analytical (philosophical) and non-analytical (historical, phenomenological, etc.) lines, with focus on the argument(s) of Chapters 2 and 3 isolated from the rest of the text. Interpretations may vary significantly, but the lines of interpretation continue along these divisions, thus propagating the distinction. Alternative tools, however, expose difficulties of such a division of the Proslogion ; they permit analytical justification of claims, concerns and intuitions of historical, phenomenological, and other interests, implicating a more complex re-interpretation of the presuppositions supporting the isolation of Chapters 2 and 3.
Based on an approach to reading developed from semiotics and text linguistics, this analysis challenges the major line of analytic interpretation of the Proslogion . This paper argues that the Proslogion has a structure different from the previously realized one, and that the structure consists of three nested frameworks within a devotional whole, faith leading the heart to illuminate the intellect, which in turn can grasp the syllogisms of chapters 2–3/4. Such a textual structure suggests strongly different conclusions about the core significance, utility, and meaning of the Proslogion as "argument".     

Arguing about the likelihood of consequences: Laypeople's criteria to distinguish strong arguments from weak ones

High-quality arguments have strong and lasting persuasive effects, suggesting that people can distinguish high- from low-quality arguments. However, we know little of what norms people employ to make that distinction. Some studies have shown that, in evaluating arguments from consequences, people are more sensitive to differences with respect to the desirability of these consequences than to differences in the likelihood that these consequences will occur. This raises the question of whether people lack the criteria to distinguish high-quality from low-quality arguments in support of such claims. In an experiment, 196 participants without any training in argument theory rated their acceptance of 30 claims about the likelihood that a certain outcome would result from a certain action. These claims were supported by an argument from authority, or from cause to effect, or from example. Arguments were systematically manipulated to violate nine specific criteria. For seven out of the nine criteria violation decreased acceptance of the claim supported. These findings show that people can use argument type specific criteria to distinguish high- from low-quality arguments.