The Power of a Propositional Constant

Monomodal logic has exactly two maximally normal logics, which are also the only quasi-normal logics that are Post complete, and they are complete for validity in Kripke frames. Here we show that addition of a propositional constant to monomodal logic allows the construction of continuum many maximally normal logics that are not valid in any Kripke frame, or even in any complete modal algebra. We also construct continuum many quasi-normal Post complete logics that are not normal. The set of extensions of S4.3 is radically altered by the addition of a constant: we use it to construct continuum many such normal extensions of S4.3, and continuum many non-normal ones, none of which have the finite model property. But for logics with weakly transitive frames there are only eight maximally normal ones, of which five extend K4 and three extend S4.     

Biofeedback as a treatment for childhood hyperactivity: a critical review of the literature

Hyperactivity is a significant problem for which no causal theories have been unequivocally substantiated and one in which treatment approaches have met with limited success. Recent research in behavioral medicine has brought biofeedback into use as a treatment for disorders that are mediated by physiologic functioning, with hyperactivity as one such disorder. 36 studies are reviewed in which biofeedback was used as a treatment for hyperactivity. This review indicated that biofeedback treatments alone have not been effectively evaluated, and methodological problems with the current studies severely limit generalizations that may be made to hyperactive populations. Biofeedback in conjunction with other techniques appears to have promise for reducing some of the behavioral symptoms of the hyperactivity syndrome. Directions for further research are presented.     

Vagueness as a Modality

I present a modal conception of vagueness and vague objects, according to which a vague object is a transworld object which coincides with one precise object in one world and with another precise object in another world. Such worlds are called precisifications; they are modal, worldly counterparts of the precisifications postulated in supervaluationism. I criticize Evans' argument against vague objects, admitting the validity of the argument, but rejecting its basic assumption that if there are vague objects, certain identity statements must be indefinite in truth value. I distinguish identity from coincidence, and claim that if there are vague objects, some statements of coincidence will be indefinite in truth-value, not statements of identity. To establish this point, I compare vagueness with temporal modality.     

Theorems for a finite sequence from a two-state,first-order markov chain with stationary transition probabilities

Various theorems are obtained forN-trial sample sequences from the general two-state, first-order Markov chain with stationary transition probabilities. Four lemmas which facilitate the derivations are given. A brief discussion of applications to binary data, estimation, and evaluation is given, including a maximum-likelihood procedure for estimating transition probabilities which are restricted by inequalities.     

Classifying emotion: a developmental account

The aim of this paper is to propose a systematic classification of emotions which can also characterize their nature. The first challenge we address is the submission of clear criteria for a theory of emotions that determine which mental phenomena are emotions and which are not. We suggest that emotions as a subclass of mental states are determined by their functional roles. The second and main challenge is the presentation of a classification and theory of emotions that can account for all existing varieties. We argue that we must classify emotions according to four developmental stages: 1. pre-emotions as unfocussed expressive emotion states, 2. basic emotions, 3. primary cognitive emotions, and 4. secondary cognitive emotions. We suggest four types of basic emotions (fear, anger, joy and sadness) which are systematically differentiated into a diversity of more complex emotions during emotional development. The classification distinguishes between basic and non-basic emotions and our multi-factorial account considers cognitive, experiential, physiological and behavioral parameters as relevant for constituting an emotion. However, each emotion type is constituted by a typical pattern according to which some features may be more significant than others. Emotions differ strongly where these patterns of features are concerned, while their essential functional roles are the same. We argue that emotions form a unified ontological category that is coherent and can be well defined by their characteristic functional roles. Our account of emotions is supported by data from developmental psychology, neurobiology, evolutionary biology and sociology.     

The impact of a stillbirth on a marriage

The crippling consequences on family life of the failure to mourn a stillbirth adequately are demonstrated in a vulnerable couple. They were helped by brief, planned, focal, conjoint marital psychotherapy which is described.     

