逻辑真理与事实真理

本文分别从逻辑和事实的角度对真理的表现形式和外在特征进行了分析,从而彰显了逻辑真理与事实真理之间的区别与联系。     

真理、符合与收缩论

The central claim of this essay is that many deflationary theories of truth are variants of the correspondence theory of truth. Essential to the correspondence theory of truth is the proposal that objective features of the world are the truthmakers of statements. Many advocates of deflationary theories (including F. P. Ramsay, P. F. Strawson and Paul Horwich) remain committed to this proposal. Although T-sentences (statements of the form “s is true iff p”) are presented by advocates of deflationary theories of truth as truisms or analytic truths, T-sentences are often understood as entailing commitment to the central proposal of the correspondence theory.     

生命、真理与人性的脆弱：奥古斯汀论撒谎

奥古斯汀在撒谎问题上持有绝对主义立场,许多当代学者认为这种立场过于严厉。奥古斯汀的支持者试图重新解释撒谎和撒谎的语境来为奥古斯汀辩护。这些方式并不成功,也许应回到奥古斯汀的神学来理解他在撒谎问题上的立场。奥古斯汀的三个观点可为其撒谎立场辩护。首先,奥古斯汀关于世俗生命与天上生命的区分是撒谎禁令的基础;其次,人性的软弱是通常导致我们认可撒谎的原因;最后,奥古斯汀对撒谎的禁令实际上反映了人类生活的伦理困境。     

真理的寓言

有一位哲人，他带了许多的弟子。他教这些弟子如何做人，如何思考，如何运用自己的智慧，如何辨别真理与谬误。     

真理与自由

基督徒是自由人.这不是自吹自擂,因为圣经说: "基督释放了我们,叫我们得以自由"(加5:1); "主的灵在哪里,那里就得以自由"(林后3:17).毫无疑问,我们的蒙恩,都是这些经文的见证.我们为此充满感恩.     

论作品、真理与艺术的关系——解读《艺术作品的本源》

海德格尔的思想分为三个时期,《艺术作品的本源》是他中期的代表作。这个时期其思想的主题是历史,此历史不是人生在世,而是存在本身的命运,即存在自身的遮蔽与遗忘。他在寻找克服形而上的道路。海德格尔在此用现象学的方法,面对作品本身追问艺术作品的本源。     

伽达默尔论艺术作品的存在与诠释学的真理

伽达默尔拒绝从审美体验开始他的艺术诠释学考察,而把焦点方放在艺术作品的存在方式上,以此他希望恢复艺术经验的真理要求。在他看来,艺术作品像游戏一样,以实际发生在那里的方式存在;在作品中真理作为无蔽而发生并敞开存在的意义。此外,艺术游戏的重复发生形成可重复的结构,它对参与者发挥着主宰作用;在另一方面,可重复的结构只存在于具体发生之中,它把其中新的因素融会进自身之中,从而得到充实;这种充实是通过理解的有限视域的融合而实现的,因而结构是可变的,并且并不趋向最终目的。这种既敞开又充实的真理在艺术作品中的发生有赖于摹仿。在这一背景下,文章集中讨论伽达默尔的摹仿概念。文章指出,伽达默尔强调摹仿不是盲目的复制,而是借再现来实现的创造活动,它把关于现实的本真理解呈现在那里。这正是诠释学真理的发生,借此过去和未来得到中介。作者着重阐明伽达默尔的如下意图,即突显摹仿抵制抽象的力量——摹仿通过创制新的存在而使先前的东西来到自己被呈现的存在,并借此被提升到自身更丰富更真实的存在,而如此被创造的存在整体拒绝任何方法论的简化和区分。     

论康德对真理概念的判断力奠基

康德的真理理论既不是符合论,也不是融贯论,而是对真理的奠基。他把真理的现实性根据奠定在判断力的基础之上。由于判断力被区分为规定性的判断力与反思性的判断力,因此他对真理的奠基也就是双重的。前者使真理得以现实地产生出来,并在现象界呈现为经验性的真理;后者则为这种经验性的真理增添了一种情感的基础。由此,康德的奠基就使得真理成为一种相对的而非绝对的关于现象的真理。这种奠基虽然大大缩小了真理的地盘,却使得人们对真理的探索因远离幻相而变得更加稳健。     

早期莱布尼茨真理论中的符号问题

对莱布尼茨的思想发展的研究有许多不同的分期方式,但通常大多数研究还是以其1688年的《形而上学论》为界把莱布尼茨的思想分为前期和后期。早期莱布尼茨关注的核心问题之一就是真理论与符号的关系。[1]     

Imagination and Memory

A growing body of literature shows that imagining contrary-to-truth experiences can change memory. Recent experiments are reviewed to show that when people think about or imagine a false event, entire false memories can be implanted. Imagination inflation can occur even when there is no overt social pressure, and when hypothetical events are imagined only briefly. Overall, studies of imagination inflation show that imagining a counter-factual event can make subjects more confident that it actually occurred. We discuss possible mechanisms for imagination inflation and find that, with evidence supporting the involvement of both source confusion and familiarity in creating inflation, the primary mechanism is still to be determined. We briefly review evidence on individual differences in susceptibility to inflation. Finally, the widespread use of imagination-based techniques in self-help and clinical contexts suggests that there may be practical implications when imagination is used as a therapeutic tool.     

