Agent-Relative Reasons and Normative Force

Philosophia - The distinction between agent-relative reasons and agent-neutral reasons is philosophically important, but there is no consensus on how to understand the distinction exactly. In this...     

Meaningfulness and Kinds of Normative Reasons

Philosophia - Meaningfulness is the dimension of importance that exists for beings capable of adjudicating between competing kinds of normative reasons. The way an agent decides to rank competing...     

Justifying Reasons, Motivating Reasons, and Agent Relativism in Ethics

According to agent relativism, each person's moral requirements are relative to her desires or interests. That is, whether a person morally ought to depends on what interests or desires she has. Some philosophers charge that the main argument for agent relativism trades on an ambiguity –specifically, an ambiguity in ``reason,' ``reasonfor action,' or a kindred term. This charge has been common, and widely thought to damage the case for agent relativism, since its appearance, in 1958, in a now classic paper by William Frankena. In what follows I examine the charge in detail, showing that insofar as it aims to discredit the argument for agent relativism, it fails in its purpose.     

Facts,Ends, and Normative Reasons

This paper is about the relationship between two widely accepted and apparently conflicting claims about how we should understand the notion of ‘reason giving’ invoked in theorising about reasons for action. According to the first claim, reasons are given by facts about the situation of agents. According to the second claim, reasons are given by ends. I argue that the apparent conflict between these two claims is less deep than is generally recognised.     

Normative Reasons and the Agent-Neutral/Relative Dichotomy

The distinction between the agent-relative and the agent-neutral plays a prominent role in recent attempts to taxonomize normative theories. Its importance extends to most areas in practical philosophy, though. Despite its popularity, the distinction remains difficult to get a good grip on. In part this has to do with the fact that there is no consensus concerning the sort of objects to which we should apply the distinction. Thomas Nagel distinguishes between agent-neutral and agent-relative values, reasons, and principles; Derek Parfit focuses on normative theories (and the aims they provide to agents), David McNaughton and Piers Rawling focus on rules and reasons, Skorupski on predicates, and there are other suggestions too. Some writers suspect that we fundamentally talk about one and the same distinction. This work is about practical reasons for action rather than theoretical reasons for belief. Moreover, focus is on whether reasons do or do not essentially refer to particular agents. A challenge that undermines the dichotomy in this sense is posed. After having rejected different attempts to defend the distinction, it is argued that there is a possible defence that sets out from Jonathan Dancy’s recent distinction between enablers and favourers.     

Salvation Events Left Unattended: An Inquiry into the Unconscious

In this essay I celebrate James E. Dittes’ impact on my ministry by reassessing three strategic moments in the church in Providence I served for thirty-three years: a dinner, a Sunday morning summer service, and the replacement of the church’s dome. I try to step outside of the heroic role assigned me back then, into a probing, however painful, investigation of the church’s, and my own, darker side.     

儒家诗乐思想初探

本文将《上海博物馆藏战国楚竹书·孔子诗论》与传世相关文献联系,辅以《郭店楚墓竹简》相关篇章,探讨儒家诗乐思想源流,分析《毛诗大序》、《乐记》的时代以及二者之间的关系等问题。根据较为可信的传世文献资料,依照古书通例,认为《毛诗大序》、《乐记》为学派著作,成书于战国时期;二者可能有共同的思想来源,我们不当以“抄袭”的观点看待二者。     

Moral Realism, Normative Reasons, and Rational Intelligibility

This paper concerns a prima facie tension between the claims that (a) agents have normative reasons obtaining in virtue of the nature of the options that confront them, and (b) there is a non-trivial connection between the grounds of normative reasons and the upshots of sound practical reasoning. Joint commitment to these claims is shown to give rise to a dilemma. I argue that the dilemma is avoidable on a response dependent account of normative reasons accommodating both (a) and (b) by yielding (a) as a substantial constraint on sound practical reasoning. This fact is shown to have significance for the contemporary dialectic between moral realists and their opponents.     

