亚里士多德实践智慧思想及其复兴

亚里士多德的实践智慧(phronesis)概念是其阐释实践哲学的重要范畴,也是西方实践哲学发展的重要基点.这个概念在经过了N.马基雅维利和F.培根的改造之后其本真的内涵却被遮蔽了,甚至退化为计算与权术的代名词.但是,进入到现代之后,亚氏的实践智慧概念开始复兴.这实际上已经标识出实践智慧的普遍意义,而对此问题的研究也已关系到对整个传统哲学的理解以及对整个现代西方哲学的理性重建.本文以此为基点,在厘清亚氏实践智慧的本真内涵及其重要意义的同时,也进一步阐明现代哲学在此理路上所应具有的样态.     

亚里士多德实践哲学中的德性与实践智慧

"德性"与"实践智慧"是亚里士多德阐释实践哲学的重要概念,也是现代美德伦理学的重要思想资源。但这两个概念之间的关系在亚里士多德的伦理学中阐述得不甚清楚,在中西方学界存在着不同意见。实践智慧与德性到底是什么关系,仍然是德性伦理学同时也是实践哲学必须弄清楚的问题。     

实践智慧(phronesis)与"技艺"(techne)之喻——由亚里士多德引发的现代思考

亚里士多德虽然将目的在己还是在他作为区分实践智慧与技艺的重要标准,但是由于受“技艺”之喻此种潜在思想图式的影响,亚里士多德关于实践智慧与技艺的划界并非无懈可击,为后代思想家们的进一步思考留下伏笔。马克思提升生产劳动为目的价值,进而批判资本主义社会的“异化劳动”状态;海德格尔则对实践智慧与技艺的区分作了存在论的解读,以此对应人类自身本真-非本真的生存状态;阿伦特则更加注重和强调行动/实践智慧的政治涵义,以此对抗政治上的极权主义。     

纳斯鲍姆论亚里士多德的实践智慧与好生活

纳斯鲍姆在《善的脆弱性》一书中以“运气”对好生活的影响为主线,考察了亚里士多德为经验立场之下的实践智慧进行辩护的理由.亚里士多德和柏拉图的“神目观”不同,他重视偶然的灾难等不可抗拒的因素对人类的好生活的影响.好生活本来是具有脆弱性的,纳斯鲍姆分析了人面对这种脆弱性表现出来的实践智慧.在这种情况下,好生活的特点是不可通约的、多元的、不确定的,实践智慧的洞察力也是非理性的、非演绎性的.只有这样,伦理学才是以人类为中心的.这也表明了亚里士多德思想的巨大张力.     

实践智慧在二十一世纪(上)

Prudence是为了实现好的行为和政治的可持续性而适用于处理偶然性的那种智识。要将prudence复原为与晚近现代之狂妄自大不同的另一种选择,人们应该考虑到,它那些与众不同的特征是如何反映出人类行为的深刻困境的。这些特征通过用以界定实践智慧话语的历史、理论、实践、结构、品质和观众等方面而得以鉴别,它们在本杂志(《现代哲学》)中分成两部分来陈述。这第一部分强调了偶然性、多元性和实践性这几个条件,并且通过对其规范的、计虑的和施行的这些表达方式的阐述来界定实践智慧。明智(审慎)的行动者就是这样的人,他平衡着各种不可通约之善、洞悉着各种可能的行动方略,以及用一种适当及适时的方式与他人进行着互动协作。     

悲剧、实践智慧与幸福——论亚里士多德《诗学》中的实践哲学

亚里士多德将幸福界定为灵魂合乎德性的实现活动,但在伦理学中并未阐述实现活动是如何展开的,是如何实现幸福的。由于运气的存在,德性本身并不能保证幸福。这个任务是通过《诗学》中对悲剧的系统论述来完成的。悲剧主人公具有较好的习俗德性,但因缺乏实践智慧而尚未形成完满的德性。当其信守习俗德性并执着地进行合乎德性的行动时,便可能遭遇德性的单一性所不能容纳的实践复杂性,进而产生事与愿违的后果。通过编制一个完整的悲剧情节,实践的整个过程得以被统观,从而使人们能够理解习俗德性的局限性。这种理解培育着悲剧智慧。将悲剧智慧把握到的实践整体意义结合到当下情境的实践之中,便孕育着实践智慧。实践智慧把握住每一个具体实现活动的善及其与整体善的关联,由此便可能超越实践中的运气带来的不幸,走向幸福。就此而言,亚里士多德的《诗学》是实践哲学的内在组成部分。如果说伦理学论述的是幸福的可能性,那么诗学则论述了幸福的现实性。     

