Applying the Psychology of Science to the Science of Psychology: Can Psychologists Use Psychological Science to Enhance Psychology as a Science?

ABSTRACT— Added to the already tremendous diversity of subdisciplines of psychological science is the psychology of science. Although research on the psychology of science began in 1874, the field has seen a substantial expansion of activity in recent years. One particular subset of this research literature has special importance: namely, inquiries into the psychology of doing great science. These investigations may be assigned into four groups: cognitive, differential, developmental, and social. Each of these deal with critical questions that can, if answered, contribute directly to the improvement of psychology as a science. Potential applications include (a) the identification of scientific talent in psychology, (b) the education of future investigators in psychological science, and (c) the evaluation of psychology's progress as a scientific endeavor.     

Is Psychology a Cognitive Science?

ABSTRACT Since the 1970s there has been a significant paradigm shift in psychology away from behaviourism and towards cognitive psychology. Indeed a recent survey discovered that by 1983 more than half American psychologists were describing their approaches as cognitive. However, while behaviourism has had an identifiable philosophical 'line' in positivism, reductionism and the hypothetico-deductive model, such a framework has been noticeably lacking from cognitive psychology. A view of cognitive psychology based on functionalism and ideas from systems analysis is put forward.     

Psychology as the Science of Self-Reports and Finger Movements: Whatever Happened to Actual Behavior?

ABSTRACT— Psychology calls itself the science of behavior, and the American Psychological Association's current "Decade of Behavior" was intended to increase awareness and appreciation of this aspect of the science. Yet some psychological subdisciplines have never directly studied behavior, and studies on behavior are dwindling rapidly in other subdisciplines. We discuss the eclipse of behavior in personality and social psychology, in which direct observation of behavior has been increasingly supplanted by introspective self-reports, hypothetical scenarios, and questionnaire ratings. We advocate a renewed commitment to including direct observation of behavior whenever possible and in at least a healthy minority of research projects.     

Is Folk Psychology Different?

In this paper, I seek to refute arguments for the idea that folk psychological explanation, i.e., the explanation of actions, beliefs and desires in terms of one another, should be understood as being of a different character than ordinary scientific explanations, a view defended most prominently in analytical philosophy by Donald Davidson and John McDowell. My strategy involves arguing both against the extant arguments for the idea that FP must be construed as giving such explanations, and also against the very notion of such a different kind of explanation. I argue first that the in some sense a priori and conceptual nature of folk psychological principles does not support the idea that these are other than empirical generalisations, by appeal to recent nativist ideas in cognitive science and to Lewis's conception of the meaning of theoretical terms. Second, I argue that there is no coherent sense in which folk psychological explanations can be seen as normative. Thirdly, I examine the putatively holistic character of the mental and conclude that that too fails to provide any cogent reasons for viewing folk psychological explanations as different from other kinds of explanation.     

Kierkegaard and Psychology as the Science of the “Multifarious Life”

The aim of this paper is to demonstrate the actuality of some considerations around psychology made by the Danish philosopher Søren Kierkegaard (1813–1855). According to him psychology is about the “multifarious” life, which is a term that pinpoints the challenges psychology still have when it comes to including changes and genetic perspectives on its understanding of actual living. Yet Kierkegaard discusses psychology in relationship to metaphysics, which is an almost forgotten perspective. His understanding opens up for narrowing the definition of psychology down to the science of subjectivity, which at the same time elevates psychology to being the only science that focuses on the actual human life. Yet Kierkegaard’s most important contribution to psychology is to maintain a radical distinction between subjectivity and objectivity, and in this respect the psychology of today is challenged.     

Should Psychology Ignore the Language of the Brain?

ABSTRACT— Claims that neuroscientific data do not contribute to our understanding of psychological functions have been made recently. Here I argue that these criticisms are solely based on an analysis of functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) studies. However, fMRI is only one of the methods in the toolkit of cognitive neuroscience. I provide examples from research on event-related brain potentials (ERPs) that have contributed to our understanding of the cognitive architecture of human language functions. In addition, I provide evidence of (possible) contributions from fMRI measurements to our understanding of the functional architecture of language processing. Finally, I argue that a neurobiology of human language that integrates information about the necessary genetic and neural infrastructures will allow us to answer certain questions that are not answerable if all we have is evidence from behavior.     

Ethics and Science: Is Plausibility in the Eye of the Beholder?

This paper argues that morality is objective in a specific sense that accords with a broadly expressivist stance in metaethics. The paper also explains that although there is a kind of subjectivity in moral inquiry, the same holds for other kinds of normative inquiry, including epistemic and even scientific inquiry, and moreover that this kind of subjectivity is no threat to morality’s objectivity. The argument for the objectivity of morality draws strong parallels between ethics, epistemology, and science, but does not depend on equally strong parallels between ethics and mathematics. I argue that there is more to learn from a comparison between ethics and mathematics than I used to think, but the difference between the issues that come up in thinking about objectivity in ethics and those that come up in thinking about objectivity in mathematics is substantial, and we cannot carry over results from the philosophy of mathematics to the case of morality.     

