Deliberating About the Public Interest

Although the idea of the public interest features prominently in many accounts of deliberative democracy, the relationship between deliberative democracy and the public interest is rarely spelt out with any degree of precision. In this article, I identify and defend one particular way of framing this relationship. I begin by arguing that people can deliberate about the public interest only if the public interest is, in principle, identifiable independently of their deliberations. Of course, some pluralists claim that the public interest is an implausible idea, which casts doubt on the idea that there might be something for people to deliberate about. Yet while, following Brian Barry, we can get around this problem by defining the public interest as an interest in which everyone shares qua member of the public, what still needs to be explained is why people should be prepared to privilege this particular capacity. I argue that the account of political equality with which deliberative democracy is bound up offers a compelling explanation of this sort, even if it also gives rise to some difficult questions of feasibility. I conclude by considering the charge that any political scheme that framed the relationship between deliberative democracy and the public interest in this way would be undesirable.     

An Inquiry into Views,Beliefs and Faith: Lessons from Buddhism,Behavioural Psychology and Constructivist Epistemology*

Abstract

 The causes of disagreements between individuals, social groups, cultural groups, political parties, and nations can be traced down to the basic human tendency to give form to – and to reify views, beliefs, and opinions. With this being the case, I would like to ask the question: what, exactly are ‘views’ (including here such overlapping categories as ‘opinions’, ‘beliefs’ and ‘attitudes’,)? How, exactly, do we give form to them? Why is it so difficult to change, or get rid of them? The Buddhist tradition since the time of its inception, has been greatly concerned with the matter of identifying ‘false views’ and replacing them with ‘correct views’. But serious and insightful research into the formation and maintenance of views and beliefs is by no means limited to Buddhism. It has been a topic of great concern in the past century to a wide range of secular researchers: social and behavioural psychologists; literary theorists and epistemologists; scientists and marketing strategists. What the specialists in these various fields have to say about beliefs is diverse – and yet there is much overlap. The ways in which they overlap are thought-provoking, and their differences are revelatory. In this paper, I investigate a few prominent approaches to the study of views and beliefs, and show how these various approaches can do much to fill in each other’s discourse. Finally, I reframe the Mahayana Buddhist notion of ‘correct faith’ within the context of this exploration of views.     

Deliberation,Reasons, and Alternatives

A plausible constraint on normative reasons to act is that it must make sense to use them as premises in deliberation. I argue that a central sort of deliberation – what Bratman calls partial planning – is question‐directed: it is over, and aims to resolve, deliberative questions. Whether it makes sense to use some consideration as a premise in deliberation in a case of partial planning can vary with the deliberative question at issue. I argue that the best explanation for this is that reasons are contrastive or relativized to deliberative questions.     

Mindset effects on information search in self‐evaluation

Research on mindset theory (Gollwitzer & Bayer, 1999 ) observed that people in an implemental mindset show an orientation towards positive illusionary self‐evaluations, whereas people in a deliberative mindset opt for accurate self‐evaluations. In the present study, we tested whether these self‐evaluative orientations and the associated search for certain types of self‐relevant information (feedback) are moderated by low versus high self‐views. With high self‐view participants we observed the hypothesized mindset effects on information search, but we obtained the reverse pattern for low self‐view participants. The latter finding points to self‐defensiveness in low self‐view individuals. Implications are discussed in terms of the consequences of accurate versus positive illusionary self‐evaluations for the successful control of goal pursuits, and individual differences in mindset effects. Copyright © 2005 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Taking the edge off of disagreement: linguistic abstractness and self‐presentation to a heterogeneous audience

The use of linguistic abstraction in self‐presentation was examined. Participants, whose goal it was to be liked by recipients, presented their political views to an audience of two people. Participants learned beforehand that the two recipients had the same political views as the participant, that both had different political views from the participant, or that one had similar views to and one had dissimilar views from the participant. Theorising that variations in the degree of linguistic abstractness used by participants when describing their political views were related to their social goals, it was hypothesised that participants would describe their political views at a higher level of linguistic abstractness when communicating with a similar agreeing audience than when communicating with a mixed audience. Results confirmed this hypothesis. The role of linguistic abstractness in achieving self‐presentational goals is discussed. Copyright © 2002 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Counsellors' perceptions of client progression when working with clients who intentionally self‐harm and the impact such work has on the therapist

