Samaritanism and Civil Disobedience

In this paper, I defend the existence of a moral duty to disobey the law and engage in civil disobedience on the basis of one of the grounds of political obligation—the Samaritan duty. Christopher H. Wellman has recently offered a ‘Samaritan account’ of state legitimacy and political obligation, according to which the state is justified in coercing each citizen in order to rescue all from the perilous circumstances of the state of nature; and each of us is bound to obey the law, as the state demands, because we each have a responsibility to help rescue others when this assistance is not unreasonably costly. Though Wellman recognizes that there can be reasons for disobeying the law and resisting injustice in otherwise legitimate states, he overlooks the possibility that at least some of these reasons could be Samaritan in nature, grounded in the duty to rescue people from peril. As I shall argue, the Samaritan duty supports obligations to disobey the law, when the law prohibits Samaritan rescues, and to engage in civil disobedience, when unjust laws and practices contribute to endangering people. The discussion proceeds as follows. After a brief overview of the Samaritan duty, I articulate my case for Samaritan duties to disobey the law, and duties to engage in civil disobedience when unjust laws, institutions, or practices enable what I call ‘persistent Samaritan perils’. I then examine and respond to several objections to my account: first, that the costs of law-breaking are unreasonable, and thus cannot be morally required; second, that individuals’ particular acts of protest and civil disobedience do not appear to make any difference to the rescue, and thus cannot be required; third, that I stretch the Samaritan duty beyond recognition; and fourth, that the Samaritan duty binds us to help people in need or peril anywhere, not particularly at home. I consider in conclusion the advantages and limits of my account of citizens’ Samaritan duties in the face of injustice.     

Hobbes on Teleology and Reason

Starting from considering how radical Hobbes' rejection of teleology was, this paper presents a coherent reading of Hobbesian reason, as applied to the justification of political obligation, striking a more perspicuous third way between the ‘orthodox’ (based on self‐interest and consequentialism) and the ‘revisionist’ (moralizing, or variously substantive) readings. Both families of interpretations are partial to some elements of Hobbes' thought, therefore incapable of providing a coherent reading of its whole. A precise rendering of Hobbes' deontological reason allows a better hermeneutical understanding of his philosophy as well as a keener appreciation of its relevance for past and present political thought.     

Realism,Utopianism, and Radical Values

One of the more debated topics in the recent realist literature concerns the compatibility of realism and utopianism. Perhaps the greatest challenge to utopian political thought comes from Bernard Williams' realism, which argues, among other things, that political values should be subject to what he calls the ‘realism constraint’, which rules out utopian arguments based on values which cannot be offered by the state as unrealistic and therefore inadmissible. This article challenges that conclusion in two ways. First, it argues that the rationale for accepting Williams' original argument for the ‘realism constraint’ fails. Secondly, it argues that there is at least one genuinely political value of liberty available which is both compatible with realism and something that cannot be offered by the state, namely that of the political anarchist. This opens the way for far more ambitious and utopian forms of realist political thought and implies that the arguments of what we call political anarchists must be met by (realist) political argumentation, not simply ruled out by methodological stipulation.     

Political Obligation,Dirty Hands and Torture; A Moral Evaluation

The example of a political leader who has to decide whether he would allow the torture of a suspect in order to get information about a ticking bomb has become notorious in ethical discussions concerning the tension between moral principles and political necessity. The relation between these notions must be made as clear as possible before a sincere moral evaluation of ticking bomb situations can be given. The first section of this article considers whether the concept of political obligation is different from moral and legal obligations or whether it is a special kind of moral obligation. In the second section, the idea that the dirty hands problem confronts us with the ambiguities of moral life is rejected because it would imply an untenable moral paradox. The thesis that is developed is, namely, if there is such a thing as political necessity, it must be some form of moral obligation. The third section analyses the concept of political necessity and concludes that it cannot overrule basic moral principles and that the international legal prohibition of torture must be considered to be a categorical imperative. In the last section, these ideas concerning political and moral necessity are brought in against the defence of torture, which should be tolerated in the ‘War on Terror’. There it will be argued that the use of the ticking bomb argument not only supports a highly hypocrite political practice but is also deceptive as a moral and political argument.     

The interpretation of Locke’s Two Treatises in Britain, 1778–1956

ABSTRACT

This paper describes how Locke’s Two Treatises of Government was read in Britain from Josiah Tucker to Peter Laslett. It focuses in particular upon how Locke’s readers responded to his detailed and lengthy engagement with the patriarchalist political thought of Sir Robert Filmer. In the second half of the eighteenth century, the debate between Locke and Filmer continued to provide the framework within which political obligation was discussed. A hundred years later that had changed, to the point where Locke’s readers found it unintelligible that he argued against Filmer and not Hobbes. I explain this in terms of the development in nineteenth-century Britain of a new conception of the history of political philosophy, the product of interest in the Hegelian theory of the state. The story told here is offered as one example of how understandings of the history of philosophy are shaped by understandings of philosophy itself.     

