Dissociation and self-awareness in directed daydreaming

Self-awareness, as the ability to be the observer of one's own cognitive. affective, and volitional states, was explored in directed daydreaming. Self-awareness of varying complexity and depth was found in the dissociated ego states, which were experienced as relatively discontinuous with each other in space and time, and discontinuous with the subjects' usual experience of a cohesive self. An extreme expression of shallow self-awareness was found for a few subjects who reported a fantasy with no experience of a self. The most elaborate form of self-awareness, coconsciousness , was found for the majority of subjects in the two-ego state group, where both of their ego states were associated with an identity feeling, and where one ego state evidenced full awareness of the thoughts and feelings of the other state. Coconsciousness was found to be a prerequisite for deep self-awareness in directed daydreaming.     

The self as phenotype

Self-awareness is viewed here as the phenotypic expression of an interaction between genes and the environment. Brain and behavioral development of fetuses and newborn infants are a rich source of information regarding what might constitute minimal self-awareness. Research indicates that newborns have feeling (subjective) experience. Unlike automata, they do not just sense and respond to proximal stimulations. In light of the explosive brain growth that takes place inside and outside of the womb, first signs of feeling as opposed to sensing experience are discussed. Feeling experience is considered as the necessary condition for having minimal self-awareness. Both would co-emerge in development. However, minimal self-awareness is rapidly supplemented with an awareness that is not just perceptual, but also conceptual and ethical, primarily defined in relation to and by others.     

Saudi therapists' lived experience of self-awareness

Self-awareness and self-reflection in psychotherapeutic processes have been critical components for effective counselling and psychotherapy. However, little qualitative research in Saudi Arabia has been conducted that aims to explore the therapist's subjective experiences of the self in their professional work. Therefore, the purpose of this phenomenological study was to understand the therapist's self-awareness within psychotherapy, by focusing on the therapist's lived experience of self-awareness and exploring how therapists recognise themselves as an integral component of the therapeutic relationship. Semi-structured interviews were conducted with six experienced and accredited psychologists with at least three years of clinical experience, and the qualitative data were analysed using interpretative phenomenological analysis (IPA). Five superordinate themes emerged from the data; that is, development of the professional self, use of self, self-oriented, supervision and experience. This study provides an understanding of the therapist's self in psychotherapy, as it shows that self-awareness is important for therapists to manage their feelings, thoughts and behaviours in meeting with clients and that it is a valuable resource for a therapist to become aware of and reflect upon the process within oneself. This understanding is integrated into the training programmes in counselling psychology, especially in the areas of self-awareness and personal development.     

The Pre-reflective Situational Self

It is often held that to have a conscious experience presupposes having some form of implicit self-awareness. The most dominant phenomenological view usually claims that we essentially perceive experiences as our own. This is the so called “mineness” character, or dimension of experience. According to  this view, mineness is not only essential to conscious experience, it also grounds the idea that pre-reflective self-awareness constitutes a minimal self. In this paper, we show that there are reasons to doubt this constituting role of mineness. We argue that there are alternative possibilities and that the necessity for an adequate theory of the self within psychopathology gives us good reasons to believe that we need a thicker notion of the pre-reflective self. To this end, we develop such a notion: the Pre-Reflective Situational Self. To do so, we will first show how alternative conceptions of pre-reflective self-awareness point to philosophical problems with the standard phenomenological view. We claim that this is mainly due to fact that within the phenomenological account the mineness aspect is implicitly playing several roles. Consequently, we argue that a thin interpretation of pre-reflective self-awareness—based on a thin notion of mineness—cannot do its needed job within, at least within psychopathology. This leads us to believe that a thicker conception of pre-reflective self is needed. We, therefore, develop the notion of the pre-reflective situational self by analyzing the dynamical nature of the relation between self-awareness and the world, specifically through our interactive inhabitation of the social world.

