Functional influences on orienting a reference frame

Spatial relational terms like above are defined with respect to a reference frame. Reference frames are imposed on reference objects and define the space in which to search for a located object. Reference frames have a number of parameters that must be set during spatial term assignment, including origin, scale, and orientation. Previous research has shown that a functional relationship between objects in the scene influences the selection of a reference frame (Carlson-Radvansky & Radvansky, 1996). However, because this work operated at the level of the reference frame, generalizing across various spatial terms, it is unclear how function had its influence. One possibility is that function influences how the parameters of a reference frame are set. Consistent with this idea, Carlson-Radvansky, Covey, and Lattanzi (1999) showed an influence of function on where the origin of a reference frame was imposed. The present paper demonstrates that function also influences how the orientation of the axes of a reference frame is set. The implications for setting multiple parameters of a reference frame are discussed.     

Inhibition Accompanies Reference-Frame Selection

Spatial relational terms are ambiguous because they can be defined by different and sometimes conflicting frames of reference. Previous research has suggested that multiple reference frames are simultaneously active before a reference frame is selected. Two experiments examined the on-line selection of a reference frame to determine whether it is assisted by inhibition. These experiments used a negative-priming paradigm in which access to a reference frame was assessed on trial n when that reference frame was either available but not selected or not available on trial n – 1. Significant negative priming was observed; it operated along the axis of the reference frame, encompassing both endpoints. In addition, reference-frame selection seems to be independent of object selection. We cast these findings within the view of negative priming as an inhibitory mechanism, and discuss their implications for the use of spatial relations.     

Special Abstract Section: 2008 National Conference in Sales Management

Each year, Pi Sigma Epsilon sponsors the National Conference in Sales Management (NCSM) in conjunction with its annual convention. JPSSM is pleased to present this special section containing the abstracts of the papers presented at the 2008 NCSM, which was held March 26–29 in Dallas, TX.     

Special Abstract Section: 2009 National Conference in Sales Management

Each year, Pi Sigma Epsilon sponsors the National Conference in Sales Management (NCSM) in conjunction with its annual convention. JPSSM is pleased to present this special section containing the abstracts of the papers presented at the 2009 NCSM, which was held March 26–28 in Norfolk, VA.     

Special Abstract Section: 2011 National Conference in Sales Management

Each year, Pi Sigma Epsilon sponsors the National Conference in Sales Management (NCSM) in conjunction with its annual convention. JPSSM is pleased to present this special section containing the abstracts of the papers presented at the 2011 NCSM, which was held in Orlando, FL, March 30–April 2.     

Sympathy reconfi gured: Some reflections on sympathy, empathy and the discovery of values

Two words, sympathy and empathy, are commonly used to describe three distinguishable things. These are: i) an elementary, involuntary capacity which puts us in touch with the emotional state of another; ii) the use of 'trial identification' to discover, consciously or unconsciously, the emotional state of another; iii) the affect of compassion. Because these three usages have not been clearly sorted out, and because the word sympathy has been disparaged, empathy has been overused, and a variety of technical terms (including intersubjectivity, recurrent primary identification, projective identification, alpha function etc.), all of which have important specialised applications, have been used confusingly to describe functions at a much higher level of generality. This paper attempts to sort out the three meanings with reference to the history of the two words, and also to show that the use of clear general terms gives us a more intelligible linguistic base from which other matters can be considered: in particular, whether an origin can be discerned for judgements of value other than that of superego internalisation.     

Ramsey's Tests

This paper starts by criticising some olderaccounts of conditionals based on the so-called `Ramsey Test', and ends by proposing their replacement, in part with a material account, in part with a probabilistic account using epsilon terms. The combined replacement is in fact closer to Ramsey's ideas. But there is also a resemblance between the latter and a more recent account of conditionals, which relates some of them to causality. The comparison provides a basis for assessment of the proposed replacement.     