技艺与德性中的实践智慧——基于亚里士多德伦理学与当代伦理学自然主义的比较

亚里士多德在其古典伦理学中讨论了作为制作活动的技艺与作为实践活动的德性以及二者所依赖的实践智慧的联系与区别。基于亚里士多德的思想以及当代认知科学,这一类比研究延续到当代自然主义伦理学及其反思中。自然主义伦理学主张技艺与德性及其实践智慧之间存在着某种类同关系,源于亚里士多德德性伦理学的辩护者则主张技艺行为与德性行为的实践智慧在诸多方面存在区别。更进一步的研究表明,技艺行为和德性行为的实践智慧应当有效地整合,即技艺行为的实践智慧可能使人们对整体生活目标的反思更为正确,同时,技艺行为的实践智慧也同时应当遵从基于"好的人类生活"的更高规范标准。     

海德格尔的时间性概念——对近来一种批评的反思

海德格尔《存在与时间》中的时间性分析一直遭到学界的忽视。这种疏忽部分是由于研究者受限于自身的学术传统,同时也是由海德格尔自己论述的模糊性所导致的。本文集中考察和批判了德国学者弗莱希尔对海德格尔的时间性分析的两个相关的反驳,并依次对其作出回应。作者试图证明,海德格尔的时间性分析不仅是有必要的,它进一步补充和完善了《存在与时间》第一部分的此在分析,揭示了作为整体的此在之存在的意义,同时,海德格尔对源始的时间性的阐述是清楚的,并且他明确地将源始和本真的时间性联系在一起,而非如其他学者所认为的,源始的时间性是本真和非本真的时间性的可能性条件。     

实践智慧与实践思维中的范畴错误——从杨国荣教授的实践智慧理论谈起

杨国荣教授在新作《人类行动与实践智慧》中提出一种形而上的实践智慧理论,将事实与价值、理论与实践、实然与应然等概念统一起来。尽管实践智慧的实际运作会综合地涉及诸多方面,但要清晰呈现其内在结构,须首先详尽分析每个方面在实践中的意义和作用。实践活动针对的是复杂异质的经验对象,根据对象的不同可将其大致分为三个最高范畴和六个次级范畴或类型。实践智慧的洞察与判断力就在于分析和判断实践对象应属哪个或哪些范畴,进而以适合该类型的方式筹划实践活动。范畴归属不当便是实践思维中的范畴错误,也就是实践判断的错误。只有以确切的经验分析和判断为前提,杨国荣教授所倡导的形而上的综合性实践智慧才有可能。     

海德格尔对希腊哲学的诠释与哲学的可能性

当代＂实践哲学＂的复兴是一个很重要的思想现象,而它的源头正是海德格尔早年关于希腊哲学、尤其是关于亚里士多德的一系列讲座。但是,海德格尔本人却并没有走上实践哲学的道路。相反,他在根本上否定了实践哲学的可能性。在后期,他更是否定了哲学本身的可能性。总体来看,海德格尔对哲学的看法同他对希腊哲学的解释密切相关。鉴于此,本文的主要任务是讨论海德格尔关于希腊哲学的具体看法,并希望藉此对哲学的起源、历史和当下可能性等相关问题做一些力所能及的澄清。     

海德格尔论亚里士多德的时间观

本文详尽疏解了海德格尔对亚里士多德时间定义的现象学解释。在他看来,亚里士多德的时间定义没有“错误”可言,因为一方面,亚里士多德的时间决不是如柏格森所认为的那样就是空间,尽管他把时间的特征首先刻画为诸现在的相继序列,但值得注意的是,诸现在不是诸部分从而把时间拼接在一起成为一个整体;另一方面,当他相关乎“早与晚”来界定时间时,他恰恰是基于时间之为相关乎运动而被计数者来界定时间,所以亚里士多德的时间定义本身并不属于同语反复,相反,他是从事情本身的规定性来说的。尽管亚里士多德的时间观还属于流俗的前科学的时间领会,但它所显示的现象学内容为我们从流俗时间过渡到源始时间提供了一条可靠的进路。     

Heidegger's Reception of Kierkegaard: The Existential Philosophy of Death

After briefly drawing attention to two key strains in the history of philosophy's dealings with death, the Platonic and the Epicurean, I describe a more recent philosophical alternative to viewing death in terms of this ancient dichotomy. This is the alternative championed by the likes of Søren Kierkegaard, the father of existentialism, and Martin Heidegger, whose work on death tends to overshadow Kierkegaard's despite the undeniable influence exerted on him by the nineteenth century Dane. By exploring this influence, a deep connection between them on the topic of death becomes apparent. Although both of these thinkers arise from the Platonic/Christian tradition, I discuss how they handle Epicurean insights about death in their work, and thereby prescribe a peculiar way of living with death that falls somewhere in between the Platonic and the Epicurean strains. This way of approaching life through death, in which Kierkegaard and Heidegger show signs of reaction to (and in some cases, influence from) both strains, is what I call the ‘existential philosophy of death’.     

