Against Elective Forgiveness

It is often claimed both that forgiveness is elective and that forgiveness is something that we do for reasons. However, there is a tension between these two central claims about the nature of forgiveness. If forgiving is something one does for reasons, then, at least sometimes, those reasons may generate a requirement to forgive or withhold forgiveness. While not strictly inconsistent with electivity, the idea of required forgiveness strikes some as antithetical to the spirit of the concept. They argue that forgiveness is essentially elective. In this paper, I dispute these arguments. I argue that the intuitive plausibility of the position diminishes upon reflection and that the best arguments fail to explain why reasons to forgive, unlike most other reasons for action, cannot generate requirements.     

Clearing Up Client Confusion Regarding the Meaning of Forgiveness: An Aristotelian/Thomistic Analysis With Counseling Implications

Although the construct of forgiveness is popular in research and counseling, there remains considerable confusion surrounding this topic. This article examines the likely errors clients may bring to counseling regarding the meaning of forgiveness. The author uses an Aristotelian/Thomistic perspective to analyze error in understanding forgiveness and concludes that client misunderstanding and the resultant fear of attempting to forgive are oftentimes rooted not in understanding forgiveness itself, but instead in focusing on 1 of 2 vices surrounding that construct. The author recommends bringing this misunderstanding to clients so that they can better decide for themselves whether or not to forgive others.     

Supererogatory Forgiveness 1

While forgiveness is widely recognised as an example of a supererogatory action, it remains to be explained precisely what makes forgiveness supererogatory, or the circumstances under which it is supererogatory to forgive. Philosophers often claim that forgiveness is supererogatory, but most of the time they do so without offering an adequate explanation for why it is supererogatory to forgive. Accordingly, the literature on forgiveness lacks a sufficiently nuanced account of the supererogatory status of forgiveness. In this paper, I seek to remedy this shortcoming by offering a systematic account of forgiveness as an example of a supererogatory action. In terms of explaining the supererogatory status of forgiveness, I will argue that, to qualify as supererogatory, a forgiving action must fulfil three conditions: (i) it must be permissible; (ii) it must not be obligatory; and (iii) it must be good or praiseworthy, that is, it must have a certain moral value. Moreover, a distinction is drawn between “unconditional” and “conditional” forgiveness. I argue that conditional forgiveness (i.e., forgiveness of repentant wrongdoers) is sometimes a duty and sometimes supererogatory, whereas unconditional forgiveness (i.e., forgiveness of unrepentant wrongdoers) is typically supererogatory or beyond duty.     

Vengeance is mine: Narcissism, vengeance, and the tendency to forgive

Recent theory and research have suggested that the disposition to forgive and the tendency to seek vengeance are related but distinguishable characteristics. Although highly forgiving individuals cannot be simultaneously high in vengeance, those who are low in forgiveness could be either vengeful or not. The present study tested the hypothesis that what distinguishes unforgiving people who are highly vengeful from unforgiving people who are not highly vengeful is that the latter group is lower in narcissism. Measures of dispositional forgiveness, narcissism, global self-esteem, and vengeance were administered to 248 undergraduates. As expected, people low in dispositional forgiveness were more vengeful than were people high in dispositional forgiveness, but particularly so among those high in narcissism; among those low in narcissism, forgiveness was less strongly related to vengeance. Thus, the most vengeful people were those who were both low in forgiveness and high in narcissism, independent of gender differences and healthy self-esteem.     

Barriers to forgiveness

Society generally encourages individuals to forgive their transgressors because forgiveness can yield many psychological, physiological, and social benefits (Exline & Baumeister, 2000 ). Nevertheless, victims face barriers to forgiving others, and other people face obstacles that prevent them from encouraging victims to forgive. We aim to provide insight into the various barriers that deter forgiveness by examining the role of the various parties involved—victims, transgressors, and uninvolved third parties—in creating barriers to forgiveness. We contend that beliefs held by these various parties significantly reduce the likelihood that victims will forgive their transgressors. By identifying how these beliefs impede forgiveness, we can begin to understand more fully why convincing victims to forgive is often a challenge. In our discussion, we also suggest ways by which victims, transgressors, and third parties can overcome these barriers to forgiveness.     

