Illusion of control and behavioral control attempts in obsessive-compulsive disorder

The present research used the illusion-of-control paradigm to examine the relationships among obsessive-compulsive disorder (OCD) symptoms, behavioral control attempts, and illusory sense of control. Participants were presented with a preprogrammed sequence of aversive and neutral visual stimuli and were encouraged to attempt to control the sequence with keyboard presses. Participants rated their perceived level of control 3 times during the task. In addition, the authors used the repetitiveness of keyboard presses as a measure of rigid, compulsive-like behavior. In Study 1, this procedure was administered to a sample of 55 students who also completed measures of OCD and depression. In Study 2, the task was administered to 22 participants with OCD and 22 matched participants without OCD. In line with predictions, OCD symptoms were correlated with higher illusory sense of control and with more repetitive behavioral control attempts. The authors discuss the central role of control in OCD and specifically the relationships between need for control and compulsive rituals, which may be conceptualized as means for achieving an illusory sense of control over stressful life events.     

Illusion of control in Internet users and college students.

When people try to obtain a desired event and this outcome occurs independently of their behavior, they often think that they are controlling its occurrence. This is known as the illusion of control, and it is the basis for most superstitions and pseudosciences. However, most experiments demonstrating this effect had been conducted many years ago and almost always in the controlled environment of the psychology laboratory and with psychology students as subjects. Here, we explore the generality of this effect and show that it is still today a robust phenomenon that can be observed even in the context of a very simple computer program that users try to control (and believe that they are controlling) over the Internet. Understanding how robust and general this effect is, is a first step towards eradicating irrational and pseudoscientific thinking.     

Visual flow is interpreted relative to multisegment postural control

To control upright stance, the human nervous system must estimate the movements of multiple body segments based on multisensory information. To investigate how visual information contributes to such multisegmental estimation, participants were exposed to 3 types of visual-scene movement: translation in the anteroposterior direction, rotation about the ankle joint, and rotation about the hip joint. Trunk and leg responses were larger for rotational than for translational movements, but only at lower stimulus frequencies. Based on a feedback-control theoretical framework, these results indicated that visual inputs distinguish between translation and rotation of the head. Also, visual condition effects were similar for the leg and trunk segments, suggesting a control strategy with a single control signal that determines the activation of all muscles.     

Illusion of Transparency

It's generally agreed that, for a certain a class of cases, a rational subject cannot be wrong in treating two elements of thought as co-referential. Even anti-individualists like Tyler Burge agree that empirical error is impossible in such cases. I argue that this immunity to empirical error is illusory and sketch a new anti-individualist approach to concepts that doesn't require such immunity.     

Illusion of control: invulnerability to negative affect and depressive symptoms after laboratory and natural stressors.

We examined whether individual differences in susceptibility to the illusion of control predicted differential vulnerability to depressive responses after a laboratory failure and naturally occurring life stressors. The illusion of control decreased the likelihood that subjects (N = 145) would (a) show immediate negative mood reactions to the laboratory failure, (b) become discouraged after naturally occurring negative life events, and (c) experience increases in depressive symptoms a month later given the occurrence of a high number of negative life events. In addition, the stress-moderating effect of the illusion of control on later depressive symptoms appeared to be mediated in part by its effect on reducing the discouragement subjects experienced from the occurrence of negative life events. These findings provide support for the hopelessness theory of depression and for the optimistic illusion-mental health link.     

Illusion of confirmation from exposure to another's hypothesis

We examine the influence of exposure to an advisor's hypothesis, in the form of a point estimate of an uncertain quantity, on subsequent point estimates and confidence judgments made by advisees. In three experiments, a group of unexposed advisees produced their own estimates before being presented with that of the advisor, while a group of exposed advisees were presented with the advisor's estimate before making their own. Not surprisingly, exposed advisees deliberately incorporated the information conveyed by the advisor's estimate in producing their own estimates. But the exposure manipulation also had a contaminating influence that shifted what the advisees viewed as their own, independent estimates toward those of the advisor. Seemingly unaware of this influence, exposed advisees were subject to an illusion of confirmation in which they expressed greater confidence in the accuracy of the advisor's estimate than did unexposed advisees. Copyright © 2006 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

闪光滞后效应的机制：时间错觉与空间错觉

闪光滞后效应（flash—lag effect,FLE）是指在与某运动物体相同的位置上呈现的闪光（flash）知觉上滞后于该运动物体的视错觉。本文简要介绍了有关闪光滞后效应机制的理论模型。笔者认为,目前各种理论的争议可归结为时间错觉假说与空间错觉假说之争,并在此基础上就今后进一步研究的方向提出了建议。     

Freud's Illusion: New Approaches to Intractable Issues

In his later theological work The Future of an Illusion, Freud (1927/1961) makes provocative suggestions about the psychological significance of religious ideas. Freud begins by analyzing their meaning in the lives of particular individuals. He then extrapolates to a critique of their effect on human civilization. Religion originally evolved in order to explain difficult concepts such as death and fate. It quickly outgrew its purely theological dimensions and became a social regulator by coercing compliance with a set of cultural norms.

