Sort out your neighbourhood

Axelrod (The evolution of cooperation, 1984) and others explain how cooperation can emerge in repeated 2-person prisoner’s dilemmas. But in public good games with anonymous contributions, we expect a breakdown of cooperation because direct reciprocity fails. However, if agents are situated in a social network determining which agents interact, and if they can influence the network, then cooperation can be a viable strategy. Social networks are modelled as graphs. Agents play public good games with their neighbours. After each game, they can terminate connections to others, and new connections are created. Cooperative agents do well because they manage to cluster with cooperators and avoid defectors. Computer simulations demonstrate that group formation and exclusion are powerful mechanisms to promote cooperation in dilemma situations. This explains why social dilemmas can often be solved if agents can choose with whom they interact.     

The effect of decision timing on the willingness to costly reward cooperation and punish noncooperation: Sanctioning the past,the present,or the future

Numerous studies have demonstrated that sanctions can promote cooperation. However, it is important to know not only that sanctions can work but also under what conditions people are actually willing to sanction cooperation positively (i.e., reward) or noncooperation negatively (i.e., punish). In this article, we demonstrate that people use sanctions less often and sanction more mildly when they decide about sanctioning before (instead of after) the occurrence of others' (non)cooperation (Experiments 1 and 2), regardless of whether they decide directly afterwards or after a time delay (Experiment 2). Moreover, we reveal that beforehand (as compared with afterwards) people have not yet formed clear sanctioning preferences (Experiment 3). These findings corroborate our reasoning that the decision environment beforehand induces nonconsequential reasoning and thereby hampers people's willingness to sanction. We discuss the theoretical, methodological, and practical implications of our work.     

Cultural influence on COVID-19 cognitions and growth speed: The role of collectivism

Major challenges faced by humans often require large-scale cooperation for communal benefits. We examined what motivates such cooperation in the context of social distancing and mask wearing to reduce the transmission intensity of the coronavirus pandemic (COVID-19). We hypothesized that collectivism, a cultural variable characterizing the extent that individuals see themselves in relation to others, contributes to people's willingness to engage in these behaviors. Consistent with preregistered predictions, across three studies (n = 2864), including a U.S. nationally representative sample, collectivist orientation was positively associated with intentions, positive beliefs, norm perceptions, and policy support for the preventive behaviors. Further, at a country level, more collectivist countries showed lower growth rates in both COVID-19 confirmed cases and deaths. Together, these studies demonstrate the role of collectivism in reducing COVID-19 transmission, and highlight the value of considering culture in public health policies and communications.     

A classification and review of cooperation procedures

The definition of cooperation allows many procedural variations, as revealed by examination of the cooperation literature which includes procedures differing so greatly that it is surprising that all of them are considered under the same topic. This paper attempts to provide a framework for organizing that literature by (1) indicating some procedural dimensions along which cooperation procedures can be classified, (2) classifying and reviewing briefly the research at the extremes of these procedural dimensions, and (3) indicating the behavioral effects that are necessary to demonstrate control by the various cooperation procedures.     

惩罚和社会价值取向对公共物品两难中人际信任与合作行为的影响

通过两个计算机情境模拟实验, 采用“取消惩罚”范式, 引入社会价值取向变量, 发现惩罚对人际信任和合作行为具有消极影响, 具体表现为当惩罚取消后, 经历过惩罚的被试的人际信任水平显著低于无惩罚条件被试的水平。惩罚对博弈者合作行为的影响在社会价值取向不同的博弈者之间存在显著差异：经历过惩罚的亲社会型被试在惩罚取消阶段的合作程度显著低于惩罚存在阶段的合作程度, 并且显著低于无惩罚条件被试的相应水平。惩罚通过亲社会型博弈者的人际信任水平对合作程度产生间接负效应, 即惩罚程度越强, 亲社会型博弈者的人际信任水平越低, 进而使其合作程度也下降。     

Kea cooperate better with sharing affiliates

Controlled studies that focus on intraspecific cooperation tasks have revealed striking similarities, but also differences, in abilities across taxa as diverse as primates, fish, and birds. Such comparisons may provide insight into the specific socio-ecological selection pressures that led to the evolution of cooperation. Unfortunately, however, compared to primates data on birds remain relatively scarce. We tested a New Zealand psittaciform, the kea, in a dyadic cooperation task using the loose-string design. During trials our subjects were in separate compartments, but obtained a common reward that could be divided multiple ways, allowing the examination of reward division effects. Ten individuals were tested twice in 44 combinations of partners. Dyads with a high affiliation score attempted to cooperate more often and were also more often successful in doing so. Furthermore, dyads that shared rewards more equally seemed to be more likely to attempt cooperation in the next trial. Like other bird and some monkey species, but unlike, for example, chimpanzees, kea did not spontaneously show understanding of either the role of the partner or the mechanism behind the cooperation task. This may point to true disparities between species, but may also be due to differences in task design and/or the amount of exposure to similar tasks and individual skills of the subjects.     

