Distinctions between subgroups of asthmatic children: Parental reactions to experimental separation

Parental reactions to experimental separation were analyzed for two groups of asthmatic children, those for whom behavioral factors were judged highly relevant to asthma and those for whom such factors appeared unimportant. The former group of 13 (predicted positives) had shown a highly significant improvement in asthma during separation from their families; the latter group of 12 (predicted negatives) had not. Coding of standardized interviews conducted around the time of separation disclosed that parents (mothers, especially) of predicted positives scored significantly higher than parents of predicted negatives on such scales as fussing over the child at the time of leave taking, missing child, experiencing pain and discomfort during the separation, being anxious over child's welfare, etc. Psychological test data did not discriminate between the parents' or childrens' groups as clearly as the more focused separation interviews but the test results were consistent with interview differences. The separation elicited very strong emotional reactions from several mothers.This study was supported by United States Public Health Service Grant No. HD01060 from the National Institute of Child Health and Human Development. Kirk Brady, John Means, loan Muser, and Claire Purcell contributed to data collection and/or data analysis.     

The way of the agent

The conditional,if an agent did something, then the agent could have done otherwise, is analyzed usingstit theory, which is a logic of seeing to it that based on agents making choices in the context of branching time. The truth of the conditional is found to be a subtle matter that depends on how it is interpreted (e.g., on what otherwise refers to, and on the difference between could and might) and also on whether or not there are busy choosers that can make infinitely many choices in a finite span of time.     

The Self Psychology of Heinz Kohut: What's It All About Theologically?

As a psychoanalytic thinker who offered by means of his self psychology a new paradigm of psychological development and functioning, Heinz Kohut was also a theologian manqué. With the help of the method of interpretation devised by Paul Tillich and David Tracy, Kohut's limit-concepts of tragic man, the self-object, and empathy, all set within his theory of narcissism, are elucidated as theological constructs. These are critiqued for adequacy from a Christian perspective. The conclusion is that Kohut's understanding of the human dilemma and of the way of salvation correlates well with Christianity, while his view of empathy as the means of salvation has created some confusion. Kohut has thus left an unfinished, profoundly important, agenda for theologians and clinicians.     

Reflection-impulsivity and information seeking in emotionally disturbed children

Forty-four emotionally disturbed children were administered the Matching Familiar Figures Test by one examiner after which the 13 most impulsive and 13 most reflective were chosen. A second examiner administered the Fixed Alternatives Question-Asking Game in whichSs sought information by asking questions that could be answered either yes or no. These questions were classified on a developmental basis; reflective children were found to employ more mature questions than did impulsive ones. Indirect comparisons between the present results and those obtained with normalSs were made.     

“Some more” notes,toward a “third” sophistic

Historians of rhetoric refer to two Sophistics, one in the 5th century B.C. and another c. 2nd century A.D. Besides these two, there is a 3rd Sophistic, but it is not necessarily sequential. (The 3rd is counter to counting sequentially.) Whereas the representative Sophists of the 1st Sophistic is Protagoras, and the second, Aeschines, the representative sophists of the 3rd are Gorgias (as proto-Third) and Friedrich Nietzsche, Jean-François Lyotard, Michel Foucault, Jacques Lacan, and Paul de Man.To distinguish between and among Socrates, Plato, and Aristotle, and then Protagoras, Gorgias, and Lacan, the author determines how far each of these personages can count. The model of counting, used semiotically across the topoi of possible/impossible, is that of the people of New Guinea: one thing, two things, many things. It is determined (generally) that the philosophers, including Aristotle, count to one; the Sophists to two; and Gorgias, Lacan, and Lyotard, et al. count to many things, thereby breaking up a monism or binarism. The ancient philosophers employ a substratum of probability to hold together the contraries of possible/impossible; the Sophists employ anti/logic, which keeps the contraries/antitheses separate and therefore without synthesis, but which eventually threatens the integrity of the substratum, or the law of non-contradiction; and Gorgias, Lacan, Lyotard et al. theorize about the impossibility/Resistance of the Logos (reason, logic, law, argumentation, history) to Theory/Totalization, because of the Gorgian Kairos and the Lacanian Real — both of which enter the Logos and break up the cycle of the antitheses and create something new, irrational (Untersteiner).This breaking up has a negative/positive influence on Protagoras's man-measure doctrine, which in turn has a similar influence on the problem of the ethical subject. The subject/agent not only no longer knows (by way of Logos) but also no longer acts (as independent agent); the subject becomes a function of Logos as determined by Kairos/Real; it moves from a hypotaxis/syntaxis of one and two to a radical parataxis/paralogy of some more.From the Impossibility/tragedy of knowledge, however, comes the Possible, or Possibilisms, which allows for the new (though divided) ethical subject to reclaim its position as individual. Such a reclamation of the subject, however, has a profound effect on argumentation, and especially the notion of consensus. What is wanted, then, in a Third Sophistic ethical — as opposed to a political — rhetoric is dissensus through radical parataxes and paralogies.     