The purpose of this article is not to evaluate whether Freud was right, that is, if religion in fact is an illusion. Rather, using concepts derived from current work in analytical theology, it examines the internal logic of Freud's analysis and some of the assumptions he made to reach this conclusion. Despite his theoretical insights, much of Freud's reasoning is invalid and many of his premises are questionable. Freud adopts assertions without explaining them and does not offer much in the way of deductive or inferential support for his argument. This article advocates an epistemological approach to understanding Freud's use of terms such as “wishes” and “illusions.” Adopting this perspective uncovers tacit presuppositions underlying his theory about the origins of religious belief and its relationship to culture and society, and clarifies the conceptual links holding it together.     

消费活动中品牌错觉产生和错觉类型的年龄特征的试验研究

本研究通过实验得出以下结论：(1)记忆错觉与消费者的年龄有关,老年组的错误率最高,青年组的错误率最低;(2)记忆错觉类型与年龄有关,老年组在英文和色彩项目上错误率最高,少儿在英文和汉字项目上错误最高,而对形状和色彩相对要敏感,青年组比较平均,是错误率最低的一组被试：(3)消费者记忆错觉的产生与消费者具体的消费实践有关,接触少的品牌产生错觉的概率高,接触得比较多的品牌错觉率相对要低。     

On luck and chance: Need for control as a mediator of the attribution of events to luck

Chance and luck are regarded as two distinct causal agents that effect different results. Whereas chance is deemed utterly uncontrollable, luck elicits, at the very least, an illusion of control. Hence, need for control might be a decisive factor in determining whether an event is attributed to chance or to luck. More specifically, the greater is a person's need for control, the stronger would be that person's tendency to attribute events to luck. This proposition, along with its implications concerning effects of luck attributions on decision making, were tested in three experiments. The results showed that situational circumstances and personality dispositions that heighten individuals' need for control strengthen their tendency to attribute events and outcomes to luck. The results showed, further, that such attributions can affect the process of decision making.     

The Illusion of Exclusivity

It is widely held that when you are deliberating about whether to believe some proposition p, only considerations relevant to the truth of p can be taken into account as reasons bearing on whether to believe p and motivate you accordingly. This thesis of exclusivity has significance for debates about the nature of belief, about control of belief, and about certain forms of evidentialism. In this paper I distinguish a strong and a weak version of exclusivity. I provide reason to think that strong exclusivity is an illusion and that weak exclusivity may also be an illusion. I describe a number of cases in which exclusivity seems not to hold, and I show how an illusion of exclusivity may be generated by a rather different feature of doxastic deliberation, which I call demandingness.     

Varieties of Pictorial Illusion

This article focuses on a potentially perplexing aspect of our interactions with pictorial representations (including film, paintings, pictures, drawings, photographs, even video games): in some cases, it seems that visual representations can play tricks on our cognitive faculties. We may either come to believe that objects represented in pictures are real or perhaps perceive them as such. The possibility of widespread pictorial illusions has been oft discussed, and discarded, in the aesthetics literature. I support this stance. However, the nature of the illusion is more complicated than is usually considered. I argue that there are five different types of potential illusions and present reasons for rejecting each. I also explore in detail the most persistent illusion: the “object recognition perceptual illusion thesis,” which states that we undergo a perceptual illusion while viewing pictorial representations simply in virtue of seeing objects in the representation. I contend that a rejection of this thesis depends on the nature of perceptual content, an issue with far‐reaching consequences in aesthetics.     

Preschool children's control of action outcomes

Naturalistic goal‐directed behaviours require the engagement and maintenance of appropriate levels of cognitive control over relatively extended intervals of time. In two experiments, we examined preschool children's abilities to maintain top‐down control throughout the course of a sequential task. Both 3‐ and 5‐year‐olds demonstrated good abilities to access goals at the lowest level of the representational hierarchy. However, only 5‐year‐olds consistently aligned their response choices with goals at superordinate levels. These findings suggest that the ability to maintain top‐down control and adjust behavioural responses according to goals at multiple levels of abstraction undergoes a marked improvement throughout the preschool period. Results are discussed in relation to current accounts of cognitive control and the monitoring of conflict in sequential action.     

Dimensions of control and project-work outcomes

Two questionnaires exploring dimensions of control were administered to 463 Open University students involved in courses containing an element of either structured or unstructured project work. The questionnaires were Rotter's Locus-of-Control Form and Parlett's Syllabus-Orientation Form. Correlations were examined between these scores, the student's attitudes toward project work, and academic outcomes from their courses (scores for project work and scores for non-project work). Locus of Control was found not to correlate with outcomes, but Syllabus Orientation was found to correlate with attitude toward project work. Locus of Control and Syllabus Orientation were not correlated, suggesting that each construct corresponds to different dimensions of control.