Forgiveness: Who Does It and How Do They Do It?

Forgiveness is a suite of prosocial motivational changes that occurs after a person has incurred a transgression. People who are inclined to forgive their transgressors tend to be more agreeable, more emotionally stable, and, some research suggests, more spiritually or religiously inclined than people who do not tend to forgive their transgressors. Several psychological processes appear to foster or inhibit forgiveness. These processes include empathy for the transgressor, generous attributions and appraisals regarding the transgression and transgressor, and rumination about the transgression. Interpreting these findings in light of modern trait theory would help to create a more unified understanding of how personality might influence forgiveness.     

Religion and unforgivable offenses

ABSTRACT The value of forgiveness is emphasized in many religions, but little is known about how members of distinct religious cultures differ in their views of forgiveness. We hypothesized and found that Jews would agree more than Protestants that certain offenses are unforgivable and that religious commitment would be more negatively correlated with belief in unforgivable offenses among Protestants than among Jews (Studies 1 and 2). Dispositional forgiveness tendencies did not explain these effects (Studies 1 and 2). In Study 3, Jews were more inclined than Protestants to endorse theologically derived reasons for unforgivable offenses (i.e., some offenses are too severe to forgive, only victims have the right to forgive, and forgiveness requires repentance by the perpetrator). Differential endorsement of these reasons for nonforgiveness fully mediated Jew-Protestant differences in forgiveness of a plagiarism offense and a Holocaust offense.     

Third Parties and the Social Scaffolding of Forgiveness

It is widely accepted that only the victim of a wrong can forgive that wrong. Several philosophers have recently defended “third‐party forgiveness,” the scenario in which A, who is not the victim of a wrong in any sense, forgives B for a wrong B did to C. Focusing on Glen Pettigrove's argument for third‐party forgiveness, I will defend the victim's unique standing to forgive, by appealing to the fact that in forgiving, victims must absorb severe and inescapable costs of distinctive kinds, a plight that third parties do not share. There are, nonetheless, significant, even essential, roles played by third parties in making forgiveness possible, reasonable, or valuable for victims of serious wrongs. I take a closer look at the links between victims, wrongdoers, resentment, and forgiveness in showing why the victim alone can forgive.     

On Taking Back Forgiveness

I argue that the effectiveness of forgiveness in the healing of relationships is dependent on both the givers and recipients of forgiveness understanding that once it has been granted, forgiveness is not normally able to be retracted. When we forgive, we make a firm commitment not to return to our former state of moral resentment against the offender, replacing it by good-will. This commitment can be broken only where the forgiving party makes some significant cognitive adjustment to her appraisal of either the offender or the offence, believing that her original forgiveness was granted in error. I reject the view (defended, for example, by Anthony Bash) that forgiveness can lapse or be withdrawn on the basis of a return of hurt or disappointed feelings, arguing that these do not amount to a restoration of the resentment that is extinguished when forgiveness is granted. I contend that a person who ‘forgives’ and later takes back that ‘forgiveness’ because certain negative feelings have returned either did not genuinely forgive in the first place or shows that she has not fully grasped the nature of forgiveness.     

Motives to (not) forgive deviant group members: A comparison within and between cultures

This study examines people's motives to (not) forgive group members who violate an important group norm. More specifically, we attempt to determine what is the primary focus in such a situation (the group, the offender, the relationship, or the self), and whether this depends on how important the group is and on the cultural context (more individualist or more collectivist). Our sample includes Moluccans living in Indonesia (more collectivist) and Moluccans in the Netherlands (more individualist). Participants were asked to evaluate a scenario in which a group member (close or nonclose other) violated an important group norm. We find that Indonesian Moluccans are more likely not to forgive group members who violate a group norm than Dutch Moluccans. This finding suggests that the group is more important to Indonesian Moluccans. Across the two samples, however, participants were more inclined to forgive an ingroup deviant for the benefit of this person or their relationship than for the benefit of the group. Interestingly, self‐focused concerns were more important among Indonesian Moluccans and differences between the samples in the relative importance of the different motives could not be explained by people's self‐definition (i.e., more independent or interdependent). Implications of these findings for the literature on forgiveness and on individualism–collectivism are discussed.     