What is the Good Life? Positive Psychology and the Renaissance of Humanistic Psychology

Positive and humanistic psychology overlap in thematic content and theoretical presuppositions, yet positive psychology explicitly distances itself as a new movement, despite the fact that its literature implicitly references its extensive historical grounding within humanistic psychology. Consequently, humanistic psychologists both celebrate diffusion of humanistic ideas furthered by positive psychology, and resent its disavowal of the humanistic tradition. The undeniably close alignment of these two schools of thought is demonstrated in the embracing of eudaimonic, in contrast to hedonic, conceptions of happiness by positive psychology. Eudaimonic happiness cannot be purely value-free, nor can it be completely studied without using both nomethetic and idiographic (i.e., quantitative and qualitative) methods in addressing problems of value, which identifies positive psychology clearly as a humanistic approach, despite its protestations.     

Is Science Neurotic?

Neurosis can be interpreted as a methodological condition from which any aim-pursuing entity can suffer. If such an entity pursues a problematic aim B but represents to itself that it is pursuing a different aim C and, as a result, fails to solve the problems associated with B which, if solved, would lead to the pursuit of aim A, then the entity may be said to be "rationalistically neurotic." Natural science is neurotic in this sense insofar as its basic aim is represented as improving knowledge of factual truth as such (aim C), when actually the aim of science is to improve knowledge of explanatory truth (aim B). Science itself does not suffer significantly from this neurosis, but philosophy of science does. Much more serious is the rationalistic neurosis of the social sciences and academic inquiry more generally. freeing social science and academic inquiry from neurosis would have far-reaching beneficial, intellectual, institutional and cultural consequences.     

Is Consequential Luck Morally Inconsequential? Empirical Psychology and the Reassessment of Moral Luck

Philosophical discussions of the phenomenon that has come to be known as ‘moral luck’ have either dismissed it as illusory or touted it as the evidence for doubting the probative value of our commitment to certain widely avowed views concerning interpersonal assessments of responsibility. In this discussion, we present a third, distinctive interpretation of the moral luck phenomenon. Drawing upon empirically robust results from psychological studies of judgment bias, we argue that the phenomenon of moral luck is demonstrably not illusory. What we suggest, however, is that the phenomenon ought not to be taken to countenance doubts about the standards generally taken to be regulative of assessments of interpersonal responsibility. Rather, its significance lies in foregrounding certain generally unacknowledged obstacles we face in the process of conclusively applying general valid moral standards in making specific judgments of responsibility and desert.¹     

How Inclusive Is European Philosophy of Science?

The main question of this article is given by its title: how inclusive is European philosophy of science? Phrased in this way, the question presupposes that, as a mature discipline, philosophy of science should provide an inclusive account of its subject area. I first provide an explanation of the notion of an inclusive (in contrast to a restricted) philosophy of science. This notion of an inclusive philosophy of science is specified by discussing three general topics that seem to be missing from, or are quite marginal in, restricted philosophy of science. These topics are the philosophy of historical inquiry, the role of technology in science, and the socio-political and moral dimensions of science. On this basis, I address the question whether European philosophy of science qualifies as more inclusive as compared with Anglo-American philosophy of science.     

And the Winner is… Awards for the Integration of Science and Practice in Psychology

Psychotherapists from all fields perform difficult and challenging work, trying to help their clients gain insight into their problems and make lasting changes in their thoughts and behaviors. Unfortunately, too often the work of a psychotherapist is minimized, neglected, or disregarded. Where departmental or conference awards may be presented regularly, public recognition for evidence-based and clinically-relevant published work is lacking. The present paper aims to acknowledge the most valuable recent accomplishments in the field of mental health assessment and treatment. Nominations were accepted for works published during 2017, papers of enduring value, and most valuable psychologist, and votes were cast by a panel of judges. These valuable contributions are recommended for all psychotherapists who hope to improve their work with clients.     

Analytical Psychology and Science: Adversaries or Allies?

This article examines C. G. Jung's relationship to science as a paradigm and the relationship between the Jungian community and science. The impact of Jungian “isolation” in terms of academic dialogue, cross-theoretical influence, and absence from the public sphere is also discussed. The author examines how findings from science can enhance our functioning as analytic clinicians and improve our ability to communicate the wealth found in analytical psychology to a variety of audiences outside Jungian circles. Finally, research on analytic interaction and analytic theories of the mind/psyche is explored as well as general research that has implications for analytical psychology and psychoanalytic theory.     

Is the Effect of Behavioral Synchrony on Cooperative Behavior Mediated by Pain Threshold?

Synchronized behavior results in a variety of prosocial behaviors. Research has also implicated that interpersonal synchrony affects pain thresholds, inferred as indicative of endorphin levels. The current study was designed to see if these pain threshold effects mediated the effect of synchrony on interpersonal cooperation. Twenty six individuals were randomly assigned to complete a 30 minute run on a treadmill in either a synchronized or nonsynchronized condition. Pain threshold was measured both before and after exercise as an indicator of endorphin activity. A postrun social investment game measured interpersonal cooperation. Analyses showed that there was a significant direct relationship between condition and cooperation but that this effect was not mediated by pain threshold.