Epistemological Disjunctivism and Introspective Indiscriminability

Philosophia - According to Duncan Pritchard’s Philosophical Issues, 21(1), 434–455, (2011, 2012, 2015)version of epistemological disjunctivism, in paradigm cases of perceptual...     

The Formulation of Epistemological Disjunctivism

I argue that we should question the orthodox way of thinking about epistemological disjunctivism. I suggest that we can formulate epistemological disjunctivism in terms of states of seeing things as opposed to states of seeing that p. Not only does this alternative formulation capture the core aspects of epistemological disjunctivism as standardly formulated, it has two salient advantages. First, it avoids a crucial problem that arises for a standard formulation of epistemological disjunctivism—the basis problem. And second, it is less committed than standard formulations are in the metaphysics of perception.     

Disjunctivism unmotivated

Many naive realists are inclined to accept a negative disjunctivist strategy in order to deal with the challenge presented by the possibility of phenomenologically indistinguishable hallucination. In the first part of this paper I argue that this approach is methodologically inconsistent because it undercuts the phenomenological motivation that underlies the appeal of naive realism. In the second part of the paper I develop an alternative to the negative disjunctivist account along broadly Meinongian lines. In the last section of this paper I consider and evaluate a somewhat similar but rival view of hallucination developed by Mark Johnston.     

Chasing the Title VII Holy Grail: The Pitfalls of Guaranteeing Adverse Impact Elimination

Purpose

Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 provided industrial/organizational (I/O) psychologists with a unique role as professional test developers and consultants involved in assisting organizations in establishing the job-relatedness/validity defense to charges of discrimination, specifically charges based on an adverse or disparate impact theory. However, these activities have transmogrified into the fairly common occurrence of public municipalities and organizations demanding the reduction or absence of adverse impact as part of the scope of work or contracts and for practitioners and consultants to guarantee adverse impact reduction or elimination a priori. Plaintiffs and their experts also routinely argue that the observed adverse impact could have been allayed or eliminated if the defendant had only just used alternative testing methods. This then begs the following question: “Are there well established techniques and procedures that can reduce, minimize, or eliminate adverse impact in a predictable, generalizable, and replicable fashion in the same manner that we might guarantee validity?” The present paper seeks to answer this question.

Approach and Findings

With the preceding as a backdrop, the present paper identifies and discusses four overlooked critical attributes of adverse impact that collectively and in conjunction work against and obviate adverse impact reduction and elimination guarantees.

Conclusions and Implications

We conclude that the search for guaranteed adverse impact reduction or elimination is a “Holy Grail” and that we should avoid predictions and guarantees regarding adverse impact elimination in specific situations, including those based on the inclusion of “alternative” selection devices. However, in the context of civil rights legislation, and the intersection of I/O psychologists with said legislation, what we can guarantee as a science and profession are sound and valid tests and assessment devices that can be defended accordingly should the use of said tests and devices be challenged.     

Disjunctivism and skepticism

Disjunctivism is the view that perceptual experience is either constituted by fact in the world or mere appearance. This view is said to be able to guarantee our cognitive contact with the world, and thus remove a crucial “prop” upon which skepticism depends. This paper has two aims. First, it aims to show that disjunctivism is a solution to Cartesian skepticism. Cartesian skepticism is an epistemological thesis, not an ontological one. Therefore, if there is an external world, we may well undergo a veridical experience, and thus we can take advantage of disjunctivism to adopt an anti-evidential-skepticism strategy to counter Cartesian skepticism. Second, this paper argues that disjunctivism fails to solve Pyrrhonian skepticism. To counter Pyrrhonian skepticism, one has to give reasons both for his belief and for his believing. But disjunctivism can only account the former, that is, the reason for the content of perceptual belief. Given that one’s experience in good case and bad case is subjectively indistinguishable, one cannot just use his experience to justify his believing. This shows that disjunctivism cannot meet the requirement to provide an adequate account for reflective knowledge.     

Disjunctivism and the urgency of scepticism

This paper argues that McDowell is right to claim that disjunctivism has anti-sceptical implications. While the disjunctive conception of experience leaves unaffected the Cartesian sceptical challenge, it undermines another type of sceptical challenge. Moreover, the sceptical challenge against which disjunctivism militates has some philosophical urgency in that it threatens the very notion that perceptual experience can acquaint us with the world around us.     

Disjunctivism, contextualism and the sceptical aporia

We know things that entail things we apparently cannot come to know. This is a problem for those of us who trust that knowledge is closed under entailment. In the paper I discuss the solutions to this problem offered by epistemic disjunctivism and contextualism. The contention is that neither of these theories has the resources to deal satisfactory with the problem.     

The rorschach search for the borderline Holy Grail: an examination of personality structure, personality style, and situation

Much of the research on the use of the Rorschach to diagnose borderline disturbance has sought to discover a specific borderline pattern or Rorschach configuration. Given our increased understanding of borderline functioning representing a level of personality organization (or personality structure), this single pattern approach is excessively simplistic. It fails to consider the complex interaction between personality structure, personality style, and situational variables. An approach to the Rorschach assessment of borderline functioning is presented using a clinical example. The patient was tested at the onset of psychotherapy and then some 4 years into treatment. Results from the two testings were compared using Weiner and Exner's (1991) Rorschach variable clusters for assessing change in psychotherapy.     

Moral Luck and the Possibility of Agential Disjunctivism

Most presentations of the problem of moral luck invoke the notion of control, but little has been said about what control amounts to. We propose a necessary condition on an agent's having been in control of performing an action: that the agent's effort to perform the action ensured that the agent performed the action. The difficulty of satisfying this condition (or one like it) leads many on both sides of the moral luck debate to conclude that much of what we do is not within our control, and, at the limit, underpins agential skepticism, the view that no one has ever been in control of having performed an action in the external world. We propose a response to the agential skeptic modeled on the epistemological disjunctivist's response to the skeptic about perceptual experience. According to agential disjunctivism, the necessary condition on control can be met, thus undermining agential skepticism and one motivation for the problem of moral luck. Our view can be understood as resisting moral luck not by shrinking the domain of robust moral evaluation but by refusing to contract the realm of robust control.     

Holy Movement and Holy Place: Christian Pilgrimage and the Hajj

Abstract : This article uses a comparative theological model to explore the concept of pilgrimage—holy movement and holy place. It examines Christian pilgrimage exemplified by John Paul II's pilgrimage to Jerusalem in 2000 and Islamic pilgrimage exemplified by the Hajj. It then re‐visions Christian pilgrimage by suggesting how three features of the Hajj (danger and hardship, ritual nature, and gathering) can be used to deepen the Christian experience and understanding of pilgrimage.