Relationships between core ideological motives,social and economic conservatism,and religiosity: Evidence from a Turkish sample

The “conservatism as motivated social cognition” approach posits two core ideological motives underlying political conservatism across cultures. However, there is a scarcity of tests from non‐Western cultures, and much research has failed to distinguish between social and economic conservatism. Using a relatively large undergraduate sample from a non‐Western, predominantly Muslim country (Turkey), we tested the associations among resistance to change and opposition to equality motives, social and economic conservatism, right‐wing political orientation, and religiosity. In line with the “conservatism as motivated social cognition” account, we found that (a) social conservatism is more strongly related to resistance to change (rather than opposition to equality), (b) economic conservatism is more strongly related to opposition to equality (rather than resistance to change), (c) social conservatism is the strongest predictor of right‐wing political orientation among other conservatism measures, and (d) political orientation and religiosity had divergent effects: While right‐wing political orientation was related to economic conservatism, religiosity was inversely related to the latter, providing support for previous work indicating a resemblance between leftists and Islamists in Turkey. The results generally support the motivated social cognition approach to conservatism while also highlighting the importance of distinguishing between social and economic conservatism.     

Social Dominance Orientation and Right‐Wing Authoritarianism: Additive and Interactive Effects on Political Conservatism

It is commonly accepted that social dominance orientation (SDO) and right‐wing authoritarianism (RWA) are potent unique predictors of a variety of prejudice and prejudice‐related constructs. However, contrary to some predictions, there has been little evidence that these constructs interact to produce this outcome—they appear to be additive but not interactive in their prediction of prejudice. We extend the interaction hypothesis to consideration of another broadly relevant construct—political ideology. Drawing from 14 independent New Zealand–based samples, we show, through meta‐analysis and multilevel random coefficient modelling, that SDO and RWA additively and interactively predict levels of political conservatism operationalised in a variety of ways. Specifically, both constructs are associated with increasing political conservatism, and the lowest levels of conservatism (or highest levels of political liberalism) are found in those lowest in both SDO and RWA.     

The Suppression and Justification of Prejudice as a Function of Political Orientation

Politically conservative (versus liberal) individuals generally report more prejudice towards various low‐status out‐groups. Three studies examined whether prejudice suppression factors—specifically, internal and external motivation to suppress (IMS and EMS, respectively) prejudice—can help explain the relationship between political orientation and prejudice. Study 1 showed that IMS and EMS partially mediated the relationship between political orientation and affective prejudice towards Arabs. Study 2 demonstrated that when justification [right‐wing authoritarianism (RWA) and social dominance orientation] and suppression (IMS and EMS) factors are simultaneously tested as mediators, only RWA partially mediated the relationship between political orientation and prejudice towards deviant (e.g. gay men) out‐groups, whereas RWA and IMS fully mediated the relationship between political orientation and prejudice towards derogated out‐groups (e.g. Blacks). Intriguingly, IMS rendered social dominance orientation effects non‐significant for derogated out‐groups. Study 3 showed that anticipating an out‐group interaction (with a Black or lesbian confederate) diminished the mediational contribution of IMS in the political orientation–prejudice relationship because of increased IMS among participants; yet the increases in IMS did not completely eliminate differences in prejudice as a function of political orientation. Ultimately, these three studies demonstrate that suppression (in addition to justification) factors do help explain the relationship between political orientation and prejudice. Copyright © 2013 European Association of Personality Psychology.     

Political Intolerance,Right and Left

Research recently published in Political Psychology suggested that political intolerance is more strongly predicted by political conservatism than liberalism. Our findings challenge that conclusion. Participants provided intolerance judgments of several targets and the political objective of these targets (left‐wing vs. right‐wing) was varied between subjects. Across seven judgments, conservatism predicted intolerance of left‐wing targets, while liberalism predicted intolerance of right‐wing targets. These relationships were fully mediated by perceived threat from targets. Moreover, participants were biased against directly opposing political targets: conservatives were more intolerant of a left‐wing target than the opposing right‐wing target (e.g., pro‐gay vs. anti‐gay rights activists), while liberals were more intolerant of a right‐wing target than the opposing left‐wing target. These findings are discussed within the context of the existing political intolerance and motivated reasoning literatures.     