Introduction: This paper describes a qualitative study focusing on counsellors' perceptions of client progression when working with clients who intentionally self‐harm and the impact this has on the therapist. Method: Semi‐structured interviews were employed and the constant comparative method utilised to analyse the data. Findings: Findings indicate that counsellors experience intense emotions in response to self‐harm including: shock; sadness; anxiety; anger; and frustration. Counsellors also struggled to manage the tension between multiple dualities, corresponding to professional opinions of a seemingly polar opposite nature. Although participants indicated a requirement to work in a client‐led way, they all had either an explicit or implicit agenda for change. These two conflicting states create a tension for a counsellor that is difficult to resolve. In addition there were various views of client progression, yet all participants agreed that progression was not simply about stopping self‐harm. Conclusion: There is a significant impact on the counsellor when working with clients who intentionally self‐harm and the complexity of the phenomenon appears to exacerbate their anxiety. Implications: Further research within the counselling field focusing on the ambiguous nature of the subject may increase understanding, which in turn may contribute to greater therapist efficacy when working with this client group.     

Respect,Coercion, and Religious Reasons

It is often assumed that people of faith should not endorse a law for religious reasons, since such an endorsement is considered to be disrespectful. Such a position is increasingly opposed by scholars who argue that such demands unjustifiably force people of faith to compromise their religious ideals. In order to defend their opposition to such demands, some scholars have invoked thought experiments as reductio arguments against the claim that endorsing laws dependent on religious reasons is necessarily disrespectful. I argue that these attempts have failed, and present an alternative thought experiment that demonstrates that such a law is not necessarily disrespectful. Because I conclude that previously proposed principles cannot defend this conclusion, I defend an alternative way of accommodating this intuition; a post‐secular deliberative approach based on the principle of double effect.     

How Does the Comforting Process Work? An Empirical Test of an Appraisal‐Based Model of Comforting

Burleson and Goldsmith’s (1998) comforting model suggests an appraisal‐based mechanism through which comforting messages can bring about a positive change in emotional states. This study is a first empirical test of three causal linkages implied by the appraisal‐based comforting model. Participants (N = 258) talked about an upsetting event with a confederate trained to display low, moderate, or high levels of person centeredness and nonverbal immediacy. After the conversation, participants completed several scales. Latent composite structural equation modeling was used to examine the model, which showed that person‐centered and immediate emotional support exerted a direct effect on emotional improvement. Above and beyond this direct effect, person‐centered comfort also encouraged people to verbalize their thoughts and emotions. These verbalizations facilitated cognitive appraisals, which in turn exerted a strong direct effect on emotional improvement. Mediation analyses further suggested that verbalizations of positive emotion words in conjunction with reappraisals partially mediated the influence of person‐centered comfort on emotional improvement.     

Empathetic Understanding and Deliberative Democracy

Epistemic democracy is standardly characterized in terms of “aiming at truth”. This presupposes a veritistic conception of epistemic value, according to which truth is the fundamental epistemic goal. I will raise an objection to the standard (veritistic) account of epistemic democracy, focusing specifically on deliberative democracy. I then propose a version of deliberative democracy that is grounded in non-veritistic epistemic goals. In particular, I argue that deliberation is valuable because it facilitates empathetic understanding. I claim that empathetic understanding is an epistemic good that doesn't have truth as its primary goal.     

THE LIMITS TO PARTICIPATION IN DIS‐EQUILIBRIUM ECOLOGY: Maori involvement in habitat restoration within Te Urewera National Park

In this paper, we explore conceptualizations of ‘ordinary’ citizens common in public engagement forums on emerging technologies and assumptions from deliberative theory that ordinary people are more likely to be appropriately ‘changed’ through deliberative processes facilitated by experts. Looking at a large US public forum event [the National Citizens Technology Forum (NCTF)], we asked: What were the goals for this exercise and how did they shape conceptualizations of ordinariness and representativeness? Whose goals and conceptualizations were they? Were the engaged citizens ordinary and representative—and were they changed by the exercise? Our exploration revealed that exercise organizers conceived of ordinary citizens as people lacking science and technology backgrounds, without advocacy or business connections to the technologies at hand, and demographically reflecting the US population. Exercise materials also implied that ideal ordinary participants would lack strong opinions and emotions about these technologies. Actual NCTF participants, however, tended to be more educated, have higher incomes, and to be more liberal than the US public, and participants from all backgrounds had a range of relevant knowledge, experiences and opinions about science and technology. They were changed by the exercise in complex and conflicting ways—based as much on their own knowledge and reflections on relational dynamics as on exercise processes, interactions with experts, and information provided in the exercise. We argue that inadequately explored ideas about ordinary citizens are highly problematic. Further, invisible assumptions about what is ‘normal’ among experts and status quo institutions serve to reify the lay–expert divide that engagement exercises are intended to counteract.     