     

Self-awareness and the emotional consequences of self-discrepancies

Several self theories explore the effects of discrepant self-beliefs on motivation and emotion. This research intersected two self theories: self-discrepancy theory and objective self-awareness theory. Self-discrepancy theory predicts that ideal and ought discrepancies cause different negative emotions; objective self-awareness theory predicts that high self-awareness will strengthen the relationship between self-discrepancies and emotions. People (N =112) completed measures of self-discrepancies and emotions (dejection, agitation, positive affect, and negative affect). Self-focused attention was manipulated with a large mirror. When self-awareness was low, self-discrepancies had weak, nonsignificant relations to emotion. When self-awareness was high, however, self-discrepancies strongly predicted emotional experience. These effects were general-ideal and ought discrepancies affected emotions because of their substantial shared variance, not their unique variance. Implications for theories of self-discrepancies and emotions are considered.     

Self-focused attention and the experience of alcoholic intoxication

The present study investigates the relationship between self-focused attention and the experience of emotional and bodily concomitants of alcoholic intoxication. It was hypothesized that self-focused attention would amplify salient mood and bodily concomitants of intoxication after alcohol intake and counteract these concomitants after placebo treatment. Self-focused attention was assessed by measures of private body consciousness, private self-consciousness, and of self-awareness. Since alcohol intake did not influence mood, it was not possible to test our main-hypothesis linking self-focused attention with the experience of mood concomitants of intoxication. As to bodily concomitants of intoxication a strong effect of alcohol intake was disclosed. Further analysis revealed the predicted relationship between self-awareness and private body consciousness on one hand and the experience of bodily concomitants of intoxication, on the other. The relationship between private body consciousness and experience of bodily concomitants of intoxication was moderated by the amount of experience with alcohol. No significant relationship between private self-consciousness and experience of bodily concomitants of intoxication was found.     

Right hemispheric self-awareness: a critical assessment

In this commentary I evaluate the claim made by that since self-recognition results from right hemispheric activity, self-awareness too is likely to be produced by the activity of the same hemisphere. This reasoning is based on the assumption that self-recognition represents a valid operationalization of self-awareness; I present two views that challenge this rationale. Keenan et al. also support their claim with published evidence relating brain activity and self-awareness; I closely examine their analysis of one specific review of literature and conclude that it appears to be biased. Finally, recent research suggests that inner speech (which is associated with left hemispheric activity) is linked to self-awareness-an observation that further casts doubt on the existence of a right hemispheric self-awareness.     

Sartre,Developmental Psychology and Burgeoning Self-Awareness: Ricocheting from Being to Nothingness

While the genesis of self-awareness at approximately 18 months old is a dramatic landmark in human development, there is at this stage no explicit awareness on the toddler's part of his/her truly standing apart from others. Only much later does a distinct sense of self shift into focus, and here Sartre provides us with a compelling theory of a first reflective experience of self-awareness. He explains this phenomenon by emphasizing a violent shift in ontological status, one in which the pre-adolescent child is precipitated from functional unity with a primary caregiver to an individuated state involving self-awareness as privative, i.e. where the child becomes aware of existing only in the form of not-being-the-adult. For Sartre this new experience of self is not therefore positive but rather formal or empty; there has in fact been a psychic transition, from being to nothingness. In addition, Sartre also states that all children first explicitly experience themselves in this fashion. These claims find support in the work of developmental psychologist Margaret Mahler. In fact, in spite of the vast developmental discrepancies between toddler and pre-adolescent child, given the appropriate environmental triggers privative subjectivity will be shown to involve a regression to the much earlier rapprochement stage of development described by Mahler.     