A Puzzle About Free Speech, Legitimacy, and Countermajoritarian Constraints

This paper argues that there is a tension between two central features of Dworkin’s partnership conception of democracy. The conception holds, on the one hand, that it is a necessary condition of the legitimacy of the decisions of a political majority that every member of the political community has a very robust right to publicly criticize those decisions. A plausible interpretation of this argument is that free political speech constitutes a normatively privileged vehicle for political minorities to become majorities, and therefore in the absence of freedom of speech minorities could not be rightfully compelled to comply with majority decisions. On the other hand, the partnership conception holds that properly exercised constraints on majority rule do not incur any moral costs. The no-moral-costs thesis is argued for on the basis that nothing of significance is lost when individuals’ influence on political decisions is diminished. However, the legitimacy argument for free speech assumes the significance of individual political influence, which the no-moral-costs thesis denies. Hence the tension.     

God’s moral goodness and supererogation

What do we understand by God’s goodness? William Alston claims that by answering this question convincingly, divine command theory can be strengthened against some major objections. He rejects the idea that God’s goodness lies in the area of moral obligations. Instead, he proposes that God’s goodness is best described by the phenomenon of supererogation. Joseph Lombardi, in response, agrees with Alston that God does not have moral obligations but says that having rejected moral obligation as the content of divine goodness, Alston cannot help himself to supererogation as a solution to the content of God’s moral goodness. If God has no moral obligations and does not perform supererogatory acts, Lombardi suggests that God’s goodness may be explicated through concentrating on God’s benevolence, but he does not develop this theme. I propose that Alston’s idea of divine supererogation without obligation is sustainable, but that a reshaping of the concept of supererogation is required; one in which love, rather than benevolence, plays an important part. If the love associated with supererogation is characterised in a certain way, I suggest this adds a new angle to the understanding of divine goodness.     

Play,Idleness and the Problem of Necessity in Schiller and Marcuse

The central concern of this paper is to explore the efforts of Schiller's post-Kantian idealism and Marcuse's critical theory to develop a new conception of free human experience. That conception is built on the notion of play. Play is said to combine the human capacities for physical pleasure and reason, capacities which the modern world has dualized. Analysis of their respective accounts of play reveals its ambivalent form in the work of both philosophers. Play supports the ideal of ‘freedom from necessity’, understood as a release from all external constraint. But it also appears to serve as a model for ‘freedom as a higher necessity’. In the case of Schiller, the ambivalence encompasses idle play and an obligation to make ourselves worthy of freedom. For Marcuse, play represents a kind of libidinal idleness while also underpinning a non-alienated conception of labour.     

Pragmatism and revisionism: James's conception of truth

Abstract

The paper argues that James's conception of truth is non‐revisionist, that is, it sanctions common use of the notion of truth, but criticizes foundation‐alist philosophical accounts of that notion. This interpretation conflicts with traditional interpretations of James such as Russell's and Moore's, and contemporary interpretations such as Dummett's, all of which are revisionist. To the extent that objections raised against James's pragmatism depend on such revisionist reading, this paper constitutes a defence of James. The paper argues, further, that non‐revisionism distinguishes James from logical positivism and contemporary verificationism, and that James seeks to defend rather than renounce metaphysics. On this issue the paper disagrees with Rorty, who ascribes to James an extreme anti‐metaphysical stance.     

Political Inequality and the ‘Super-Rich’: Their Money or (some of) Their Political Rights

The ability of very wealthy individuals (or, as I will call them, the ‘super-rich’) to turn their economic power into political power has been—and remains—an important cause of political inequality. In response, this paper advocates an original solution. Rather than solving the problem through implementing a comprehensive conception of political equality, or through enforcing complex rules about financial disclosure etc., I argue that we should impose a choice on the super-rich. The super-rich must choose between (i) forfeiting the things that make them super-rich, i.e., pay a 100 % tax on their wealth above a certain level, or, (ii) they must forfeit some of their political rights. These rights include entitlements to fund political parties; to stand for office; and to work or volunteer for political parties. The right to vote, though, is not limited. I defend my proposal against non-consequentialist and consequentialist objections. I also argue that it avoids two problems that many attempts to reduce political inequality face; these are the political egalitarian’s dilemma and the problem of political equality’s relative moral importance.     