Vibration as a reinforcer with a profoundly retarded child

Data are presented which indicate that lever-pressing behavior of a profoundly retarded child could be reinforced by the contingent application of vibratory stimulation for each response. With vibration available 24 hr per day, no decrement in daily rate of responding for vibration was seen over a three-week period. Suggestions are made for further use of this finding in working with the profoundly retarded.     

Privacy as a value and as a right

Conclusions Knowledge of others, then, has value; so does immunity from being known. The ability to extend one's knowledge has value; so does the ability to limit other's knowledge of oneself. I have claimed that no interest can count as a right unless it clearly outweighs opposing interests whose presence is logically entailed. I see no way to establish that my interest in not being known, simply as such, outweighs your desire to know about me. I acknowledge the intuitive attractiveness of such a position; but my earlier discussion concluded that the value of privacy is ease, and the value of knowledge is understanding - and it's not obvious that either outweighs the other. Nor is it obvious that the freedom and autonomy which result from the power to limit what others know is more significant than the freedom and autonomy which result from the power to extend one's knowledge. I believe the intuitive attractiveness of the belief that privacy values outweigh knowledge values lies in the entirely correct belief that a society without any privacy would be unpleasant. But a society without mutual knowledge would be impossible.I conclude therefore that there is no right to privacy nor to control over it. Nevertheless, each of these things is a good, and a good made possible (given the presence of other people) by social structures. A desirable society will provide both privacy and control over privacy to some extent. Nothing in my analysis helps determine what the proper extent is, nor what areas of life particularly deserve protection. Those who would argue that privacy and control over it are entailed by respect for persons should, I think, choose instead some particular areas central to being a person, to counting as a person, and then show how one is less likely to exercise one's capacities there fully without privacy or without control over it. Although Gerstein's attempt fails because he inaccurately defines intimacy as a kind of absorption and incorrectly opposes absorption with publicity, I think it is the kind of attempt which must be made. Furthermore, he has probably chosen the right area of life - if anything has a special claim to privacy it is probably the union between people who care for one another. The value of being together alone may be more significant than the value of being alone, if only because words and actions are public while thoughts are not. But I will not try to develop that argument here.In any case both privacy and control over it are social goods; on egalitarian grounds they should, ceteris paribus, be equally available to everyone. This helps explain the dehumanizing effect of institutions which provide no privacy at all- prisons and some mental institutions. It is not so much that the inmates are totally known; it is rather that those who know them are not so fully known by them; further, that the staff has a great deal of control over what they disclose of themselves, and the inmates very little. The asymmetry of knowledge in those institutions is one aspect of the asymmetry of power; the completely powerless are likely to feel dehumanized.My analysis also helps account for the wrongness of covert observation. It is not simply that the observer violates the wishes of the observed, for the question is whose wishes trump. The observer is violating the justified expectations of the observed: expectations supported by weighty social conventions. These have more moral weight than simple desires do. The peeping torn is violating a convention which structures the distribution of knowledge, a convention from which he benefits. Without it his own activities might well be impossible. He might be more easily caught; or his victim, less trusting, might choose houses without windows. More deeply, the thrill of what he is doing depends on the existence of the convention. Even morally permissible excitement - the suggestiveness of some clothing- would disappear without conventions about nudity. Presumably, too, there are elements of his own personal life for which he values his privacy. He is on grounds of justice obligated to observe the rule which makes his benefits possible.(Some claims to privacy result from personal predilections, rather than from convention. Parent describes a person who is extremely sensitive about being short, for instance, and does not want his exact height to be common knowledge. The grounds for these claims are obviously different from those I've been discussing. The grounds are the moral obligation not to cause needless pain, or, if the information was given in confidence, to keep one's promises.)Although there is no right to privacy or to control over it as such, there is a right to equality of consideration and to a just distribution of benefits and burdens. To put it another way: there is no natural human right to privacy or to control over it; but a good society will provide some of each, and justice requires that the rules of a good society be observed.