Forgiveness: The Victim’s Prerogative

Abstract

This article explores and offers a qualified defence of the claim that the entitlement to forgive a wrongdoer belongs to the victim of the wrong. A summary account of forgiveness is given, followed by arguments in favor of the victim’s prerogative to forgive. Primary, or direct victims are then distinguished from secondary and tertiary ones, which point to a plurality of prerogatives to forgive. In cases of conflicts between these prerogatives it is emphasized that special care should be taken to protect the primary victim’s entitlement, without giving an absolute and exclusive status to the latter prerogative. Grounds for limiting the primary victim’s prerogative regarding forgiveness include (a) cases where harm to secondary and/or tertiary victims are greater than the harm resulting from the original wrong committed against the primary victim, (b) the social dimensions of the elements of forgiveness, and (c) the need for self-forgiveness when a repentant wrongdoer is not forgiven by any of the victims. The practical significance of these arguments are illustrated by considering the criticism that the South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission have forgiven perpetrators in ways that inappropriately pre-empted the primary victims’ entitlement to forgive.     

The tendency to forgive in dating and married couples: The role of attachment and relationship satisfaction

Given the positive benefits associated with interpersonal forgiveness, the current investigation examined the tendency to forgive in romantic relationships. Two studies tested the hypothesis that the tendency to forgive mediates the association between attachment models of self and other and relationship satisfaction in dating (n = 184) and marital relationships (n = 96). In addition, the extent to which the tendency to forgive predicts forgiveness of an actual transgression was examined among married couples. The tendency to forgive partially mediated the relation between model of other (relationship partner) and satisfaction for those in dating relationships and for husbands. For those in marital relationships, the tendency to forgive partially mediated the relation between model of self and satisfaction. In addition, for wives, endorsing a greater tendency to forgive was related to forgiveness of an actual transgression, regardless of the severity of that transgression. For husbands, endorsing a greater tendency to forgive was related to forgiveness of an actual transgression, but only for more severe transgressions. Results are discussed in terms of who is more likely to forgive and the role that the tendency to forgive plays in romantic relationships.     

The perception of time heals all wounds: temporal distance affects willingness to forgive following an interpersonal transgression

Prior research has assessed the temporal unfolding of forgiveness and found that forgiveness becomes more likely as time distances the victim from the transgression. These findings lend credence to the axiom "time heals all wounds." This research examines the effect of time perception on forgiveness of others by experimentally manipulating temporal distance. In Experiment 1, respondents reported greater willingness to forgive the transgressor when more time had elapsed since the transgression. Experiments 2 and 3 determined the influence of subjective temporal distance on willingness to forgive. Participants who perceived a hypothetical (Experiment 2) or real (Experimental 3) transgression to be farther away in time were more willing to forgive the target than were participants who perceived the event to be temporally closer. Results suggest that temporal appraisals of an event are central to the forgiveness process.     

The varying meaning of forgiveness: Relationship closeness moderates how forgiveness affects feelings of justice

Psychological research has repeatedly shown that victims are more likely to forgive socially close than distant others, but little research has addressed the question whether forgiveness in these two cases actually has the same psychological meaning. As one approach to this issue, the present research investigates how acts of forgiveness aid the restoration of victims' justice feelings through different processes, depending on the closeness of their relationship to the offender. In two studies (Study 1 using a scenario method, Study 2 an autobiographical recall), the victim's perceptions of value consensus with the offender mediated justice‐restoring effects of forgiveness expressed towards a close offender, whereas feelings of status/power mediated justice‐restoring effects of forgiveness expressed towards a distant offender. Copyright © 2012 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Self-Construal and Forgiveness Revisited: Replication and Extension

Evidence suggests that people who have greater interdependent self-construal forgive others more often because they are motivated to forgive to maintain the relationship. Furthermore, such forgiveness might lead to greater emotional well-being. In this study, we examined the relationship between interdependent self-construal and (a) decisional forgiveness and (b) emotional well-being. We also tested models that included trait forgivingness and the motivation to forgive to maintain relationships. Results indicated that (a) trait forgivingness and relational motivations to forgive uniquely mediate the relationship between interdependent self-construal and decisional forgiveness and (b) trait forgivingness may be a pathway from interdependent self-construal to emotional well-being.     

