Indexical contextualism and the challenges from disagreement

In this paper I argue against one variety of contextualism about aesthetic predicates such as “beautiful.” Contextualist analyses of these and other predicates have been subject to several challenges surrounding disagreement. Focusing on one kind of contextualism—individualized indexical contextualism—I unpack these various challenges and consider the responses available to the contextualist. The three responses I consider are as follows: giving an alternative analysis of the concept of disagreement; claiming that speakers suffer from semantic blindness; and claiming that attributions of beauty carry presuppositions of commonality. I will argue that none of the available strategies gives a response which both (a) satisfactorily explains all of the disagreement-data and (b) is plausible independent of significant evidence in favor of contextualism. I conclude that individualized indexical contextualism about the aesthetic is untenable, although this does not rule out alternative contextualist approaches to the aesthetic.     

Phenomenal consciousness with infallible self-representation

In this paper, I argue against the claim recently defended by Josh Weisberg that a certain version of the self-representational approach to phenomenal consciousness cannot avoid a set of problems that have plagued higher-order approaches. These problems arise specifically for theories that allow for higher-order misrepresentation or—in the domain of self-representational theories—self-misrepresentation. In response to Weisberg, I articulate a self-representational theory of phenomenal consciousness according to which it is contingently impossible for self-representations tokened in the context of a conscious mental state to misrepresent their objects. This contingent infallibility allows the theory to both acknowledge the (logical) possibility of self-misrepresentation and avoid the problems of self-misrepresentation. Expanding further on Weisberg’s work, I consider and reveal the shortcomings of three other self-representational models—put forward by Kreigel, Van Gulick, and Gennaro—in order to show that each indicates the need for this sort of infallibility. I then argue that contingent infallibility is in principle acceptable on naturalistic grounds only if we attribute (1) a neo-Fregean kind of directly referring, indexical content to self-representational mental states and (2) a certain ontological structure to the complex conscious mental states of which these indexical self-representations are a part. In these sections I draw on ideas from the work of Perry and Kaplan to articulate the context-dependent semantic structure of inner-representational states.     

Mental states inside out: Switching costs for emotional and nonemotional sentences that differ in internal and external focus

Mental states—such as thinking, remembering, or feeling angry, happy, or dizzy—have a clear internal component. We feel a certain way when we are in these states. These internal experiences may be simulated when people understand conceptual references to mental states. However, mental states can also be described from an “external” perspective, for example when referring to “smiling.” In those cases, simulation of visible outside features may be more relevant for understanding. In a switching costs paradigm, we presented semantically unrelated sentences describing emotional and nonemotional mental states while manipulating their internal or external focus. The results show that switching costs occur when participants shift between sentences with an internal and an external focus. This suggests that different forms of simulation underlie understanding these sentences. In addition, these effects occurred for emotional and nonemotional mental states, suggesting that they are grounded in a similar way—through the process of simulation.     

Concepts are not represented by conscious imagery

According to theories of grounded cognition, conceptual representation and perception share processing mechanisms. We investigated whether this overlap is due to conscious perceptual imagery. Participants filled out questionnaires to assess the vividness of their imagery (Questionnaire on Mental Imagery) and the extent to which their imagery was object oriented and spatially oriented (Object-Spatial Imagery Questionnaire), and they performed a mental rotation task. One week later, they performed a verbal property verification task. In this task, involvement of modality-specific systems is evidenced by the modality-switch effect, the finding that performance on a target trial (e.g., apple—green) is better after a same-modality trial (e.g., diamond—sparkle) than after a different-modality trial (e.g., airplane—noisy). Results showed a modality-switch effect, but there was no systematic relation between imagery scores and modality switch. We conclude that conscious mental imagery is not fundamental to conceptual representation.     

Why I stopped worrying about the definition of life... and why you should as well

In several disciplines within science—evolutionary biology, molecular biology, astrobiology, synthetic biology, artificial life—and outside science—primarily ethics—efforts to define life have recently multiplied. However, no consensus has emerged. In this article, I argue that this is no accident. I propose a dilemma showing that the project of defining life is either impossible or pointless. The notion of life at stake in this project is either the folk concept of life or a scientific concept. In the former case, empirical evidence shows that life cannot be defined. In the latter case, I argue that, although defining life may be possible, it is pointless. I conclude that scientists, philosophers, and ethicists should discard the project of defining life.     

