‘No statues’

One thing nearly all epistemologists agree upon is that Gettier cases are decisive counterexamples to the tripartite analysis of knowledge; whatever else is true of knowledge, it is not merely belief that is both justified and true. They now agree that knowledge is not justified true belief because this is consistent with there being too much luck present in the cases, and that knowledge excludes such luck. This is to endorse what has become known as the ‘anti-luck platitude’.

But what if generations of philosophers have been mistaken about this, blinded at least partially by a deeply entrenched professional bias? There has been another, albeit minority, response to Gettier: to deny that the cases are counterexamples at all.

Stephen Hetherington, a principal and vocal proponent of this view, advances what he calls the ‘Knowing Luckily Proposal’. If Hetherington is correct, this would call for a major re-evaluation and re-orientation of post-Gettier analytic epistemology, since much of it assumes the anti-luck platitude both in elucidating the concept of knowledge, and in the application of such accounts to central philosophical problems. It is therefore imperative that the Knowing Luckily Proposal be considered and evaluated in detail.

In this paper I critically assess the Knowing Luckily Proposal. I argue that while it draws our attention to certain important features of knowledge, ultimately it fails, and the anti-luck platitude emerges unscathed. Whatever else is true of knowledge, therefore, it is non-lucky true belief. For a proposition to count as knowledge, we cannot arrive at its truth accidentally or for the wrong reason.     

Ethics,Violence, and Counseling: Hear No Evil,See No Evil,Speak No Evil?

Situations involving violence directed either at a client or by a client pose ethical and legal dilemmas for the mental health professional. The authors present information concerning both ethical and legal aspects of violence as they relate to client welfare, dangerousness, confidentiality or duty to warn, and counselor violence. In certain situations, case material is used to illustrate both the ethical standards and the laws and statutes that provide directives for professional behavior.     

No Harm,No Foul? Justifying Bans On Safe Performance-Enhancing Drugs

Scholars such as Simon (2007; 2004) and Loland (2002) as well as the authors of the World Anti-Doping Code (2001) argue that using performance-enhancing substances is unhealthy and unfairly coercive for other athletes. Critics of the anti-doping position such as Hoberman (1995), Miah et al. (2005) and Tamburrini (2007) are quick to argue that such prohibitions, even though well-intended, constitute an unjustifiable form of paternalism. However, advocates for both of these positions assume that preserving good health and, conversely, avoiding health-related harms, lie at the centre of the debate. Given the apparent stalemate in the debate over the validity of health concerns on performance-enhancing drugs, in this essay, I investigate ethical issues of ‘harm-free’ pharmaceutical performance enhancement. Beginning with the hypothesis that a harm-free performance-enhancing drug may be produced in the future, I ask if there would still be compelling reasons for prohibiting such a drug. I address this question by providing two arguments against allowing athletes to use pharmaceutical performance-enhancing drugs – the damage to the testing and contesting of sport and the loss of internal goods that are intrinsically satisfying. These two arguments taken together, I argue, are sufficient to sustain the prohibition of pharmaceutical performance-enhancing drugs without citing their harmful side effects.     

Is Nature Enough? No

Abstract. This essay is based on a lecture delivered at the 2002 IRAS Star Island conference, the theme of which was “Is Nature Enough? The Thirst for Transcendence.” I had been asked to represent the position of those who would answer No to the question. I thought it would stimulate discussion if I presented my side of the debate in a somewhat provocative manner rather than use a more ponderous approach that would argue each point in a meticulous and protracted fashion. Here I lay out a theological position that finds naturalism wanting in three ways: in terms of human spiritual needs, in terms of the mind's need for deep explanation, and in terms of the perennial human search for truth. Again, the style of presentation, like that of the original lecture, prohibits the kind of philosophical development that an adequate answer to each of the issues requires. The purpose is that of evoking discussion on a most important question.     

No.1时代 油画

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Sceptical possibilities? No worries

This paper undermines a paradigmatic form of sceptical reasoning. It does this by describing, and then dialectically dissolving, the sceptical-independence presumption, upon which that form of sceptical reasoning relies.     

If No Capacities Then No Credible Worlds. But Can Models Reveal Capacities?

This paper argues that even when simple analogue models picture parallel worlds, they generally still serve as isolating tools. But there are serious obstacles that often stop them isolating in just the right way. These are obstacles that face any model that functions as a thought-experiment but they are especially pressing for economic models because of the paucity of economic principles. Because of the paucity of basic principles, economic models are rich in structural assumptions. Without these no interesting conclusions can be drawn. This, however, makes trouble when it comes to exporting conclusions from the model to the world. One uncontroversial constraint on induction from special cases is to beware of extending conclusions to situations that we know are different in relevant respects. In the case of economic models it is clear by inspection that the unrealistic structural assumptions of the model are intensely relevant to the conclusion. Any inductive leap to a real situation seems a bad bet.

