A Clash of Civilizations? Preferences for Religious Political Leaders in 86 Nations

Huntington claimed that today's major conflicts are most likely to erupt between religiously defined “civilizations,” in particular between Christianity and Islam. Using World Values Surveys from 86 nations, we examine differences between Christians and Muslims in preferences for religious political leaders. The results suggest a marked difference between Muslims and Christians in their attitudes toward religious politicians, with Muslims more favorable by 20 points out of 100. Devoutness, education, degree of government corruption, and status as a formerly Communist state account for the difference. Little support is found for the clash‐of‐civilizations hypothesis. Instead, we find that a clash of individual beliefs—between the devout and the secular—along with enduring differences between the more developed and less developed world explains the difference between Islam and Christianity with regards to preferences for religious political leaders.     

Are Muslims a Distinctive Minority? An Empirical Analysis of Religiosity,Social Attitudes,and Islam

Scholarly and public discourses on Muslim immigrants in Europe have questioned if Islam is an impediment to sociocultural adaptation and whether Muslims are a distinctive group in their religiosity and social values. We use a new survey of 480 British Muslims in conjunction with the British Social Attitudes Survey to examine differences between Muslim and non‐Muslim Britons on religiosity (practice, belief, salience) and moral and social issues regarding gender, abortion, and homosexuality. Muslims are more religious than other Britons, including both British Christians and religious “nones.” Muslims also are more conservative than other Britons across the range of social and moral attitudes. Multivariate analysis shows, however, that much of the difference on moral issues is due to socioeconomic disadvantage and high religiosity among Muslims. Although being a highly religious group in an otherwise secular country renders Muslims distinctive, factors that predict social conservatism among all Britons—high religiosity and low SES—apply similarly to Muslims.     

Religiosity as a buffer against suicidal ideation: a comparison between Christian and Muslim-Arab adolescents

The majority of existing studies on the impact of religious beliefs on adolescents’ suicidal ideation have been conducted among Christians living in Western countries. This study explored the association between religious beliefs and suicidal thoughts among Muslim and Christian adolescents from the Arab minority population of the State of Israel. An estimated 219 late-adolescents participated in this study, including 110 Muslims and 99 Christians, with the same proportion of boys and girls. Participants completed questionnaires on reasons for living, suicidal ideation and religiosity. A significant negative correlation (r =??.33) was found between level of religiosity and suicidal ideation, but only among the Christian adolescents. Religious devoutness may not be a universal buffer against suicidal ideation, across different religions.     

The Mosaic of Muslim Religiosity and Social‐Political Attitudes in Kyrgyzstan: A Gender‐Based Exploration

This research explores the diversity of Islam in post‐Soviet Kyrgyzstan and the implications of that diversity for social‐political attitudes. Our hypotheses are (1) Kyrgyzstani Muslims can be categorized into gender‐based religious groupings defined by various religious indicators and (2) membership in these groupings influences social‐political attitudes. Using a 2011 nationwide survey in Kyrgyzstan and applying statistical clustering, we identify three groups of religiosity within each gender. Looking at four issues such as preferences for Islam in politics and for religious versus civil law, we find significant differences among the religious groups even after region, urbanity, and ethnicity are controlled. These findings suggest that narratives treating Muslims as a single, unified community or simply contrasting Muslims and non‐Muslims need to be expanded to capture meaningful variations. Our findings are consistent with the theoretical notion that more devout Muslims form a subculture that seeks to extend Islamic values into secular realms.     

Christian‐Muslim relations in the African context

Abstract

The course of Islam and Christianity in Africa as well as statistical figures suggest a wide variety within, as well as considerable divergence between, both religions in the many African contexts. Though the majority of African Muslims still stick to a ‘traditional African Islam’, we observe a resurgence of Islam reflecting a growing religious awareness, on the one hand, and tendencies towards an ideological re‐interpretation (Islamism), on the other. Trends in resurgent Islam are highlighted by the examples of Islamic internationalism and da'wa, the modernisation of Islamic education, and the proliferation of Islamic political groups all over the continent. Various dimensions of Christian—Muslim relations in Africa today show areas of conflict as well as of cooperation and exchange. Against the background of the economic and social disintegration of many African societies, there is no alternative to inter‐religious dialogue which must be based on an authentic African theological foundation, being rooted in the African heritage shared by Muslim and Christian communities alike.     

