Joint independent random utility models where one of the choice structures satisfies the strict utility model

It is known that one cannot construct an independent joint random utility model for which both the preference and aversion probabilities satisfy the strict utility model. Given this result, it is natural to ask what kind of relations are possible in such contexts. Here, for instance, we demonstrate that if a structure of preference and aversion probabilities are generated by a common independent random utility model, and if the preference probabilities satisfy the strict utility model, then the preference and aversion probabilities are related by what is known as the strong acceptance condition. We also prove an appropriate converse of this result. Finally, an example is given of a process (other than the random utility model) that is compatible with the assumption that a structure of preference and aversion probabilities satisfies a common strict utility model.     

Extreme malleability of preferences: Absolute preference sign changes under uncertainty

Malleability of preferences is a central tenet of behavioral decision theory. How malleable preferences really are, however, is a topic of debate. Do preference reversals imply preference construction? We argue that to claim preferences are construed, a demonstration of more extreme preference malleability than simple preference reversals is required: absolute preference sign changes within participants. If respondents value a prospect positively in 1 condition but negatively in a different condition, preferences cannot be considered stable. Such absolute preference sign changes are possible under uncertainty. In 2 incentive‐compatible experiments, we found participants were willing to pay to take part in a gamble and also demanded to be compensated to take part in a subsequent gamble with identical outcomes and probabilities. Such absolute preference sign changes within participants led to simultaneous risk aversion and risk seeking for the same risky prospect, suggesting that, at least in the domain of risky decisions, consumers' preferences are indeed malleable and construed.     

概率大小、损益结果和认知闭合需要对模糊规避的影响

模糊规避是指在相同奖赏的情况下,决策者会力图规避从主观上判断具有模糊概率的事件而偏好具有相同精确概率的事件。本研究探讨了概率大小、损益结果和认知闭合需要对模糊规避的影响。研究发现,在小概率受益的情况下,个体倾向于模糊寻求;在中概率受益的情况下,个体倾向于模糊规避;在高概率受益的情况下,个体倾向于模糊规避;在小概率损失的情况下,个体倾向于模糊规避;在中概率损失的情况下,个体倾向于模糊规避;在高概率损失的情况下,个体倾向于模糊寻求。但是,研究并未发现认知闭合需要对模糊规避有预测作用。     

Impact of regulatory focus on ambiguity aversion

Although prior research has shown that some people prefer a risky to an ambiguous option, this study further proposes that people's regulatory focus (promotion vs. prevention) might influence their ambiguity aversion. Three experiments have tested whether people with promotion focus showed less ambiguity aversion than those with prevention focus: The first experiment revealed that, compared with chronically promotion‐focused individuals, prevention‐focused subjects preferred a risky to an ambiguous option. In the second experiment, priming of the subjects' goal orientations led to similar results. Experiment 3 demonstrated that participants showed less ambiguity aversion for the expected performance of an investment product representative of promotion (e.g., a stock fund) rather than one representative of prevention (e.g., a bond fund). In other words, people showed less preference for a bond fund when the probability distribution of its expected performance was unknown than when it was known, whereas they showed less preference difference between known and unknown probability distributions for the expected performance of a stock fund. This study has integrated research pertaining to regulatory focus and ambiguity aversion, and the results have confirmed that the impact of regulatory focus on ambiguity aversion is robust across different methods and decision tasks. Copyright © 2010 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

The effects of strong belief structures on information-processing evaluations and choice

This study examined the influence of the strength of belief structures on selected aspects of the decision-making process. To examine these issues, a business-acquisition decision scenario was studied in an experiment. Subjects played the role of a CEO of an electronics firm and were asked to evaluate the attractiveness of six potential acquisition candidates and to rate various aspects of the associated decision process. We presented half the subjects with information that the belief structure of their organization was extreme, agreed upon, and clear. The other half was presented with information that there was disagreement about the belief structure and that it was more ambiguous and less extreme. The results clearly showed that the decision process is different for people who were presented with an agreed-upon, extreme, and tightly constructed belief structure when compared to those who received information reflecting a weak and loosely constructed belief structure. A strong belief structure resulted in less positive evaluations, information requested, and money allocated to explore incompatible acquisition candidates (and vice versa for a highly compatible candidate) when compared to subjects using a weak belief structure. In addition, subjects in the strong-belief condition reported that their decision process would be characterized by less doubt, less time, less difficulty, and less conflict compared to subjects in the weak-belief structure condition. Implications for both decision theory and practical decision processes are discussed.     