Palatable Punishment in Real‐World Social Dilemmas? Punishing Others to Increase Cooperation Among the Unpunished1

Social‐dilemma research has shown that imposing sanctions on defection may increase cooperation, a principle behind attempts to solve real‐world social dilemmas. Yet sanctioning systems are often difficult to implement: They are unpopular and often have large surveillance and enforcement costs. A new sanctioning system, intentionally punishing defection intermittently for some but not all group members, is shown to increase cooperation among those not punished, a finding labeled the spillover effect. This study suggests that the effect cannot be attributed simply to cooperative tendencies, as factors affecting cooperation do not affect the effect's size. The benefits of such a sanctioning system, which preserves the characteristics of social dilemmas, could include minimization of surveillance and enforcement costs, and greater public acceptability.     

Subclinical Bias,Manners, and Moral Harm

Mundane and often subtle forms of bias generate harms that can be fruitfully understood as akin to the harms evident in rudeness. Although subclinical expressions of bias are not mere rudeness, like rudeness they often manifest through the breach of mannerly norms for social cooperation and collaboration. At a basic level, the perceived harm of mundane forms of bias often has much to do with feeling oneself unjustly or arbitrarily cut out of a group, a group that cooperates and collaborates but does not do so with me. Appealing to the subtle but familiar choreography of mannered social interaction, I argue, makes it easier to recognize how exclusion can be accomplished through slight but symbolically significant gestures and styles of interaction, where bias manifests not in announced hostility but in an absence of the cooperation and collaboration upon which we rely socially.     

Movement Synchrony Influences Intergroup Relations in a Minimal Groups Paradigm

Studies show that synchronizing movements with others encourages a collective social identity, leading to increased cooperation within a group. The current study investigated whether movement synchrony impacts social categorization and cooperation across intergroup boundaries. Two 3-person groups were brought together under movement synchrony conditions designed to emphasize different social categorizations of the aggregate: all individuals moved to the same beat, each minimal group moved to a different beat, or each individual moved to a different beat. Results demonstrate that movement synchrony influenced social categorization and cooperation across intergroup boundaries. Implications for approaches to intergroup relations using movement synchrony are noted.     

Cognitive Constraints on How Economic Rewards Affect Cooperation

ABSTRACT— Cooperation often fails to spread in proportion to its potential benefits. This phenomenon is captured by prisoner's dilemma games, in which cooperation rates appear to be determined by the distinctive structure of economic incentives (e.g., $3 for mutual cooperation vs. $5 for unilateral defection). Rather than comparing economic values of cooperating versus not ($3 vs. $5), we tested the hypothesis that players simply compare numeric values (3 vs. 5), such that subjective numbers (mental magnitudes) are logarithmically scaled. Supporting our hypothesis, increasing only numeric values of rewards (from $3 to 300¢) increased cooperation ( Study 1 ), whereas increasing economic values increased cooperation only when there were also numeric increases ( Study 2 ). Thus, changing rewards from 3¢ to 300¢ increased cooperation rates, but an economically identical change from 3¢ to $3 elicited no gains. Finally, logarithmically scaled reward values predicted 97% of variation in cooperation, whereas the face value of economic rewards predicted none. We conclude that representations of numeric value constrain how economic rewards affect cooperation.     

Predicting Safer Sex Practices: The Interactive Role of Partner Cooperation and Cognitive Factors

This study integrates aspects of cognitive and social contextual approaches to understanding the practice of safer sex. Study participants were 398 unmarried college students attending one of two institutions of higher education in Texas. As predicted, individuals who perceived more cooperation from their sexual partner to practice safer sex were significantly more likely to do so than those who saw their partners as uncooperative. Especially important, as predicted, partner cooperation also moderated the relationship between cognitive and behavioral predictors and safer sex. These moderation findings demonstrate that partner cooperation limits the range of operation of psychological factors that have been shown in previous research to play a significant role in deciding to practice safer sex.     

