On Knowing Our Own Minds

Book reviewed in this article:
Crispin Wright, Barry C. Smith and Cynthia Macdonald, Knowing Our Own Minds     

Finding Happiness for Ourselves and Our Clients

D. G. Myers (2000) examined the contributing factors of happiness: money, relationships, and religion. The implications of these factors for counseling are discussed with specific recommendations made for counselors regarding their own self‐care and their work with their clients.     

Knowing and Not‐Knowing For Your Own Good: The Limits of Epistemic Paternalism

Epistemic paternalism is the thesis that a paternalistic interference with an individual's inquiry is justified when it is likely to bring about an epistemic improvement in her. In this article I claim that in order to motivate epistemic paternalism we must first account for the value of epistemic improvements. I propose that the epistemic paternalist has two options: either epistemic improvements are valuable because they contribute to wellbeing, or they are epistemically valuable. I will argue that these options constitute the foundations of a dilemma: either epistemic paternalism collapses into general paternalism, or a distinctive project of justified epistemic paternalism is implausible.     

Learning to Live in the Anthropocene: Our Children and Ourselves

This essay responds to recent philosophical interest in the Anthropocene by asking (Trachtenberg in Inhabiting the Anthropocene: how we live changes everything, 2016): Can and should educators adopt, form, transmit, teach ways of living to maintain, if not enhance Earth’s habitability, especially its habitability for diverse children? This inquiry therefore calls for conceptual study of learning to live through the Anthropocene—with, despite, after, before, amid, among, away from, and against its myriad harms, possible and actual, especially its harms to children. Examining cases of environmental racism in Checker’s Polluted Promises (2005), and other cases of environmental threats to children’s health, in Steingraber’s Raising Elijah (2011), this study begins by proposing the ecological gap in philosophy of education consequential for children resides within another epistemological gap, variously designated gender gap, love gap, care gap (Martin in The schoolhome: rethinking schools for changing families. Harvard University Press, Cambridge, 1992; Education reconfigured: culture, encounter, and change. Routledge, New York, 2011; Warren in Ecofeminist philosophy: a Western persepctive on what it is and why it matters. Rowman & Littlefield, Lanham, 2000). Ruddick’s maternal thinking (1984, 1988) provides a conceptual frame for theorizing three moral aims of learning to live in the Anthropocene that might inform public schooling.     

Transformative Aspects of Our Own Analyses and Their Resonance in Our Work With Our Patients

As psychoanalysts, our own relational stories, our “wounds that must serve as tools” (Harris, 2009 Harris, A. April 2009. “Keynote address at the meeting of the Division of Psychoanalysis, American Psychological Association, Toronto, Canada.”. In You must remember this April,  [Google Scholar]), represent both our greatest liabilities and potential for change, at times facilitating and at times impeding our capacity to engage deeply in the analytic process. Transformative aspects of our personal analysis dwell, often unconsciously or preconsciously, in the analyst, generating unanticipated opportunities in our work with our patients. In this paper, the author describes how a profound piece of work in her own analysis around healing in her relationship with her young son resonated in her work with a long-term patient, enlivening and deepening the treatment. The author explores how she drew on the interpenetrating experiences of analyst, patient, mother, and child, helping her to deconstruct a complex enactment with her patient, and opening up potential space. In the process, her patient discovered new places within herself, which enabled her to reach out to her vulnerable teenage son in new and reparative ways.     

Confronting Our Own Hypocrisy: Being a Model for Our Students and Clients

Counselor educators, supervisors, and practitioners sometimes act in ways that contradict the most significant beliefs and values that they espouse. Despite communicating to students and trainees the importance of being caring, respectful, warm, flexible, honest, and personally competent, we are sometimes found to be operating quite differently. Issues related to the counselor educator, supervisor, and practitioner's narcissism, self-indulgence, abuses of power, illusions of omnipotence, prejudices, and unresolved issues are discussed. A case is strongly presented that we would all be a lot more effective if we worked to confront our hypocrisies and practice more what we preach.     

Activating and Enlivening Ourselves and Our Patients: Commentary on Paper by Susan H. Sands

In my response to Sands's paper I offer comments on four aspects of clinical work with dissociation: the sensory power of language, the evocation of the analyst's own dissociated experience and internal growth, the question of the relationship between dissociation and unconscious experience, and the different responses evoked by patients who are at different points on the path toward association.     

