Moore's Proof And Martin Davies's Epistemic Projects

In the recent literature on Moore's Proof of an external world, it has emerged that different diagnoses of the argument's failure are prima facie defensible. As a result, there is a sense that the appropriateness of the different verdicts on it may depend on variation in the kinds of context in which the argument is taken to be a move, with different characteristic aims. In this spirit, Martin Davies has recently explored the use of the argument within two different epistemic projects called respectively ‘deciding what to believe’ and ‘settling the question’. Depending on which project is in hand, according to Davies, the diagnoses of its failure—if indeed it fails—will differ. I believe that, by introducing the idea that the effectiveness of a valid argument may be epistemic project-relative, Davies has pointed the way to an important reorientation of the debates about Moore's Proof. But I wish to take issue with much of the detail of his proposals. I argue that Davies's characterization of his two projects is misleading (§1), and his account of their distinction defective (§2). I then canvass some suggestions about how it may be improved upon and about how further relevant kinds of epistemic projects in which Moore's argument may be taken to be a move can be characterized, bringing out how each of these projects impinges differently on the issue of the Proof's failure and of its diagnosis (§§3 and 4). In conclusion (§5) I offer an overview of the resulting terrain.     

On the Advantages and Disadvantages of Reading Heidegger Backwards: White's Time and Death ∗

In Time and Death: Heidegger's Analysis of Finitude, Carol White pursues a strange hermeneutic strategy, reading Heidegger backwards by reading the central ideas of his later work back into his early magnum opus, Being and Time. White follows some of Heidegger's own later directives in pursuing this hermeneutic strategy, and this paper critically explores these directives along with the original reading that emerges from following them. The conclusion reached is that White's creative book is not persuasive as a strict interpretation of Heidegger's early work, but remains extremely helpful for deepening our appreciation of Heidegger's thought as a whole. Most importantly, White helps us to understand the pivotal role that thinking about death played in the lifelong development of Heidegger's philosophy.     

‘Pain Always Asks for a Cause’: Nietzsche and Explanation

Those who have emphasised Nietzsche's naturalism have often claimed that he emulates natural scientific methods by offering causal explanations of psychological, social, and moral phenomena. In order to render Nietzsche's method consistent with his methodology, such readers of Nietzsche have also claimed that his objections to the use of causal explanations are based on a limited scepticism concerning the veracity of causal explanations. My contention is that proponents of this reading are wrong about both Nietzsche's methodology and his method. I argue for this by: first, showing that Nietzsche was suspicious of causal explanations not only on sceptical grounds but also for reasons provided by his psychological analysis of our tendency to look for causes; and second, arguing for a non‐causal interpretation of Nietzsche's approach to psychological explanation.     

The purpose of analysis in Moore's principia Ethica

After distinguishing two senses of ‘analysis’, the author claims that the purpose of Moore's analytical (meta‐ethical) program in Principia Ethica was to serve as an indispensable tool for avoiding false judgments in substantial ethics and for establishing true ones. It is shown that Moore's analyses and assumptions are not normatively neutral in that, (1) he disagreed with other philosophers about the extension (as well as the intension) of moral terms, (2) he disagreed in extension with ‘common‐sense’ morality. Finally, an attempt is made to show that Moore's moral methodology, in which his analytical distinctions play the crucial part, is meant to be of practical value for everybody in their moral decisions.     

‘Psychosomatic families’: Henry B. Richardson remembered*

Henry B. Richardson's work is reassessed. It is argued that he demonstrated an understanding of the role of family factors in the etiology and perpetuation of psychosomatic disorders which was well ahead of his time. On the other hand, his contribution has largely been ignored by contemporary family theorists. This paper is an attempt to rectify that oversight.     

A puzzling misinterpretation of the Asch ‘conformity’ study

In this article, we examine the interpretations by social psychologists of Asch's widely cited study of independence and conformity. Though it has become known as the ‘Asch Conformity Study’, Asch equally, if not more, intended and interpreted it as demonstrating the powers of independence. The evidence for this analysis consists of 99 accounts in social psychology textbooks published between 1953, following the appearance of his study, and 1984. We asked whether these accounts were accurate, or whether, as we suspected, they minimized the role of independence and exaggerated that of conformity. We found that authors have often distorted Asch's findings, and that this trend has increased substantially with time: they have increasingly accentuated the role of conformity and underestimated that of independence. We suggest several reasons for this distortion. For one, there has been insufficient care in reading the findings and drawing conclusions. Second, authors have generally limited themselves to reports of quantitative results. Although these were strong and beyond question, authors have usually neglected the intimately connected qualitative findings, which would have discouraged the misinterpretations. Third, the study of Asch was an integral part of his perspective on social psychology, which authors again ignored, thus encouraging a limited and out-of-context view of his study. We conclude with a thematic presentation of Asch's general theoretical framework, showing how it bears on independence and conformity.     

