Effects of Perceived Consensus on Selective Reinforcement of Other People's Stated Opinions

Three studies tested whether perceived consensus affects selective reinforcement of other people's stated opinions on important social issues. Participants who perceived relatively high consensus for their opinions were more likely than participants who perceived low consensus to reward another person's agreeing statements more than the person's disagreeing statements about gun control (Study 1) and to prolong interrogating another student about abortion (Study 2). In Study 3, participants who were told they were in a two-thirds majority regarding gay scout troop leaders were more likely than participants who were told they were in a one-third minority to practice selective reinforcement. The results have implications for settings in which interrogators believe they can exercise power over the person who is being questioned.     

Modulation of the leniency bias in the discursive dilemma

We experimentally approach the discursive dilemma to gain insight into people's procedural appropriateness judgments. We relied on a vignette in which three people had formed opinions about two skills (premises) of a candidate to decide whether to hire her/him (conclusion). The dilemma arises when different outcomes (hire vs. not hire) are achieved depending on whether the majority opinion is independently considered for each premise or for the global conclusion of each judge. Participants were asked to choose the procedure they thought to be more appropriate to reach a decision. In Experiment 1, we found a leniency effect (a bias to prefer the aggregation procedure that led to hiring the candidate), which was reduced by introducing the participant as a juror with an exogenously provided negative opinion about the candidate's skills. In Experiment 2, we replicated the opinion effect, even when subjects did not participate as jury members. In Experiment 3, we found that the leniency bias was only reduced when participants' negative opinion was aligned with a majority of negative premises, but not with a majority of negative conclusions. We discuss present findings in terms of the identification of empirical regularities that may affect people's procedural legitimacy judgments.     

Neurodualism: People Assume that the Brain Affects the Mind more than the Mind Affects the Brain

People commonly think of the mind and the brain as distinct entities that interact, a view known as dualism. At the same time, the public widely acknowledges that science attributes all mental phenomena to the workings of a material brain, a view at odds with dualism. How do people reconcile these conflicting perspectives? We propose that people distort claims about the brain from the wider culture to fit their dualist belief that minds and brains are distinct, interacting entities: Exposure to cultural discourse about the brain as the physical basis for the mind prompts people to posit that mind–brain interactions are asymmetric, such that the brain is able to affect the mind more than vice versa. We term this hybrid intuitive theory neurodualism. Five studies involving both thought experiments and naturalistic scenarios provided evidence of neurodualism among laypeople and, to some extent, even practicing psychotherapists. For example, lay participants reported that “a change in a person's brain” is accompanied by “a change in the person's mind” more often than vice versa. Similarly, when asked to imagine that “future scientists were able to alter exactly 25% of a person's brain,” participants reported larger corresponding changes in the person's mind than in the opposite direction. Participants also showed a similarly asymmetric pattern favoring the brain over the mind in naturalistic scenarios. By uncovering people's intuitive theories of the mind–brain relation, the results provide insights into societal phenomena such as the allure of neuroscience and common misperceptions of mental health treatments.     

Emotion and intuition

We investigated effects of emotional states on the ability to make intuitive judgments about the semantic coherence of word triads. Participants were presented word triads, consisting of three clue words that either were weakly associated with a common fourth concept (coherent triads) or had no common associate (incoherent triads). In Experiment 1, participants in a neutral mood discriminated coherent and incoherent triads reliably better than chance level even if they did not consciously retrieve the solution word. In Experiment 2, the induction of a positive mood reliably improved intuitive coherence judgments, whereas participants in a negative mood performed at chance level. We conclude that positive mood potentiates spread of activation to weak or remote associates in memory, thereby improving intuitive coherence judgments. By contrast, negative mood appears to restrict spread of activation to close associates and dominant word meanings, thus impairing intuitive coherence judgments.     

Hesitation in communication: Does minority status delay responses?

Past studies indicated that people in a minority (vs. majority) position are slower to express their public/political opinion, and the larger the difference between the size of the two positions, the slower the response. Bassili termed this the minority‐slowness effect (MSE). In the current study, two experiments were conducted to demonstrate that MSE extends to people's understanding of utterances and explored the cognitive basis for this. Participants were asked to judge if an utterance is a ‘direct’ or an ‘indirect’ expression. The results show that participants in the minority (vs. majority) took longer to respond, and the larger the difference between the size of majority and minority, the longer the response latency (Study 1a). Furthermore, participants were aware of their own minority position (Study 1b). In Study 2, when participants were deprived of cognitive resources, MSE disappeared, presumably because participants lack the cognitive resources required to conform to utterance interpretation as favoured by the majority.     