The Effects of Framing, Reflection, Probability, and Payoff on Risk Preference in Choice Tasks

A meta-analysis of Asian-disease-like studies is presented to identify the factors which determine risk preference. First the confoundings between probability levels, payoffs, and framing conditions are clarified in a task analysis. Then the role of framing, reflection, probability, type, and size of payoff is evaluated in a meta-analysis. It is shown that bidirectional framing effects exist for gains and for losses. Presenting outcomes as gains tends to induce risk aversion, while presenting outcomes as losses tends to induce risk seeking. Risk preference is also shown to depend on the size of the payoffs, on the probability levels, and on the type of good at stake (money/property vs human lives). In general, higher payoffs lead to increasing risk aversion. Higher probabilities lead to increasing risk aversion for gains and to increasing risk seeking for losses. These findings are confirmed by a subsequent empirical test. Shortcomings of existing formal theories, such as prospect theory, cumulative prospect theory, venture theory, and Markowitz's utility theory, are identified. It is shown that it is not probabilities or payoffs, but the framing condition, which explains most variance. These findings are interpreted as showing that no linear combination of formally relevant predictors is sufficient to capture the essence of the framing phenomenon.     

Effects of probability mode on preference reversal.

Six analysts estimated verbally and numerically the chances that specific events will occur. Sixty decision makers used each type of estimate to make binary-choice decisions and to bid for lotteries based on the events. The usual reversal of preference between choice and bidding procedures was found in the numerical condition, but the frequency of preference reversals was significantly reduced in the verbal condition. This reduction occurred because risk aversion was reduced in choice when verbal estimates were given, whereas bidding was unaffected by presentation mode. The pattern of results was predicted by and supports the hypothesis that the relative importance given to the dimensions of a prospect depends on the form in which the information is displayed.     

The Effects of Skewed Probability on Decision Making under Ambiguity

Studies have shown that many decision makers knowingly contradict the Savage Postulates when event probabilities are ambiguous, typically displaying ambiguity aversion. For the purposes of this paper, ambiguity is defined operationally as a subjective second-order distribution on probabilities, f(p). Most studies to date on ambiguity have focused on symmetric second-order distributions, demonstrating preference effects of the mean and range or variance of f(p). This research asserts that choice behavior is also significantly and systematically impacted by the skewness of f(p). An experiment using 130 MBA students revealed that subjects are often ambiguity averse when f(p) is negatively skewed but ambiguity seeking when the skewness is positive, even though the mean and variance of f(p) remain constant. These skewness effects are incorporated into a model of choice under ambiguity.     

模糊规避的形成机制：基于可评价性假设的视角

模糊规避是指在相同奖赏的情况下,决策者会力图规避从主观上判断具有模糊概率的事件而偏好具有相同精确概率的事件。本研究使用同时评价、单独评价的研究范式从随机事件和自然事件两个领域来探讨模糊规避的形成机制。研究结果表明,当风险事件和模糊事件同时评价时,个体倾向于模糊规避;当风险事件和模糊事件单独评价时,模糊规避会消失。     

行为决策中模糊规避研究的回顾与展望

模糊规避是指在相同奖赏的情况下,决策者会偏好有精确概率的事件而不是从主观上判断具有相同模糊概率的事件。自从Ellsberg提出模糊规避的概念以来,模糊规避已在行为决策研究的多个领域得到广泛验证。本文梳理了近五十年来关于模糊规避的研究文献,系统分析了模糊规避的研究范式、心理机制和影响因素,同时提出了未来的研究展望。     