III. Morals,Moore, and Maclntyre

Maclntyre's claim that contemporary moral language is, by traditional standards, merely chaotic somewhat exaggerates our chaos, and traditional order. He accuses. Moore and his disciples in particular of using moral language merely as propaganda, failing, like other critics, to reckon with the Platonic context of Moore's argument and the reasons why Goodness is an idea that rational inquiry should not abandon. Genuine moral action is done as the right thing, that produces more that is good than any alternative. Plato's model of the threefold structure of human motivation, and his image of the cave, locates moral action at a higher level than action from desire or social prejudice. We discover our real selves, distinct from our physical and social natures, in seeing what Goodness requires. This neo‐Platonism is a better bet than Maclntyre allows, and an answer to the barbarian puppeteers he rightly condemns.     

SONYA & RASKÓLNIKOV – TOWARDS AN UNDERSTANDING OF THE ORIGIN OF BARTH'S DOCTRINE OF SIN AND GRACE1

This paper examines the origin of Barth's understanding of sin and grace in his reading of Dostoevsky in 1915. It is essentially the theological portrait of Sonya & Raskólnikov (Crime & Punishment) that regrounds Barth's understanding of sin and grace in an orthodox forensic model, which in turn develops into the mature doctrine we see in Die Kirchliche Dogmatik IV. The young Barth is exposed to many influences in his move away from nineteenth‐century neo‐Protestant liberal theology (characterized by a sociological‐humanistic model of sin). Mediated by his theological colleague Eduard Thurneysen, Dostoevsky is one such influence amongst many. Barth's reading has a profound effect on him: sin becomes defined by and in relation to God –eritis sicut deus. This sublapsarian perspective can then be discerned in his seminal paper ‘Die Gerechtigkeit Gottes’, delivered within months of his reading of Crime & Punishment, particularly in the Dostoevsky motif of the Tower of Babel (this reading occurs five to seven years prior to the generally accepted period of the influence of Dostoevsky). Barth's understanding then develops through his study of Romans (Der Römerbrief ) and by rediscovering a traditional approach in the Reformed Confessions in the 1920s; however, it is his reading of Crime and Punishment that initiates this model of sin and grace.     

What is Radical Behaviorism? A Review of Jay Moore's Conceptual Foundations of Radical Behaviorism

B. F. Skinner founded both radical behaviorism and behavior analysis. His founding innovations included: a versatile preparation for studying behavior; explicating the generic nature of stimulus and response; a pragmatic criterion for defining behavioral units; response rate as a datum; the concept of stimulus control; the concept of verbal behavior; and explicating the explanatory power of contingencies. Besides these achievements, however, Skinner also made some mistakes. Subsequent developments in radical behaviorist thought have attempted to remedy these mistakes. Moore's book presents a “party line” version of radical behaviorism. It focuses narrowly on a few of Skinner's concepts (mostly mentalism and verbal behavior) and contains no criticism of his mistakes. In fact, Moore adds a few mistakes of his own manufacture; for example, he insists that the mental realm does not exist—an unprovable and distracting assertion. The book's portrayal of behavior analysis would have been current around 1960; it mentions almost none of the developments since then. It also includes almost no developments in radical behaviorism since Skinner. Moore's book would give an unwary reader a highly distorted picture of contemporary behavior analysis and radical behaviorism.     

Constructing the truth From ‘Confusion of tongues’ to ‘Constructions in analysis’1

The author hypothesizes that the papers Freud wrote in the period 1934‐9 constitute a fi nal turning point in his work resulting from an attempt to work through, by means of self‐analysis, early traumatic elements reactivated by the conditions of his life in the 1930s. The author emphasizes that the ups and downs of Freud's relationship with Sándor Ferenczi and the mourning which followed his death in 1933 played an important role in this traumatic situation. He suggests that through these last works, Freud pursued a posthumous dialogue with Ferenczi. This working through led Freud, in Moses and monotheism, to an ultimate revision of his theory of trauma, a revision which the author examines in full, in the light of the works of the Egyptologist, Jan Assmann. A new analytical paradigm emerges: that of constructions in analysis developed in the article of the same name. The activity of construction appears as an alternative to the mutual analysis proposed by Ferenczi and is closely bound up with the notion of historical truth. In psychoanalysis, it would mean constructing a historical truth whose anchoring in the material truth of the past is essential, though it should not be confused with it.     