The Impact of Al‐Islam on the African American Population

At the beginning of the 21st century, there seems to be a growing interest in the Islamic religion, or Al‐Islam, in the African American community. This interest is evidenced by the recognition that Al‐Islam is the fastest growing religion in the United States. In some cases, Muslims outnumber some of the traditional religions in America. In addition, of the 5 million Muslims in the United States, approximately 40% are African Americans. This article explores different aspects of Al‐Islam, including the beliefs and religious practice of Muslims; the historical relationship among Africa, African Americans, and Al‐Islam; and the current and future implications for African Americans.     

Accepting Muslim minority practices: A case of discriminatory or normative intolerance?

West European societies have seen strong debates about the acceptance of Muslim minority practices. In the current research we sought to better understand intolerance by examining whether people use a double standard in which the same practices are tolerated of Christians but not of Muslims (discriminatory intolerance), or rather reject the practices independently of the religious minority group because these are considered to contradict society's normative ways of life (normative intolerance). The results of two survey‐embedded experiments among native Dutch were most in agreement with an interpretation in terms of normative intolerance rather than discriminatory intolerance. This suggests that the rejection of Muslim practices has less to do with Muslims per se but rather with the perceived normative deviance of the practices, independently of the religious minority group. These findings broaden the research on anti‐Muslim sentiments and thereby the debate on the place of Islam within Western liberal societies.     

Religious involvement, beliefs about God, and the sense of mattering among older adults

Using data from a 2001–2002 sample of adults aged 65 and older living in the Washington, DC metropolitan area, we examine the associations among religious involvement (as measured by the frequency of attendance at religious services and praying), the belief in divine control, and the sense of mattering—a key component of the self-concept. We also assess the extent to which these patterns vary by gender, race, and education. Findings indicate indirect effects of religious attendance on mattering through divine control beliefs and the frequency of social contact. Praying increases mattering indirectly only through divine control beliefs. Moreover, divine control beliefs are more strongly associated with mattering among women, African Americans, and individuals with less education. We discuss the contribution of these findings for theory about the links between religious involvement, beliefs about God, and psychosocial resources, and the influence of core dimensions of social status and stratification.     

Christians and Muslims in search of common ground in Malaysia

According to its constitution, Malaysia is a federation and a secular state. But due to the special position given to the Malays, who usually adhere to Islam, Islam is declared to be the ‘official’ religion in the federation — although not necessarily in all of its member states, which differ in their ethnic and religious composition. The federal constitution generally guarantees religious freedom, but it provides that the propagation of other faiths among Malays and Muslims may be prohibited by law. In recent years, however, the Christians together with the other non‐Muslims feel a growing restriction of their freedom while the federal government pursues a policy of creating a common ‘Malaysian culture’ oriented towards Malay, and thus Islamic, values. This would change the open and pluralistic character of Malaysia — which is more than just peninsular Malaya — substantially and carry the danger of compartmentalizing society.     

Islamophobia as Reactive Co-Radicalization

Since 9/11, 2001, a new form of religious extremism has arguably emerged, one which paradoxically portrays itself as a counter to another perceived extremism regarded as a real and imminent threat. Within North America and Western Europe, as elsewhere, there is an upsurge of various forms of reactionary rhetoric and opposition expressed towards Islam and Muslims. An increase in extremist behaviour, even violence, is appearing from quarters opposed to, or varyingly fearful of, Islamic extremism if not Islam or Muslims. Islamophobia, as a manifestation of fear of an exclusionary Islam, manifests as exclusionary or negatively reactive behaviours with Muslims and Islam as the target. This article explores the idea that Islamophobia can be regarded as a manifestation of religious extremism and, further, that such extremism is construable as “reactive co-radicalization.” It focuses on two European cases – the 2009 Swiss ban on the building of minarets and the 2011 Norwegian massacre carried out by Anders Breivik – as examples of this “reactive co-radicalization.” This term, I suggest, is an apt denominator for the exclusionary reaction to the rising presence of Islam within otherwise secular, albeit nominally Christian, Western European and North American societies, among others.     