Variations of career decision ambiguity tolerance between China and the United States and between high school and college

The variation of career decision ambiguity tolerance (CDAT) by cultures and development stages was examined in a sample of Chinese high school students (n = 339), a sample of Chinese college students (n = 356), along with U.S. college students (n = 328). It was hypothesized that career decision ambiguity tolerance decreases when individuals experience more societal/cultural pressure on decidedness and responsibility for their career decision making. Based on the three-factor structure of CDAT (i.e., preference, tolerance, and aversion), measurement invariance was examined between Chinese and U.S. college students and between Chinese high school and college students. While the factor of tolerance was not upheld in both Chinese samples, the factors of preference and aversion were found to be structurally invariant across cultures and developmental stages. The analyses comparing means of preference and aversion found that U.S. college students had a higher level of preference relative to Chinese college students. It was also found that in comparison to Chinese high school students, Chinese college students had a higher level of aversion. The criterion validity of CDAT in Chinese culture was supported in the findings of preference and aversion being associated with career exploration and career indecision. The implication of this study was discussed along with its limitations and suggestions for future research.     

不确定性容忍度对模糊决策中决策偏好的影响及其情景依赖性*

研究以Ellsberg选瓶任务为决策材料,探讨了不同任务特征下个体不确定性容忍度对模糊决策中决策偏好的影响。结果发现,获益情景下:高概率时高、低容忍度个体对模糊选项的选择无显著差异,均偏好模糊规避;中概率时低容忍度个体比高容忍度个体表现出更低程度的模糊规避,前者倾向于模糊中立,后者倾向于模糊规避;低概率时两者对模糊选项的选择无显著差异,均倾向于模糊中立。损失情景下:高概率时两者对模糊选项的选择无显著差异,均倾向于模糊寻求;中概率时低容忍度比高容忍度个体更偏好模糊寻求,前者倾向于模糊寻求,后者倾向于模糊中立;低概率时两者对模糊选项的选择无显著差异,均倾向于模糊规避。这表明,不确定性容忍度对模糊决策偏好产生作用,但这种作用会受到损益概率和损益结果的影响,具有情景依赖性。     

A Representation Theorem for a Decision Theory With Conditionals

This paper investigates the role of conditionals in hypothetical reasoning and rational decision making. Its main result is a proof of a representation theorem for preferences defined on sets of sentences (and, in particular, conditional sentences), where an agent’s preference for one sentence over another is understood to be a preference for receiving the news conveyed by the former. The theorem shows that a rational preference ordering of conditional sentences determines probability and desirability representations of the agent’s degrees of belief and desire that satisfy, in the case of non-conditional sentences, the axioms of Jeffrey’s decision theory and, in the case of conditional sentences, Adams’ expression for the probabilities of conditionals. Furthermore, the probability representation is shown to be unique and the desirability representation unique up to positive linear transformation. This revised version was published online in June 2006 with corrections to the Cover Date.     

小概率权重问题及其市场应用

探讨了决策制定中有关“小概率权重”的理论问题和市场应用问题。若干实验结果表明概率的权重大小不是绝对的,而是背景依赖的,在决策问题中价值对比降低或不存在时,小概率事件权重不太可能被高估。然而,对小概率的权重也会因决策人所处的目前状况有关,个体在财富状况等方面的差异会对小概率事件的赋权产生影响。实验结果还证明有关小概率权重问题的理论发现对彩票价格制定、保险费用确定以及选择有效的有奖促销策略具有重要的启示     

The behavioural components of risk aversion

There have been few theoretical investigations of risk attitude within Cumulative Prospect Theory (CPT). Unlike expected utility theory, in CPT risk attitude is affected by loss aversion and decision weight distortions as well as utility curvature for both gains and losses. We introduce two variants of the risk premium—the total risk premium relative to expected value, and the behavioural risk premium relative to the imputed behavioural expected value. Approximate solutions for each using Pratt's [(1964). Risk aversion in the small and in the large. Econometrica, 32, 122-136] methodology show that the CPT risk premium is composed of two components: the first, analogous to the Pratt-Arrow coefficient of risk aversion, governs the contribution of the curvature of the value function to risk aversion; the second governs the first-order contribution of loss aversion. Both of these terms are made more complex by the introduction of decision weights. We analyse the contribution of each component and provide sufficient conditions to ensure risk aversion in CPT.     