Acting and Believing Under the Guise of Normative Reasons

In this paper, I defend an account of the reasons for which we act, believe, and so on for any Ф such that there can be reasons for which we Ф. Such reasons are standardly called motivating reasons. I argue that three dominant views of motivating reasons (psychologism, factualism and disjunctivism) all fail to capture the ordinary concept of a motivating reason. I show this by drawing out three constraints on what motivating reasons must be, and demonstrating how each view fails to satisfy at least one of these constraints. I then propose and defend my own account of motivating reasons, which I call the Guise of Normative Reasons Account. On the account I defend, motivating reasons are propositions. A proposition is the reason for which someone Ф‐s when (a) she represents that proposition as a normative reason to Ф, and (b) her representation explains, in the right way, her Ф‐ing. As I argue, the Guise of Normative Reasons Account satisfies all three constraints on what motivating reasons must be, and weathers several objections that might be leveled against propositionalist views.     

五台山旅游开发问题探析

随着旅游业的迅速发展,五台山以其优越的人文和自然资源成为外出旅游的主要目的地之一。但是五台山旅游的开发还存在几个问题:宗教圣地形象没有突出,优美自然风光不能展示,特色纪念品开发不足,旅游开发没有带动周边发展。为此提出几点发展建议。     

On the Connection between Normative Reasons and the Possibility of Acting for those Reasons

According to Bernard Williams, if it is true that A has a normative reason to Φ then it must be possible that A should Φ for that reason. This claim is important both because it restricts the range of reasons which agents can have and because it has been used as a premise in an argument for so-called ‘internalist’ theories of reasons. In this paper I rebut an apparent counterexamples to Williams’ claim: Schroeder’s (2007) example of Nate. I argue that this counterexample fails since it underestimates the range of cases where agents can act for their normative reasons. Moreover, I argue that a key motivation behind Williams’ claim is compatible with this ‘expansive’ account of what it is to act for a normative reason.     

Normative Reasons are not Good Bases: a Reply to Gregory

Philosophia - In a recent paper, Gregory defends the claim that a normative reason is a good basis for Φ-ing. He claims that a “basis” is what is commonly known as a motivating...     

荀子荣辱思想探析

荣辱思想是荀子思想的重要组成部分.在中国伦理思想史上,荀子继承和发展了孔孟的知耻思想,第一次对荣辱问题进行了全面系统的论述.他界定了荣辱的内涵,区分了荣辱的层次,明确了荣辱的实质,探讨了荣辱的价值,并进一步探索了荣辱的养成.研究苟子的荣辱思想,对于我们进一步继承和弘扬中国传统文化中关于荣辱思想的精华、进一步学习和践行社会主义荣辱现有着重要的理论意义和现实价值.     

佛学当代价值意蕴初探

现代佛学是从古印度传入华夏后,经与儒家、道家近千年摩荡而终成中国优秀传统文化之有机组成部分。然而,由于诸种原因,近百年来,佛学一直处于边缘地位,隐而不显。当下人类面临诸多全球性问题,重返经典无疑给人类有益警示,尤其在解决人生问题、伦理道德问题、文化沟通乃至提携科学研究等方面均有着重大的现实意义。     

佛教比喻经典的思想价值探究

佛教比喻经典思想博大宏赡、系统致密,不仅会展示广阔的理论空间,也构成一整套独特的思想方式,成为人们知行兼备、定慧双运的实践和体验。这对我国的社会文化和社会祥和安定都会有一定的作用。     

海德格尔与亚洲语言之双重关系探究

本文旨在对海德格尔与亚洲语言之双重关系的复杂性做出尽量公允并具有说服力的评估。大部分海德格尔的相关论述出现在德文文献中,几乎从未被研究。本文首次对有关资料进行合乎情理的论述。此外,本文揭示海德格尔与亚洲语言两度鲜为人知的相遇。一次是1960年,他询问梵文中对应于“存在”、“存在者”、“揭蔽”、“遗忘”等的哲学术语。另一次则是1958年他与日本学者久松真一在弗莱堡共同主持的“艺术与恩想”论坛,其中他问及日文中关于“艺术”的词语。