Explaining White Opposition to Black Political Leadership: The Role of Fear of Racial Favoritism

Despite the election of America's first Black president, most non‐Hispanic Whites continue to oppose Black political leadership. The conventional explanation for White opposition is sheer racial prejudice, yet the available empirical evidence for this theory is inconsistent. I test an alternative theory that Whites perceive Black political leaders as a threat to their group's interests. Using a new survey measure and nationally representative panel data covering the 2008, 2010, and 2012 U.S. elections, I find that a majority of Whites perceive Black elected officials as likely to favor Blacks over Whites. Moreover, fear of racial favoritism predicts support for Barack Obama in both cross‐sectional models and fixed‐effects models of within‐person change, controlling for negative racial stereotypes. I replicate these findings using a separate cross‐sectional survey fielded after the 2014 election that controls for racial resentment. Collectively, these results suggest that perceptions of conflicting group interests—and not just prejudice—drive White opposition to Black political leadership.     

Cultural group perception enhances sense of agency in a multicultural society

Group, which involves collective actions for achieving shared goals, can be conceptually understood as an important source of agency and control. The current research investigated whether group identity salience can enhance sense of agency within the individual. Specifically, we examined whether an activated cultural group identity, through presenting different types of cultural photographs in a predictable way, would facilitate people's sense of agency by using an implicit method, namely, intentional binding effect paradigm. Experiment 1a found that an activated cultural group identity enhanced the sense of agency. Next, Experiment 1b replicated the findings by recruiting a different ethnic group in the same society. Experiment 2 explored what may affect the intensity of induced sense of agency and found that perceived representativeness of the presented cultural stimuli was positively correlated with the intensity of induced sense of agency. Finally, Experiment 3 explored whether ethnic minority and majority groups would demonstrate different intensity of agency when their cultural identity was activated. The results showed that the sense of agency induced by the mainstream cultural stimuli was greater than that induced by the foreign cultural photographs. These patterns were not different between the two ethnic groups. Taken together, these findings reflected the dynamic nature of cultural identity construction in a multicultural society.     

Conflict detection during moral decision-making: evidence for deontic reasoners’ utilitarian sensitivity

Moral dilemmas often force us to decide between deontological (harming others is wrong) and utilitarian (harming others can be acceptable depending on the consequences) considerations. Cognitive scientists have shown that utilitarian responders typically engage demanding deliberate thinking to override a conflicting intuitive deontological response. A key question is whether deontic responders also take utilitarian considerations into account and detect that there are conflicting responses at play. The present study addressed this issue by contrasting people's processing of moral dilemmas in which utilitarian and deontological considerations cued conflicting or non-conflicting decisions. Results showed that deontic responders were slower and less confident about their decision when solving the conflict (vs. no-conflict) dilemmas. This suggests that they are considering both deontic and utilitarian aspects of their decision and indicates that a deontic decision is more informed and less oblivious than it might appear.     

Levels of consensus and majority and minority influence

Three experiments are reported which examine the effects of consensus information on majority and minority influence. In all experiments two levels of consensus difference were examined; large (82% versus 18%) and small (52% versus 48%). Experiment 1 showed that a majority source had more influence than a minority source, irrespective of consensus level. Experiment 2 examined the cause of this effect by presenting only the source label (‘majority’ versus ‘minority’), only the consensus information (percentages) or both. The superior influence of the majority was again found when either (a) both source label and consensus information were given (replicating Experiment 1) and (b) only consensus information was given, but not when (c) only the source label was given. The results showed majority influence was due to the consensus information indicating more than 50% of the population supported that position. Experiment 3 also manipulated message quality (strong versus weak arguments) to identify whether systematic processing had occurred. Message quality only had an impact with the minority of 18%. These studies show that consensus information has different effects for majority and minority influence. For majority influence, having over 50% support is sufficient to cause compliance while for a minority there are advantages to being numerically small, in terms of leading to detailed processing of its message. Copyright © 2002 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Weighting information from outside sources: a biased process

How do people utilize information from outside sources in their decisions? Participants observed a signal‐plus‐noise or noise‐alone event and then made a yes–no decision about whether a signal had occurred. Participants were provided with two information sources to aid decision making. Each source consisted of four components that provided estimates of signal likelihood. In Experiment 1, the two sources had equal overall accuracy but differed in the expertise and internal correlation of their components. A regression analysis indicated that participants overweighed the high‐expertise‐high‐correlation source. This bias occurred on trials when the aggregate opinions of the sources disagreed. In Experiment 2, both the overall accuracy of the source and its components were manipulated. Participants overweighed information from the higher accuracy source. These biases reflect people's sensitivity to across‐trial and within‐trial differences in the accuracy and internal consistency of information sources. Experiment 3 provided additional evidence supporting these conclusions. Copyright © 2004 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Does Anxiety Improve Voters' Decision Making?

