Embodied Institutions and Epistemic Exclusions: Affect in the Academy

This paper explores the intersection between affect, emotion, social imaginaries, and institutions through the lens of epistemic power in the academy. It argues that attending to this intersection is critical for a fuller understanding of how affective and emotional dynamics can assist to entrench, but also disrupt, asymmetries of epistemic privilege that cut across lines of race, sex, and other markers of social difference. As part of this discussion the paper reflects on the possibility of intervening in dominant social imaginaries that become sedimented in the routine operations of the modern university, and which produce affective ecologies that sustain epistemic exclusions within academic institutions.

     

Tracking Privilege‐Preserving Epistemic Pushback in Feminist and Critical Race Philosophy Classes

Classrooms are unlevel knowing fields, contested terrains where knowledge and ignorance are produced and circulate with equal vigor, and where members of dominant groups are accustomed to having an epistemic home‐terrain advantage. My project focuses on one form of resistance that regularly surfaces in discussions with social‐justice content. Privilege‐preserving epistemic pushback is a variety of willful ignorance that many members of dominant groups engage in when asked to consider both the lived and structural injustices that members of marginalized groups experience daily. I argue that this dominant form of resistance is neither an expression of skepticism nor a critical‐thinking practice. I suggest that standard philosophical engagements with these expressions of resistance are incapable of tracking the harms of privilege‐preserving epistemic pushback. I recommend treating this pushback as a “shadow text,” that is, as a text that runs alongside the readings in ways that offer no epistemic friction. I offer this as one critical philosophical practice for making students mindful of the ways they contribute to the circulation of ignorance and epistemic violence during the course of their discussions.     

Varieties of Epistemic Freedom

When we deliberate about what to do, we appear to be free to decide on different options. Three accounts use ordinary beliefs to explain this apparent freedom—appealing to different types of ‘epistemic freedom’. When an agent has epistemic freedom, her evidence while deliberating does not determine what decision she makes. This ‘epistemic gap’ between her evidence and decision explains why her decision appears free. The varieties of epistemic freedom appealed to might look similar. But there is an important difference. Two rely on an agent's ability to justifiably form beliefs unconstrained by evidence, and identify decisions as beliefs—either beliefs about acts (Velleman) or about decisions (Joyce and Ismael). But, when used to explain apparent freedom, these accounts face serious problems: they imply that agents have epistemic freedom over evidence-based beliefs, and rely on a faulty notion of justification. Underlying these troubles, it turns out that these accounts presuppose an unexplained apparent ability to form different beliefs. A third variety of epistemic freedom uses ignorance conditions instead (Levi and Kapitan). We appear free partly because we're ignorant of what we'll decide. Ignorance-based accounts avoid the above problems, and remain a promising alternative.     

Imposters,Tricksters, and Trustworthiness as an Epistemic Virtue

This paper argues that trustworthiness is an epistemic virtue that promotes objectivity. I show that untrustworthy imposture can be an arrogant act of privilege that silences marginalized voices. But, as epistemologists of ignorance have shown, sometimes trickery and the betrayal of epistemic norms are important resistance strategies. This raises the question: when is betrayal of trust epistemically virtuous? After establishing that trust is central to objectivity, I argue for the following answer: a betrayal is epistemically vicious when it strengthens or promotes oppressive, exclusive networks of trust, and a betrayal is epistemically virtuous when it expands trust networks to involve the oppressed. These criteria correctly account for both the epistemic vice of a recent case of Internet imposture and the epistemic virtue of resistant tricksters.     

Insights from Cowichan: A Hybrid Approach to Understanding Suicide in One First Nations’ Collective

Explanations for suicide are theorized primarily in terms of the individual, seldom considering the interdependent orientation of Indigenous communities. Drawing on the interpersonal theory of suicide and settler colonial theory, this study addresses Indigenous suicide on two levels: the individual and the collective. Twenty‐one interviews were conducted with members of the Cowichan Tribes to understand reasons for suicide in one community. Qualitative analysis identified explanatory constructs proposed by the interpersonal theory as well as negative conditions stemming from colonialism, as proposed by settler colonial theory. These results argue that Indigenous suicidal behavior is best understood from an interdependent standpoint.     

