Comprehension and belief structure

Abstract.— A reader's belief structure is suggested to affect the way he processes incoming information. It is analyzed in terms of what propositions the reader regards as true (the truth values) and of how the reader discriminates between propositions as to truth value (the discrimination index). In a study on 20 psychology students, the comprehension task involved matching single statements to a previously read text. The statements represented two different ideas, whereas the text represented only one. The subjects' belief structure in terms of statements accepted (truth value) and statements discriminated as to truth value (discrimination index) was related to the way in which they matched the same Statements to the previously read text (comprehension). Truth values and discrimination indices together were found to account for 39% of the interindividual variation in comprehension after the first reading and for 50 % of that variation after the second reading. It is suggested that a reader, when confronted with a new text, arrives at the most probable interpretation of that text by turning to his own belief structure.     

How does background information improve memory for text content?

In two experiments, we investigated whether reading background information benefits memory for text content by influencing the amount of content encoded or the organization of the encoded content. In Experiment 1, half of the participants read background information about the issues to be discussed in the text material, whereas half did not. All the participants were then tested for free recall and cued recall of text content. Free recall was greater for individuals who read issue information than for those who did not. The groups did not differ on cued recall, suggesting that background information did not facilitate the encoding of more text content. Measures of representational organization indicated that increased recall in the issue information group resulted from better organization of content in memory. Experiment 2 extended these findings, using background information about text sources, demonstrated that the efficacy of background information depends on the semantic relationship between that information and text content.     

Mistaking randomness for free will

Belief in free will is widespread. The present research considered one reason why people may believe that actions are freely chosen rather than determined: they attribute randomness in behavior to free will. Experiment 1 found that participants who were prompted to perform a random sequence of actions experienced their behavior as more freely chosen than those who were prompted to perform a deterministic sequence. Likewise, Experiment 2 found that, all else equal, the behavior of animated agents was perceived to be more freely chosen if it consisted of a random sequence of actions than if it consisted of a deterministic sequence; this was true even when the degree of randomness in agents’ behavior was largely a product of their environments. Together, these findings suggest that randomness in behavior—one’s own or another’s—can be mistaken for free will.     

Cheating more for less: Upward social comparisons motivate the poorly compensated to cheat

Intuitively, people should cheat more when cheating is more lucrative, but we find that the effect of performance-based pay-rates on dishonesty depends on how readily people can compare their pay-rate to that of others. In Experiment 1, participants were paid 5 cents or 25 cents per self-reported point in a trivia task, and half were aware that they could have received the alternative pay-rate. Lower pay-rates increased cheating when the prospect of a higher pay-rate was salient. Experiment 2 illustrates that this effect is driven by the ease with which poorly compensated participants can compare their pay to that of others who earn a higher pay-rate. Our results suggest that low pay-rates are, in and of themselves, unlikely to promote dishonesty. Instead, it is the salience of upward social comparisons that encourages the poorly compensated to cheat.     

Sweeping dishonesty under the rug: how unethical actions lead to forgetting of moral rules

Dishonest behavior can have various psychological outcomes. We examine whether one consequence could be the forgetting of moral rules. In 4 experiments, participants were given the opportunity to behave dishonestly, and thus earn undeserved money, by over-reporting their performance on an ability-based task. Before the task, they were exposed to moral rules (i.e., an honor code). Those who cheated were more likely to forget the moral rules after behaving dishonestly, even though they were equally likely to remember morally irrelevant information (Experiment 1). Furthermore, people showed moral forgetting only after cheating could be enacted but not before cheating (Experiment 2), despite monetary incentives to recall the rules accurately (Experiment 3). Finally, moral forgetting appears to result from decreased access to moral rules after cheating (Experiment 4).     

Habitual reading biases in the allocation of study time

Item order can bias learners’ study decisions and undermine the use of more effective allocation strategies, such as allocating study time to items in one’s region of proximal learning. In two experiments, we evaluated whether the influence of item order on study decisions reflects habitual responding based on a reading bias. We manipulated the order in which relatively easy, moderately difficult, and difficult items were presented from left to right on a computer screen and examined selection preference as a function of item order and item difficulty. Experiment 1a was conducted with native Arabic readers and in Arabic, and Experiment 1b was conducted with native English readers and in English. Students from both cultures prioritized items for study in the reading order of their native language: Arabic readers selected items for study in a right-to-left fashion, whereas English readers largely selected items from left to right. In Experiment 2, native English readers completed the same task as participants in Experiment 1b, but for some participants, lines of text were rotated upside down to encourage them to read from right to left. Participants who read upside-down text were more likely to first select items on the right side of an array than were participants who studied right-side-up text. These results indicate that reading habits can bias learners’ study decisions and can undermine agenda-based regulation.     