Special Abstract Section: 2006 National Conference in Sales Management

Each year, Pi Sigma Epsilon sponsors the National Conference in Sales Management (NCSM) in conjunction with its annual convention. JPSSM is pleased to present this special section containing the abstracts of the papers presented at the 2006 NCSM, which was held March 2–4 in Minneapolis, MN.     

Social Construction and Achieving Reference1

One influential view is that at least some putatively natural human kinds are actually social constructions, understood as some real kind of thing that is produced or sustained by our social and conceptual practices. Category constructionists share two commitments: they hold that human category terms like “race” (and racial terms) and “sex” (and sexual terms) and “homosexuality” and “perversion” actually refer to constructed categories, and they hold that these categories are widely but mistakenly taken to be natural kinds. But it is far from clear that these two commitments are consistent. The sort of mismatch between belief and underlying nature constructionists’ suppose is often taken to indicate a failure of reference. Reliance on a causal‐historical account of reference allows the preservation of reference, but unfortunately, constructionists' appropriation of causal historical accounts of reference is beset by difficulties that do not attend natural kind theorists’ appeals to such accounts. Here, I set out these difficulties, but argue that they can be answered, allowing terms for apparently natural human kinds refer to some sort of social construction about which there is massive error.     

The pessimistic induction,the flight to reference and the metaphysical zoo

Scientific realism says of our best scientific theories that (1) most of their important posits exist and (2) most of their central claims are approximately true. Antirealists sometimes offer the pessimistic induction in reply: since (1) and (2) are false about past successful theories, they are probably false about our own best theories too. The contemporary debate about this argument has turned (and become stuck) on the question, Do the central terms of successful scientific theories refer? For example, Larry Laudan offers a list of successful theories that employed central terms that failed to refer, and Philip Kitcher replies with a view about reference in which the central terms of such theories did sometimes refer. This article attempts to break this stalemate by proposing a direct version of the pessimistic induction, one that makes no explicit appeal to a substantive notion or theory of reference. While it is premature to say that this argument succeeds in showing that realism is probably false, the direct pessimistic induction is not subject to any kind of reference-based objection that might cripple a weaker, indirect version of the argument. Any attempt to trounce the direct pessimistic induction with a theory of reference fails.     

非严格弗雷格自由逻辑

莱曼(S.Lehmann)的1994年的论文从三值逻辑角度处理语言中的空词项。弗雷格认为句子的所指是真值,包含空词项的句子缺乏所指,而只有涵义,那么这样的句子不真也不假。莱曼的文章刻画了弗雷格这一思想,但有两点不尽人意之处:其一、对量词进行特殊处理,使得量词公式是二值的;其二,把包含空词项的复合句一概归于第三值。针对上述两点,本文以一度衍推系统为基础,在语义上,以偏解释函数为基础构造了一个非严格弗雷格中性自由逻辑表列系统,使得量词公式是三值的,同时使得一部分包含空词项的复合公式或真或假。     

The relation between APOE status and neuropsychological memory test performance: an analysis of the Canadian Study of Health and Aging

This study examined the relationship between two risk factors for dementia, the apolipoprotein (APOE) epsilon4 allele and poor memory test performance. Participants were from the Canadian Study of Health and Aging, a 4-year longitudinal population-based study. Persons with no cognitive impairment who had an epsilon4 allele but whose memory was average or better were not at increased risk of developing dementia after five years. Risk was increased for those with below average memory and no epsilon4 allele, but was particularly increased for those with below average memory and an epsilon4 allele. While the APOE epsilon4 allele was associated with slightly lower memory test performance for persons without cognitive impairment at baseline, it only increased their risk of developing dementia if their memory was below average.     

LEGAL CONCERNS IN THE USE OF WEIGHTED APPLICATIONS1

The use of the standard weighted application procedure relies on strictly empirically derived keys for validity. While weighted applications are generally valid in terms of the correlation between score on the application and position on the criterion, the empirical scheme may weight items that can not be shown to be relevant to the job for which they predict. To the extent that employment decisions are based on non-job-relevant weighted applications, such decisions may be contrary to the letter or the spirit of the Civil Rights Act. Alternative methods incorporating job relevance into the weighting procedure via job analysis inject the “hand of reason” into the process. Such rational-empirical approaches ensure job-relatedness as well as validity.     

