Approaching self-deception: How Robert Audi and I part company

This article explores fundamental differences between Robert Audi’s position on self-deception and mine. Although we both depart from a model of self-deception that is straightforwardly based on stereotypical interpersonal deception, we differ in how we do that. An important difference between us might be partly explained by a difference in how we understand the kind of deceiving that is most relevant to self-deception.     

Real self-deception

Self-deception is made unnecessarily puzzling by the assumption that it is an intrapersonal analog of ordinary interpersonal deception. In paradigmatic cases, interpersonal deception is intentional and involves some time at which the deceiver disbelieves what the deceived believes. The assumption that self-deception is intentional and that the self-deceiver believes that some proposition is true while also believing that it is false produces interesting conceptual puzzles, but it also produces a fundamentally mistaken view of the dynamics of self-deception. This target article challenges the assumption and presents an alternative view of the nature and etiology of self-deception. Drawing upon empirical studies of cognitive biases, it resolves familiar "paradoxes" about the dynamics of self-deception and the condition of being self-deceived. Conceptually sufficient conditions for self-deception are offered and putative empirical demonstrations of a kind of self-deception in which a subject believes that a proposition is true while also believing that it is false are criticized. Self-deception is neither irresolvably paradoxical nor mysterious, and it is explicable without the assistance of mental exotica. The key to understanding its dynamics is a proper appreciation of our capacity for acquiring and retaining motivationally biased beliefs.     

Social strategies in self-deception

How do people deceive themselves? I argue that although self-deception tends to be conceptualized as something that happens ‘within an individual’, it can also be a process that is distributed across the social context of a self-deceiver. In this paper I will, first, conceptually distinguish different strategies of such ‘social self-deception’. Second, I will incorporate these into the two main conceptualizations of self-deception: intentionalism and deflationism. Finally, I will show how the proposed re-conceptualization of self-deception can be beneficial to conceptual, moral and empirical research.     

Self-deception and self-knowledge

The aim of this paper is to provide an account of a certain variety of self-deception based on a model of self-knowledge. According to this model, one thinks that one has a belief on the basis of one’s grounds for that belief. If this model is correct, then our thoughts about which beliefs we have should be in accordance with our grounds for those beliefs. I suggest that the relevant variety of self-deception is a failure of self-knowledge wherein the subject violates this epistemic obligation. I argue that construing this type of self-deception as a failure of self-knowledge explains two important aspects of it: The tension that we observe between the subject’s speech and her actions, and our inclination to hold the subject responsible for her condition. I compare this proposal with two other approaches to self-deception in the literature; intentionalism and motivationalism. Intentionalism explains the two aspects of self-deception but it runs into the so-called ‘paradoxes’ of self-deception. Motivationalism avoids those paradoxes but it cannot explain the two aspects of self-deception.     

自我欺骗:为了调节个体心理状态

本研究旨在探索自我欺骗的研究方法、产生的原因和认知机制,以及这一领域中有待解决的新问题。近期研究发现:基于自我欺骗产生的动机特点,主要存在三类不同的定义方式,大多数心理学家是基于第三类定义来研究自我欺骗。研究方法上,适用性较强的自欺问卷是自欺性提升量表(SDE),操作性较强的经典实验范式是点追踪任务。在认知过程的任一阶段中,调节心理状态是个体产生自我欺骗的直接动机,改变个体的心理状态或对事物的模糊感知可能阻止个体自我欺骗的产生。未来应从如何调节个体心理状态的角度探讨和研究自我欺骗,能够利用点追踪任务,结合ERPs或fMRI技术为之后研究自欺产生的具体阶段、认知机制以及神经机制提供实证研究基础。     

Lies and bullshit: The negative effects of misinformation grow stronger over time

In a world where exposure to untrustworthy communicators is common, trust has become more important than ever for effective marketing. Nevertheless, we know very little about the long-term consequences of exposure to untrustworthy sources, such bullshitters. This research examines how untrustworthy sources—liars and bullshitters—influence consumer attitudes toward a product. Frankfurt's (1986) insidious bullshit hypothesis (i.e., bullshitting is evaluated less negatively than lying but bullshit can be more harmful than are lies) is examined within a traditional sleeper effect—a persuasive influence that increases, rather than decays over time. We obtained a sleeper effect after participants learned that the source of the message was either a liar or a bullshitter. However, compared to the liar source condition, the same message from a bullshitter resulted in more extreme immediate and delayed attitudes that were in line with an otherwise discounted persuasive message (i.e., an advertisement). Interestingly, attitudes returned to control condition levels when a bullshitter was the source of the message, suggesting that knowing an initially discounted message may be potentially accurate/inaccurate (as is true with bullshit, but not lies) does not result in the long-term discounting of that message. We discuss implications for marketing and other contexts of persuasion.     