“知道自己知道”与“知道自己不知道”——一项有关知道感（FOK）的脑成像研究

采用事件相关功能性磁共振成像技术（event-related fMRI）以及在FOK（feeling-of-knowing）研究中常用的“线索回忆-FOK判断-再认测验”（Recall-Judgment-Recognition,RJR）程序,以汉字词对为识记材料,研究了FOK判断中的大脑活动区域。根据FOK判断的正负以及其后的再认测验的对错,实验将FOK判断的项目分为四类：PP项目（正性FOK判断,正确再认）,NN（负性FOK判断,错误再认）,NP（负性FOK判断,正确再认）以及PN（正性FOK判断,错误再认）。脑成像的分析结果显示：准确的FOK预测（即PP与NN项目）与不准确的FOK预测（即NP与NP项目）在脑活动上没有显著的差异。而进一步分析表明,这种“无差异”的现象可能是由于PP项目与NN项目激活了不同的脑活动模式所造成的。具体地讲,相对于NN项目而言,PP项目伴随有明显的左侧前额叶（BA 8区）的活动。这一观察提示我们：知道感（PP）与不知道感（NN）可能是由不同的脑神经网络所支持、并通过不同的认知过程来实现的。     

Nathan Söderblom and Our Own Time1

In 1914 Professor Nathan Söderblom was elected archbishop of the Church of Sweden. His consecration took place in Uppsala Cathedral just months after the beginning of World War I. In 1925, he convened an ecumenical meeting in Stockholm that came to shape the ecumenical movement for decades to come. The peace question remained at the heart of his episcopate as long as it lasted. In this article, Antje Jackelén and Jakob Wirén explore some of the additional challenges that lay before Nathan Söderblom. Even today, there are lessons to be learned from the way Söderblom responded to issues such as questioning the relevance of the church, the need for dialogue between science and theology, the urgency of ecumenical cooperation, and the risks of nationalism.     

Locke on Land and Labor

Philosophical Studies -     

Explaining Our Own Beliefs: Non-epistemic Believing and Doxastic Instability

It has often been claimed that ourbelieving some proposition is dependent uponour not being committed to a non-epistemicexplanation of why we believe that proposition.Very roughly, I cannot believe that p andalso accept a non-epistemic explanation of mybelieving that p. Those who have assertedsuch a claim have drawn from it a range ofimplications: doxastic involuntarism, theunacceptability of Humean naturalism, doxasticfreedom, restrictions upon the effectiveness ofpractical (Pascalian) arguments, as well asothers. If any of these implications are right,then we would do well to have a precisestatement of the nature of this phenomenoncentral to first-person doxastic explanations,as well as of our reasons for believing that itholds. Both of these are lacking in theliterature. This paper is an attempt toelucidate and defend this claim.     

Measuring Feeling of Knowing: Comment on Schraw (1995)

Schraw compares two coefficients for the 2×2 contingency tables resulting from many feeling of knowing (FOK) studies: Hamann's coefficient and Goodman and Kruskal's γ. He favours Hamann's coefficient and gives examples where Hamann's coefficient produces what might be considered the more intuitive result. Further scrutiny reveals that these examples are not as convincing as Schraw makes them out to be. Because Hamann's coefficient depends on the row and column marginals, it does not map onto FOK ability as well as Goodman and Kruskal's γ, which is a direct measure of the diagnostic worth of FOK ratings.     

Locke and Leibniz on Religious Faith

In the Essay Concerning Human Understanding, Locke maintains that ‘Reason must be our last Judge and Guide in every Thing,’ including matters of religious faith, and this commitment to the primacy of reason is not abandoned in his later religious writings. This essay argues that with regard to the relation between reason and religious faith, Locke is primarily concerned not with evidence, but with consistency, meaning, and how human beings ought to respond to their inclinations, including their inclinations to believe. Leibniz, on the other hand, stakes out an alternative conception of the relationship between faith and reason that assigns to faith the role of a primary truth. For Leibniz, some religious propositions can be believed immediately and without an additional examination and evaluation by reason. The essay maintains that the differences between the two regarding faith and reason are tied to a broader disagreement about how much of the human understanding is due, in Locke's words, to ‘Labour, Attention and Industry’.