Word for word: Multiple lexical access in speech production

We report an experiment in which we test the possible influence of the tense of the verb and explicit negatives with indicative conditionals. We tested the effects of systematically negating the constituents of four fundamental inferences based on conditionals in three different tenses (present tense, past tense, future tense): Modus Ponens (i.e., inferences of the form: if p then q; p; therefore q), Modus Tollens (if p then q; not-q; therefore not-p), Affirmation of the Consequent (if p then q; q; therefore p), and Denial of the Antecedent (if p then q; not-p; therefore not-q). The latter two inferences are invalid for true conditionals, but are valid for bi-conditionals (if, and only if, p then q). The participants drew their own conclusions from premises about letters and numbers on cards. We discuss the results in relation to an affirmation premise bias, a negative conclusion bias, and a double negation effect. We outline the importance of our findings for theories about conditional and counterfactual thinking.     

Strange-but-true: a (quick) new argument for contextualism about ‘know’

A powerful objection to subject-sensitive invariantism (SSI) concerns various ‘strange-but-true’ (or “embarrassing”) conditionals. One popular response to this objection is to argue that strange-but-true conditionals pose a problem for non-sceptical epistemological theories in general. In the present paper, it is argued that strange-but-true conditionals are not a problem for contextualism about ‘know’. This observation undercuts the proposed defence of SSI, and supplies a surprising new argument for contextualism.     

How French Speaking Children Understand Promises: The Role of the Future Tense

The purpose of this study was to gain insight into one of the textual characteristics of promises: the future tense as a temporal marker of utterances. More specifically, our aim was to determine the role of the future tense in the comprehension of promises by native French-speaking children between the ages of 3 and 9. In line with speech act theory, a promise is defined here as a commitment on the part of a speaker to perform a future act. Promise comprehension is assumed to be dependent upon textual characteristics (the linguistic form of the utterance, temporal markers in the utterance, etc.) as well as contextual characteristics (listener's desire, social implications of the promise, etc.). Children performed a story-completion task from two-character stories presented in comic strip form. The stories varied in two ways: the verb tense (immediate future, simple future, or past) and the utterance production context (specific or neutral). The main results can be summarized as follows: (1) The 3- and 6-year-olds based their interpretation of the promises primarily on the contextual characteristics of the communication situation; (2) after the age of 6, the children began to rely on temporal markers in the utterances whenever the immediate future tense was used and promise-specific contextual information was lacking; and (3) the 9-year-olds always based their interpretation of the promises on temporal cues in the utterance. The results are discussed in the framework of interactionist theories of development and models of language functioning.     

Processing of logically valid and logically invalid conditional inferences in discourse comprehension

Two competing theories of processing of conditionals (if-then) were tested. Syntactic theories posit that people only draw inferences conforming to the logically valid modus ponens (MP) schema. Mental models theories predict that people draw MP and invalid affirming-the-consequent (AC) inferences. Three experiments tested these predictions. Participants read short stories that conformed to either the MP or AC form but without conclusions, and they completed either priming or recognition tasks. Results indicate that both MP and AC inferences occur during discourse processing: MP and AC premise forms prime their respective conclusions, participants erroneously judged that they had read the conclusions to MP and AC arguments, and AC inferences did not stem from a biconditional interpretation of conditionals. Findings support mental models theories.     

Abstract reasoning and the interpretation of basic conditionals

Studies examining the interpretation that is given to if–then statementstypically use what are referred to as basic conditionals, which give contextless relations between two unrelated concrete terms (If the ball is blue, then the shape is square). However, there is some evidence that basic conditionals require a more abstract form of representation. In order to examine this, we presented participants with truth-table tasks involving either basic conditionals or conditionals referring to imaginary categories (If it is a bori, then it has red wings), and standard conditional inference tasks with abstract and familiar premises. As expected, fewer typical defective conditional interpretations were given to basic conditionals. In addition, partial correlations showed a unique relationship between the interpretation of basic conditionals and abstract inferential reasoning. Results suggest that people process basic conditionals as a form of abstract reasoning, and that the interpretation of conditionals must consider the semantic context.     

The Logic of Dominance Reasoning

The logic of dominance arguments is analyzed using two different kinds of conditionals: indicative (epistemic) and subjunctive (counter‐factual). It is shown that on the indicative interpretation an assumtion of independence is needed for a dominance argument to go through. It is also shown that on the subjunctive interpretation no assumption of independence is needed once the standard premises of the dominance argument are true, but that independence plays an important role in arguing for the truth of the premises of the dominance argument. A key feature of the analysis is the interpretation of the doubly conditional comparative "I will get a better outcome if A than if B" which is taken to have the structure "(the outcome if A) is better than (the outcome if B)".     

Defending truth values for indicative conditionals

Philosophical Studies - There is strong disagreement about whether indicative conditionals have truth values. In this paper, I present a new argument for the conclusion that indicative conditionals...     