Exposure to moral relativism compromises moral behavior

Across two studies we investigated the relationship between moral relativism versus absolutism and moral behavior. In Experiment 1, we found that participants who read a relativist argument for tolerating female genital mutilation were more likely to cheat to win an incentivized raffle than participants who read an absolutist argument against female genital mutilation, or those in a control condition. In Experiment 2, participants who read a definition of morality phrased in absolutist terms expressed less willingness to engage in petty theft than those who read a definition of morality phrased in relativist terms, or those in a control condition. Experiment 2 also provided evidence that effects were not due to absolutist arguments signaling that fewer behaviors are morally permissible, nor to relativist arguments defending more disagreeable moral positions. Rather, the content of the philosophical positions themselves—the fact that relativism describes morality as subjective and culturally-historically contingent, whereas absolutism describes morality as objective and universal—makes individuals more likely to engage in immoral behaviors when exposed to moral relativism compared to moral absolutism.     

The impact of moral theories on cheating

This research series began as a test of an emotion-attribution approach to moral behavior. However, in the early studies, college students who read about morality were subsequently more likely to cheat on a vocabulary test than were control subjects who read materials irrelevant to morality. We hypothesized that resentment toward the test constructors interacted with the moral schemas activated by the reading task. To reduce resentment, in Study III the vocabulary test was presented as the experimenter's doctoral research. As predicted, compared to controls, those subjects who read about morality cheated less. Study IV was a quasi-experiment that confirmed the hypothesized resentment differences between Study III and the earlier studies. In Study V, while two groups read about morality, one group read an internal emotion-attribution passage and the other read an external version; less cheating was observed in the internal condition than in the external or control conditions. The results indicate that even when moral schemas are elicited under conditions favoring moral behavior, those schemas will lead to reduced cheating most effectively under conditions in which subjects attribute their emotional arousal to their own behavior rather than to external causes. Issues of moral schema activation and emotion-attribution in moral behavior are discussed.     

Is manipulation of mood a critical component of cognitive bias modification procedures?

This paper investigates whether changes in mood state are an important component of cognitive bias modification (CBM) procedures. In a novel CBM procedure participants read either positive or negative statements relating to social issues for 5 min. Interpretation bias was measured by means of a scrambled sentence test, which was presented both before and after the CBM procedure. Participants who read the positive statements made more positive resolutions to the scrambled sentences, while participants who read the negative statements made more negative resolutions. Thus, the appropriate positive and negative interpretative biases were induced by the CBM procedure. However, significant mood changes also occurred following CBM. In Experiment 2, a musical mood induction procedure was presented with depressing or elating music. As before, a scrambled sentence test was presented both before and after the musical mood induction. Mood changed in accordance with the valence of the music to the same extent as with CBM. Critically however, performance on the scrambled sentence task did not change for both groups. This demonstrates that a change in mood state is not sufficient for a change in cognitive bias to occur.     

Metacomprehension judgements reflect the belief that diagrams improve learning from text

In two experiments we systematically explored whether people consider the format of text materials when judging their text learning, and whether doing so might inappropriately bias their judgements. Participants studied either text with diagrams (multimedia) or text alone and made both per-paragraph judgements and global judgements of their text learning. In Experiment 1 they judged their learning to be better for text with diagrams than for text alone. In that study, however, test performance was greater for multimedia, so the judgements may reflect either a belief in the power of multimedia or on-line processing. Experiment 2 replicated this finding and also included a third group that read texts with pictures that did not improve text performance. Judgements made by this group were just as high as those made by participants who received the effective multimedia format. These results confirm the hypothesis that people's metacomprehension judgements can be influenced by their beliefs about text format. Over-reliance on this multimedia heuristic, however, might reduce judgement accuracy in situations where it is invalid.     

Feeling the past: The absence of experimental evidence for anomalous retroactive influences on text processing

In two self-paced reading experiments, we investigated the hypothesis that information moves backward in time to influence prior behaviors (Bem Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 100:407?C425, 2011a). In two of Bem??s experiments, words were presented after target pictures in a pleasantness judgment task. In a condition in which the words were consistent with the emotional valence of the picture, reaction times to the pictures were significantly shorter , as compared with a condition in which the words were inconsistent with the emotional valence of the picture. Bem Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 100:407?C425, (2011a) interpreted these results as showing a ??retroactive priming?? effect resulting from precognition. To test the precognition hypothesis, we adapted a standard repetition priming paradigm from psycholinguistics. In the experiments, participants read a set of texts. In one condition, the participants read the same text twice. In other conditions, participants read two different texts. The precognition hypothesis predicts that readers who encounter the same text twice will experience reductions in processing load during their first encounter with the text. Hence, these readers' average reading times should be shorter than those of readers who encounter the target text only once. Our results indicated that readers processed the target text faster the second time they read it. Also, their reading times decreased as their experience with the self-paced reading procedure increased. However, participants read the target text equally quickly during their initial encounter with the text, whether or not the text was subsequently repeated. Thus, the experiments demonstrated normal repetition priming and practice effects but offered no evidence for retroactive influences on text processing.     