On the Relation Between Religiosity and the Endorsement of Conspiracy Theories: The Role of Political Orientation

Religious and conspiracy beliefs share the feature of assuming powerful forces that determine the fate of the world. Correspondingly, they have been theorized to address similar psychological needs and to be based on similar cognitions, but there exist little authoritative answers about their relationship. We delineate two theory-driven possibilities. If conspiracy theories and religions serve as surrogates for each other by fulfilling similar needs, the two beliefs should be negatively correlated. If conspiracy and religious beliefs stem from the same values and cognitions, this would speak for a positive correlation that might be diminished—for example—by controlling for shared political ideologies. We approached the question with a meta-analysis (N = 10,242), partial correlations from large Christian-dominated datasets from Germany, Poland, and the United States (N = 12,612), and a preregistered U.S. study (N = 500). The results indicate that the correlations between religiosity and conspiracy theory endorsement were positive, and political orientation shared large parts of this covariance. Correlations of religiosity with the more need-related conspiracy mentality differed between countries. We conclude that similarities in the explanatory style and ideologies seem to be central for the relation between intrinsic religiosity and endorsing conspiracy theories, but psychological needs only play a minor role.     

Ideological Asymmetries and the Essence of Political Psychology

Individuals are not merely passive vessels of whatever beliefs and opinions they have been exposed to; rather, they are attracted to belief systems that resonate with their own psychological needs and interests, including epistemic, existential, and relational needs to attain certainty, security, and social belongingness. Jost, Glaser, Kruglanski, and Sulloway ( 2003 ) demonstrated that needs to manage uncertainty and threat were associated with core values of political conservatism, namely respect for tradition and acceptance of inequality. Since 2003 there have been far more studies on the psychology of left‐right ideology than in the preceding half century, and their empirical yield helps to address lingering questions and criticisms. We have identified 181 studies of epistemic motivation (involving 130,000 individual participants) and nearly 100 studies of existential motivation (involving 360,000 participants). These databases, which are much larger and more heterogeneous than those used in previous meta‐analyses, confirm that significant ideological asymmetries exist with respect to dogmatism, cognitive/perceptual rigidity, personal needs for order/structure/closure, integrative complexity, tolerance of ambiguity/uncertainty, need for cognition, cognitive reflection, self‐deception, and subjective perceptions of threat. Exposure to objectively threatening circumstances—such as terrorist attacks, governmental warnings, and shifts in racial demography—contribute to modest “conservative shifts” in public opinion. There are also ideological asymmetries in relational motivation, including the desire to share reality, perceptions of within‐group consensus, collective self‐efficacy, homogeneity of social networks, and the tendency to trust the government more when one's own political party is in power. Although some object to the very notion that there are meaningful psychological differences between leftists and rightists, the identification of “elective affinities” between cognitive‐motivational processes and contents of specific belief systems is essential to the study of political psychology. Political psychologists may contribute to the development of a good society not by downplaying ideological differences or advocating “Swiss‐style neutrality” when it comes to human values, but by investigating such phenomena critically, even—or perhaps especially—when there is pressure in society to view them uncritically.     

Differences in Media Preference Mediate the Link Between Personality and Political Orientation

Research has consistently demonstrated that political liberalism is predicted by the personality trait Openness to Experience and conservatism by trait Conscientiousness. Less well studied, however, is how trait personality influences political orientation. The present study investigated whether differences in media preference might mediate the links between personality and political orientation. Participants completed measures of Big Five personality, media preferences, and political orientation. Results revealed that increased preferences for Dark/Alternative and Aesthetic/Musical media genres, as well as decreased preferences for Communal/Popular media genres, mediated the association between Openness to Experience and liberalism. In contrast, greater preferences for Communal/Popular and Thrilling/Action genres, as well as lower preferences for Dark/Alternative and Aesthetic/Musical genres mediated the link between Conscientiousness and conservatism.     