The evolution and psychology of self-deception

In this article we argue that self-deception evolved to facilitate interpersonal deception by allowing people to avoid the cues to conscious deception that might reveal deceptive intent. Self-deception has two additional advantages: It eliminates the costly cognitive load that is typically associated with deceiving, and it can minimize retribution if the deception is discovered. Beyond its role in specific acts of deception, self-deceptive self-enhancement also allows people to display more confidence than is warranted, which has a host of social advantages. The question then arises of how the self can be both deceiver and deceived. We propose that this is achieved through dissociations of mental processes, including conscious versus unconscious memories, conscious versus unconscious attitudes, and automatic versus controlled processes. Given the variety of methods for deceiving others, it should come as no surprise that self-deception manifests itself in a number of different psychological processes, and we discuss various types of self-deception. We then discuss the interpersonal versus intrapersonal nature of self-deception before considering the levels of consciousness at which the self can be deceived. Finally, we contrast our evolutionary approach to self-deception with current theories and debates in psychology and consider some of the costs associated with self-deception.     

自我欺骗：通过欺骗自己更好地欺骗他人

心理学的研究几乎都把自欺看作一种个体特质, 主要探讨自欺对个体自身的作用。而在进化的理论框架中, 自欺是一种人际交往的策略, 目的是为了更好地欺骗其他个体。由于直接欺骗有可能被对方识破, 个体把自己欺骗之后就可以“诚实地”向对方传递错误信息而不被察觉。这就把自欺定义为人际间而非个体内的概念。本文系统地阐述人际间自欺的概念和思路, 并为之在心理学的研究中提出一套理论假设和研究方法。在理论上, 由于难以区别通过自欺的欺骗和直接的欺骗, 本文提出一系列假设和条件来证明自欺的存在, 这些条件包括欺骗双方的地位高低、道德高低、和人数多寡。因为自欺是用来应付高欺骗探测压力的, 上述条件可以反映被骗对象的欺骗探测能力的高低。在方法上, 本文提出采用两次回忆的方式来展现自欺, 第一次回忆时欺骗动机存在, 个体在诚实的状态下提供较少真实信息, 第二次回忆时欺骗动机消失, 个体可以提供较多真实信息, 通过比较两次回忆内容的差异来验证自欺的存在。这一操作方法突破了个体间自欺因缺乏操作定义而无法进行心理学研究的屏障, 为人们探讨人际间自欺提供了一条可行途径。     

The Ubiquity of Self-Deception

My paper is a discussion of Bas van Fraassen’s important, but neglected, paper on self-deception, “The Peculiar Effects of Love and Desire.” Paradoxes of self-deception are widely thought to follow from the ease with which we know ourselves. For example, if self-deception were intentional, how could we fail to know as target of our own deception just those things necessary to undermine the deception? Van Fraassen stands that reasoning on its head, arguing that is the ease with which we accuse ourselves of self-deception that undermines our confidence in our claims to know ourselves. I unpack and modify his argument, attempting to show that it makes a powerful case for scepticism about self-knowledge. I argue, contra van Fraassen, that local scepticism about self-knowledge threatens our claims to know ourselves in a way that global scepticism does not threaten our claims about the external world. I support this claim by showing that the Wittgensteinian response to the sceptic in On Certainty—that we don’t know what to do with the sceptic’s doubts, that we don’t know how to incorporate those doubts into our practices—does not succeed in deflecting scepticism about self-knowledge because the local sceptic’s doubts—about whether we can distinguish genuine claims to know ourselves from self-deceived claims—are integral to language game of self-knowledge. The local sceptic’s doubts are our doubts because it is natural to ask whether we are deceiving ourselves when we claim to know ourselves. However, because, we have no way of distinguishing genuine claims to know ourselves from self-deceived claims, our claims to self-knowledge are systematically undermined.     