POLITICAL OBLIGATION AND THE PARTICULARITY PROBLEM

Natural duty theorists of political obligation try to base a moral duty to obey the law on some natural duty, such as the duty to promote justice. Their critics say they confront an insurmountable obstacle in the particularity problem: Since natural duties do not bind us to some persons and institutions more strongly than to others, they cannot support a duty to one particular state or society. I solve the particularity problem, by developing a version of the political obligation thesis, giving a natural duty argument for it and showing that the particularity problem does not arise for the argument. I reply to some likely objections to my view.     

Epistemic contextualism defended

Epistemic contextualists think that the extension of the expression ‘knows’ (and its cognates) depends on and varies with the context of utterance. In the last 15 years or so this view has faced intense criticism. This paper focuses on two sorts of objections. The first are what I call the ‘linguistic objections’, which purport to show that the best available linguistic evidence suggests that ‘knows’ is not context-sensitive. The second is what I call the ‘disagreement problem’, which concerns the behaviour of ‘knows’ in disagreement reports. These may not be the only objections to epistemic contextualism, but they are probably the most influential. I argue that the best current epistemic contextualist response to the linguistic objection is incomplete, and I show how it can be supplemented to deal with the full range of linguistic objections. I also develop a new solution to the disagreement problem. The upshot is that neither sort of objection gives us any reason to reject epistemic contextualism. This conclusion is, in a sense, negative—no new arguments for epistemic contextualism are advanced—but it’s a vital step towards rehabilitating the view.     

Epistemic justice as a condition of political freedom?

I shall first briefly revisit the broad idea of ‘epistemic injustice’, explaining how it can take either distributive or discriminatory form, in order to put the concepts of ‘testimonial injustice’ and ‘hermeneutical injustice’ in place. In previous work I have explored how the wrong of both kinds of epistemic injustice has both an ethical and an epistemic significance—someone is wronged in their capacity as a knower. But my present aim is to show that this wrong can also have a political significance in relation to non-domination, and so to freedom. While it is only the republican conception of political freedom that presents nondomination as constitutive of freedom, I shall argue that non-domination is best understood as a thoroughly generic liberal ideal of freedom to which even negative libertarians are implicitly committed, for non-domination is negative liberty as of right—secured non-interference. Crucially on this conception, non-domination requires that the citizen can contest interferences. Pettit specifies three conditions of contestation, each of which protects against a salient risk of the would-be contester not getting a ‘proper hearing’. But I shall argue that missing from this list is anything to protect against a fourth salient threat: the threat that either kind of epistemic injustice might disable contestation by way of an unjust deflation of either credibility or intelligibility. Thus we see that both testimonial and hermeneutical injustice can render a would-be contester dominated. Epistemic justice is thereby revealed as a constitutive condition of non-domination, and thus of a central liberal political ideal of freedom.     

Nation,State and the Incarnation in the Political Writings of Vladimir Solov'yev: The Transfiguration of Politics

Introduction A great volume of popular literature produced by Islamists strives to demonstrate the universal validity of the Islamic political principles and their applicability in any time and place. Although there is an agreement on certain characteristics of a government in a Muslim society, the debate reflects quite varied interpretations and some essential theoretical differences. The controversy stems largely from the conditions that scholars live in. Regarding the revived interest in creating a state based on Islamic political and moral guidelines, it is possible to encounter various interpretations and different standpoints. For instance, one point of view asserts that ‘the undemocratic nature of Islamic political ideology, popularised in the present times by fundamentalist ideologues, commends it to regimes which have no popular support and need to find some measure of legitimacy’ (Tibi, 1998). With the failure of man-made ideologies and withdrawal of imperialist western powers, according to another standpoint, the inhabitants of the Third World countries were led to revitalise their own sociopolitical values and institute their own political systems. In the case of the Islamic world, the idea of a state based on Islamic political principles, envisaged in the latter perspective, is ’the rekindling of the typical Islamic political ethos‘; in that Islam unifies the spiritual and social realms, it is therefore impossible to divorce politics from religion (Sulaiman, 1987). There is a wide range of contributions and critiques on the issue of Islamic principles guiding the constitutional aspects of a state, particularly since the Iranian Revolution in 1979. The interest in this matter has increased since the terrorist attacks in the USA on 11 September 2001, coinciding with a rising interest in such issues as Islamic social order and so-called Islamic terrorism. Nevertheless, most of these writings are popular and sensational; analytical studies are few. This article aims to fill the gap in scholarly inquiry into such an important matter by exploring the political ideas of major contemporary Muslim thinkers, and by identifying some essential characteristics for a state based on Islamic political principles in the light of the views of these scholars.     