Defending a Law of Peoples: Political Liberalism and Decent Peoples

In this paper I reconstruct and defend John Rawls' The Law of Peoples, including the distinction between liberal and decent peoples. A “decent people” is defined as a people who possesses a comprehensive doctrine and uses that doctrine as the ground of political legitimacy, while liberal peoples do not possess a comprehensive doctrine. I argue that liberal and decent peoples are bound by the same normative requirements with the qualification that decent peoples accept the same normative demands when they are reasonably interpreted and from their comprehensive doctrine, not from political liberalism. Normative standards for peoples appear in a law of peoples in two places: as internal constraints carried forward from political liberalism which regulate domestic affairs and as principles derived from a second original position that provide the normative ground for a society of peoples. This first source of normative standards was unfortunately obscured in Rawls' account. I use this model to defeat the claim that Rawls has accommodated decent peoples without sufficient warrant and to argue that all reasonable citizens of both liberal and decent peoples would accept the political authority of the state as legitimate. Although my reconstruction differs from Rawls on key points, such as modifying the idea of decency and rejecting a place for decent peoples within a second original position, overall I defend the theoretical completeness of political liberalism and show how a law of peoples provides reasonable principles of international justice. This paper explores theoretical ideas I introduced in embryonic form in a paper presented at the International Conference on Human Rights: Theoretical Foundations of Human Rights, 17–18 May, 2003, Mofid University (Qom, Iran). That paper, “Political Liberalism and Religious Freedom: Asymmetrical Tolerance for Minority Comprehensive Doctrines” (forthcoming in the Proceedings of the conference), addressed specific issues related to religious toleration, but left unexplored theoretical questions regarding the status of decent peoples. I wish to thank participants in the conference for their helpful feedback on my interpretation of Rawls' international political theory, especially Jack Donnelly, Michael Freeman, Stephen Macedo, Samuel Fleishacker, Omar Dahbour, Yasien Ali Mohamed, and Saladin Meckled-Garcia. In addition, I wish to offer my sincere appreciation to the Executive Committee of the Conference and especially to Sayyed Masoud Moosavi Karimi, Nasser Elahi, and Mohammad Habibi Modjandeh.     

Translating Dispositional Resistance to Change to the Culture Level: Developing a Cultural Framework of Change Orientations

A fundamental societal challenge is to balance the desire for growth, development, and progress on the one hand and the need for stability and maintenance of the status quo on the other. To better understand how societies deal with this challenge we employ the personality trait of dispositional resistance to change to conceptualize and empirically establish the concept of cultural change orientation. With data from individuals in 27 countries (N = 6487), we identify three culture‐level change orientation dimensions (routine seeking, affective reactance, and cultural rigidity) and interpret their meaning through their relationships with established cultural frameworks (e.g. GLOBE, Hofstede, Inglehart, and Schwartz). We thus propose a new culture‐level framework and test hypotheses about relationships between change orientation dimensions and national indexes of economic, technological, social, and environmental change. Our findings demonstrate meaningful differential relationships between the three change orientation dimensions and these societal outcomes. Copyright © 2018 European Association of Personality Psychology     

Nikolai Mikhailovskii and Konstantin Leont'ev. On the Political Implication of Herbert Spencer's Sociology

I present a fragment from thehistory of the Russian reception of HerbertSpencer's sociology. The discussion concernstwo diametrically opposed but exceptionallyimportant figures in the history of Russianthought, Nikolai Mikhajlovskij (1842–1904) andKonstantin Leont'ev (1831–1891). As one of thechief ideologues of the Populist movementMikhajlovskij turned Spencer's ideas into anegative frame of reference for his own`romantic socialist utopia'. In turn, Leont'evformulated his extremely conservative politicalviews on the basis of Spencer's organicistsociology. Though at the opposite ends of thespectrum both standpoints succeeded inexhibiting the political implications of thepositivist and naturalist style of thinking.     