Realism,Positivism and Reference

Summary  Depending on the realist or instrumentalist twist that is given to positivism, interesting arguments can be made for both causal and classical theories of reference with regard to the use of scientific terms in the language of theory. But my claim is that the rigid foundationalism that supports the theoretical terms via the correspondence rules of the Received View undercuts the notion that it is possible to argue coherently for a causal theory of reference as allied to a positivistic view.     

‘Knowledge’ as a natural kind term

Naturalists who conceive of knowledge as a natural kind are led to treat ‘knowledge’ as a natural kind term. ‘Knowledge,’ then, must behave semantically in the ways that seem to support a direct reference theory for other natural kind terms. A direct reference theory for ‘knowledge,’ however, appears to leave open too many possibilities about the identity of knowledge. Intuitively, states of belief count as knowledge only if they meet epistemic criteria, not merely if they bear a causal/historical relation to the term. I will develop this objection and show that it is grounded in modal considerations central to Kripke’s work on reference. I will also argue that a more plausible externalist semantics for natural kind terms disarms the objection.     

Syntax,Semantics, and Intentional Aspects

Abstract

It is widely assumed that the meaning of at least some types of expressions involves more than their reference to objects, and hence that there may be co-referential expressions which differ in meaning. It is also widely assumed that “syntax does not suffice for semantics”, i.e. that we cannot account for the fact that expressions have semantic properties in purely syntactical or computational terms. The main goal of the paper is to argue against a third related assumption, namely that what is responsible for a difference in meaning between co-referential expressions is the computational difference in the cognitive functioning of the expressions. “Intentional aspects” of expressions—those features which their meanings involve in addition to reference—cannot be syntacticized, since they are individuated not in terms of any cognitive feature, but rather in terms of those properties of the referents through which the expressions refer to them, and cognitive features cannot determine such properties in exactly the same sense as they cannot determine reference.     

Confusion of space and time in the flash-lag effect

The apparent lagging of a short flash in the relation to a moving object, the flash-lag effect (FLE), has so far been measured mainly in terms of illusory spatial offset. We propose a method of measuring the perceived temporal asynchrony of the FLE separately from its perceived spatial offset. We presented a moving stimulus that changed its colour at a certain moment. The observer indicated, in two different tasks, where and when the colour change occurred in relation to a stationary reference flash. Results show that the perceived time of the colour change was not congruent with the perceived location of the colour change: the colour change is perceived simultaneously with the flash, but is shifted in position. The presentation of the reference in the form of a flash is not critical for the occurrence of the FLE, because the same effect was obtained with a constantly visible reference signal, the position of which or time when it changed its colour were varied. The observer was not able to ignore the irrelevant dimension of the reference signal: the apparent time of the colour change was influenced by the position of the reference signal, and the apparent location of the colour change was influenced by the presentation time of the reference signal. The observer's inability to separate the spatial and temporal aspects of the moving stimulus clearly imposes certain limits on theories that are attempting to explain the FLE exclusively in terms of the perceived space and time.     

Categorization,cognitive consistency and the concept of dimensional salience

Cognitive consistency theories predict changes in evaluation within an existing frame of reference. This frame of reference must be defined in terms of those dimensions or aspects of the situation that appear most salient to the individual concerned. The same siuation may appear balanced or unbalanced, depending on which dimensions are seen as salient. The tendency to maintain balance may therefore reveal itself in a tendency to see as salient those dimensions in terms of which a given situation will appear most balanced. This is consistent with evidence from the judgment of attitude statements, which suggests that individuals will regard as most salient those dimensions along which their own evaluations of a set of statements will be most congruent with the value connotations of the terms by which the judgment scale is labelled.