Affective Intelligence (AI) theory proposes to answer a fundamental question about democracy: how it succeeds even though most citizens pay little attention to politics. AI contends that, when circumstances generate sufficient anxiety, citizens make informed and thoughtful political decisions. In Ladd and Lenz (2008 ), we showed that two simpler depictions of anxiety's role can explain the vote interactions that apparently support AI. Here, we again replicate Marcus, Neuman and MacKuen's (2000 )'s voting model, which they contend supports AI, and again show that it is vulnerable to these alternative explanations, regardless of how candidate choice is measured. We also briefly review the broader literature and discuss Brader's (2005, 2006 ) important experimental results. Although the literature undoubtedly supports other aspects of AI, few studies directly test AI's voting claims, which were the focus of our reassessment. In our view, the only study that does so while ruling out the two alternatives is our analysis of the 1980 ANES Major Panel ( Ladd & Lenz, 2008 ), which finds no support for AI, but ample support for the alternatives. None of the responses to Ladd and Lenz (2008 ) addresses these findings. Overall, evidence that anxiety helps solve the problem of voter competence remains sparse and vulnerable to alternative explanations.     

The political glass cliff: When left-wing orientation leads to minority candidate choices for hard-to-win seats

IntroductionGlass cliff evidence shows that women and ethnic, racial, and immigration (ERI) groups are more likely to face precarious leadership positions than majority groups. In politics, this is illustrated by minority candidates running for harder-to-win seats than majority candidates.ObjectiveThe present research extends these correlational findings on ERI populations to an experimental setting and investigates the underlying reasons.MethodTwo scenario-based experimental studies were conducted with voting populations in France and Switzerland, who took the role of party decision-maker. In Study 1 (n = 64), we manipulated candidate origin and measured the choice of political ward (hard vs. easy-to-win), while in Study 2 (n = 151), we manipulated ward winnability and measured candidate choice (ERI minority vs. majority).ResultsOverall, findings suggest that ERI minority (compared to majority) political candidates were more likely to be matched with hard-to-win than easy-to-win political wards. Of interest, this finding only occurred for participants with a political left-wing orientation. Moreover, both studies investigated the reasons underlying such tendency and, in particular, focused on participants’ motivation to implement change.ConclusionThe discussion confronts hostile and benign motives for glass cliff decisions and highlights the potentially distinct consequences for minority candidates.     

The decoy effect as a covert influence tactic

The purpose of this research was to determine whether individuals could use the decoy effect to influence others' choices. In study 1, undergraduates (n = 50) and executive master's of business administration (EMBA) students (n = 24) read an employee selection scenario in which they were randomly assigned to prefer one of two candidates that were equal in overall attractiveness, but that had different strengths and weaknesses. They were then asked to choose one of three inferior candidates to add to the choice set that would make their preferred candidate more likely to be chosen by other decision makers. The “correct” inferior candidate was asymmetrically dominated—dominated by one of the two existing candidates, but not the other. Participants chose the “correct” decoy candidate at better than chance levels. In study 2, undergraduates and EMBA students (total n = 66) completed a set of four decision tasks, in which they were asked to choose from potential decoy alternatives that would highlight their preferred job candidate or the product they preferred to sell to a customer. Participants again chose the correct option at better than chance levels. When participants provided free‐response reasons for their choices, these responses indicated a fairly strong recognition of the influential nature of creating a dominating relationship. Implications for understanding this effect and how it may be used by hiring managers, sales personnel, and others who attempt to influence others people's decisions at work, are discussed. Copyright © 2010 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Voting at 16? 16–17-Year-Old Germans Vote as Correctly as Adults

Lowering the voting age from 18 to 16 years has recently been a hot topic of the political debate in many democratic countries. This study investigated whether the voting quality of 16–17-year-olds is inferior to that of the voting population. Shortly before the 2021 German federal election, two samples, representative for age and gender, indicated personal preferences about various political issues and weighted them according to importance, allowing for the calculation of individual expected values for political parties. Participants then indicated their voting choice. These choices were normatively correct when individuals voted for the party that best reflected their preferences, that is, the one maximizing the expected value. Results show that the voting decisions of 16–17-year-olds were as good as those by eligible voters. The study indicates that the exclusion of 16–17-year-old Germans in democratic elections cannot be justified by their lack of decision-making ability.     