论海德格尔对康德实践哲学的解读

海德格尔对康德实践哲学的解读是他阐释康德哲学的重要组成部分。本文围绕着道德情感、实践理性、实践自由等问题分析了海德格尔在这一方面的解读内容,并且指出海德格尔的解读是定向于存在论的,属于基础存在论筹划,人的存在问题是关注的核心。他力图发掘康德思想中的存在论-生存论的内涵,这反而丧失了原初的伦理学意义。     

Heidegger's Brightness as a Responsibility of the Therapist in Existential Family Therapy

The author reflects upon the Heideggerian concepts of thrown-ness, death imagery, arrogance and brightness and their usefulness in existential family therapy. The article describes and illustrates with clinical material the process of helping a couple or family to move from an arrogance response to thrownness and death imagery to the response of brightness as attendants of Being. The responsibilities of the therapist in facilitating such a process are also described.Director of the Worthington Logotherapy Institute, co-director of Lantz and Lantz Counseling Associates, and a professor at The Ohio State University. College of Social Work     

Originary Temporality and Existential Commitment: A Defense of Heidegger's A Potiori Claim

Being and Time's fundamental ontoogy and existentialism both rest on the A Potiori Claim, which states that originary temporality is, although non‐sequential, a genuine and basic concept of time from which we derive our more ordinary, sequential concept of time. In this paper, I develop a new reading and defense of this claim against the readings of William Blattner, which ties originary temporality too tightly to the particular roles and identities we live out and must therefore find Heidegger's project a failure, and Tony Fisher, who implies that our various roles and identities hang together in time in a merely accidental and non‐rational way. On my reading, originary temporality is the structure of Dasein's characteristic activity of existential commitment. Through this activity, we each work out, in our own case, what it takes to embody the capacity for sense‐making, at all. Here, the non‐sequentiality of originary temporality reflects the way in which commitments are revised and sustained through time, while the sequence of nows derives from our need to embody our commitment in a single life that negotiates among the practical demands that our various identities make of us.     

存在主义心理治疗及其儒学解读

受存在主义心理治疗理论的启发,阐述了其理论在以儒学为基础的传统文化下的解读,强调儒家的为己修身之学从家庭的领域扩散出去,通过人伦教化的落实对主体自觉性的激发,形成对自我心性的超越.这一过程正是对本体存在意义的诠释与实践,也使存在主义的治疗理论落实到日常的修身实践当中.     

On the Existential Interpretation of the Rorschach Test

This is an analysis of the Rorschachs of two subjects, a boy and a girl, from the longitudinal research programs of the Institute of Human Development, University of California, Berkeley. Rorschachs had been obtained from these subjects prior to their becoming seriously ill, one with a kidney condition, the other with leukemia. On the basis of the thematic content of the Rorschachs, it was postulated that Rorschach responses may, like dreams, be considered endoscopic in that they may reveal the actual functioning or disfunctioning of the organism, particularly at the onset of somatic illness. Data, from anthropological, mythological, and literary sources, as well as research on the body image concept, were utilized to amplify the hypothesis and to suggest directions for further research.     

The Birth of Being and Time: Heidegger's Pivotal 1921 Reading of Aristotle's On the Soul

During the 1920s Heidegger gave no less than twelve seminars and lecture courses devoted either exclusively or in large part to the reading of Aristotle's texts. Seven of these, especially the smaller seminars for advanced students, have not been published and apparently will never be included in the Gesamtausgabe . My focus here is on the very first of these. Billed as a reading of Aristotle's De Anima , much of it was devoted to Aristotle's Metaphysics . This decision not to separate Aristotle's “psychology” from his “ontology” is a key move of the seminar that anticipates the project of Being and Time . This and many other ways in which Heidegger's early reading of De Anima anticipates the key moves of the later book constitute one of the reasons for its importance. Another is that the seminar allows us to see what gets suppressed in Heidegger's reading of Aristotle, most significantly, the phenomenon of life itself in favor of an eventual focus on the being of human life or Dasein. This early seminar thus enables us not only to better understand Heidegger's project, but also to raise some fundamental questions concerning it.