Descartes discarded? Introspective self-awareness and the problems of transparency and compositionality

What has the self to be like such that introspective awareness of it is possible? The paper asks if Descartes’s idea of an inner self can be upheld and discusses this issue by invoking two principles: the phenomenal transparency of experience and the semantic compositionality of conceptual content. It is assumed that self-awareness is a second-order state either in the domain of experience or in the domain of thought. In the former case self-awareness turns out empty if experience is transparent. In the latter, it can best be conceived of as a form of mental quotation. Various proposed analyses of direct and indirect quotation are discussed and tested regarding their applicability to thought. It is concluded that, on the assumption of compositionality, the inner self is only insofar accessible to awareness as it has an accessible phonological (or otherwise subsymbolic) structure, as apparently only inner speech does.     

Strangers to Ourselves: Exploring the Limits and Potentials of the Analyst's Self Awareness in Self- and Mutual Analysis

The analyst's self-analysis—originally fashioned on Freud's solo foray into his own unconscious mind—continues to play an important psychoanalytic role. A summary of relevant literature is presented that includes recent relational psychoanalytic and neuroscientific data. Three major findings emerge: First, analysts' achievement of self-awareness in the analytic setting is clearly limited, more limited than we might like to admit, especially when we act alone; second, analysts reaching clinical self-awareness is a mutual, interactive process that, in addition to psychological processes, can be understood on the basis of operations uncovered by neuroscience, especially the mirror neuron system; third, accordingly, a form of “mutual” analysis is seen as an indispensable element of the analytic process. Analysts' achievement of self-awareness is discussed with a particular focus on our intrinsic relationality, and on mentalization, self-reflexivity, new relational experience, and therapeutic action. Illustrative case material is discussed.     

Voluntary decision-making in addiction: A comprehensive review of existing measurement tools

The notion of voluntariness, notably the inability to refrain from using an addictive substance, is central to addiction. This review examines different constructs measuring voluntariness in the context of drug addiction. We found 117 articles featuring 123 distinct scales for 11 of the 16 constructs initially searched. Self-efficacy was by far the construct with most scales. Most scales were not specifically developed with samples of people with addictions. From a methodological standpoint, current literature jeopardizes the validity of generalizations about how voluntariness functions and is measured in people with and without a drug addiction. From the standpoint of social psychology, the study of voluntariness remains anchored in an individualistic orientation to the study of cognition and behavior, thus calling for greater crosstalk between psychology subspecialties.     

意志与意识对记忆的交互影响

运用加工分离程序,研究了编码和提取时不同意志和意识水平对部首补笔的影响。结果发现：除编码阶段和提取阶段的意志之间不存在交互作用之外,同一阶段和（或）不同阶段的意志和（或）意识之间均存在显著的或非常显著的交互作用。研究表明：意志和意识两个因素对记忆存在复杂影响,在记忆研究中应关注意志因素的作用。研究结果验证了记忆的状态依存性。     

Suicide as escape from self

Suicide is analyzed in terms of motivations to escape from aversive self-awareness. The causal chain begins with events that fall severely short of standards and expectations. These failures are attributed internally, which makes self-awareness painful. Awareness of the self's inadequacies generates negative affect, and the individual therefore desires to escape from self-awareness and the associated affect. The person tries to achieve a state of cognitive deconstruction (constricted temporal focus, concrete thinking, immediate or proximal goals, cognitive rigidity, and rejection of meaning), which helps prevent meaningful self-awareness and emotion. The deconstructed state brings irrationality and disinhibition, making drastic measures seem acceptable. Suicide can be seen as an ultimate step in the effort to escape from self and world.     

Speculations on the emergence of self-awareness in big-brained organisms: the roles of associative memory and learning, existential and religious questions, and the emergence of tautologies

This paper argues that self-awareness emerges in organisms whose brains have a sufficiently integrated, complex ability for associative learning and memory. Continual sensory input of information related to the organism leads to the formation of a set of associations that may be termed an organismal “self-image”. After providing the basic mechanistic basis for the emergence of an organismal self-image, this paper proceeds to go through a representative list of behaviors associated with self-awareness, and shows how associative memory and learning, combined with an organismal self-image, leads to the emergence of these various behaviors. This paper also discusses various tautologies that invariably emerge when discussing self-awareness. We continue with various speculations on manipulating self-awareness, and discuss how concepts from set and logic theory may provide a useful set of tools for understanding the emergence of higher cognitive functions in complex organisms.     