The early Russell on the metaphysics of substance in Leibniz and Bradley

While considerable ink has been spilt over the rejection of idealism by Bertrand Russell and G.E. Moore at the end of the 19th Century, relatively little attention has been directed at Russell’s A Critical Exposition of the Philosophy of Leibniz, a work written in the early stages of Russell’s philosophical struggles with the metaphysics of Bradley, Bosanquet, and others. Though a sustained investigation of that work would be one of considerable scope, here I reconstruct and develop a two-pronged argument from the Philosophy of Leibniz that Russell fancied—as late as 1907—to be the downfall of the traditional category of substance. Here, I suggest, one can begin to see Russell’s own reasons—arguments largely independent of Moore—for the abandonment of idealism. Leibniz, no less than Bradley, adhered to an antiquated variety of logic: what Russell refers to as the subject-predicate doctrine of logic. Uniting this doctrine with a metaphysical principle of independence—that a substance is prior to and distinct from its properties—Russell is able to demonstrate that neither a substance pluralism nor a substance monism can be consistently maintained. As a result, Russell alleges that the metaphysics of both Leibniz and Bradley has been undermined as ultimately incoherent. Russell’s remedy for this incoherence is the postulation of a bundle theory of substance, such that the category of “substance” reduces to the most basic entities—properties.     

The Epistemological Roots of Ecclesiastical Claims to Knowledge

In theoretical matters, ecclesiastical claims to knowledge have lead to various conflicts with science. Claims in orientational matters, sometimes connected to attempts to establish them as a rule for legislation, have often been in conflict with the justified claims of non-believers. In addition they violate the Principle of Autonomy of the individual, which is at the very heart of European identity so decisively shaped by the Enlightenment. The Principle of Autonomy implies that state legislation should not interfere in the life of individual citizens, as long as his or her actions do not violate the rights of others. This paper—using the example of the theory of evolution—rejects ecclesiastical claims to theoretical knowledge as completely unfounded and preposterous. In the case of orientational knowledge—using the example of euthanasia—ecclesiastical claims to (universalizable) knowledge are shown to be unfounded as well. The Church’s position with respect to euthanasia and a range of other bio-ethical topics, such as pre-marital sex, contraception, abortion, indissolubility of marriage, and homosexuality, rests on a very peculiar ethical position. This ethical position is the natural right theory, which—far from being universalizable—is shared by very few people. Among other things, this position presupposes the belief in God as the creator of nature, and the assumption that ethical norms can be derived from this premise. Thus ecclesiastical knowledge claims, cannot be justified in a way which could be reasonably supposed to be universally acceptable. Kant (see the quote) was the first to require this sort of justification. Claims that fail to implement Kant’s stipulations should be eliminated by what I would like to call “Kant’s razor”.     

Issues in group work with older lesbians

This article outlines considerations in group interventions with older lesbians. It is intended for mental health professionals who work—as leaders, supervisors, and consultants—with various kinds of groups in their professional practice, including therapy, psychoeducational, support, growth, recreational, and self-help groups. First, unique issues in the life circumstances of older lesbians are addressed. Next, five case examples are presented that illustrate the usefulness of group interventions with this population. The article concludes with recommendations for effective practice.     

A simulation-based assessment of the value of enhancing the credibility of policy analysis

Credibility has been proposed recently as a standard for assessing the value of policy analysis. While various strategies for enhancing the credibility of policy analysis are available, little evidence exists concerning to what extent and under what circumstances implementing such strategies does, in fact, increase the value of policy analysis in terms of improving organizational decisionmaking. In this paper computer simulation—a methodological approach that has not been widely used to date in the field of knowledge application—is used to begin, to fill this gap. Specifically, the “garbage-can” model of decisionmaking developed by Cohen, March and Olsen (1972) has been modified to reflect a possible contribution of policy analysis to decisionmaking. Using this model, the extent to which enhancing credibility results in improved organizational decisionmaking under various circumstances is examined. Marvin B. Mandell is an assistant professor of policy sciences at the University of Maryland Baltimore County. His present research is focused on quantitative techniques for policy analysis and evaluation and the use of analytical information in decisionmaking.     

Caring and incapacity

This essay seeks to explain a morally important class of psychological incapacity—the class of what Bernard Williams has called “incapacities of character.” I argue for two main claims: (1) Caring is the underlying psychological disposition that gives rise to incapacities of character. (2) In competent, rational adults, caring is, in part, a cognitive and deliberative disposition. Caring is a mental state which disposes an agent to believe certain considerations to be good reasons for deliberation and action. And caring is a mental state which structures an agent’s practical deliberation, by establishing presumptive boundaries on the landscape of possibilities over which her deliberative imagination ranges. Incapacities of character are a consequence of the structure which these presumptive boundaries give to an agent’s deliberation.     

