Husserl's concept of the noema: A Daubertian critique

I am deeply indebted to Barry smith for his helpful criticism of earlier versions of this paper.     

正念是什么——从正念内涵研究发展角度的思考

"正念是什么"是正念研究中的基本问题,也是长期困扰研究者的难题,造成此困境的重要原因是正念跨越了佛学与心理学两种语境。在正念内涵研究历程中,研究者们先后试图以"去神秘化"、"去语境化"及"整合化"来解决跨语境所造成的问题。本研究认为:正念为多维概念,其内涵的复杂性决定了研究者对正念的认识并非静态的判断,而是逐步成熟的过程;应深入整合佛学与心理学语境,以发展的视角看待正念。     

Virtual reflection: Antoine Arnauld on Descartes' concept of conscientia

ABSTRACT

Although Descartes has often been portrayed as the father of the modern concept of mind, his approach to consciousness is notoriously problematic. What makes it particularly hard to assess his role in the development of the theories of consciousness is the difficulty of clarifying the kind of consciousness he might have in mind when using the associated Latin terms (conscius, cogitatio, conscium esse, etc.). In this article, I analyse Antoine Arnauld’s early interpretation of the passages in Descartes that refer to the issue of consciousness. I argue for two separate but interconnected claims. Firstly, I show that when Arnauld sets out to make a case for Descartes’ concept of cogitatio, he reads the central passages in light of some scholastic theories of cognition, in particular, the concept of ‘reflexio virtualis’ which, far from being a Cartesian invention, comes from the late scholastic discourse. Secondly, I argue that by talking about virtual reflection Arnauld provides an interpretation of Descartes’ views in terms of the intrinsic structure of the first-order thought – a reading which is still plausible, even by our contemporary standards.     

Intentionality: A Fundamental Idea of Husserl's Phenomenology

Simone de Beauvoir has written of the sense of excitement that marked Jean-Paul Sartre's first encounter with the thought of Husserl and Heidegger. Perhaps no work of Sartre's communicates this excitement, and the reason for it, quite so transparently as his brief 1939 essay on Husserl's notion of intentionality. Husserl here appears as a revolutionary, almost as a saviour, who has provided the necessary key for putting philosophy back in touch with the ordinary experience which both French realism and French idealism had vainly sought to characterize. Realism and idealism alike had been guilty in effect of a reduplication of things in consciousness, dependence on an often unexpressed correspondence theory which made mental surrogates for the real the only reality available to man. But if the present essay testifies to Sartre's attempt to return French thought to immediate contact with things, it enters into a fascinating dialectical tension with another of Sartre's chief motives—to purify immediate experience of its deceptions through a highly reflective, analytic mediation. The essay first appeared in Nouvelle Revue Francaise, LII, January 1939. (Tr.)     

Debriefing work experience: A reflection on reflection?

Using date from a pilot study into pupil work experience pre-16, it is argued that work experience has expanded rapidly on the basis of little evidence and many claims about what it can achieve. As experience-based learning, it relies heavily upon debriefing to maximise its learning potential. If work experience is to be more than a work transition exercise, then debriefing becomes central to its success. Although difficult to accomplish and surrounded by muddled definitions, this approach deserves greater attention in view of the contribution it can make to pupils' ability to manage their own learning and the foundation it can provide for continuous learning throughout life.     

Jung's concept of the archetype: An existential phenomenological reflection

Abstract

The concept of the archetype became the central focus of Jung's analytic psychology. This paper will present some phenomenological reflections on this concept. It will first reason that the archetype is not a phenomenologically acceptable concept by drawing upon the absolutely unconscious nature of the archetypes, their independence from the individual's intentionaliry, and their separateness from Dasein. The paper will then argue that what Jung refers to as “archetypal” images, ideas, and experiences do have phenomenological value. As data pursuant to a phenomenological analysis, they may lead to a better understanding of those psychological experiences that may be common to all of humanity.     

情绪的身体感觉：基于身体感觉地图（BSMs）与主观报告

关于不同情绪是否对应不同的生理反应一直存在争议。Nummenmma等人（2014）使用自创的emBODY工具,发现每种情绪都有其独特的身体感觉地图（BSMs）。本研究以中国大学生为被试,以emBODY为研究工具绘制快乐、爱、恐惧、焦虑四种情绪的BSMs,并要求被试口头报告BSMs所反映的身体感觉。结果发现,四种情绪具有不同的身体感觉,体现为BSMs的差异与主观报告的差异。质性资料分析发现BSMs所反映的身体感觉不仅包括生理反应、也包括认知、感受和行为倾向,这为情绪与身体的关系提供了新的证据。被试对身体部位活动性增强或减弱的理解不一致、只呈现身体的一面等是BSMs作为研究工具的潜在局限,未来研究需要做出改进。     

The concept of reflection: a systematic review and thematic synthesis across professional contexts

Reflection is widely endorsed by professional bodies and practitioners are required to document professional learning to evidence standards of professionalism. Due to the lack of a consensual definition for reflection, there is confusion regarding ‘what reflection is’. Prior to the development of an empirical evidence base that explores reflection, it is important to develop a consensually agreed concept and definition to guide experimental research. The aim of this systematic review is to understand the concept of reflection by performing a synthesis of existing conceptually oriented qualitative studies. Fourteen sources were included in a thematic synthesis that resulted in the construction of four analytical themes: cognitive, integrative, iterative and active. These themes were explored in relation to existing research and a novel definition of reflection was proposed. It is hoped that this review will encourage further enquiry into the concept and process of reflection.     

知觉的主动性与主动综合——对胡塞尔判断发生学的一个考察

在知觉的被动性阶段,自我还停留在一种被动的存在信念之中,即相信有某个东西存在着。但是自我并不满足于这种素朴的存在信念,它还试图采取进一步的行动来获得关于这个对象"是什么"以及"怎么样"的知识,试图全面地把握这个对象的内在性质和外部关系。这就迫使自我从知觉的被动性阶段前进到知觉的主动性阶段。知觉的"主动性"就是自我通过对一个对象的积极主动的观察,利用范畴形式将所观察到的内容进行主动的综合统一,构成作为知识的最基本形态的述谓判断"S是P"。通过对最原始的基底对象"S"的连续的判断,就构成了关于S的一个"意义的历史"。科学就是由"诸意义的历史"所构成的一个"总的意义的历史"。我们人所生存于其中的这个科学世界实际上就是一个充满了"意义的历史"的世界。