Test of the violation of local realism in quantum mechanics with no use of Bell's inequalities

A novel and versatile polarization-entanglement scheme is adopted to investigate the violation of the EPR local realism for a non-maximally entangled two-photon system according to the recent nonlocality proof by Lucien Hardy. In this context the adoption of a sophisticated detection method allows direct determination of any element of physical reality (viz., determined with probability equal to unity in the words of Einstein, Podolsky and Rosen) for the pair system within complete measurements that are largely insensitive to the detector quantum-efficiencies and noise.     

Interpretations of the first-order theory of diagonalizable algebras in peano arithmetic

For every sequence |p _n } _n of formulas of Peano ArithmeticPA with, every formulaA of the first-order theory diagonalizable algebras, we associate a formula ⁰ A, called the value ofA inPA with respect to the interpretation. We show that, ifA is true in every diagonalizable algebra, then, for every, ⁰ A is a theorem ofPA.     

A partially ordered extention of the integers

This paper presents a monotonic system of Post algebras of order +* whose chain of Post constans is isomorphic with 012 ... -3-2-1. Besides monotonic operations, other unary operations are considered; namely, disjoint operations, the quasi-complement, succesor, and predecessor operations. The successor and predecessor operations are basic for number theory.The editing of this unified version of two previous papers [Epstein, Rasiowa 1990, 1991] by the authors was completed, except for footnotes, while the first author visited at Warsaw University during June–July, 1994. The footnotes were added by the first author in September, 1994.Presented byRyszard Wójcicki     

On superintuitionistic logics as fragments of proof logic extensions

Coming fromI andCl, i.e. from intuitionistic and classical propositional calculi with the substitution rule postulated, and using the sign to add a new connective there have been considered here: Grzegorozyk's logicGrz, the proof logicG and the proof-intuitionistic logicI set up correspondingly by the calculiFor any calculus we denote by the set of all formulae of the calculus and by the lattice of all logics that are the extensions of the logic of the calculus, i.e. sets of formulae containing the axioms of and closed with respect to its rules of inference. In the logiclG the sign is decoded as follows: A = (A & A). The result of placing in the formulaA before each of its subformula is denoted byTrA. The maps are defined (in the definitions of x and the decoding of is meant), by virtue of which the diagram is constructedIn this diagram the maps, x and are isomorphisms, thereforex ^–1 = ; and the maps and are the semilattice epimorphisms that are not commutative with lattice operation +. Besides, the given diagram is commutative, and the next equalities take place: ^–1 = ^–1 and = ^–1 x. The latter implies in particular that any superintuitionistic logic is a superintuitionistic fragment of some proof logic extension.     

Modal logic with names

We investigate an enrichment of the propositional modal language with a universal modality having semanticsx iff y(y ), and a countable set of names — a special kind of propositional variables ranging over singleton sets of worlds. The obtained language _c proves to have a great expressive power. It is equivalent with respect to modal definability to another enrichment () of, where is an additional modality with the semanticsx iff y(y x y ). Model-theoretic characterizations of modal definability in these languages are obtained. Further we consider deductive systems in _c. Strong completeness of the normal _c-logics is proved with respect to models in which all worlds are named. Every _c-logic axiomatized by formulae containing only names (but not propositional variables) is proved to be strongly frame-complete. Problems concerning transfer of properties ([in]completeness, filtration, finite model property etc.) from to _c are discussed. Finally, further perspectives for names in multimodal environment are briefly sketched.     

Confusion in philosophy: A comment on Williams (1992)

Patricia Williams made a number of claims concerning the methods and practise of cladistic analysis and classification. Her argument rests upon the distinction of two kinds of hierarchy: a divisional hierarchy depicting evolutionary descent and the Linnean hierarchy describing taxonomic groups in a classification. Williams goes on to outline five problems with cladistics that lead her to the conclusion that systematists should eliminate cladism as a school of biological taxonomy and to replace it either with something that is philosophically coherent or to replace it with pure methodology, untainted by theory (Williams 1992, 151). Williams makes a number of points which she feels collectively add up to insurmountable problems for cladistics. We examine Williams' views concerning the two hierarchies and consider what cladists currently understand about the status of ancestors. We will demonstrate that Williams has seriously misunderstood many modern commentators on this subject and all of her five persistent problems are derivable from this misunderstanding.

Nelson (1989, 67).

     

Sheaves over Heyting lattices

For a complete Heyting lattice , we define a category Etale (). We show that the category Etale () is equivalent to the category of the sheaves over , Sh(), hence also with -valued sets, see [2], [1]. The category Etale() is a generalization of the category Etale (X), see [1], where X is a topological space.     

Belief change as change in epistemic entrenchment

In this paper, it is argued that both the belief state and its input should be represented as epistemic entrenchment (EE) relations. A belief revision operation is constructed that updates a given EE relation to a new one in light of an evidential EE relation, and an axiomatic characterization of this operation is given. Unlike most belief revision operations, the one developed here can handle both multiple belief revision and iterated belief revision.The authors are thankful to John G. Bennett, Henry E. Kyburg, Jr., Norman Foo, Pavlos Pepas, Maurizio Pagnucco, Bob Hadley, members of the Knowledge Systems Group at the University of Sydney and participants of the AI'93 workshop on Belief Revision: Bridging the Gap Between Theory and Practice at Melbourne where a version of this paper was presented, for their suggestions. The authors also express their gratitude to the two anonymous referees for Synthese for their excellent comments and suggestions. Of course it is only the authors that are responsible for the errors that remain.     