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Should Humans Colonize Mars? No

Space advocates, presidents, and NASA administrators have talked for decades about sending people back to the Moon and on to Mars, to stay. Neither funding nor public support has materialized. Billionaire Elon Musk has declared his intent to establish a human colony on Mars, drawing much media attention. Here Linda Billings argues that it would be unethical to contaminate a potentially habitable planet for further scientific exploration and immoral to transport a tiny, non-representative, subset of humanity—made up of people who could afford to spend hundreds of thousands to millions of dollars on the trip—to live on Mars.     

No Reservations Required? Defending Anti-Nominalism

In a 2005 paper, John Burgess and Gideon Rosen offer a new argument against nominalism in the philosophy of mathematics. The argument proceeds from the thesis that mathematics is part of science, and that core existence theorems in mathematics are both accepted by mathematicians and acceptable by mathematical standards. David Liggins (2007) criticizes the argument on the grounds that no adequate interpretation of “acceptable by mathematical standards” can be given which preserves the soundness of the overall argument. In this discussion I offer a defense of the Burgess-Rosen argument against Liggins’s objection. I show how plausible versions of the argument can be constructed based on either of two interpretations of mathematical acceptability, and I locate the argument in the space of contemporary anti-nominalist views.     

No Route to Material Origin Essentialism?

In the last 30 years repeated attempts have been made to develop a proof-sketch Kripke gave for essentialism about material origins into a cogent argument. I argue that there are general reasons that all such attempts have failed, and so we should likewise expect future attempts to fail.     

Should Humans Colonize Other Planets? No

In certain segments of the space community, the idea of colonizing other planetary bodies has been popular for decades. Disproportionate attention to this idea in the mass media, and lip service from key U.S. government officials, may convey the impression that the goal of space colonization¹1. Though some advocates now eschew the term “colonization” in favor of “settlement” when advocating for human expansion to other planetary bodies, the author makes no distinction between the two terms in this particular case and will use the term colonization.View all notes and exploitation is universally embraced. This author will argue that this is not the case, and, further, should not be. Given the current state of humankind’s overall ethical and moral development, humans should clean up the mess they have made on their home planet and learn how to take care of one another here before they go off into space.     

No microphysical causation? No problem: selective causal skepticism and the structure of completeness-based arguments for physicalism

Synthese - A number of philosophers have argued that causation is not an objective feature of the microphysical world but rather is a perspectival phenomenon that holds only between...     

Is Killing No Worse Than Letting Die?

ABSTRACT Those who wish to refute the view that it is worse to kill than to let die sometimes produce examples of cases in which an agent lets someone die but would be generally agreed to be no less reprehensible than if he had killed. It is argued that the examples produced typically possess a feature which makes their use in this context illegitimate, and that when modified to remove this feature, they provide support for the view which they were designed to undermine.     

On Noël Carroll on narrative closure

This paper examines various claims by Noël Carroll about narrative closure and its relationship to narrative connections, which are, roughly, causal connections generously conceived to include necessary conditions for sufficient conditions for an effect. I propose supplementing the expanded notion of a cause with Michael Bratman’s notion of a psychological connection to account for the particular role that human agents play in narratives. A novel and a film are used as examples to illustrate how the concept of a psychological connection eliminates the need for Carroll's condition that narratives must be globally forward-looking.     

Genetic Moral Enhancement? Yes. Holiness? No

As moral human beings, we deplore our violence and try to rein it in through moral suasion and post-hoc restraint. Could genetic engineering help? Moral enhancement through genetic engineering might predispose us to performing good acts, good deeds. However, good acts alone, theologically speaking, do not count as either morality or holiness. Becoming a good and holy person-in-community is a process of freely chosen character development. While re-creating ourselves genetically to eliminate aggressive acts is not insignificant, such interventions constitute a starting point, not the endpoint, of living a meaningful life in relation to God. Bernard Lonergan’s notion of moral agency requires moral conversion and religious conversion, neither of which could be achieved through gene expression alone. Conversion requires free and intentional participation in moral character development. Finally, we note that salvation according to Christianity is not earned, regardless of a person’s good acts or good moral character.     

Personality assessment: Does the medium matter? No

The equivalence of an Internet administration of personality tests with two other administration formats was assessed using Item Response Theory (IRT) and various other statistical methods. The analyses were conducted on measures of Neuroticism, Extroversion, Agreeableness, and Conscientiousness. A total of 728 participants took part in the study. Participants were randomly assigned to one of three administrative conditions: paper-and-pencil, proctored computer lab, and unproctored Internet. Analyses with IRT, factor analysis, criterion-related validity, and mean differences supported the equivalence of Internet and traditional paper-and-pencil administrations of personality tests.