Choosing what to choose from: Preference for inclusion over exclusion when constructing consideration sets from large choice sets

Decision making is a two‐stage process, consisting of, first, consideration set construction and then final choice. Decision makers can form a consideration set from a choice set using one of two strategies: including the options they wish to further consider or excluding those they do not wish to further consider. The authors propose that decision makers have a relative preference for an inclusion (vs. exclusion) strategy when choosing from large choice sets and that this preference is driven primarily by a lay belief that inclusion requires less effort than exclusion, particularly in large choice sets. Study 1 demonstrates that decision makers prefer using an inclusion (vs. exclusion) strategy when faced with large choice sets. Study 2 replicates the effect of choice set size on preference for consideration set construction strategy and demonstrates that the belief that exclusion is more effortful mediates the relative preference for inclusion in large choice sets. Studies 3 and 4 further support the importance of perceived effort, demonstrating a greater preference for inclusion in large choice sets when decision makers are primed to think about effort (vs. accuracy; Study 3) and when the choice set is perceived as requiring more effort because of more information being presented about each alternative (vs. more alternatives in the choice set; Study 4). Finally, Study 5 manipulates consideration set construction strategy, showing that using inclusion (vs. exclusion) in large choice sets leads to smaller consideration sets, greater confidence in the decision process, and a higher quality consideration set.     

Uncertainty Avoidance Influences Choices for Potential Gains but not Losses

Uncertainty of outcomes is a primary dimension underlying human judgment and decision making, and is a defining feature of risk. Even though uncertainty almost always exists in decision making contexts, individuals and cultures vary in their preference for avoiding uncertainty. This study examines how uncertainty avoidance influences judgments involving uncertain and risky alternatives. Participants were presented with problems that involve potential gains or losses and contain options reflecting uncertain or certain outcomes. Greater uncertainty avoidance predicted choices for uncertain outcomes that involved gains, which tend to promote risk aversion, but not for uncertain outcomes that led to losses, which tend to promote risk seeking. These results demonstrate that culturally-relevant dispositions such as uncertain avoidance can have complex effects on judgment.     

不确定性容忍度、损益概率及延迟风险对延迟选择的影响

研究通过两个实验考查了不确定性容忍度及相关变量对延迟选择的影响,其中实验1采用2（不确定性容忍度：高/低）×2（概率水平：高/中）被试间实验设计;研究2将实验任务设定在有延迟风险情景下中等概率水平,采用单因素（不确定性容忍度：高/低）被试间实验设计.实验1结果表明：不确定性容忍度与概率水平存在交互作用：中等概率时,低容忍度个体比高容忍度个体更偏好延迟选择,高概率时,两者的延迟选择无显著差异,都偏好于选择决策.实验2结果表明：在有延迟风险中等概率时,高、低容忍度个体的决策偏好无显著差异,都偏好选择决策.结论：不确定性容忍度对延迟选择存在影响且受概率水平和延迟风险的调节.     

Self‐other decision‐making differences in loss aversion: A regulatory focus perspective

Drawing on a cultural perspective, we examined whether differences in self‐other decision making documented in the West can be replicated in an Eastern context. Study 1 revealed that Chinese participants showed self‐other decision‐making differences in loss aversion similar to those observed in Western participants; loss aversion differed depending on the type of decision recipient, and trait regulatory focus moderated the self‐other decision‐making difference. Study 2 found a mediating effect of situational prevention but not promotion focus on the relationship between decision makers’ roles and loss aversion. Furthermore, both studies revealed that participants did not show a preference for loss aversion, suggesting that the baseline of self‐other decision‐making differences has shifted in China compared to the West.