Southeast Asian immigrants' perceptions of good adolescents and good parents

The authors examined the extent to which Southeast Asian immigrant parents and adolescents agree on what it means to be a "good" parent and a "good" adolescent. Thirty-six parents and 37 adolescents of Cambodian, Hmong, Lao, and Vietnamese descent participated in a series of focus groups. Content analyses of their discussions showed that good adolescents were obedient, helpful around the house, and respectful to parents and elders, and good parents were those who provide for, nurture, and monitor children's activities. The findings suggest that ideas about good parents and good adolescents are influenced by both the parents' traditions and by adolescents' acculturation to American values.     

复活的喜讯

经文:林前15:1-10 17-22 太28:1-10 保罗告诉我们:我当日所领受又传给你们的福音,就是"基督照圣经所说,为我们的罪死了,而且埋葬了,又照圣经所说,第三天复活了"。 基督从死里复活的福音,是保罗自己领受的,而且也是他传扬的中心。不但如此,彼得和众使徒也都为"这事做见证",甚至使徒们愿意为主复活的见证而死。现在我们一起来默想耶稣复活清晨的情景。     

The good guys

Journal of Contemporary Psychotherapy -     

Every good counts

The first version of the present appeared as [Srzednicki 1988]. Thanks are due to the editors of that journal for the permission to publish the revised (English) version here.     

The good engineer

Conclusion So why be a good engineer? There are basically three reasons: 1) possible detection and the harm that dishonorable acts might cause, 2) a common responsibility to the professional engineering community, and 3) a negative impact on one’s own integrity when one behaves badly. But what if, in the face of these arguments, one is still not convinced? I must admit that there appears to be no knock-down ethical argument available to change the mind of a person set on behaving badly. There remains the option to act in whatever way one may wish. Engineers must realize however that bad manners and/or immorality and/or illegality, even if undetected, will most likely result in harm to themselves and thus rational behavior should result in honorable conduct of professional duties. While the Viking society of northern Europe was in many ways cruel and crude, they had a very simple code of honor. Their goal was to live life so that when they died, others would say “He was a good man”. The definition of what they meant by a “good man” might be quite different by contemporary standards but the principle is important. If engineers conduct their professional lives so as to uphold the exemplary values of engineering, the greatest professional honor would be to be remembered as a good engineer.     

Being good by doing good: Daily eudaimonic activity and well-being

Eudaimonic theories of well-being assert the importance of achieving one’s full potential through engaging in inherently meaningful endeavors. In two daily diary studies, we assessed whether reports of engagement in behaviors representative of eudaimonic theories were associated with well-being. We also examined whether eudaimonic behaviors were more strongly related to well-being than behaviors directed toward obtaining pleasure or material goods. In both studies, eudaimonic behaviors had consistently stronger relations to well-being than hedonic behaviors. Data also provided support for a temporal sequence in which eudaimonic behaviors were related to greater well-being the next day. Overall, our results suggest that “doing good” may be an important avenue by which people create meaningful and satisfying lives.     

Moralism and the good

It is often held that moral considerations take precedence over considerations of other kinds in determining what we ought to do. I contend that this claim is ambiguous and argue that objections to each interpretation of it can be met only by rejecting the other. One surprising consequence of my argument is that no deontic moral theory can effectively guide action unless it is conjoined with a theory of the good. Another interesting consequence is that the deontologists' favorite objection to teleological theories — the objection from injustice — does not go through.     

Aiming at the good

This paper shows how we can plausibly extend the guise of the good thesis in a way that avoids intellectualist challenge, allows animals to be included, and is consistent with the possibility of performing action under the cognition of their badness. The paper also presents some independent arguments for the plausibility of this interpretation of the thesis. To this aim, a teleological conception of practical attitudes as well as a cognitivist account of arational desires is offered.     

The good of boredom

I argue that the state of boredom (i.e., the transitory and non-pathological experience of boredom) should be understood to be a regulatory psychological state that has the capacity to promote our well-being by contributing to personal growth and to the construction (or reconstruction) of a meaningful life.     

Quinine pellets as an inferior good and a Giffen good in rats.

In Experiment 1, 4 rats earned their daily food ration by choosing between two levers. One lever delivered two regular and one quinine-adulterated food pellets, and the other delivered two regular and four quinine pellets. A 20-s intertrial interval separated successive choices. Sessions began with 10 forced trials during which only one lever, selected with p = .5 and cued by a light above it, could deliver its reinforcer. Forced trials were followed by 30 or 150 trials, depending on the condition, during which choices to either lever could be reinforced. Over this range, absolute choice of the four-quinine, two-regular-pellet lever was inversely related to the number of free-choice trials, establishing this reinforcer as an inferior good. In Condition 1 of Experiment 2, the prior design was altered in two ways: (a) one lever delivered four quinine pellets, and the other lever delivered one standard pellet; and (b) sessions ended after 140 free-choice trials. When the number of free-choice trials was reduced to 100 (Condition 2), all 3 rats increased their preference for quinine pellets, confirming their status as an inferior good. In the next several conditions, the number of quinine pellets provided for selecting its associated lever was varied between three and four. Preference for the quinine-pellet alternative was inversely related to the number of pellets it provided, a result defining it as a Giffen good. These findings are not accommodated readily by extant choice models and complicate the search for a unitary model of choice.