Epistemically exploitative bullshit: A Sartrean account

This paper presents a novel conceptualization of a type of untruthful speech that is of eminent political relevance but has hitherto been unrecognized: epistemically exploitative bullshit (EEB). Speakers engaging in EEB are bullshitting: they deceive their addressee regarding their unconcern for the very difference between truth and falsity. At the same time, they exploit their discursive victims: they oblige their counterparts to perform unacknowledged and emotionally draining epistemic work to educate the speakers about the addressees' oppression, only to discredit their epistemic trustworthiness. I argue that EEB is irreducible to various recently discussed untruthful speech, and in particular to Frankfurtian bullshit, as well as to epistemic exploitation or other epistemic injustices. Taking inspiration from Sartre's analysis of anti-Semitic discourse, where bullshitting and epistemic exploitation are essentially interlinked, I instead suggest that recognizing the distinctiveness of EEB allows for a more refined conceptualization of these discursive phenomena. Specifically, I show how bad faith and the ensuing collective diffusion and delegation of epistemic responsibility play a so far neglected but key role here. I ultimately demonstrate that with Sartre's help, we can grasp how the existential, interpersonal and institutional dimensions involved in the negotiation of truth seamlessly intersect better than we would with the lens of analytic or critical epistemology alone.     

Reception and willingness to share pseudo‐profound bullshit and their relation to other epistemically suspect beliefs and cognitive ability in Slovakia and Romania

Propensity to judge randomly generated, syntactically correct (i.e., bullshit) statements as profound is associated with a variety of conceptually relevant variables (e.g., intuitive cognitive style and supernatural beliefs). Besides generalizing these findings to a different cultural setting, we examined the relationships to sharing the bullshit on social media. Rating nonsense as profound was associated with a lower cognitive ability; a stronger belief in the paranormal, alternative medicine, and conspiracies; and ontological confusion. The more profound a statement was rated to be, the more likely it was to be shared, and propensity for sharing bullshit was predicted by ontological confusion and religious beliefs. Bullshit receptivity and sharing may be closely related to several dimensions of epistemically suspect beliefs; people with these propensities are relatively open to vague statements resembling New Age spirituality.     

Self-Deception Needs No Explaining

How can one deceive oneself if at the same time one knows the truth? The idea of such a thing has puzzled philosophers, and many philosophical efforts have been devoted to explaining the puzzle. Yet all such attempts have been misplaced. For in fact there is nothing distinctive about the way the mind works in self-deception, nothing that needs special explaining. The perception of a puzzle arises from certain mistaken assumptions about how the mind works generally. Once this is explained, we see that the way the mind works in self-deception embodies no deviation from the norm. The aura of paradox then disappears, and we see that self-deception requires no special explanation of its own.     

Self-deception's adaptive value: effects of positive thinking and the winner effect

There is a puzzle about why self-deception, a process that obscures the truth, is so pervasive in human behavior given that tracking the truth seems important for our survival and reproduction. William von Hippel and Robert Trivers argue that, despite appearances, there is good reason to think that self-deception is an adaptation by arguing: (1) self-deception leads to a positive self-perception and (2) a positive self-perception increases an individual's fitness. D.S. Neil Van Leeuwen, however, gives persuasive arguments against both steps. In response, we will defend both propositions, thereby supporting the conclusion that self-deception indeed has adaptive value. The first premise will be bolstered by a survey of the philosophical literature and empirical work on self-deception, whereas the second will be strengthened by empirical research on a behavioral phenomenon known as the winner effect.     

自我欺骗实证研究述评

自我欺骗的施骗者和受骗者都是自我。这个特殊性导致自我欺骗的定义、类型、研究范式和机制等存在着争议。在系统梳理自我欺骗相关实证研究的基础上,比较了自我欺骗不同的定义和不同的研究范式,提出了两种新的自我欺骗分类方法,探析了自我欺骗的心理机制,以期为后续研究提供借鉴和参考。     

认认知模糊程度和动机强度对有意识和无意识自我欺骗的影响

三个实验分别探讨了无意识和有意识自我欺骗存在的可能性, 以及认知模糊程度与动机强度对两种自我欺骗的影响。实验1的结果发现, 自我欺骗存在无意识和有意识两种形式; 实验2的结果发现, 随着认知模糊程度的降低, 无意识自我欺骗人数明显减少, 而有意识自我欺骗人数显著增加; 实验3的结果发现, 随着动机强度的增加, 有意识自我欺骗人数显著增多, 无意识自我欺骗人数并无显著变化。结果提示, 自我欺骗具有现实存在性, 且有两种不同形式; 两种形式自我欺骗具有不同的产生机制。     