The Spirit of Truth

This article reflects on the theme of the “spirit of truth” in a post-truth era – a time in which objective truth seems to no longer exist, any given claim can be substantiated, and it is no longer possible to tell falsehood and truth apart. Focusing on the objectivity of science, the humanity of truth, and the spirit of truth revealed by divinity, the article argues for the adoption of a humane and ecological wisdom, seeing it as a way to deal with humanity’s immense knowledge in a way that is conducive to life, to avoid optimizing humans in a “trans-human” way and making the earth uninhabitable.     

Against the Additive View of Imagination

According to the additive view of sensory imagination, mental imagery often involves two elements. There is an image-like element, which gives the experiences qualitative phenomenal character akin to that of perception. There is also a non-image element, consisting of something like suppositions about the image's object. This accounts for extra-sensory features of imagined objects and situations: for example, it determines whether an image of a grey horse is an image of Desert Orchid, or of some other grey horse. The view promises to give a simple and intuitive explanation of some puzzling features of imagination, and, further, to illuminate imagination's relation to modal knowledge. I contend that the additive view does not fulfil these two promises. The explanation of how images come to be determinate is redundant: the content constituting the indeterminate mental images on which the view relies is sufficient to deliver determinate images too, so the extra resources offered by the view are not required. When applied to modal epistemology, the view either delivers implausible results or offers no distinctive insight. Since the view is sold on its explanatory merits, and since these are dubious, the additive view should be rejected.     

Weak and Strong Theories of Truth

A subtheory of the theory of self-referential truth known as FS is shown to be weak as a theory of truth but equivalent to full FS in its proof-theoretic strength.     

Imagination as laboratory

The theme, 'Science and the Symbolic', may be approached via either concept. From one side, we may track how imagination, fantasy, and even dreams have initiated scientific theory and lines of research. From the other, we may look to the mythopoeic musings of the human mind for themes of proto-science and/or proto-psychology, and attempt to discern if they follow a method which may be called scientific. Neuroscientists such as Edelman and Llinas honour imagination as the carrier of emergent properties, and depth psychoanalysts see it as a vector toward actualization. What mind imagines through what the alchemists termed 'true imagination' may eventually be realized through what brain and body may conceive and execute.     

真实性及其伦理边界——对新闻真实性原则的伦理反思

真实是新闻的生命 ,追求并维护新闻的真实性是新闻工作者的伦理准则。然而和任何准则都不可能是绝对的一样 ,真实性同样不是一条绝对性原则。在具体的新闻传播活动中 ,由真实性引发的伦理冲突是经常存在的。新闻从业人员的职责之一 ,就是如何运用自己的道德智慧来解决这些伦理冲突。     

Truth and Assertability

Deflationists say that the equivalence between ‘p is true’ and p is all there is to the meaning of ‘true’. “Use” theories generally construe meaning as acceptance conditions. I argue: (i) there are certain obvious objections to a deflationary theory of truth so formulated; but (ii) they can be overcome if we employ a graded notion of use, i.e. a notion of assertability; but (iii) there appear to be certain further difficulties which cannot be overcome in this way.     

Conservative Theories of Classical Truth

Some axiomatic theories of truth and related subsystems of second-order arithmetic are surveyed and shown to be conservative over their respective base theory. In particular, it is shown by purely finitistically means that the theory PA ÷ "there is a satisfaction class" and the theory FS of [2] are conservative over PA.     

Hallucination And Imagination

What are hallucinations? A common view in the philosophical literature is that hallucinations are degenerate kinds of perceptual experience. I argue instead that hallucinations are degenerate kinds of sensory imagination. As well as providing a good account of many actual cases of hallucination, the view that hallucination is a kind of imagination represents a promising account of hallucination from the perspective of a disjunctivist theory of perception like naïve realism. This is because it provides a way of giving a positive characterisation of hallucination—rather than characterising hallucinations in negative, relational, terms as mental events that are subjectively indistinguishable from veridical perceptual experiences.     

Taking Degrees of Truth Seriously

This is a contribution to the discussion on the role of truth degrees in manyvalued logics from the perspective of abstract algebraic logic. It starts with some thoughts on the so-called Suszko’s Thesis (that every logic is two-valued) and on the conception of semantics that underlies it, which includes the truth-preserving notion of consequence. The alternative usage of truth values in order to define logics that preserve degrees of truth is presented and discussed. Some recent works studying these in the particular cases of Łukasiewicz’s many-valued logics and of logics associated with varieties of residuated lattices are also presented. Finally the extension of this paradigm to other, more general situations is discussed, highlighting the need for philosophical or applied motivations in the selection of the truth degrees, due both to the interpretation of the idea of truth degree and to some mathematical difficulties.