共查询到20条相似文献,搜索用时 15 毫秒
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Christian Basil Miller 《Philosophical Studies》2008,139(2):233-255
Cases involving amoralists who no longer care about the institution of morality, together with cases of depression, listlessness,
and exhaustion, have posed trouble in recent years for standard formulations of motivational internalism. In response, though,
internalists have been willing to adopt narrower versions of the thesis which restrict it just to the motivational lives of
those agents who are said to be in some way normal, practically rational, or virtuous. My goal in this paper is to offer a
new set of counterexamples to motivational internalism, examples which are effective both against traditional formulations
of the thesis as well as against many of these more recent restricted proposals.
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Christian Basil MillerEmail: |
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Victor Kumar 《Canadian journal of philosophy》2016,46(3):318-345
Do psychopaths make moral judgments but lack motivation? Or are psychopaths’ judgments are not genuinely moral? Both sides of this debate seem to assume either externalist or internalist criteria for the presence of moral judgment. However, if moral judgment is a natural kind, we can arrive at a theory-neutral criterion for moral judgment. A leading naturalistic criterion suggests that psychopaths have an impaired capacity for moral judgment; the capacity is neither fully present nor fully absent. Psychopaths are therefore not counterexamples to internalism. Nonetheless, internalism is empirically problematic because it is unable to explain psychopaths’ moral deficits. 相似文献
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Karl Schafer 《Synthese》2014,191(12):2571-2591
In the following I discuss the debate between epistemological internalists and externalists from an unfamiliar meta-epistemological perspective. In doing so, I focus on the question of whether rationality is best captured in externalist or internalist terms. Using a conception of epistemic judgments as “doxastic plans,” I characterize one important subspecies of judgments about epistemic rationality—focusing on the distinctive rational/functional role these judgments play in regulating how we form beliefs. Then I show why any judgment that plays this role should be expected to behave the manner internalists predict. In this way, I argue, we can explain why our basic toolbox for epistemic evaluation includes an internalist conception of rationality. 相似文献
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Epistemic naturalism holds that the results or methodologies from the cognitive sciences are relevant to epistemology, and
some have maintained that scientific methods are more compatible with externalist theories of justification than with internalist
theories. But practically all discussions about naturalized epistemology are framed exclusively in terms of cognitive psychology,
which is only one of the cognitive sciences. The question addressed in this essay is whether a commitment to naturalism really
does favor externalism over internalism, and we offer reasons for thinking that naturalism in epistemology is compatible with
both internalist and externalist conceptions of justification. We also argue that there are some distinctively internalist
aims that are currently being studied scientifically and these notions, and others, should be studied by scientific methods.
This essay is dedicated to Deborah Mayo, who has long advocated using error statistical techniques to analyze and resolve
epistemological puzzles in the philosophy of science. This essay follows the same spirit by advocating that computational
concepts and techniques be applied within the heart of traditional, analytic epistemology. 相似文献
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Chris Tillman 《Synthese》2012,187(2):419-440
At first pass, internalism about justification is the view that there is no justificatory difference without an internal difference. Externalism about mental content is the view that there are differences in mental content without an internal difference. Assuming (complete) mental contents are the primary bearers of justificatory features, the two views are in obvious tension. The goal of this paper is to determine how the tension is best resolved. 相似文献
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John Turri 《Synthese》2009,170(1):147-153
I respond to John Greco’s argument that all forms of internalism in epistemology are either false or uninteresting. The paper
divides into two sections. First, I explain precisely what internalists and externalists in epistemology disagree over. This
puts us in a position to assess whether Greco’s argument succeeds. Second, I present Greco’s argument and offer two objections. 相似文献
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Voin Milevski 《Philosophical Psychology》2017,30(1-2):44-57
The unconditional version of motivational internalism says that if an agent sincerely judges that to φ in circumstances C is the best option available to her, then, as a matter of conceptual necessity, she will be motivated to φ in C. This position faces a powerful counterargument according to which it is possible for various cases of practical irrationality to completely defeat an agent’s moral motivation while, at the same time, leaving her appreciation of her moral reasons intact. In this paper, I will argue that weakness of will, as the paradigmatic case of practical irrationality, and all other cases of practical irrationality that feature in standard formulations of this argument do not represent genuine counterexamples to this version of motivational internalism. In this sense, the main aim of this paper is to show that proponents of this internalist position are well justified in their denial of the claim that there are people who are completely unmotivated by their judgments about what is the best option available to them. 相似文献