Effects of Consensus Information and Task Demonstrability on Preference-Consistent Information Evaluation and Decision Quality in Group Decision Making

Groups often fail to solve hidden profiles even when all information is exchanged. This is partly due to biased evaluation of information. We examined the effects of consensus information and task demonstrability on preference-consistent information evaluation and decision quality. The results showed that the evaluation of unshared but not shared information was moderated by consensus information and task demonstrability. For unshared information, majority members exhibited a higher evaluation bias favoring preference-consistent information than minority members. Task demonstrability reduced the evaluation bias only when group members received no information about the other members' preferences. Finally, majority members were less likely to solve the hidden profile than minority members, and this was partially mediated by the evaluation bias favoring preference-consistent unshared information.     

The Effect of a Majority Group's Orientation Toward Acculturation on a Minority Group's Feelings of National Identity

In the present study, 136 ethnic Russian students in Estonia read one of two fictitious scenarios about the results of a national survey. The first scenario led participants to believe that members of the majority group (Estonians) prefer minority groups to assimilate to the dominant, majority culture. The second scenario led participants to believe that the majority group prefers a multicultural orientation that values all cultural groups. After reading one of the two scenarios, participants completed measures of national identity and ethnic identity. Participants' responses revealed that the effect of the majority's acculturation orientation on feelings of national identity was moderated by the minority group's self-identification and the strength of their ethnic identity. Specifically, the different acculturation scenarios produced different intensities of national identity, but only for persons who identified as monocultural or reported a high degree of ethnic identity.     

Trust and Acceptance in Response to References to Group Membership: Minority and Majority Perspectives on Cross‐Group Interactions1

This research examined anticipated feelings of trust and acceptance in cross‐group interactions among members of ethnic minority and majority groups, depending on whether an out‐group member referred to their group membership. In Study 1, Asian, Latino, and White participants read scenarios describing interactions between them and an in‐group member, an out‐group member, or an out‐group member who referred to their group membership. Participants from each group responded more negatively toward interactions with out‐group members when they referred to group membership. These findings were replicated in Study 2 with samples of Black and White participants, also showing that anticipated prejudice partially mediated the effects of out‐group members' references to group membership on feelings of trust and acceptance. Implications of these findings are discussed in terms of facilitating intergroup communication and conversations about group differences.     

Belief merging and the discursive dilemma: an argument-based account to paradoxes of judgment aggregation

The aggregation of individual judgments on logically interconnected propositions into a collective decision on the same propositions is called judgment aggregation. Literature in social choice and political theory has claimed that judgment aggregation raises serious concerns. For example, consider a set of premises and a conclusion where the latter is logically equivalent to the former. When majority voting is applied to some propositions (the premises) it may give a different outcome than majority voting applied to another set of propositions (the conclusion). This problem is known as the discursive dilemma (or paradox). The discursive dilemma is a serious problem since it is not clear whether a collective outcome exists in these cases, and if it does, what it is like. Moreover, the two suggested escape-routes from the paradox—the so-called premise-based procedure and the conclusion-based procedure—are not, as I will show, satisfactory methods for group decision-making. In this paper I introduce a new aggregation procedure inspired by an operator defined in artificial intelligence in order to merge belief bases. The result is that we do not need to worry about paradoxical outcomes, since these arise only when inconsistent collective judgments are not ruled out from the set of possible solutions.     

Distracted by Details: Narrative Influence Following Conflicting Stories

Work on narrative influence has demonstrated that stories can have a strong effect on people's thoughts and attitudes. However, existing research has not addressed how people respond to multiple stories endorsing different conclusions. The current studies examined how reading two conflicting narratives influences people's decisions about a subsequent situation, with particular emphasis on how resemblances between the narratives and the situation moderate the effects. Across two studies, participants read two testimonials that described the successful use of different treatments for a medical disorder. Participants subsequently made treatment recommendations for a patient who resembled one of the testimonials in treatment-relevant ways. The key manipulation was whether the patient also resembled the other testimonial in treatment-irrelevant ways. Both studies found that these distracting, irrelevant similarities led to less appropriate treatment recommendations. The effect on decision confidence, however, was less clear, with some suggestion of both an increase (Study 1) and a decrease (Study 2) in confidence.