Political Action in Conflict and Nonconflict Regions in Indonesia: The Role of Religious and National Identifications

This study examined the relationship between group identification and political action in Indonesia. We made four contributions to the literature. First, we studied political action on behalf of religious groups and examined the role of religious identification alone and in combination with national identification. Second, we analyzed political action in a non‐Western country where social cleavages occur primarily along religious lines and where a conflict and nonconflict region can be studied. Third, we compared Muslims and Christians, whose majority and minority status varies across the two regions, and fourth, we investigated both normative and nonnormative forms of political action (protest and violence). In line with the dual‐identification model of politicization, we found that religious identification increased support for protest (but not violence) in the conflict region only and particularly among high national identifiers. In the nonconflict region, religious identification was not related to violence, and it was related to lower support for protest among high national identifiers. The patterns were largely similar for Muslims and Christians, but some differences were found depending on the majority‐minority status. We conclude that particularities of the intergroup context should be taken into consideration when studying politicization.     

“Practical Divine Influence”: Socioeconomic Status and Belief in the Prosperity Gospel

The “prosperity gospel” is an understudied feature of the religious landscape of the United States. Little is known about the social patterning of prosperity gospel beliefs. We focus on two core dimensions of socioeconomic status (SES)—education and income—as potential influences. Our analyses of data from the Pew Forum on Religion & Public Life's 2006 Survey of Pentecostals produce three findings. First, education and income have negative and mostly independent associations with prosperity gospel beliefs. Second, SES‐based patterns remain after accounting for other attributes of the religious role. Third, while most education‐based differences are contingent upon the attributes of the religious role, these contingencies are not replicated for income‐based differences. These observations reinforce the long‐standing claim that SES plays a pivotal—and complex—role in the social patterning of religious beliefs.     

Religious Affiliation and Attitudes Towards Gay Men: On the Mediating Role of Masculinity Threat

Previous research suggests that people from some religious backgrounds hold more negative attitudes towards gay men than others do. The current research focuses on psychological variables as an alternative explanation to religious affiliation, testing whether masculinity beliefs regarding gay men and their perceived threat to one's masculinity can explain such between‐group differences in negative attitudes. With a sample of 155 male heterosexual university students (Muslims and Christians in Germany), we found that Muslims held more negative attitudes towards gay men than Christians did. Yet, this relation was partially mediated by beliefs about the masculinity of gay men and the experience of masculinity threat imposed by gay men, substantially reducing the effect of religious affiliation on antigay attitudes. In sum, similar psychological processes explained antigay attitudes of both Muslims and Christians. Copyright © 2013 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Religion,Cultural Clash,and Muslim American Attitudes About Politically Motivated Violence

Does adherence to Islam predict attitudes about “suicide bombing” among American Muslims? This study examines the effects of religious and political factors on views of politically motivated violence (PMV). We draw from diverse scholarship, emphasizing arguments that are inspired by Samuel Huntington's Clash of Civilizations perspective, as well as recent work in the sociology of Islam. Using a measure that gauges support for “suicide bombing” from the 2007 Pew Survey of American Muslims, results from logistic regression models suggest that political views and religious factors have a minimal effect on Muslim American attitudes toward suicide bombing. Furthermore, we find that Qur’ānic authoritativeness (i.e., the view that the Qur’ān is the word of God and not written by men) is associated with lower odds of supporting this form of PMV. We discuss the implications of our findings for the often anecdotal and alarmist accounts that link Muslim religiosity to support for “radical” extremism. We close with study limitations and avenues of future research.     

Interreligious dialogue groups and the mass media

ABSTRACT

Interreligious dialogues have received attention since they were introduced as a security policy and social pacification measure after the attack on 9/11. This essay examines the development of interreligious dialogue in Germany as well as the influence of media discourses on interreligious dialogue and asks to what extent they affect the motives, goals and modes of communication of both Muslim and non-Muslim participants. This analysis leads to the thesis that the mass media’s frequent security-policy framing of Islam within issues of integration, violence, and threat has developed interreligious dialogue groups as a space of face-to-face coping processes with the imagined religious conflict. Muslims attend it in order to put Islam in a different and positive frame. For the Christian participants this also presents the opportunity to reach a new relevance of religion in the public secular space.     