What is an emotional feeling? Lessons about affective origins from cross-species neuroscience

Cross-species affective neuroscience aspires to provide an evidence-based foundation for understanding the primary-process emotional networks that concurrently control instinctual emotional actions and affective feelings—direct emotional circuit mediated ‘rewards’ and ‘punishments’. In humans and other mammals, the ancestral subcortical regions of the brain are central to such affective BrainMind functions (a monistic term, here used synonymously with MindBrain, depending on stylistic needs). Although these circuits cannot be ‘identical’ across species (that would be incompatible with evolutionary principles) they are sufficiently similar, anatomically, neurochemically and functionally, to allow animal brain research to illuminate (yield testable predictions) about homologous human mind functions. Primal emotional feelings (affects) are inbuilt value functions of the brain that energize and inform the rest of the mental apparatus about basic survival values, thereby promoting secondary-process learning/memory functions and tertiary-process cognitive thinking-ruminative functions, yielding bottom-up evolutionary controls that ultimately allow top-down regulatory controls. As we envision how such “nested” hierarchies—two-way paths of causality—reflecting both bottom-up and top-down functions—we will need disciplined distinctions between cognitions and emotions at the primary-process level, while also accepting total interpenetrance of cognitions and affects at the tertiary-process level of MindBrain organization. This allows full and synergistic integration of basic and dimensional approaches to emotions. Here the primal emotional networks, so critically important for understanding ‘human-nature’ and psychiatric disorders, are discussed didactically in ways that can minimize dilemmas that non-evolutionary, non-hierarchical perspectives are subject to in modern emotion research.     

Towards a theory of intention revision

Although the change of beliefs in the face of new information has been widely studied with some success, the revision of other mental states has received little attention from the theoretical perspective. In particular, intentions are widely recognised as being a key attitude for rational agents, and while several formal theories of intention have been proposed in the literature, the logic of intention revision has been hardly considered. There are several reasons for this: perhaps most importantly, intentions are very closely connected with other mental states—in particular, beliefs about the future and the abilities of the agent. So, we cannot study them in isolation. We must consider the interplay between intention revision and the revision of other mental states, which complicates the picture considerably. In this paper, we present some first steps towards a theory of intention revision. We develop a simple model of an agent’s mental states, and define intention revision operators. Using this model, we develop a logic of intention dynamics, and then investigate some of its properties.     

Connecting Information with Scientific Method: Darwin’s Significance for Epistemology

Theories of epistemology make reference—via the perspective of an observer—to the structure of information transfer, which generates reality, of which the observer himself forms a part. It can be shown that any epistemological approach which implies the participation of tautological structural elements in the information transfer necessarily leads to an antinomy. Nevertheless, since the time of Aristotle the paradigm of mathematics—and thus tautological structure—has always been a hidden ingredient in the various concepts of knowledge acquisition or general theories of information transfer. We hold that Darwin’s Evolutionary Theory is the first scientific theory which consistently presupposes a non-tautological structure for the information transfer and, at the same time, keeps it strictly distinct from the tautological metric of scientific observation. The consequences of this technique—namely the dissociation of information from intentionality—have not yet been fully drawn.     

Religion,Evolution, and Mental Health: Attachment Theory and ETAS Theory

This article reviews the historical origins of Attachment Theory and Evolutionary Threat Assessment Systems Theory (ETAS Theory), their evolutionary basis and their application in research on religion and mental health. Attachment Theory has been most commonly applied to religion and mental health in research on God as an attachment figure, which has shown that secure attachment to God is positively associated with psychological well-being. Its broader application to religion and mental health is comprehensively discussed by Kirkpatrick (2005). ETAS Theory explains why certain religious beliefs—including beliefs about God and life-after-death—should have an adverse association, an advantageous association, or no association at all with mental health. Moreover, it makes specific predictions to this effect, which have been confirmed, in part. The authors advocate the application of ETAS Theory in research on religion and mental health because it explains how religious and other beliefs related to the dangerousness of the world can directly affect psychiatric symptoms through their affects on specific brain structures.     

It’s in your nature: a pluralistic folk psychology

I suggest a pluralistic account of folk psychology according to which not all predictions or explanations rely on the attribution of mental states, and not all intentional actions are explained by mental states. This view of folk psychology is supported by research in developmental and social psychology. It is well known that people use personality traits to predict behavior. I argue that trait attribution is not shorthand for mental state attributions, since traits are not identical to beliefs or desires, and an understanding of belief or desire is not necessary for using trait attributions. In addition, we sometimes predict and explain behavior through appeal to personality traits that the target wouldn’t endorse, and so could not serve as the target’s reasons. I conclude by suggesting that our folk psychology includes the notion that some behavior is explained by personality traits—who the person is—rather than by beliefs and desires—what the person thinks. Consequences of this view for the debate between simulation theory and theory theory, as well as the debate on chimpanzee theory of mind are discussed.     