Feminists, Islamists, and Political Change in Turkey

This paper examines how some feminist and Islamist women in Turkey helped bring about change in political values during the past decade. The traditional political culture upheld statist, corporatist (as opposed to liberal, individualist) norms. The state controlled religion in the name of secularism and limited democracy within the confines of formal equality. Both feminists and Islamists contested traditional political values by insisting on their own definition of their interests, as opposed to those that were state-enforced. The feminists questioned the justice of formal equality as they sought substantive equality; Islamist women challenged the secular concept of equality as they insisted on the justice of male-female complementarity. Both groups engaged in active politics and expanded the parameters of democratic participation as they sought substantive equality beyond formal equality. Yet the patriarchal heritage of Islam defined the limits of Islamist women's search for liberation within the confines of religion.     

Ideological Orientation and Political Transition in Hong Kong: Confidence in the Future

In the two-component model of ideological orientation, a person's ideological position is jointly influenced by attitudinal and affective components. The present study adopted this conceptual model to predict confidence in the future of Hong Kong. Questionnaire responses were collected from 395 adults (56.8% men and 43.2% women) in Hong Kong in April 1995, some 2 years before its transfer from British to Chinese control. The results show that the level of confidence in Hong Kong was related to both attitudinal and affective identification with Hong Kong and China. These findings suggest that the transfer of government may have brought to the surface a collision of the divergent political cultures of Hong Kong and mainland China, resulting in two antagonistic political orientations that predicted confidence in the future of Hong Kong.     

Christian and Political Conservatism Predict Opposition to Sexual and Gender Minority Rights through Support for Christian Hegemony

Although significant strides have been made for sexual and gender minority (SGM) rights in the United States, there continues to be opposition to SGM rights from many conservative Christians and political conservatives. In this study, we investigate this opposition by examining support for Christian hegemony (i.e., the idea that Christianity should be the norm and Christians should be in power in the United States) and unawareness of Christian privilege (i.e., unearned advantages for Christians) as religiopolitical variables that help to explain the association between Christian and political conservatism and opposition to a host of SGM rights (same-sex marriage, same-sex adoption, nondiscrimination policies in jobs and housing for SGMs, and bills regarding transgender public bathroom use). Based on structural equation modeling analysis with heterosexual cisgender Christian (n = 688) and Areligious (n = 327) students, we demonstrate that support for Christian hegemony and unawareness of Christian privilege help to explain the association between Christian and political conservatism and opposition to SGM rights. These findings advance our understanding of a new type of religious-based variable focused on religious power and privilege to help understand conservative religious and political opposition to SGM rights. Limitations, implications, and directions for future research also are discussed.     

Beyond “Heartless Conservative” and “Bleeding Heart Liberal” Caricatures: How Religiosity Shapes the Relationship Between Political Orientation and Empathy

Is political orientation associated with self‐reported empathy? Popular caricatures frame political orientation in terms of the “heartless conservative” and the “bleeding heart liberal.” Yet, previous research has produced findings that present mixed evidence to support these caricatures. Using data from the 2004 General Social Survey, analyses show that the caricatures of the caring liberal and the cold‐hearted conservative are supported by results for empathy—in which conservatives have lower levels of empathy than liberals—but this pattern holds only when individuals also have low levels of religiosity. In the context of high religiosity, self‐identified conservatives do not have lower empathy than self‐identified liberals, net of a host of sociodemographic characteristics. Our observations demonstrate that patterns in empathy across political orientation are evident only when levels of different forms of religiosity are considered.     

The Relation Between Familial Factors and the Future Orientation of Urban, African American Sixth Graders

This study examined the relations between familial and environmental factors and five dimensions of future orientation in a sample of urban, African American early adolescents from low-income families. A new multidimensional interview measure, the Future Orientation Interview, was designed for this study to expand on available measures. Hierarchical multiple regression was used to examine the unique contribution of each familial and environmental factor to each dimension of future orientation. The independent variables significantly predicted three of the five dimensions of future orientation: salience, detail, and control beliefs. The pattern of significance varied for each dimension of future orientation, with mother involvement, kinship social support, and socialization of future orientation emerging as important predictors of various dimensions of future orientation. Results are discussed in terms of theoretical issues related to future orientation and implications for intervention.     