Self-awareness and self-deception: a Sartrean perspective

In spite of the fact that many find Jean-Paul Sartre’s account of la mauvaise foi puzzling, unclear and troublesome, he remains a recurring figure in the debate about self-deception. Indeed, Sartre’s exposition of self-deception is as puzzling as it is original. The primary task of my paper will be to expose why this is the case and to thereby correct a recurrent misunderstanding of Sartre’s theory of consciousness. In the end, will we see that Sartre offers the following theory: self-deception is to be accounted for by assuming that there are intrinsically self-deceptive epistemic states. The latter are self-deceptive in so far as they claim certainty while nevertheless being accompanied by an inbuilt and incorruptible awareness of being unwarranted. For Sartre, developing this rather peculiar account of self-deception, is, as we will see, not primarily intended as an end in itself. Rather, Sartre thereby hopes to illuminate the nature of self-awareness as (i.) epistemically super-secure, (ii.) pre-reflexive, (iii.) non-positional and “embryonic” knowledge that (iv.) does not necessitate but can still ground epistemically super-secure reflexive knowledge, and (v.) that can replace Freud’s notion of unconscious knowledge. As an account of self-deception, Sartre’s suggestion, however, comes at a high price. Apart from the presuppositions Sartre makes in the theory of consciousness and intentionality, his account is deflationist with regard to local cases of self-deception.     

Willful ignorance and self-deception

Willful ignorance is an important concept in criminal law and jurisprudence, though it has not received much discussion in philosophy. When it is mentioned, however, it is regularly assumed to be a kind of self-deception. In this article I will argue that self-deception and willful ignorance are distinct psychological kinds. First, some examples of willful ignorance are presented and discussed, and an analysis of the phenomenon is developed. Then it is shown that current theories of self-deception give no support to the idea that willful ignorance is a kind of self-deception. Afterwards an independent argument is adduced for excluding willful ignorance from this category. The crucial differences between the two phenomena are explored, as are the reasons why they are so easily conflated.     

Self-deception and belief attribution

One of the most common views about self-deception ascribes contradictory beliefs to the self-deceiver. In this paper it is argued that this view (the contradiction strategy) is inconsistent with plausible common-sense principles of belief attribution. Other dubious assumptions made by contradiction strategists are also examined. It is concluded that the contradiction strategy is an inadequate account of self-deception. Two other well-known views — those of Robert Audi and Alfred Mele — are investigated and found wanting. A new theory of self-deception relying on an extension of Mark Johnston's subintentional mental tropisms is proposed and defended.     

自我欺骗实证研究述评

自我欺骗的施骗者和受骗者都是自我。这个特殊性导致自我欺骗的定义、类型、研究范式和机制等存在着争议。在系统梳理自我欺骗相关实证研究的基础上,比较了自我欺骗不同的定义和不同的研究范式,提出了两种新的自我欺骗分类方法,探析了自我欺骗的心理机制,以期为后续研究提供借鉴和参考。     

反馈对自我欺骗的影响：来自ERP的证据

本研究主要探讨反馈类型和反馈效价对自我欺骗的影响。实验1采用前瞻范式探究不同效价的模糊反馈对自我欺骗的影响, 结果发现, 相比于无答案提示组, 有答案提示组的被试在积极模糊反馈的条件下显著地提高测试2第二阶段的预测分数(自我欺骗的程度加重)。实验2探究不同效价的精确反馈对自我欺骗的影响, 结果发现, 相对于无答案提示组, 有答案提示组的被试在消极精确反馈条件下显著地降低测试2第二阶段的预测分数。实验3采用ERP技术探究反馈类型和反馈效价影响自我欺骗的内在机制, 结果发现, 模糊反馈条件下的自我欺骗诱发较大的P2成分、诱发较小的N1和N400成分; 以及发现自我欺骗在额区的效应较大。总之, 这些研究结果表明可能积极反馈促进个体的自我欺骗产生, 消极反馈削弱个体自我欺骗的产生; 积极模糊反馈能够进一步促进了个体自我欺骗的产生。这些研究结果还表明自我欺骗产生的背后机制可能是自我膨胀。