Associations Among Body Mass Index,Depression, and Family Factors Across Two Generations

In this pilot study, we examined the relationship between health factors, sociodemographic factors, and body mass index (BMI) across two generations (n = 41 parent-child pairs). Generation 1 study variables included parent- and family-focused characteristics and health variables, the Generation 2 variables included child demographic factors, and the outcome variable was youths’ physical health (operationalized as BMI). Regression models revealed that Generation 1 variables, taken together, accounted for 26% of the variance in youth BMI. However, only the parent’s mental health symptoms (i.e., depression symptoms) made a unique contribution to the variance in youth BMI. Logistic regression analysis revealed that the youths’ race and age—but no other demographic factor—were significantly related to youth BMI-for-age. Our findings suggest that youth race, age, and parent mental health are each associated with youth physical health (i.e., BMI), confirming previous study findings that parental factors and demographic factors should be considered when exploring youth health outcomes.     

Phenomenological immanence,normativity, and semantic externalism

This paper argues that transcendental phenomenology (here represented by Edmund Husserl) can accommodate the main thesis of semantic externalism, namely, that intentional content is not simply a matter of what is ‘in the head,’ but depends on how the world is. I first introduce the semantic problem as an issue of how linguistic tokens or mental states can have ‘content’—that is, how they can set up conditions of satisfaction or be responsive to norms such that they can succeed or fail at referring. The standard representationalist view—which thinks of the problem in first-person terms—is contrasted with Brandom’s pragmatic inferentialist approach, which adopts a third-person stance. The rest of the paper defends a phenomenological version of the representationalist position (seeking to preserve its first-person stance) but offers a conception of representation that does not identify it with an entity ‘in the head.’ The standard view of Husserl as a Cartesian internalist is undermined by rejecting its fundamental assumption—that Husserl’s concept of the ‘noema’ is a mental entity—and by defending a concept of ‘phenomenological immanence’ that has a normative, rather than a psychological, structure. Finally, it is argued that phenomenological immanence cannot be identified with ‘consciousness’ in Husserl’s sense, though consciousness is a necessary condition for it.     

The role of inhibition in task switching: A review

The concept of inhibition plays a major role in cognitive psychology. In the present article, we review the evidence for the inhibition of task sets. In the first part, we critically discuss empirical findings of task inhibition from studies that applied variants of the task-switching methodology and argue that most of these findings— such as switch cost asymmetries—are ambiguous. In the second part, we focus on n-22 task-repetition costs, which currently constitute the most convincing evidence for inhibition of task sets. n-22 repetition costs refer to the performance impairment in sequences of the ABA type relative to CBA, which can be interpreted in terms of persisting inhibition of previously abandoned tasks. The available evidence suggests that inhibition is primarily triggered by conflict at selection of stimulus attributes and at the response level. Author Note     

Form and meaning in early morphological processing: Comment on Feldman, O'Connor, and Moscoso del Prado Martin (2009)

Feldman, O’Connor, and Moscoso del Prado Martín (2009) reported evidence for differential priming of semantically transparent (talker—talk) and semantically opaque (corner—corn) morphological pairs under masked presentation conditions. The present commentary argues that these data should not call into question the theory that morphologically structured words undergo a segmentation process based solely on form, because (1) these results do not contradict existing evidence for morphoorthographic segmentation, (2) funnel plots suggest that the lack of priming observed for semantically opaque items in this study is inconsistent with findings in the existing literature, and (3) orthographic characteristics of the semantically opaque pairs in this study (rather than semantic factors) are the most likely explanation for these discrepant results.     

COGNITIVE RESTRUCTURING AND MENTAL CONTAMINATION: AN EMPIRICAL RE-CONCEPTUALIZATION

The main goal of this article is to propose a cognitive technology for blocking the impact of mental contamination during cognitive restructuring in cognitive-behavioral and rational-emotive therapy, by using fundamental research findings from cognitive psychology. In step 1, after a review of the relevant cognitive and social psychology literature, the authors elaborated several techniques hypothesized to control mental contamination. In step 2—Experiment I—the authors tested the efficacy of these techniques in blocking mental contamination. The three techniques that proved to be effective in controlling mental contamination were: (a) the global restructuring technique; (b) the rational anticipation technique; (c) the incompatible information technique. In step 3—Experiment II—these techniques were adapted and tested in clinical setting using a single case experiment design-multiple baselines across subjects (five subjects with simple phobia). The techniques were shown to be effective in both stimulating the assimilation of new adaptive cognitions (i.e., global restructuring and incompatible information technique) and in preventing relapse (i.e., rational anticipation technique). Future directions for research are discussed. Address correspondence to Daniel David, Ph.D., Department of Psychology and Center for Cognitive and Behavioral Psychotherapies, Babes-Bolyai University, No. 37, Gh. Bilascu Street, 3400, Cluj-Napoca, Cluj, Romania; e-mail: danieldavid@psychology.ro.