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Danielle Bromwich 《Philosophical Studies》2010,148(3):343-367
Cognitivist motivational internalism is the thesis that, if one believes that 'It is right to ϕ', then one will be motivated
to ϕ. This thesis—which captures the practical nature of morality—is in tension with a Humean constraint on belief: belief
cannot motivate action without the assistance of a conceptually independent desire. When defending cognitivist motivational
internalism it is tempting to either argue that the Humean constraint only applies to non-moral beliefs or that moral beliefs
only motivate ceteris paribus. But succumbing to the first temptation places one under a burden to justify what is motivationally exceptional about moral
beliefs and succumbing to the second temptation saddles one with a thesis that fails to do justice to the practicality intuition
that cognitivist motivational internalism is suppose to capture. In this paper, I offer a way of defending cognitivist motivational
internalism, which does not require accepting that there is anything motivationally unusual about moral beliefs. I argue that
no belief satisfies the Humean constraint: all beliefs are capable of motivating without the assistance of a conceptually
independent desire. 相似文献
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Ramstead Maxwell J. D. Kirchhoff Michael D. Constant Axel Friston Karl J. 《Synthese》2019,198(1):41-70
Synthese - We present a multiscale integrationist interpretation of the boundaries of cognitive systems, using the Markov blanket formalism of the variational free energy principle. This... 相似文献
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M. S. Bedke 《Philosophical Studies》2009,144(2):189-209
Consider orthodox motivational judgment internalism: necessarily, A’s sincere moral judgment that he or she ought to φ motivates
A to φ. Such principles fail because they cannot accommodate the amoralist, or one who renders moral judgments without any
corresponding motivation. The orthodox alternative, externalism, posits only contingent relations between moral judgment and
motivation. In response I first revive conceptual internalism by offering some modifications on the amoralist case to show
that certain community-wide motivational failures are not conceptually possible. Second, I introduce a theory of moral motivation
that supplements the intuitive responses to different amoralist cases. According to moral judgment purposivism (MJP), in rough
approximation, a purpose of moral judgments is to motivate corresponding behaviors such that a mental state without this purpose
is not a moral judgment. MJP is consistent with conceptual desiderata, provides an illuminating analysis of amoralist cases,
and offers a step forward in the internalist-externalist debates.
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M. S. BedkeEmail: |
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Kenneth Shields 《Philosophical Psychology》2016,29(8):1095-1111
Philosophers are divided over moral internalism, the claim that moral judgement entails some motivation to comply with that judgement. Against moral internalism, externalists defend the conceptual coherence of scenarios in which an individual makes genuine moral judgements but is entirely unmoved by them. This is amoralist skepticism and these scenarios can be called amoralist scenarios. While the coherence of amoralist scenarios is disputed, philosophers seem to agree that the coherence of amoralist scenarios is not affected by whether the amoralist is described as having moral knowledge or mere belief. But recent experimental research challenges this assumption. When evaluating amoralist scenarios, people’s intuitions lean towards externalism when the amoralist is described as knowing that X is morally wrong, whereas people’s intuitions lean towards internalism when the amoralist is described as believing that X is morally wrong. Call this the factivity effect. In this paper, I argue that the factivity effect is unlikely to be explained as an experimental artifact and that as a consequence, the traditional dispute over moral internalism and amoralist skepticism may need a major overhaul. The results of three studies testing the factivity effect provide support for this thesis. Implications of these results for the traditional debate over moral internalism are discussed. 相似文献
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Andrew Sneddon 《Philosophical explorations》2013,16(1):41-53
Internalists argue that there is a necessary connection between motivation and moral judgment. The examination of cases plays an important role in philosophical debate about internalism. This debate has focused on cases concerning the failure to act in accordance with a moral judgment, for one reason or another. I call these failure cases. I argue that a different sort of case is also relevant to this debate. This sort of case is characterized by (1) moral judgment and (2) behavior that accords with the content of the moral judgment but that has been performed not because of the moral judgment. Instead it is due to some other source of motivation. I call these alternative motivation cases. I distinguish two sorts of alternative motivation cases, and I argue that externalists have natural explanations of these cases. By contrast, extant internalist accounts of failure cases are inadequate when applied to alternative motivation cases. 相似文献