A reduction rule for Peirce formula

A reduction rule is introduced as a transformation of proof figures in implicational classical logic. Proof figures are represented as typed terms in a -calculus with a new constant P ⁽⁽⁾⁾. It is shown that all terms with the same type are equivalent with respect to -reduction augmented by this P-reduction rule. Hence all the proofs of the same implicational formula are equivalent. It is also shown that strong normalization fails for P-reduction. Weak normalization is shown for P-reduction with another reduction rule which simplifies of (( ) ) into an atomic type.This work was partially supported by a Grant-in-Aid for General Scientific Research No. 05680276 of the Ministry of Education, Science and Culture, Japan and by Japan Society for the Promotion of Science. Hiroakira Ono     

A paradigm shift in Heidegger research

The Beiträge zur Philosophie mandates a paradigm shift in Heidegger scholarship. In the face of (1) widespread disarray in the current model, the new paradigm (2) abandons Sein as a name for die Sache selbst, (3) understands Welt/Lichtung/Da as that which gives being, (4) interprets Dasein as apriori openedness rather than as being-there, (5) understands the Kehre as the interface of Geworfenheit and Entwurf, not as a shift in Heidegger's thinking, (6) interprets Ereignis as the opening of the Da rather than as appropriation, and (7) understands human finitude as what gives all forms of being and all epochs in the history of being. The conclusion alludes to the function of Mitdasein (co-openness) as die Sache selbst.     

Depression and Anxiety in Persons with Parkinson's Disease With and Without “On–Off” Phenomena

On–off phenomena in Parkinson's disease (PD) are unpredictable motor fluctuations associated with long-term levodopa use. Mood fluctuations have been found to coincide with the motor fluctuations in that depression and anxiety increase while the person with PD is in the off state. What has been relatively unexplored is whether those persons with PD who have on–off phenomena differ psychologically in fundamental ways from those who do not have on–off phenomena. In the present study, depression and anxiety symptoms were assessed in 36 persons with PD (n = 14 with on–off phenomena, n = 22 without on–off phenomena). All those with on–off phenomena were assessed in their on state. Those persons with PD with on–off phenomena had significantly higher levels of anxiety than those without on–off phenomena. However, both groups, regardless of on–off status, were mildly depressed. Neurobiological interpretations of the results implicate the locus coeruleus in the pathogenesis of both on–off phenomena and anxiety, whereas psychological interpretations of the results involve the issues of learned helplessness and control over health symptoms in PD.     

How physicalists can avoid reductionism

Kim maintains that a physicalist has only two genuine options, eliminativism and reductionism. But physicalists can reject both by using the Strict Implication thesis (SI). Discussing his arguments will help to show what useful work SI can do.(1) His discussion of anomalous monism depends on an unexamined assumption to the effect that SI is false.(2) His conclusion on multiple realizability is much stronger than his reasoning warrants.(3) In discussing supervenience, he is wrong to assume that the only approach to explaining why physical truths determine all the truths must be via psychophysical laws.(4) His general argument rests on a mistaken assumption that the only alternative to psychophysical identity theses is to accept supervenient causal relations.     

Relevant analytic tableaux

Tableau formulations are given for the relevance logics E (Entailment), R (Relevant implication) and RM (Mingle). Proofs of equivalence to modus-ponens-based formulations are vialeft-handed Gentzen sequenzen-kalküle. The tableau formulations depend on a detailed analysis of the structure of tableau rules, leading to certain global requirements. Relevance is caught by the requirement that each node must be used; modality is caught by the requirement that only certain rules can cross a barrier. Open problems are discussed.     

Construction of monadic three-valued Łukasiewicz algebras

The notion of monadic three-valued ukasiewicz algebras was introduced by L. Monteiro ([12], [14]) as a generalization of monadic Boolean algebras. A. Monteiro ([9], [10]) and later L. Monteiro and L. Gonzalez Coppola [17] obtained a method for the construction of a three-valued ukasiewicz algebra from a monadic Boolea algebra. In this note we give the construction of a monadic three-valued ukasiewicz algebra from a Boolean algebra B where we have defined two quantification operations and ^* such that ^*x=^*x (where ^*x=-^*-x). In this case we shall say that and ^* commutes. If B is finite and is an existential quantifier over B, we shall show how to obtain all the existential quantifiers ^* which commute with .Taking into account R. Mayet [3] we also construct a monadic three-valued ukasiewicz algebra from a monadic Boolean algebra B and a monadic ideal I of B. The most essential results of the present paper will be submitted to the XXXIX Annual Meeting of the Unión Matemática Argentina (October 1989, Rosario, Argentina).