Bonus and Penalty in Common Pool Resource Dilemmas under Uncertainty

Common pool resource (CPR) dilemmas constitute a class of social dilemmas in which equilibrium behavior results in Pareto deficient outcomes that are not at all desirable by the group. We focus on a class of CPR dilemmas that, in addition to strategic uncertainty about the harvesting behavior of the other group members, include environmental uncertainty about the size of the CPR. In an attempt to decrease the rate of requests from the common pool, and thereby increase individual payoffs, we extend previous research-both theoretically and experimentally-in two different directions. In the bonus treatment, a reward is given to the agent(s) who requests the least, and in the penalty treatment, a charge is imposed on the agent(s) who requests the most. We show that under equilibrium play the bonus treatment decreases total group request, whereas the penalty treatment increases it. Our experimental results do not support this prediction. Rather, both treatments considerably decrease the rate of request and, therefore, increase the rate of provision. The penalty treatment is shown to be more effective in reducing individual requests and enhancing provision rates than the bonus treatment. Copyright 2001 Academic Press.     

Intergroup and Intragroup Aspects of Leadership in Social Dilemmas: A Relational Model of Cooperation

Two experiments investigated how leadership shapes individual contributions in small groups facing public goods dilemmas. We predicted that the influence of leaders would be determined by their ability to fulfill both instrumental needs (solve the free-rider problem) and relational needs (contribute to the identity) of group members. The relative importance of these two needs was expected to vary with the salience of group membership (social vs personal identity). This hypothesis was supported in two experiments. Experiment 1 revealed that leaders showing group commitment and fairness toward members were more effective at raising contributions when social identity was salient. Furthermore, Experiment 2 showed that highly committed leaders were more influential when social identity was salient, whereas leaders with intrinsic leadership skills were more influential when personal identity was salient. This suggests that the effectiveness of leader solutions to social dilemmas depends upon the fit between leader characteristics and member expectations.     

Cultural Values in Intergroup and Single-Group Social Dilemmas

Do cultural values influence the manner in which people cooperate with one another? This study assessed cultural characteristics of individuals and then related these characteristics to cooperative behavior in social dilemmas. Participants were assessed for their degree of vertical and horizontal individualism and collectivism, cultural values identified by Triandis (1995). They made choices in either a single-group or an intergroup social dilemma. The single-group dilemma entailed a three-person dilemma; the intergroup dilemma was identical but added subgroup competition, i.e., an opposing three-person group. The results indicated an interaction between cultural characteristics and type of dilemma for cooperation. The single-group versus intergroup effect reported by Bornstein and Ben-Yossef (1994) was replicated, but only for vertical individualists. The vertical individualists were least cooperative in the single-group dilemma but were more cooperative in the intergroup dilemma-where cooperation with the group maximized personal outcomes. The vertical collectivists were most cooperative in the single-group dilemma but were less cooperative in the intergroup dilemma- where group defection resulted in maximum group outcomes. The horizontal individualists and collectivists exhibited an intermediate level of cooperation, with no differences in cooperation between the single-group and intergroup dilemmas. Taken together, the results suggest that the relationship between cultural values and cooperation, in particular with reference to vertical and horizontal components of individualism and collectivism, is more complex than has been suggested in past research. Copyright 1999 Academic Press.     

公共资源两难管理的社会学习过程和动机释放机制

公共资源两难的根本问题是个人经济利益与社会整体利益的矛盾。一些人为了追逐个人利益最大,过度获取公共资源,走向＂公共的悲剧＂,或不愿为公共资源作出贡献,＂搭便车＂现象流行。传统的研究从理性经济人的角度探讨公共资源两难博弈行为的机制,用＂贪婪＂来解释＂搭便车＂现象,并根据强化理论以奖励和惩罚作为主要对策。但是,这种理性经济人观点忽视了人的社会动机。实际上,公共资源两难博弈是一个社会互动的过程,人的社会心理因素在其中起了很重要的作用,因此在方法论上有必要从社会人（Homo socius）的人性观来进行分析。本文在当前的相关研究文献基础上,分析了公共资源两难博弈行为的动机模式,从社会学习理论出发,提出了公共资源两难管理的社会学习过程和动机释放机制。     