Multiple and Counterstereotypic Categorization of Immigrants: The Moderating Role of Political Orientation on Interventions to Reduce Prejudice

Multiple and counterstereotypic categorization of outgroup members reduces prejudice towards them. The present research addresses, for the first time, the role of political orientation in moderating the impact of these strategies on prejudice reduction. Given that right‐wingers have very likely a higher need for cognitive closure compared to left‐wingers and thus may be less tolerant to social diversity, for them, increasing the complexity of outgroup members through counterstereotypic versus stereotypic or multiple versus simple categorizations should be a less effective strategy of prejudice reduction than it is for left‐wingers and moderate individuals. Results using Romanians and immigrants as outgroup targets for Italian participants supported our prediction. Further, we found that the effect of prejudice reduction was explained by the sequential mediation of increased individuation of immigrants and reduced sense of threat from them. Implications of the interplay between multiple categorization and political orientation are discussed.     

Living in a Non‐Communist Versus in a Post‐Communist European Country Moderates the Relation Between Conservative Values and Political Orientation: A Multilevel Study

We performed a multilevel, multinational analysis using the 2012 European Social Survey dataset (N = 41 080, nested in 20 countries) to study how living in a non‐communist versus in a post‐communist country moderates the link between individual conservative values (drawn on Schwartz's theory of basic human values) and political orientation (assessed as self‐placement on the left–right axis and attitude towards economic redistribution). The results supported the moderating role of living in a non‐communist versus in a post‐communist country in the case both of political self‐placement and of attitude towards economic redistribution, even controlling for the countries' degree of individualism, power distance and democracy. Specifically, conservative values were positively related to a rightist political self‐placement among participants living in countries without a communist past, and to a favourable attitude towards economic redistribution in countries with a communist past. The limitations, implications and future directions of this study are discussed. Copyright © 2016 European Association of Personality Psychology     

Encountering Dissimilar Views in Deliberation: Political Knowledge,Attitude Strength,and Opinion Change

Conversing with diverse points of view stands as the central tenet of deliberative democracy, yet empirical evidence has suggested mixed outcomes related to perspective change as a result of deliberative encounters. I propose a difference‐driven model that suggests individual predispositions moderate the processing of dissimilar views when changing policy preferences. My analysis is based on a random sample of over 400 voters at a California‐wide deliberative event, where participants discussed proposals for reforming the state politics. I find that encountering more and different arguments transforms policy attitudes. Yet it is more difficult for people to change their minds on issues about which they hold strong beliefs. Some evidence suggests that different psychologies are at play for people who enter deliberation with substantial or weak political knowledge and for those who deliberate while holding strong or moderate prior opinions. Well‐grounded strong opinions are resistant to change, while well‐grounded moderate opinions are persuadable in deliberative groups. Uninformed positions can become entrenched in like‐minded groups, yet they can be adjusted once participants deliberate with dissimilar views, especially opinions that are held strongly without good informational ground. The findings urge deliberative forums that introduce participants to diverse perspectives to foster a considered public opinion.     

Political Economy of Conflict and Conflict Resolution Between Islam,the Arab World,and the West

The problem studied in respect to politico-economic turmoil in an uneasy world centers around conflicts in the Arab world and between Islam and the West. In this respect, the Arab political economy is deeply embroiled in a quagmire of complex factors that have deepened and are confounded by Western political, strategic, and economic interests in the region. To study the topic of the politico-economic future of the Arab world is to delve into the study of complex factors. The present scenario of war, dissensions, power conflict, and Western belligerence with elitist self interest in the region is an example of a more permanent representation of the complexity of power, Western belligerence, regional interests, and religious conflicts. With respect to the political economy of conflict and conflict resolution concerning the West there is the uneasy alliance that has been unjustifiably established between the Arab world and the West. The conflict in this case rages around the spectre of political power and governance within which the cultural, religious, and economic forces tie in to generate the global political economic disorder. Conflict resolution in this arena requires an understanding based on acceptance of epistemological perspectives that wrap up the diverse oppositional factors into a discursive and consensual learning global social contract. This article studies this case of Arab political economy as a study of conflict and conflict resolution between contending forces and reconstructive politico-economic possibilities between the Arab world and the West and between Islam, the Arab world, and Occidentalism.