On a so‐Called Solution to a Paradox

The mooronic solution to the surprise quiz paradox says students know there will be a surprise quiz one day this week but they lose this knowledge on the penultimate day. This is because ‘there will be a surprise quiz one day this week’ then becomes an instance of Moore's paradox. This view has surprising consequences. Furthermore, even though the surprise quiz announcement becomes an instance of Moore's paradox on the penultimate day, this does not prevent the students from knowing the quiz is coming. I conclude that the first stage of the paradoxical argument succeeds and the mooronic solution fails.     

“Shining in the Light of Your Glory”: Finding the Simple Reading of Scripture

This essay argues that without allowing for a legitimate extra‐biblical reasoning for the appropriateness of God's “simplicity,” Christians will be compelled biblically to affirm that God, as such, has a body — or at least Christians will have to accept this as a theologically possible reading of Scripture that cannot be ruled out. Barnes first cites ancient philosophical sources that argue that God has no parts but is utterly simple. In Barnes's quick sketch, the main role is given to Plotinus and especially to the summation found in Alcuinus's Didaskalon X.7 (Alcuinus is known also as Albinus). Barnes then examines readings of Israel's Scriptures that indicate the bodiliness of God (YHWH). Most importantly, divine bodiliness comports with the “plain sense” of Scripture. Here he draws upon such works as Benjamin Sommer's The Bodies of God, Stephen Moore's “Gigantic God,” and Tryggve Mettinger's The Dethronement of Sabaoth; and he also makes reference to the work of the Jewish kabbalist scholar Gershom Scholem. Barnes carefully investigates such passages as Exodus 33, in which God is clearly presented as having bodily parts, including a “face.” As Barnes notes, the Fathers’ arguments for why God does not have a body are tied completely to their arguments for why God exists simply.     

Kant’s Regulative Metaphysics of God and the Systematic Lawfulness of Nature

In the “Appendix to the Transcendental Dialectic” of the Critique of Pure Reason, Kant contends that the idea of God has a positive regulative role in the systematization of empirical knowledge. But why is this regulative role assigned to this specific idea? Kant's account is rather opaque, and this question has also not received much attention in the literature. In this article, I argue that an adequate understanding of the regulative role of the idea of God depends on the specific metaphysical content Kant attributes to it in the Critique and other writings. I show that neither a heuristic principle of conceptual systematicity, nor conceiving God as a hypothesis of an intelligent designer, can satisfy the demands of reason to make the unity and necessity of the laws of nature intelligible. Regarding the positive account about the metaphysical content of the idea of God, I support my argument by referring to Kant's precritical discussion of the usefulness of the conception of God for the project of science, and by expounding Kant's critical account of the necessity of the laws of nature. Thus, my account sheds light on the continuity of Kant's conception of God and his appropriation of his own rationalistic metaphysics.     

‘Thank God I’m not a Jungian’

This article focuses less on the content of Jung's ideas than on ways in which they act as both invitation and challenge to engage with psyche. It explores the mythic framework of Jung's approach and how this can enable individuals to live in psychological and mundane worlds in which there can be no final certainties. It elaborates three particular aspects of Jung's thinking that I have found personally valuable: his generosity of vision, his insistence that individuals engage for and with themselves rather than relying on someone else's ideas, and his ponderings on the relationship between the individual and the collective. All three aspects seem to be important elements of the work of individuation.     

Pragmatism and revisionism: James's conception of truth

Abstract

The paper argues that James's conception of truth is non‐revisionist, that is, it sanctions common use of the notion of truth, but criticizes foundation‐alist philosophical accounts of that notion. This interpretation conflicts with traditional interpretations of James such as Russell's and Moore's, and contemporary interpretations such as Dummett's, all of which are revisionist. To the extent that objections raised against James's pragmatism depend on such revisionist reading, this paper constitutes a defence of James. The paper argues, further, that non‐revisionism distinguishes James from logical positivism and contemporary verificationism, and that James seeks to defend rather than renounce metaphysics. On this issue the paper disagrees with Rorty, who ascribes to James an extreme anti‐metaphysical stance.     