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A rose is a rose is a rose: Minimalism in perception

The article by Wilcox and Edwards (1982) is discussed in terms of the notion of a Physics necessary for an explanatory theory of Perception. Phenomenological explanations, while true, are rejected as lacking explanatory adequacy. Some examples of succesful computational theories, covering the phenomena Gibson considered basic to an Ecological Physics, are given which are based upon a classical optics.     

The concept of configuration of interpersonal relations in a group as a time-dependent stochastic process

To explain changes in the sociometric configuration of a group through time, a problem arises of the extent to which such changes may be viewed as the aggregation of part-processes occurring at the level of two-person choice structures. A possible model is a Markov chain in which three possible states are mutual choice, one-way choice, and indifference, one realization for each pair of choosing individuals in the group. Choice data for an eighth-grade classroom are fitted to this model and are used to answer questions of constancy of transition probabilities, order of the chain, and sex differences.     

Healthcare access as a right, not a privilege: a construct of Western thought

Over 45 million Americans are uninsured or underinsured. Those living in poverty exhibit the worst health status. Employment, education, income, and race are important factors in a person's ability to acquire healthcare access. Having established that there are people lacking healthcare access due to multi-factorial etiologies, the question arises as to whether the intervention necessary to assist them in obtaining such access should be considered a privilege, or a right. The right to healthcare access is examined from the perspective of Western thought. Specifically through the works of Aristotle, Immanuel Kant, Thomas Hobbes, Thomas Paine, Hannah Arendt, James Rawls, and Norman Daniels, which are accompanied by a contemporary example of intervention on behalf of the medically needy by the The Johns Hopkins Urban Health Institute.     

Over-valued ideas: a conceptual analysis

Over-valued ideas are truly a neglected area of psychopathology with few experimental studies published. There is a different emphasis in the USA and Europe regarding their definition. For authors in the USA an over-valued idea has become shorthand for 'poor insight' in the middle of a continuum of obsessional doubts to delusional certainty. Compared to negative thoughts, obsessions and delusions, they are often more resistant to any treatment. A better understanding of over-valued ideas is required if advances are to be made in therapy and for the development of appropriate measures to evaluate the efficacy of novel treatments. A cognitive behavioural model of over-valued ideas is presented which draws upon the philosophical distinction between beliefs and values. It is argued that over-valued ideas are associated with idealised values, which have developed into such an over-riding importance, that they totally define the 'self' or identity of the individual. Idealised values are also characterised by the rigidity with which they are held. Such patients are unable to adapt to different circumstances and ignore the consequences of acting on their value. This analysis leads to a discussion of predictions that can be tested and various strategies that can be used in cognitive behaviour therapy.     

Toward a Phenomenology of Mood

Martin Heidegger's account of attunement [Befindlichkeit] through mood [Stimmung] is unprecedented in the history of philosophy and groundbreaking vis‐à‐vis contemporary accounts of emotion. On his view, moods are not mere mental states that result from, arise out of, or are caused by our situation or context. Rather, moods are fundamental modes of existence that are disclosive of the way one is or finds oneself [sich befinden] in the world. Mood is one of the basic modes through which we experience the world and through which the world is made present to us. Moreover, moods are the lenses through which things, people, animals, events, and aspects in the world matter to us. In this paper, I make the case that Heidegger's insights with respect to mood can and ought to be extended beyond the narrow scope of his fundamental ontology (in Being and Time) in which they were developed. I argue that contemporary accounts of mood within psychology ought to take these Heideggerian insights seriously and use them when defining, studying, evaluating, and drawing conclusions about the nature of moods. There are three sections to my paper. In section 1, I delineate Heidegger's account of mood. In section 2, I turn to some key studies on mood in psychology, and I elaborate upon some of the main shortcomings in this literature. In section 3, I suggest how psychology might benefit from understanding and utilizing a Heideggerian‐inspired phenomenology of mood.     