Antiskeptical Conditionals

Empirical knowledge exists in the form of antiskeptical conditionals , which are propositions like [if I am not undetectably deceived, then I am holding a pen]. Such conditionals, despite their trivial appearance, have the same essential content as the categorical propositions that we usually discuss, and can serve the same functions in science and practical reasoning. This paper sketches out two versions of a general response to skepticism that employs these conditionals. The first says that our ordinary knowledge attributions can safely be replaced by statements using antiskeptical conditionals, which provides a way around the standard sort of skeptical argument while accepting its soundness with respect to the usual targets. The second analyzes the objects of our ordinary knowledge attributions as antiskeptical conditionals, which allows us to refute, not just evade, the skeptic's argument. Both versions compare favorably to the best-known current approaches to skepticism, including semantic contextualism.     

The View from Nowhen: The Mctaggart-Dummett Argument for the Unreality of Time

Years ago, Michael Dummett defended McTaggart’s argument for the unreality of time, arguing that it cannot be dismissed as guilty of an “indexical fallacy.” Recently, E. J. Lowe has disputed Dummett’s claims for the cogency of the argument. I offer an elaboration and defense of Dummett’s interpretation of the argument (though not of its soundness). I bring to bear some work on tense from the philosophy of language, and some recent work on the concept of the past as it occurs in memory, in an effort to support the claim that McTaggart is not guilty of any simple indexical fallacy. Along the way I criticize an account of what is at stake in disputes about the reality of tense due to A. W. Moore, and I argue for the superiority of the conception of tense-realism that is implicit in McTaggart’s work. The paper is intended to prepare the ground for a substantive defense of the reality of tense.     

Causal conditionals and counterfactuals

Causal counterfactuals e.g., 'if the ignition key had been turned then the car would have started' and causal conditionals e.g., 'if the ignition key was turned then the car started' are understood by thinking about multiple possibilities of different sorts, as shown in six experiments using converging evidence from three different types of measures. Experiments 1a and 1b showed that conditionals that comprise enabling causes, e.g., 'if the ignition key was turned then the car started' primed people to read quickly conjunctions referring to the possibility of the enabler occurring without the outcome, e.g., 'the ignition key was turned and the car did not start'. Experiments 2a and 2b showed that people paraphrased causal conditionals by using causal or temporal connectives (because, when), whereas they paraphrased causal counterfactuals by using subjunctive constructions (had…would have). Experiments 3a and 3b showed that people made different inferences from counterfactuals presented with enabling conditions compared to none. The implications of the results for alternative theories of conditionals are discussed.     

Suppositions, extensionality, and conditionals: a critique of the mental model theory of Johnson-Laird And Byrne (2002)

P. N. Johnson-Laird and R. M. J. Byrne proposed an influential theory of conditionals in which mental models represent logical possibilities and inferences are drawn from the extensions of possibilities that are used to represent conditionals. In this article, the authors argue that the extensional semantics underlying this theory is equivalent to that of the material, truth-functional conditional, at least for what they term "basic" conditionals, concerning arbitrary problem content. On the basis of both logical argument and psychological evidence, the authors propose that this approach is fundamentally mistaken and that conditionals must be viewed within a suppositional theory based on what philosophical logicians call the Ramsey test. The Johnson-Laird and Byrne theory is critically examined with respect to its account of basic conditionals, nonbasic conditionals, and counterfactuals.     

A process model of the understanding of uncertain conditionals

To build a process model of the understanding of conditionals we extract a common core of three semantics of if-then sentences: (a) the conditional event interpretation in the coherencebased probability logic, (b) the discourse processingtheory of Hans Kamp, and (c) the game-theoretical approach of Jaakko Hintikka. The empirical part reports three experiments in which each participant assessed the probability of 52 if-then sentencesin a truth table task. Each experiment included a second task: An n-back task relating the interpretation of conditionals to working memory, a Bayesian bookbag and poker chip task relating the interpretation of conditionals to probability updating, and a probabilistic modus ponens task relating the interpretation of conditionals to a classical inference task. Data analysis shows that the way in which the conditionals are interpreted correlates with each of the supplementary tasks. The results are discussed within the process model proposed in the introduction.     

A tense logic for boethius

An interpretation in modal and tense logic is proposed for Boethius's reconciliation of God's foreknowledge with human freedom from The consolation of philosophy, Book V. The interpretation incorporates a suggestion by Paul Spade that God's special status in time be explained as a restriction of God's knowledge to eternal sentences. The argument proves valid, and the seeming restriction on omnipotence is mitigated by the very strong expressive power of eternal sentences.     

Evaluation strategies for some nonstandard conditionals during adolescence.