Situational changes in self-awareness influence 3- and 4-year-olds’ self-regulation

In adults, heightened self-awareness leads to adherence to socially valued norms, whereas lowered self-awareness is associated with antinormative behavior. Levels of self-awareness are influenced by environmental cues such as mirrors. Do situational changes in self-awareness also have an impact on preschoolers’ self-regulation? Adherence to a socially valued standard was observed under different conditions of self-focus. In Experiment 1 the standard was prescribed (“don’t look in the box”), and in Experiment 2 children had the opportunity to be altruistic. Heightened self-focus was induced using a large mirror. In a neutral condition, the nonreflective side of the mirror was shown. To lower self-focus, children wore a disguise. Preschoolers peeked less and showed more altruism when the mirror image was present. As found for adults, it appears that self-awareness leads 3- and 4-year-olds to adhere to salient social standards. These results suggest that self-focus has a socially adaptive regulatory function from an early age.     

The Influence of a Community-Based Service-Learning Experience on the Development of Occupational Therapy Students' Feelings of Civic Responsibility

This qualitative study examined the influence of service-learning on the development of Students' feelings of civic responsibility while involved with a community-based organization. Occupational therapy students involved in a semester-long service-learning experience maintained weekly reflective journals. Six such reflective journals were randomly selected for analysis. Findings revealed that while engaged in service-learning the six participants voiced themes of increased self-awareness, awareness of homeless individuals as persons, awareness of social issues, and professional self-efficacy. These developing competencies are associated with the skills required for health care professionals to participate in civic engagement and client advocacy.     

Genuine eye contact elicits self-referential processing

The effect of eye contact on self-awareness was investigated with implicit measures based on the use of first-person singular pronouns in sentences. The measures were proposed to tap into self-referential processing, that is, information processing associated with self-awareness. In addition, participants filled in a questionnaire measuring explicit self-awareness. In Experiment 1, the stimulus was a video clip showing another person and, in Experiment 2, the stimulus was a live person. In both experiments, participants were divided into two groups and presented with the stimulus person either making eye contact or gazing downward, depending on the group assignment. During the task, the gaze stimulus was presented before each trial of the pronoun-selection task. Eye contact was found to increase the use of first-person pronouns, but only when participants were facing a real person, not when they were looking at a video of a person. No difference in self-reported self-awareness was found between the two gaze direction groups in either experiment. The results indicate that eye contact elicits self-referential processing, but the effect may be stronger, or possibly limited to, live interaction.     

RATINGS OF MANAGERIAL CHARACTERISTICS: EVALUATION DIFFICULTY, CO-WORKER AGREEMENT, AND SELF-AWARENESS

This research examined variables contributing to self-awareness and coworker agreement on 30 managerial characteristics. The first study collected data from 233 management students on the difficulty of rating different characteristics. It also developed reliable measures of self-protection mechanisms that may negatively influence self-awareness. Four self-protection factors were identified: Denial, Giving Up, Self-Promotion, and Fear of Failure. The second study collected self-, supervisor, peer, and subordinate ratings of the managerial characteristics to derive multiple measures of self-awareness. There was a total of 283 co-worker ratings for 36 target middle managers. The results showed that within-sample co-worker disagreement measures from Study 2 were higher for items that were perceived by the sample in Study 1 as more difficult to rate. Self-ratings were more highly related to the average of co-worker ratings than to the ratings provided by any one co-worker alone. Co-workers' ratings of the target's use of self-protection mechanisms were negatively associated with self-awareness measures. Ideas are discussed for other correlates of self-awareness and ways to enhance the value of feedback processes.