“Tell Me How That Makes You Feel”: Philosophy's Reason/Emotion Divide and Epistemic Pushback in Philosophy Classrooms

Alison Bailey has recently explored the nature of what she calls privilege‐evasive epistemic pushback or “the variety of willful ignorance that many members of dominant groups engage in when they are asked to consider both the lived experience and structural injustices that members of marginalized groups experience daily.” In this article, I want to use Bailey's argument to demonstrate how privilege‐evasive epistemic pushback is facilitated and obscured by the disciplinary tools of traditional Western philosophy. Specifically, through exploring philosophical cultures of justification and case studies, this work will reveal how students engage in privilege‐evasive epistemic pushback by deploying the reason/emotion divide and various philosophical norms and practices it underlies to protect their epistemic home turf. Then, I offer three emotion‐enhancing critical philosophical practices aimed at disrupting the ignorance‐promoting moves of privilege‐evasive epistemic pushback and, instead, engage emotion as epistemically significant.     

How navigation systems transform epistemic virtues: Knowledge,issues and solutions

In this paper, we analyse how GPS-based navigation systems are transforming some of our intellectual virtues and then suggest two strategies to improve our practices regarding the use of such epistemic tools. We start by outlining the two main approaches in virtue epistemology, namely virtue reliabilism and virtue responsibilism. We then discuss how navigation systems can undermine five epistemic virtues, namely memory, perception, attention, intellectual autonomy, and intellectual carefulness. We end by considering two possible interlinked ways of trying to remedy this situation: [i] redesigning the epistemic tool to improve the epistemic virtues of memory, perception, and attention; and [ii] the cultivation of cognitive diligence for wayfinding tasks scaffolding intellectual autonomy and carefulness.     

Substance Use Research with Indigenous Communities: Exploring and Extending Foundational Principles of Community Psychology

Many Indigenous communities are concerned with substance use (SU) problems and eager to advance effective solutions for their prevention and treatment. Yet these communities also are concerned about the perpetuation of colonizing, disorder‐focused, stigmatizing approaches to mental health, and social narratives related to SU problems. Foundational principles of community psychology—ecological perspectives, empowerment, sociocultural competence, community inclusion and partnership, and reflective practice—provide useful frameworks for informing ethical community‐based research pertaining to SU problems conducted with and by Indigenous communities. These principles are explored and extended for Indigenous community contexts through themes generated from seven collaborative studies focused on understanding, preventing, and treating SU problems. These studies are generated from research teams working with Indigenous communities across the United States and Canada—inclusive of urban, rural, and reservation/reserve populations as well as adult and youth participants. Shared themes indicate that Indigenous SU research reflects community psychology principles, as an outgrowth of research agendas and processes that are increasingly guided by Indigenous communities. At the same time, this research challenges these principles in important ways pertaining to Indigenous–settler relations and Indigenous‐specific considerations. We discuss these challenges and recommend greater synergy between community psychology and Indigenous research.     

The Social Value of Non-Deferential Belief

We often prefer non-deferential belief to deferential belief. In the last twenty years, epistemology has seen a surge of sympathetic interest in testimony as a source of knowledge. We are urged to abandon ‘epistemic individualism’ and the ideal of the ‘autonomous knower’ in favour of ‘social epistemology’. In this connection, you might think that a preference for non-deferential belief is a manifestation of vicious individualism, egotism, or egoism. I shall call this the selfishness challenge to preferring non-deferential belief. The aim of this paper is to meet the selfishness challenge by arguing that non-deferential belief is (pro tanto) socially valuable.     