Moral Motivation Pluralism

Motivational externalists and internalists of various sorts disagree about the circumstances under which it is conceptually possible to have moral opinions but lack moral motivation. Typically, the evidence referred to are intuitions about whether people in certain scenarios who lack moral motivation count as having moral opinions. People’s intuitions about such scenarios diverge, however. I argue that the nature of this diversity is such that, for each of the internalist and externalist theses, there is a strong prima facie reason to reject it. That much might not be very controversial. But I argue further, that it also gives us a strong prima facie reason to reject all of these theses. This is possible since there is an overlooked alternative option to accepting any of them: moral motivation pluralism, the view that different internalist and externalist theses correctly accounts for different people’s concepts of moral opinions, respectively. I end the paper with a discussion of methodological issues relevant to the argument for moral motivation pluralism and of the consequences of this view for theories about the nature of moral opinions, such as cognitivism and non-cognitivism.     

Reasoning Is for Arguing: Understanding the Successes and Failures of Deliberation

Theoreticians of deliberative democracy have sometimes found it hard to relate to the seemingly contradictory experimental results produced by psychologists and political scientists. We suggest that this problem may be alleviated by inserting a layer of psychological theory between the empirical results and the normative political theory. In particular, we expose the argumentative theory of reasoning that makes the observed pattern of findings more coherent. According to this theory, individual reasoning mechanisms work best when used to produce and evaluate arguments during a public deliberation. It predicts that when diverse opinions are discussed, group reasoning will outperform individual reasoning. It also predicts that individuals have a strong confirmation bias. When people reason either alone or with like‐minded peers, this confirmation bias leads them to reinforce their initial attitudes, explaining individual and group polarization. We suggest that the failures of reasoning are most likely to be remedied at the collective than at the individual level.     

Determinants of job mobility: A theoretical integration and extension

The goals of this paper are to conceptually integrate and extend the diverse literature on job mobility. We introduce a multi‐level theoretical framework that describes how individuals' job mobility unfolds. Three theoretical perspectives inform this framework. The structural perspective suggests that macro‐level factors (e.g. economic conditions and industry differences) determine the opportunity structure of job mobility in the labour market. The individual difference perspective suggests that dispositional attributes affect a person's preferences for and subsequent behaviours associated with job mobility. The decisional perspective, grounded in the theory of planned behaviour ( Ajzen, 1991 ), suggests that decisions to engage in job mobility are based on the evaluation of three factors: subjective norms, the desirability of the mobility option and individuals' readiness for change. The article concludes with a discussion of the multi‐level nature of determinants of job mobility and directions for future research.     

What people believe about memory

Two representative samples of adult Norwegians (n=2000) were asked a set of general and specific questions regarding their beliefs and opinions about human memory. The results indicate that on many questions, such as time of the earliest memories, inhibiting effects of collaboration, and memory for dramatic versus ordinary events, the views of the general public concurred with current research findings, and people in general had realistic views about their own memory performance. On other questions, such as the reliability of olfactory as compared with visual and auditory memory, the memory of small children in comparison with that of adults, the likelihood of repression of adult traumatic memories, and on more general questions such as the possibility of training memory and the capacity limitations of long-term memory, a large proportion of the participants expressed views that are less supported by scientific evidence. Implications of these findings are briefly discussed.     