A Clash of Civilizations? Muslims,Christians, and Preferences for Democracy

The incompatibility of Islam with democracy has been the focal point of many public and scholarly debates. However, very few studies have attempted to investigate empirically whether the followers of Islam are less favorable to democracy than the followers of Christianity. This study extends previous research by conducting empirical and representative analyses of whether Muslims in general and religious and practicing Muslims in particular prefer democracy less than their Christian counterparts. Using country fixed effects regression and data from the World Values Survey (WVS6) that include 52,326 Muslims and Christians, the analyses show that Muslims in general, as well as religious and practicing Muslims, endorse democracy to the same extent as do Christians. Thereby, this study is the first to provide comparative, individual‐level evidence of the influence these religions may have on democratic attitudes.     

Explaining Public Attitudes towards the Integration of Muslims in British Society: The ‘Solidarity of the Religious’?

There has been growing concern in recent years about the integration of Muslims and the emergence of ‘Islamophobia’ in Britain. But there has been a lack of research into the sources of public opinion towards Muslims in British society. This article contributes to emerging research in this area by using a nationally representative survey to examine public opinion towards Muslims’ efforts to integrate into British society. It examines the relative impact of social, religious, and attitudinal variables. Religious affiliation has no impact, while greater religious salience and pro-religion attitudes on religious–secular policy issues are related to positive views of Muslims’ efforts to integrate. Women and the university-educated are more positive in their assessments. A traditionalist view of Christianity, socially authoritarian beliefs, and anti-immigrant bias are related to negative views of Muslims’ efforts to integrate. Overall, the findings lend support to the ‘solidarity of the religious’ perspective and should encourage further investigation into attitudes towards religious groups in Britain.     

One Conception of Secularism for All? A Comparison of Conceptions of Laïcité among Nonbelievers,Catholics, and Muslims in France

In European countries, a large number of people feel that Islam is incompatible with secularism. France's legal principle of laïcité (a type of state “secularism”) has governed the relationship between religion and society since 1905. However, recent research suggests that there coexist two distinct lay conceptions of laïcité that differ most notably in their tolerance for the presence of religious symbols in public places, one inclusive, the other restrictive. This latter conception appears to target mainly Muslims. The present research examined the lay conceptions of laïcité held by Catholics, Muslims, and nonbelievers. Analyses of participants’ responses (N = 375) to a scale measuring lay beliefs about laïcité confirmed the existence of two distinct lay conceptions of laïcité that differed in the importance given to public expression of religious beliefs, religious neutrality of the state, and equal treatment of different religions. The results also showed that, independent of participants’ religiosity, the restrictive conception was more prevalent among nonbelievers, the two conceptions were equally prevalent among Catholics, and the inclusive conception was more prevalent among Muslims.     

Life Satisfaction,Sense of Coherence and Job Precariousness in Italian Young Adults

We investigated (in 95 Italians aged 19–29, of both genders, and who were all facing the transition to job): (1) the relationships between job precariousness, life satisfaction (LS), and the perception that the reality is comprehensible, manageable and meaningful (sense of coherence—SOC—Antonovsky 1987); (2) the potential buffering effect of SOC versus job precariousness on LS. The findings showed that (a) young adults with a higher level of education perceive less LS and higher manageability, and youths with a precarious job perceive reality as less controllable, manageable and meaningful; (b) manageability is positively related with satisfaction with close relationships and meaningfulness is positively related with LS in general; (c) meaningfulness also buffers the effect of job precariousness on satisfaction for close relationships; among precarious workers there is a curvilinear relationship with LS: youths with intermediate meaningfulness also show higher LS with respect to both low and high meaningfulness.     

The mosque and social control in Edinburgh's Muslim community

The present paper is based on an ethnographic study of the social organisation of one of the main mosques (Markazi Jamia Masjid‐i‐Anwar‐i‐Madina) in Edinburgh, the capital of Scotland. The main focus of the paper is the ways the mosque operates as an agency of social control among the Muslim population of Edinburgh. This study identifies sabaq—mosque‐based religious education of young Muslims—and the Jom'a (Friday) congregational prayer as the two main mechanisms of social control within the mosque. It is argued that while the social organisation of the mosque is, in some important ways, a response to and shaped by exclusionary practices in the wider society, it plays a central role in the maintenance of order in the Muslim community of Edinburgh.