Christianity,settler colonialism,and resource extraction

This article explores the relationship between Christianity, extractivism, and Amer-European settler colonialism. It argues that Amer-European Christianity is an extractivist religion, with beliefs and practices that are deeply intertwined with an extractivist relationship to the natural world and Indigenous peoples. In conversation with the work of Willie Jennings and exploring the impact of the doctrine of Christian discovery, the extractivist theology of John Locke, and the supersessionist use of divine election and covenant, this article exemplifies how Amer-European Christianity has shaped and been shaped by settler colonial extractivism. It raises the question whether and how Amer-European settler Christians may decolonize their extractivist relationship to Indigenous peoples and the natural world by learning from Indigenous peoples in dialogue with the work of the Osage theologian “Tink” Tinker.     

Vulnerability,Ignorance, and Oppression

This paper aims to understand the relationship between ignorance and vulnerability by drawing on recent work on the epistemology of ignorance. After elaborating how we might understand the importance of human vulnerability, I develop the claim that ignorance of vulnerability is produced through the pursuit of an ideal of invulnerability that involves both ethical and epistemological closure. The ignorance of vulnerability that is a prerequisite for such invulnerability is, I contend, a pervasive form of ignorance that underlies and grounds other oppressive forms of ignorance. Thus, undoing such forms of ignorance requires working toward a particular form of vulnerability: epistemic vulnerability.     

The silent music sheet,the replica tin and the unsewn button: Materialising nostalgia in the Marks and Spencer's archive

This paper explores how nostalgia and collective memory are materialised, imagined, curated and orchestrated through the archive. Drawing upon the example of the Marks and Spencer's (M&S) archive, we argue that archives, particularly those containing objects, command nostalgia. They re-appropriate objects, memories and their histories into contemporary narratives. This paper adds to a body of work within and beyond geography and sociology exploring the potency and creativity of everyday materials and their ability to produce, imagine and memorialise affinities between people, places and past times. This raises questions about the politics of memory, the authenticity of objects and the nostalgic imaginaries they enliven, what we discuss as ‘faux nostalgia’. We illustrate how M&S is part of collective British memory, promoting middle-class ideals of British family life. The archive and objects on display materialise such imaginaries, creating a yearning for the spirit, values and opportunities of times gone by; interweaving them into contemporary narratives of family life to create unattainable ideals. We reflect upon the biographies of three objects from the archive: a music sheet, an unsewn button and a replica tin. By making these objects central to our account, we illustrate how they materialise and recollect nostalgia through the archive.     

Methodology of the Privileged: White Anti‐racist Feminism,Systematic Ignorance,and Epistemic Uncertainty

This article addresses the impact of systematic ignorance and epistemic uncertainty upon white Western women's participation in anti‐racist and transnational feminisms. I argue that a “methodology of the privileged” is necessary for effective coalition‐building across racial and geopolitical inequities. Examining both self‐reflexivity and racial sedition as existing methods, I conclude that epistemic uncertainty should be considered an additional strategy rather than a dilemma for the privileged.     

Gana’Jôh: Haudenosaunee Pedagogies of the Drum Letters From the Woodshop

This article presents reflections on a drum-making workshop organized for young Haudenosaunee men on Six Nations of the Grand River territory in a region now known as Ontario, Canada. Imbued with an inductive character, we reflect on the disconnections between Indigenous and Western ways of knowing and draw on transdisciplinary methodological approaches to praxis. The main body of the article is constructed through a series of letters where each author reflects on the tensions and contradictions between Indigenous ways of knowing and the modes of knowledge creation promoted through academic White settler ideals. Drawing on Indigenous epistemologies from Leanne Betasamosake Simpson we argue that material production in relation to the making of Haudenosaunee drums can become pedagogy and fuel Indigenous-specific resurgence and intelligence. After we introduce ourselves and sketch the context for our project, the narrative proceeds through two voices in conversation. Each co-author reflects on the insights that emerged from an effort to decolonize learning through the pedagogies of the drum.     