Why Can't You Take a Joke? The Several Moral Dimensions of Pilfering a Ha-Ha

This article investigates the moral wrongness of joke theft. Working through a trove of real-world cases, and using the sitcom The Marvelous Mrs. Maisel as a touchstone, I argue, ultimately, for a pluralist approach, contending that there are several wrongs that may be present in any case of joke theft, but which cannot be reduced to each other and which are collectively irreducible to any sort of “superwrong.”     

Outline of a denotative definition of aggression

Aggression is defined as generic assertiveness which includes both constructive and destructive behaviors. An attempt is then made to classify the distinctive operational settings (phenotypic situations) which trigger aggression. The classes of such settings are: 1) privation - the frustration of vital needs and the frustration due to inner conflict of needs; 2) conflict (social) - situation-specific competition and intragroup rivalry for dominance; and 3) victimization — predator-prey relations and vandalism per se. Critical questions which emerge from the definition and classification are posed.     

Evidence from a response choice task reveals a selection bias in the attentional cueing paradigm

In a typical attentional cueing paradigm, irrelevant peripheral cues produce early facilitation (fast responses) followed by later inhibition (slow responses) to cued locations. Here we examine whether cues not only influence the speed with which responses are produced, but also impact or bias which location is ultimately selected as requiring a response. Specifically, can cues influence not only the speed with which we respond but also influence the behavior produced? To examine this question, a choice localization task was used in which no targets were presented, and subjects were asked to choose which effector (left hand, right hand) to use in response to a centrally presented tone. Thus, following either a left or right peripheral cue, and then a central tone, subjects were free to respond with either their left or right hand. Early facilitation and later inhibition with this choice procedure were found in both response times and the proportion of responses to the cued and uncued locations. These results suggest that there are processes which initially bias response selection toward cued locations and then subsequently bias response selection away from cued locations.     

Restoring the associability of a pre-exposed CS by a surprising event

Three experiments are reported which use rats and the conditioned suppression technique. The first two confirmed a previous finding that prior exposure to a stimulus predicting a weak shock retards further learning when this same stimulus is subsequently used to signal a stronger shock. They further showed that this loss of stimulus associability could be attenuated by inserting trials on which the stimulus was presented alone in the absence of shock before the phase of training with the stronger shock. Experiment III demonstrated that, for animals given prior exposure to two stimuli, the insertion of nonreinforced trials with one of the stimuli will restore the associability only of that stimulus. These results are taken to show that a surprising event (the omission of an expected shock) can restore the associability of a pre-exposed conditioned stimulus.     

Association as a Cause of Dating Bias

Two experiments investigated a dating bias in which people tend to estimate recent dates too remotely and remote dates too recently. Experiment 1 examined and upheld a prediction of the hypothesis that bias arises because events whose time of occurrence is unknown are dated through associated events for which some time information is available. Experiment 2 required some subjects to date prototype events while others dated specific events. Prototype events were dated more recently, and the errors in dating specific events were related to differences in the way the prototype events were dated. Both sets of results were predicted by the association hypothesis, according to which events whose dates are well known are dated with reference either to specific associated events or to prototype events.     

On a question of orthodoxy

Judging from the main point of the replies received, a Marxist position which does not accept a dialogue with social psychology is not allowed. To indicate that such a position is Marxist only in name, and thus usurped, we are rapidly accused of economism, qualified as ‘orthodox’ and finally, last but not least, given the label ‘Stalinist’. The psycho-sociologists are firmly locked up in the rhetoric of the dilemma. The two positions — theoretical and political — which are presented in the reply by Morton Deutsch are in reality complementary: Their common characteristic is that they forget the main point of Marxism-Leninism, the thesis of the primacy of the class struggle. To accept social psychology without asking oneself questions about its meaning, or to ignore social psychology by considering it as an out-of-date ideology, leads to the same result, namely, leaving open the place of a Marxist-Leninist theory of ideology.