Forgiveness: origins, dynamics, psychopathology, and technical relevance

This paper integrates a diverse and scattered literature to describe the psychodynamic underpinnings of granting and seeking forgiveness. The evolutionary foundations and the developmental substrate of these capacities are elucidated. An individual who fails to make certain intrapsychic achievements may be vulnerable to psychopathological development, as is evident in those who cannot forgive or forgive too readily, constantly or never seek others' forgiveness, cannot accept forgiveness, or show an imbalance between their capacities to forgive themselves and to forgive others. The relevance of various developmental and phenomenological concepts to psychoanalytic technique, including the patient's need to forgive and to be forgiven, is also discussed.     

How is Self‐Forgiveness Possible?

The idea of self‐forgiveness poses a serious challenge to any philosopher interested in giving a general account of forgiveness. On the one hand, it is an uncontroversial part of our common psychological and moral discourse. On the other, any account of self‐forgiveness is inconsistent with any general account of forgiveness which implies that only the victim of an offense can forgive. To avoid this conclusion, one must either challenge the particular claims that preclude self‐forgiveness or offer an independently plausible account of self‐forgiveness. I deploy both strategies in this article, explaining what self‐forgiveness is and how it is possible.     

Group Threat, Collective Angst, and Ingroup Forgiveness for the War in Iraq

We examine the consequences of threat to the ingroup for emotional reactions to ingroup harm doing. It was hypothesized that reminders of a past threat to the ingroup would induce collective angst, and this emotional reaction would increase forgiveness of the ingroup for its harmful actions toward another group. In Experiment 1, Americans read an article about the war in Iraq that implied Americans would soon experience another attack or one where such implied future threat to the ingroup was absent. When the ingroup's future was threatened, forgiveness for the harm Americans have committed in Iraq was increased, to the extent that collective angst was induced. In Experiment 2, Americans experienced more collective angst and were more willing to forgive their ingroup for their group's present harm doing in Iraq following reminders of either the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001, or the 1941 Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor compared to when the victimization reminder was irrelevant to the ingroup. We discuss why ingroup threat encourages ingroup forgiveness for current harm doing.     

Retribution and forgiveness: The healing effects of punishing for just deserts

Although punishment and forgiveness frequently are considered to be opposites, in the present paper we propose that victims who punish their offender are subsequently more likely to forgive. Notably, punishment means that victims get justice (i.e. just deserts), which facilitates forgiveness. Study 1 reveals that participants were more likely to forgive a friend's negligence after being primed with punishment than after being primed with inability to punish. In Study 2, participants were more forgiving towards a criminal offender if the offender was punished by a judge than if the offender escaped punishment, a finding that was mediated by the just deserts motive. Study 3 was in the context of actual recalled ongoing interpersonal relations and revealed that punishment predicted forgiveness indirectly via just deserts, not via victims' vengeful motivations. It is concluded that punishment facilitates forgiveness because of its capacity to restore a sense of justice. Copyright © 2013 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Forgiveness by God, Forgiveness of Others, and Psychological Well-Being in Late Life

The purpose of this study is to examine the relationships among forgiveness by God, forgiveness of others, and psychological well–being with data provided by a nationwide survey of older adults. Three main findings emerge from the analyses. First, the data suggest that forgiving others tends to enhance psychological well–being, and these salubrious effects are greater than those associated with forgiveness by God. Second, the findings indicate that how older people go about forgiving others is important: older adults who require transgressors to perform acts of contrition experience more psychological distress than those who forgive unconditionally. Third, the results reveal that forgiveness by God may be involved in this process because older people who feel they are forgiven by God are less likely to expect transgressors to perform acts of contrition.