Settler Colonialism,Decolonization, and Climate Change

The article proposes that climate change makes enduring colonial injustices and structures visible. It focuses on the imposition and dominance of colonial concepts of land and self-determination on Indigenous peoples in settler states. It argues that if the dominance of these colonial frameworks remains unaddressed, the progressing climate change will worsen other colonial injustices, too. Specifically, Indigenous self-determination capabilities will be increasingly undermined, and Indigenous peoples will experience the loss of what they understand as relevant land from within their own ontologies of land. The article holds that even if settler states strive to repair colonial injustices, these efforts will be unsuccessful if climate change occurs and decolonization is pursued within the framework of a settler colonial ontology of land. Therefore, the article suggests, decolonization of the ontologies of land and concepts of self-determination is a precondition for a just response to climate change.     

Acknowledge the land: An Indigenous historical reflection on colonial and extractive theology

Western Christian theological support for resource extractivism is interwoven with theological support of settler coloniality. Christian theology is therefore an essential site for the defense of Indigenous land claims. Replacement theology, also known as supersessionism, should be understood as involving Jewish-Christian-Muslim relations and as imbricating the ideologies and theologies supporting political and material coloniality, including extractivism. This article offers a friendly critique of contemporary anti-supersessionist theological projects through the lenses of postcolonial, decolonial, and global Indigenous thought, suggesting a path toward addressing the crisis of the Anthropocene.     

Sosa’s Reflective Knowledge: How damaging is epistemic circularity?

The problem of epistemic circularity maintains that we cannot know that our central belief-forming practices (faculties) are reliable without vicious circularity. Ernest Sosa??s Reflective Knowledge (2009) offers a solution to this problem. Sosa argues that epistemic circularity is virtuous rather than vicious: it is not damaging. Contra Sosa, I contend that epistemic circularity is damaging. Section 1 provides an overview of Sosa??s solution. Section 2 focuses on Sosa??s reply to the Crystal-ball-gazer Objection. Section 2 also contends that epistemic circularity does not prevent us from being justified in (e.g.) perceptual beliefs, or from being justified in believing that (e.g.) sense perception is reliable. But, Sect. 3 argues that it does prevent us from being able to satisfactorily show that our central belief-forming practices (faculties) are reliable. That is, epistemic circularity prevents us from distinguishing between reliable and unreliable practices, from guiding ourselves to use reliable practices and avoid unreliable ones, and from defending reliable practices against skepticism. Hence, epistemic circularity is still damaging. The concluding section suggests that this has repercussions for Sosa??s analysis of the value of reflective knowledge.     

Epistemic and Dialectical Regress

Dialectical egalitarianism holds that every asserted proposition requires defence when challenged by an interlocutor. This view apparently generates a vicious ‘regress of justifications’, since an interlocutor can challenge the premises through which a speaker defends her original assertion, and so on ad infinitum. To halt the regress, dialectical foundationalists such as Adler, Brandom, Leite, and Williams propose that some propositions require no defence in the light of mere requests for justification. I argue that the putative regress is not worrisome and that egalitarianism can handle it quite satisfactorily. I also defend a positive view that combines an anti-foundationalist conception of dialectical interaction with a foundationalist conception of epistemic justification.     

Normalization of Racism and Moral Responsibility: Against the Exculpatory Stance

In this article, we take the case of racism in contemporary Italy as a starting point for a discussion about moral responsibility for racism in cases where ignorance is involved. We focus on the issue of the normalization of racism and its contribution to different forms of ignorance to assess the extent to which these might potentially mitigate judgments of responsibility for racism, thereby grounding an Exculpatory Stance. After illustrating the phenomenon of the normalization of racism and offering an outline of how the normalization of racism contributes to ignorance, we argue against the Exculpatory Stance by appealing to a socially situated variety of capacitarian approach to the epistemic condition of moral responsibility. This approach provides us with the tools to claim that the moral ignorance favored by the normalization of racism does not mitigate judgments of individual responsibility. Finally, we point out that the interdependence of individual responsibility and the social environment is such that, in addition to backward-looking individual responsibilities for racism, there are also forward-looking, both individual and shared, responsibilities to counter racism in its various manifestations and the increased risk of moral ignorance connected to its normalization.