Trust in the Guise of Belief

Abstract

What kind of mental state is trust? It seems to have features that can lead one to think that it is a doxastic state but also features that can lead one to think that it is a non-doxastic state. This has even lead some philosophers to think that trust is a unique mental state that has both mind-to-world and world-to-mind direction of fit, or to give up on the idea that there is a univocal analysis of trust to be had. Here, I propose that ‘trust’ is the name we give to mental states that we would think of as beliefs if belief was to be thought of in ‘pragmatist’ terms (that is, as a state posited primarily to explain agents’ actions) and belief resists ‘pragmatist’ treatment. Only such an account, I argue, can univocally account for all the diverse features of trust. As such, I also propose that the explanation of trust provides us with a case for understanding the limitations of a comprehensively ‘pragmatist’, or ‘Neo-Wittgensteinian’ conception of the mental.     

Privacy Rights,and Why Negative Control is Not a Dead End: A Reply to Munch and Lundgren

Lauritz Munch and Björn Lundgren have recently replied to a paper published by us in this journal. In our original paper, we defended a novel version of the so-called ‘control theory’ of the moral right to privacy. We argued that control theorists should define ‘control’ as what we coined ‘Negative Control’. Munch and Lundgren have recently provided a range of interesting and challenging objections to our view. Independently of each other, they give almost identical counterexamples to our definition of Negative Control. In this comment, we show that while the counterexamples are genuine counterexamples, they do not force us to abandon the idea of Negative Control. Furthermore, we reply to two additional objections raised by Lundgren. One of these replies involves giving a new account of what the relation is between the concept of privacy and the right to privacy.

     

RESPONSIBILITY AND THE AIMS OF THEORY: STRAWSON AND REVISIONISM

Abstract: Strawsonian approaches to responsibility, including more recent accounts such as Dennett's and Wallace’s, face a number of important objections. However, Strawsonian theories can be recast along revisionist lines so as to avoid many of these problems. In this paper, I explain the revisionist approach to moral responsibility, discuss the concessions it makes to incompatibilism (including the point that compatibilists may not fully capture what our commonsense understanding of responsibility), why it provides a fruitful recasting of Strawsonian approaches, and how it offers an alternative to the pattern of dialectical stalemates exhibited by standard approaches to free will and determinism.     

Lenin,Gorbachev, and ‘national-statehood’: Can Leninism countenance the new Soviet federal order?

One of the most intractable contemporary problems in the USSR is the Soviet federal dilemma. The late 1980s witnessed competing claims among the national minority groups of the USSR to rights of voice, representation, and cultural, economic, and even political sovereignty. Since the onset ofperestrojka, the principle of ‘nationalstatehood’ has acquired a new legitimacy. Nationality is one of the pillars of the federal reform. The drive to create a ‘new Soviet federalism’ has become an important component ofperestrojka. But, according to Leninist doctrine, the ‘nation’ is a transitional formation. Unless there is a significant departure from Leninist theory, the new acknowledgement of the ‘rights of nations’ in the USSR can only be a political — and thus temporary — concession. Can the ideology evolve in such a way as to provide ideologically-based political legitimacy to the notion of national-statehood? Is Gorbachev's ‘dynamic’ interpretation of Leninism capable of rejecting one of Lenin's most fundamental concepts? The thesis of this article is that Soviet federal reform requires a substantial departure from the Leninist tradition. The extent to which Soviet leaders are prepared to do this casts light on one of the perennial concerns of socialist thought, namely whether ideology matters at all.     

Epistemic constraints on practical normativity

What is the relation between what we ought to do, on the one hand, and our epistemic access to the ought-giving facts, on the other? In assessing this, it is common to distinguish ‘objective’ from ‘subjective’ oughts. Very roughly, on the objectivist conception what an agent ought to do is determined by ought-giving facts in such a way that does not depend on the agent’s beliefs about, or epistemic access to, those facts; whereas on the subjectivist conception, what an agent ought to do depends on his beliefs. This paper defends the need for, and explicates, a third category of ‘ought’: ‘warranted oughts’. Section 1 introduces the distinction between objective and subjective ‘oughts’. Sections 2–3 draw attention to some serious problems with each. Section 4 examines, though rejects, a recent attempt to replace subjective ‘oughts’ with objective ‘wide-scope oughts’ operating on belief-action combinations. Section 5 explicates the notion of a warranted ‘ought’ and defends the account against some possible objections. The resulting a picture is one in which an adequate analysis of practical normativity requires both objective and warranted ‘oughts’. Section 6 concludes by responding to a worry about countenancing both.