两难中合作行为研究的回顾和展望

如何预测人们将做出合作行为,是社会两难决策研究中重要的问题。该文回顾了社会两难研究的进展情况,包括社会两难的特征、来源、类型、研究方法和理论基础;综述了两难中影响合作行为的个人因素和情景因素,重点介绍了目前存在争议的制裁系统和合作的关系研究,以及为什么它们之间会表现出一些自相矛盾之处;对合作行为研究存在的问题进行了初步探讨,未来的研究将更侧重于合作决策的理论建构、文化内涵和认知过程的揭示     

不对称社会困境中社会价值取向对合作的影响

以往研究表明, 社会价值取向对社会困境中合作行为变异的解释量不高。本研究指出, 初始资源配置导致个体处于某种优劣势位置上, 从而影响社会价值取向不同的个体的合作行为。研究设置了两人互动和多人互动两种情境, 通过变化被试所拥有的初始资源的相对价值或相对数量来操作优势差异, 检验亲社会者和亲自我者在社会困境中的心理与行为差异。研究结果表明, 在初始资源处于相对劣势位置时, 亲社会者比亲自我者表现出更高的合作水平。     

Testing an Economic Approach to Resource Dilemmas

This article applies a market mechanism derived from principles of welfare economics to a social dilemma simulation in the laboratory. In Study 1, half of the five-person groups were offered the opportunity to voluntarily "buy-out" one or more group members in an effort to conserve a shared, scarce resource. Most groups offered the intervention achieved at least one member buy-out per game. Yet, despite the smaller size of the groups, these groups did not sustain the resource pool any longer than control groups that were left intact. In fact, the results were in the opposite direction. Subjects behaved in a more self-interested manner. In Study 2, the "buy-out" intervention was varied to test the robustness of Study 1′s result. It was found that the intervention was not sensitive to changes in the specifics of operationalization. Discussion is offered regarding the complexity of market-based interventions in social choice situations and the need for improved understanding of the micro-mediating links between market dynamics and individual- and group-level behavior.     

Effects of Environmental Uncertainty and Social Value Orientation in Resource Dilemmas

This study investigated the relationship between environmental uncertainty and social value orientation in a replenishable resource dilemma paradigm. One hundred seventy-two undergraduates harvested units from a common resource pool over 20 trials. Two levels of social value orientation (cooperative, noncooperative) were crossed with two levels of replenishment rate uncertainty (low, high). As predicted, noncooperators harvested significantly more resources than cooperators and high uncertainty subjects harvested more resources than low uncertainty subjects. The primary finding was the hypothesized three-way interaction among social value orientation, environmental uncertainty, and trials: Social value orientation moderated harvest decisionsonlyunder conditions of high uncertainty during the middle series of harvest trials. Noncooperators increased their harvests during this period, while cooperators harvested less and held their harvests constant across these trials. These results demonstrate that systematic individual differences exist in decision makers' responses to high environmental uncertainty. We suggest that social value orientation may exert its effect by influencing the scanning and processing of goal-relevant cues in this decision environment.     

Cooperation in Asymmetric Social Dilemmas When Equality Is Perceived as Unfair1

Three experiments examined the hypothesis that in an asymmetric social dilemma, perceived fairness of the distribution promotes cooperation. In support of the hypothesis, Studies 1 and 2 showed that willingness to voluntarily and anonymously pay for child care was related to ratings of perceived fairness of equal and equitable distributions of the quality of child care when it was a public good (provided by the municipality) or a market good (provided by a private business). Study 1 also showed that an equal distribution of the public good was perceived to be fairer than an equal distribution of the market good, whereas the reverse was true for an equitable distribution. Study 2 showed that when quality differences were explicit, an equitable distribution was perceived as fairer than an equal distribution. Study 3 showed that an equitable distribution of quantity of child care was perceived to be fairer and increased willingness to pay as compared to an equal distribution.     