No Other Life: death and Catholicism in the novels of Brian Moore

There is a critical consensus (Dahlie, 1969, 1981; Flood, 1974; O'Donoghue, 1990; Sullivan, 1996) that one theme predominates in Brian Moore's fiction: the literary portrayal of Roman Catholicism. Yet over the past five decades, Moore's attitude to Catholicism, now more ambivalent than openly antagonistic, has changed and developed just as Roman Catholicism, especially post‐Vatican II, has changed and developed. Refining such a literary consensus, this article argues that the literary examination of a metaphysics and theology of death has been central to Moore's portrayal of Catholicism. A critical examination will be provided here of the portrayal of death in a representative sample of Brian Moore's novels before a more detailed focus upon the novel from which this article takes its main title, No Other Life (1993). By way of open conclusion, literary case study will be highlighted as a means of engaging in that interdisciplinary realm where literature and theology examine similar themes. In particular, such interdisciplinary research will be contextualised as part of an international literary‐theological programme from which one volume has arisen and which the present author is currently editing (Gearon, forthcoming).     

‘God … or a Bad,or Mad,Man’: C.S. Lewis's Argument for Christ – A Systematic Theological,Historical and Philosophical Analysis of Aut Deus Aut Malus Homo

The proposition that Jesus was ‘Bad, Mad or God’ is central to C.S. Lewis's popular apologetics. It is fêted by American Evangelicals, cautiously endorsed by Roman Catholics and Protestants, but often scorned by philosophers of religion. Most, mistakenly, regard Lewis's trilemma as unique. This paper examines the roots of this proposition in a two thousand year old theological and philosophical tradition (that is, aut Deus aut malus homo), grounded in the Johannine trilemma (‘unbalanced liar’, or ‘demonically possessed’, or ‘the God of Israel come amongst his people’). Jesus can only be understood in the context of the Jewish religious categories he was born into; therefore, for Lewis, Jesus is who he reveals himself to be. Jesus' self‐understanding reflects his identity, his triune salvific role; this is for Lewis, the transposed reality of divine Sonship. Reason and logic are paramount here, reflected in the structure of Lewis's argument. Lewis's trilemma is not so much a proof of God's existence, but a question, a dilemma, where each and every person must come to a decision. For all its perceived faults, its simplistic language, Lewis's trilemma still is a very successful piece of Christian apologetic, grounded in a serious philosophical and theological tradition.     

Visual Theologies and Material Form

This article offers a reading of a feature of John Calvin's theology that has received little attention – the role of visuality in his writings on the sacraments as developed between the years of 1536 and 1561. As an intervention into longstanding debates over the legacy of his sacramental theology, I argue that Calvin's use of visual categories to describe the sacramental event is best understood in terms of what I will call the ‘apoiconic’: a vision of divinity had through visual negation. I suggest that for Calvin the sacramental elements signal a divine absence that, in turn, redirects the gaze upward to Christ, whose spiritual presence constitutes the sacraments' substance. To make this argument, I trace the trinitarian dynamics of this ‘apoiconic vision’, where the Spirit unveils the living Christ by illumining the eyes of faith to comprehend the power of God that dwells therein. I close by reflecting on ‘apoiconicity’ as a strategy for moving beyond anxieties over materiality's idolatrous entanglements and for developing a sacramental theology that is cosmic in scope.     

Oedipus the king: Quest for self‐knowledge – denial of reality. Sophocles’ vision of man and psychoanalytic concept formation

In the Oedipus myth we find a dramatic representation of the child’s passionate ties to its parents. In the play Oedipus the King, Sophocles relates the theme of the myth to the question of self‐knowledge. This was the predominant reading in German 19th century thinking, and even as a student Freud was fascinated by Oedipus’ character – not primarily as the protagonist of an oedipal drama, but as the solver of divine riddles and as an individual striving for self‐knowledge. Inspired by Vellacott, Steiner has proposed an alternative reading of Oedipus the King as a play about a cover‐up of the truth. The text supports both these arguments. The pivotal theme of the tragedy is Oedipus’ conflict between his desire to know himself and his opposing wish to cover up the truth that will bring disaster. It is this complex character of Oedipus and the intensity of his conflict‐ridden struggle for self‐knowledge that has made the tragedy to a rich source of inspiration for psychoanalytic concept formation and understanding both of emotional and cognitive development up to our own time.