What I Was Doing Versus What I Did: Verb Aspect Influences Memory and Future Actions

ABSTRACT— This research examined whether describing past actions as ongoing using the imperfective aspect (rather than describing them as completed using the perfective aspect) promotes memory for action-relevant knowledge and reenactment of these actions in a future context. In Experiment 1 , participants who used the imperfective aspect to describe their strategy on a prior interpersonal task were more likely to use this strategy on a later task than were participants who used the perfective aspect to describe their prior strategy. Experiment 2 demonstrated that describing behaviors on a task using the imperfective rather than the perfective aspect increased willingness to resume that task by improving memory for task contents. The last two experiments showed that the effects of the imperfective aspect on memory decayed over time and that the imperfective aspect facilitated performance of a future behavior only when the described past behavior was relevant to the future behavior. Thus, the effects of aspect are moderated by memory decay and are behavior-specific.     

The accidental transgressor: morally-relevant theory of mind

To test young children’s false belief theory of mind in a morally relevant context, two experiments were conducted. In Experiment 1, children (N = 162) at 3.5, 5.5, and 7.5 years of age were administered three tasks: prototypic moral transgression task, false belief theory of mind task (ToM), and an “accidental transgressor” task, which measured a morally-relevant false belief theory of mind (MoToM). Children who did not pass false belief ToM were more likely to attribute negative intentions to an accidental transgressor than children who passed false belief ToM, and to use moral reasons when blaming the accidental transgressor. In Experiment 2, children (N = 46) who did not pass false belief ToM viewed it as more acceptable to punish the accidental transgressor than did participants who passed false belief ToM. Findings are discussed in light of research on the emergence of moral judgment and theory of mind.     

Outsourcing self-regulation

Three studies demonstrate a novel phenomenon--self-regulatory outsourcing--in which thinking about how other people can be instrumental (i.e., helpful) for a given goal undermines motivation to expend effort on that goal. In Experiment 1, participants who thought about how their partner helped them with health goals (as opposed to career goals) planned to spend less time and effort on health goals in the upcoming week. This pattern was stronger for depleted participants than for nondepleted participants. In Experiment 2, participants who thought about how their partner helped them with academic-achievement goals procrastinated more, leaving themselves less time for an academic task, than did participants in two control conditions. This pattern was stronger for participants who were told that procrastinating would drain their resources for the academic task than for participants who were told that procrastinating would not drain their resources for that task. In Experiment 3, participants who decreased their effort after thinking of an instrumental significant other reported higher relationship commitment to that individual than did participants who did not decrease their effort. The possibility for shared (or transactive) self-regulation is discussed.     

Individual differences in motivated social cognition: the case of self-serving information processing

Three experiments examined the hypothesis that people show consistency in motivated social cognitive processing across self-serving domains. Consistent with this hypothesis, Experiment 1 revealed that people who rated a task at which they succeeded as more important than a task at which they failed also cheated on a series of math problems, but only when they could rationalize their cheating as unintentional. Experiment 2 replicated this finding and demonstrated that a self-report measure of self-deception did not predict this rationalized cheating. Experiment 3 replicated Experiments 1 and 2 and ruled out several alternative explanations. These experiments suggest that people who show motivated processing in ego-protective domains also show motivated processing in extrinsic domains. These experiments also introduce a new measurement procedure for differentiating between intentional versus rationalized cheating.     

Truthiness and law: Nonprobative photos bias perceived credibility in forensic contexts

Nonprobative but related photos can increase the perceived truth value of statements relative to when no photo is presented (truthiness). In two experiments, we tested whether truthiness generalizes to credibility judgments in a forensic context. Participants read short vignettes in which a witness viewed an offence. The vignettes were presented with or without a nonprobative, but related photo. In both experiments, participants gave higher witness credibility ratings to photo-present vignettes compared to photo-absent vignettes. In Experiment 2, half the vignettes included additional nonprobative information in the form of text. We replicated the photo presence effect in Experiment 2, but the nonprobative text did not significantly alter witness credibility. The results suggest that nonprobative photos can increase the perceived credibility of witnesses in legal contexts.     

Effects of Advance Questions on Reading Comprehension

Based on research on working memory and on advance organizers, the author hypothesized that advance information could have a negative effect on reading comprehension. College students read two expository passages and then responded to multiple-choice comprehension questions. In Experiment 1, advance information in the form of stems of multiple-choice comprehension questions was provided to participants in one condition, whereas participants in a control condition received no advance information. Participants who had received information about comprehension questions in advance of reading the text did not perform better in answering comprehension questions than those who did not receive advance information. In Experiment 2, readers were allowed to refer back to the text after encountering the comprehension questions. Those who received advance information on the questions made more errors than participants who did not receive advance information.     

The Illusion-of-Transparency and Episodic Memory: Are People Egocentric or Do People Think that Lies are Easy to Detect?

The illusion-of-transparency seems like an egocentric bias, in which people believe that their inner feelings, thoughts and perspectives are more apparent to others than they actually are. In Experiment 1, participants read out true and false episodic memories to an audience. Participants over-estimated the number of people who would think that they were the liar, and they overestimated how many would correctly identify the liar. Experiment 2 found that with lessened task demands, and by using a scale of doubt, participants distinguished lies from truthful statements (albeit with a degree of error). Over the two experiments, results indicated that people have some ability to distinguish lies from truth (in illusion-of-transparency tasks), although people often overestimate this ability, and participants sometimes think their own lies are easier to detect than is really the case.