380 adolescents and young adults between the ages of 11 and 29 years participated in three experiments in which they were asked to evaluate both universally quantified nonstandard and standard conditionals using items of information bearing upon them. Subjects found it much easier to avoid a biconditional interpretation with the nonstandard than with the standard conditionals, which throws doubt on the explanation of desire for symmetry of biconditional conversion. It was argued, from data of other studies, that a modified version of the Piagetian view that biconditional conversion occurs as a result of a desire to avoid the complications of dealing with three factors explains most cases of such conversion in adolescence. Results also confirmed that it is more profitable to analyse performance on tasks of this kind using a two-stage model of interpretation and information use previously developed to explain performance with standard universally quantified conditionals than to view such tasks as providing truth-table values. Such an analysis was extended to the nonstandard conditionals studied in the present paper. The origins of the dramatic differences in information-use strategies adopted by adolescents for standard and nonstandard conditionals remain unclear.     

The Suppositional Ramsey Test and Decision-Instability

I analyse the relationship between the Ramsey Test (RT) for the acceptance of indicative conditionals and the so-called problem of decision-instability. In particular, I argue that the situations which allegedly bring about this problem are troublesome just in case the relevant conditionals are evaluated by non-suppositional versions, e.g. causal/evidential, of the test. In contrast, a suppositional RT, by highlighting the metacognitive nature of the evaluation of indicative conditionals, allows an agent to run a simulation of such evaluation, without yet committing her to the acceptance of such conditionals. I conclude that a suppositional interpretation of RT is superior to its non-suppositional counterparts and by briefly showing that a suppositional RT is compatible with a deliberational decision theory.     

Conditionals and directionality: On the meaning of if vs. only if

The aim of this study was to test the predictions of the current theories of reasoning about the comprehension of conditional statements. We used two types of conditional statement that are logically equivalent: if p then q and p only if q . The model theory of reasoning considers that these conditional forms differ in their initial meaning, because the negative contingency is considered only in the p only if q form. Mental-rule theories maintain that the interpretation of p only if q depends on a rephrasing of the statement as: if not q then not p . Alternatively, a directional bias may explain the differences between if p then q and p only if q . We report three experiments that demonstrate the existence of a directional bias in the comprehension of the conditionals. The results were not predicted by either the mental-rules theories or the model theory; they could, however, be easily assimilated by the model theory.     

On Bradley’s preservation condition for conditionals

Bradley has argued that a truth-conditional semantics for conditionals is incompatible with an allegedly very weak and intuitively compelling constraint on the interpretation of conditionals. I argue that the example Bradley offers to motivate this constraint can be explained along pragmatic lines that are compatible with the correctness of at least one popular truth-conditional semantics for conditionals.     

Fatalism, Bivalence and the Past

In his paper 'Some Comments on Fatalism', The Philosophical Quartery , 46 (1996), pp. 1–11, James Cargile offers an argument against the view that the correct response to fatalism is to restrict the principle of bivalence with respect to statements about future contingencies. His argument fails because it is question-begging. Further, he fails to give due weight to the reason behind this view, which is the desire to give an adequate account of the past/future asymmetry. He supposes that mere appeal to the direction of causation will suffice to explain this asymmetry, whereas in fact the causal asymmetry is the same as the temporal asymmetry, and so cannot ground it. I finish by drawing a connection between the power asymmetry (our ability to affect the future but not the past) and the memory/intention asymmetry.     

An investigation into the online processing of counterfactual and indicative conditionals

The ability to represent conditional information is central to human cognition. In two self-paced reading experiments we investigated how readers process counterfactual conditionals (e.g., If Darren had been athletic, he could probably have played on the rugby team) and indicative conditionals (e.g., If Darren is athletic, he probably plays on the rugby team). In Experiment 1 we focused on how readers process counterfactual conditional sentences. We found that processing of the antecedent of counterfactual conditionals was rapidly constrained by prior context (i.e., knowing whether Darren was or was not athletic). A reading-time penalty was observed for the critical region of text comprising the last word of the antecedent and the first word of the consequent when the information in the antecedent did not fit with prior context. In Experiment 2 we contrasted counterfactual conditionals with indicative conditionals. For counterfactual conditionals we found the same effect on the critical region as we found in Experiment 1. In contrast, however, we found no evidence that processing of the antecedent of indicative conditionals was constrained by prior context. For indicative conditionals (but not for counterfactual conditionals), the results we report are consistent with the suppositional account of conditionals. We propose that current theories of conditionals need to be able to account for online processing differences between indicative and counterfactual conditionals.     

Modalised conditionals: a response to Willer

A paper by Schulz (Philos Stud 149:367–386, 2010) describes how the suppositional view of indicative conditionals can be supplemented with a derived view of epistemic modals. In a recent criticism of this paper, Willer (Philos Stud 153:365–375, 2011) argues that the resulting account of conditionals and epistemic modals cannot do justice to the validity of certain inference patterns involving modalised conditionals. In the present response, I analyse Willer’s argument, identify an implicit presupposition which can plausibly be denied and show that accepting it would blur the difference between plain assumptions and their epistemic necessitations.