群际接触中的群际隔离微生态

群际隔离微生态认为当公共空间中群际接触自然发生时,相比较内群体成员个体在空间距离上远离外群体成员;介绍了群际隔离微生态的维度、心理机制、实施过程、测度指标;分析了群际隔离微生态的相关研究现状和不足,在未来的研究中需要加强立论点、解释机制、研究方法的探索的研究,为群际接触研究提供了新的视角。     

Positional Order and Group Size Effects in Resource Dilemmas with Uncertain Resources

We report the results of three experiments in which groups of players share a common resource pool whose size is a random variable with a commonly known distribution. We study a new information structure - called the positional order protocol - under which requests are made in an exogenously determined and commonly known order without disclosing the requests of previous players in the sequence. Mean individual requests under this protocol of play are compared with data gathered under the more familiar simultaneous protocol (simultaneously made requests) and sequential protocol (sequentially made requests with full disclosure of previous requests). Previously reported effects of the resource uncertainty on individual requests obtained under the simultaneous and sequential protocols are generalized across different group sizes. In contrast to the game-theoretical prediction, which does not distinguish between the simultaneous and positional order protocols, mean individual requests and position in the sequence are highly and significantly correlated. We conclude that position effects can be induced by temporal priority, even in the absence of differential information.     

Social Norms and Cooperation in Social Dilemmas: The Effects of Context and Feedback

Drawing from research on social norms, we proposed and tested the hypothesis that people behave more competitively in social dilemmas involving economic decisions compared to those involving noneconomic decisions. We also proposed that people would compete more if they see that others have unexpectedly competed in a prior situation and cooperate more when others have unexpectedly cooperated in a previous situation. Further, we hypothesized that if others behave consistently with expectations, such behaviors (either cooperative or competitive) would not affect subsequent behavior. One hundred ninety-five under graduate students participated in an experiment in which they made choices in two different social dilemma games. Results support the hypotheses, and the discussion addresses the implications of the study for research on social norms and decision making.     

Framing in Resource Dilemmas: Loss Aversion and the Moderating Effects of Sanctions

Two resource dilemmas, the commons dilemma, in which individuals take from a common resource, and the public goods problem, in which individuals give to a common good, were experimentally compared. Although they provide equivalent outcomes, the two dilemmas involve different frames of reference and are not psychologically equivalent. We also examined sanction systems, which involve contributions by individuals in the dilemma to provide rewards and penalties for cooperation. The results of Experiment 1 supported the hypothesis that public goods problems ("give dilemmas") activate greater loss aversion and less cooperation than commons dilemmas ("take dilemmas"), and that this effect is moderated by sanction systems. No difference between dilemmas was obtained when either the reward or penalty sanction was present, indicating that sanctions cause a shift in frame of reference to the aspiration of obtaining the reward or avoiding the penalty. The penalty sanction and especially the reward sanction produced greater cooperation. Also, as expected, loss aversion heightened exploitation: when the others were cooperative, a give dilemma generated less cooperation than a take dilemma. In Experiment 2, we extended the concept of frame and loss aversion to the structure of sanction systems, finding that subjects were more likely to contribute to a "take sanction" than to a "give sanction." We discuss potential sources of reference points and loss aversion in resource dilemmas and the likely impact on cooperation.     

Effects of Protocol of Play and Social Orientation on Behavior in Sequential Resource Dilemmas

We report results of an experiment in which we examined consumption behavior of groups of players sharing a common resource pool under four distinct protocols of play. Under thesimultaneousprotocol all subjects make their requests simultaneously. In the other three protocols, players make requests, one at a time, but with various types and levels of information about the process: In thesequentialprotocol, subjects make requests with complete information about their position in the sequence and full disclosure of previous requests; In thepositionalprotocol, requests are made with precise information on one's position in the sequence order, but without disclosing the requests of previous players; Finally, under thecumulativeprotocol, subject make requests with complete information regarding the total previous requests, but do not know their exact position in the sequence. We found a significant "position effect" in all three nonsimultaneous protocols: Mean individual requests and position in the sequence are negatively correlated, reflecting an "early mover advantage" and a "late mover handicap." The effect is weakest in the positional protocol, whereas the sequential and cumulative protocols are, practically, identical. We conclude that although position effects can be induced by temporal priority, they are primarily driven by differential patterns of information regarding the behavior of the other group members. Although the request pattern was consistent with predictions based on the subjects' social orientation, the differences were not quite as pronounced (and significant) as in the "regular" simultaneous dilemmas. On the other hand, we found that the subjects' requests in the simultaneous protocol were an accurate predictor of their behavior in the other protocols as well.