External Validity,Why Art Thou Externally Valid? Recent Studies of Attraction Provide Three Theoretical Answers

Some studies have better external validity than others, but why? Recent studies in the domain of interpersonal attraction have been tackling this question by documenting how people respond differently to hypothetical versus live interactions. In live interactions, people tend to report their experienced emotions, they evaluate others using a low‐level concrete construal, and they attempt to implement the goal of having a pleasant interaction. In hypothetical scenarios, people forecast their emotions, they evaluate others using a high‐level abstract construal, and they deliberate about others' positive and negative features. By situating the hypothetical versus live interaction distinction within the framework of strong preexisting theories (i.e., affective forecasting, construal‐level theory, mindset theory), this research reinforces the idea that there is nothing inherently invalid about laboratory studies that are cosmetically dissimilar from real life. Nevertheless, it remains highly problematic to generalize findings to a setting that elicits a countervailing set of psychological processes.     

Exploitation,Justice, and Parity in International Clinical Research

Consensus is lacking among research ethicists on the question of how broadly to understand the requirements of non‐exploitation in international clinical research. Two types of principles have been proposed, minimalist and non‐minimalist, grounded in two opposing conceptions of exploitation, transactional and systemic. Transactionalists have offered principles, which, it has been argued, are satisfied by minimal gains to vulnerable subjects measured against an unjust status quo. Systemicists have advanced principles with decidedly non‐minimal mandates but only by conflating the obligations of clinical research with those of First World citizenship. My aim here is to break this deadlock by offering grounds for a non‐minimal requirement of international research ethics grounded in a transactional conception of exploitation. I do this by arguing that a subject's gains must be measured not only within the transaction, relative to her own starting point and to the share of gains enjoyed by her co‐transactor, but also across transactions, so as to ensure parity of benefit to trial participants whenever, and wherever, parity of burden is assumed.     

Strategy Selection in Risky Choice: The Impact of Numeracy,Affect, and Cross‐Cultural Differences

Real‐world decisions often involve options with outcomes that are uncertain and trigger strong affect (e.g., side effects of a drug). Previous work suggests that when choosing among affect‐rich risky prospects, people are rather insensitive to probability information, potentially compromising decision quality. We modeled the strategies of less and more numerate participants in the United States and in Germany when choosing between affect‐rich prospects and between monetarily equivalent affect‐poor prospects. Using large probabilistic national samples (n = 1047 from the United States and Germany), Study 1 showed that compared with more numerate participants, less numerate participants chose the normatively better option (i.e., the one with the higher expected value) less often, guessed more often, and relied more on a simple risk‐minimizing strategy. U.S. participants—although less numerate—selected the normatively better option more frequently and were more consistent across affect‐rich and affect‐poor problems than the German participants. Using a targeted quota sample (n = 118 from Germany), Study 2 indicated that although both more and less numerate participants paid less attention to probability information in affect‐rich than in affect‐poor problems, the two numeracy groups relied on different outcome‐based heuristics: More numerate participants often followed the minimax heuristic, and less numerate participants the affect heuristic. The observed strategy differences suggest that attempts to improve decision‐making need to take into account individual differences in numeracy as well as cultural‐specific experiences in making trade‐offs. Copyright © 2012 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

A Right of Rebellion in the Mengzi?

Mengzi believed that tyrannical rulers can be justifiably deposed, and many contemporary scholars see this as grounding a right of popular rebellion. I argue that the text of the Mengzi reveals a more mixed view, and does so in two respects. First, it suggests that the people are sometimes permitted to participate in a rebellion but not permitted to decide for themselves when rebellion is warranted. Second, it gives appropriate moral weight not to the people’s judgments about the justifiability of rebelling, but rather to certain affections and behaviors that closely track their life satisfaction. I contend that in both respects the permissions Mengzi grants the people fall short of a proper right of rebellion. I conclude that the more historical account of Mengzi’s “just revolt theory” suggests an intriguing division of deliberative labor, and note some of the advantages of this account.     

Individual responses to climate change: Framing effects on pro‐environmental behaviors

Promoting effective responses to climate change, especially among people who reject its anthropogenic causes, has been challenging. Following a qualitative study, we experimentally induce one of four frames of reference (identity, biodiversity conservation, economic prosperity, and climate change), and assess their effects on participants’ behavioral intentions using three scales (consumption‐investment, consumption‐reduction, and political participation). The sample (N = 156) included people who thought climate change is natural and those who thought it is human‐induced. Results show a significant impact of the identity frame, relative to the climate‐change frame, for both consumption scales, in the total sample, and among those who reject the anthropogenic causes. These results offer a way to address behavioral resistances associated with antagonistic views on climate change.