Relative performance and implicit incentives in the intergroup prisoner’s dilemma

This paper illustrates how the payoff matrices of the single group Prisoner’s Dilemma (PD) and the Intergroup Prisoner’s Dilemma (IPD) differentially reinforce cooperation when participants care about relative performance. Examples of particular payoff patterns and thought experiments using a computational simulation demonstrate that withholding cooperation is not always the dominant strategy in the IPD. In the intergroup structure, three conditions differentially reinforce cooperation. When competing groups have equal numbers of cooperators, withholding cooperation is always the dominant strategy just as in the single group structure. In contrast, when one group has more cooperators than the other group, cooperation by its members can dominate withholding cooperation by members of the other group. Thus, the relative advantage of one group over another increases the payoff for cooperation in some configurations of the IPD over the payoff in the PD. Relative payoff is thus an untheorized variable motivating cooperation in the IPD.     

THE ILLUSION OF MORALITY AS SELF-INTEREST:

Abstract— One reason for people's voluntary cooperation in social dilemmas, or altruistic behavior in general, may be their belief that altruism pays off in terms of long-run self-interest. Although this is often true, it is typically false in large-scale social dilemmas among strangers. In three questionnaire studies, subjects endorsed this self-interest illusion frequently for large-scale dilemmas, such as over-fishing and pollution, in which the benefits of cooperation are delayed.     

Excellent Performance: The Role of Communication and Cooperation Processes

This paper summarises recent research on excellent performance in the domains of software development and engineering. The paper focuses on differences between excellent and moderate performers with respect to communication and cooperation activities. When excellent performers' peers were asked to describe an excellent performer, they frequently mentioned competencies referring to cooperation and communication. Compared to moderate performers, excellent performers more often regarded cooperation as a useful strategy. Excellent performers generally participated more in work-related communication and cooperation processes than did moderate performers. Moreover, they were found to be more engaged in specific cooperation-related activities, such as helping coworkers and asking them for feedback.     

Facial electromyography reveals dissociable affective responses in social and non-social cooperation

While economic standard theory explains cooperation in terms of rational decision-making, empirical studies suggest that humans have social preferences for cooperating with others. We investigated the specificity of these social preferences for interactions with human, relative to non-human, agents in a prisoner’s dilemma game. To obtain insights into emotional processes during cooperation, we measured activity of the corrugator supercilii muscle as indicator of spontaneous emotional responding during cooperation. After unreciprocated defection (free-riding), participants switched more often to a cooperative strategy and showed increased corrugator activity (suggesting more negative emotional responses) when playing with a human relative to a computer. This suggests that humans have a specific preference for cooperating with other humans and that cooperation may be promoted by unpleasant affect in response to the outcome of one’s own “free-riding”.     

EFFECTS OF ROTATED LEADERSHIP AND PEER EVALUATION ON THE FUNCTIONING AND EFFECTIVENESS OF SELF-MANAGED TEAMS: A QUASI-EXPERIMENT

In a quasi-experiment of 38 self-managed undergraduate teams, we examined the effects of team designs that differed with respect to the form of member evaluation and team leadership. Relative to teams that relied on external evaluations, teams with peer evaluations had higher levels of workload sharing, voice, cooperation, performance, and member satisfaction. Relative to teams that relied on leader emergence, teams that rotated leadership among members had higher levels of voice, cooperation, and performance. Overall, results of the study demonstrate the potential importance of team-design decisions in self-managed teams.     

Cooperation in Ethnically Diverse Neighborhoods: A Lost‐Letter Experiment

Several studies suggest a negative impact of ethnic diversity on cooperation, but most of them rely on attitudinal and other indirect measurements of cooperation or are derived from the artificial laboratory setting. We conducted a field experiment based on the lost‐letter technique across 52 neighborhoods in Berlin, Germany. The study has two aims. First, we investigate whether the negative effect of ethnic heterogeneity on cooperation holds for concrete cooperative behavior in a real‐world setting. Second, we test the most prominent psychological mechanism that has been proposed to explain the negative effects of heterogeneity on cooperation, namely in‐group favoritism. We do so by experimentally varying the ethnicity and religion of the senders of letters. We find strong support for the negative effect of ethnic diversity on cooperation. We find no evidence, however, of in‐group favoritism. Letters from Turkish or Muslim organizations were as often returned as those from German and Christian organizations, and the ethnic diversity effect was the same for all types of letters.     

Defection in the dark? A randomized‐response investigation of cooperativeness in social dilemma games

As previous research has demonstrated numerous times, humans show a robust tendency for cooperation. However, part—or indeed all—of this cooperativeness may be due to socially desirable responding. To address this problem, we propose and apply a new approach for the unbiased measurement of cooperativeness in social dilemma games. Specifically, we employ an extension of the randomized‐response technique (RRT). The RRT protects the privacy of respondents by adding random noise to their responses. It thus encourages more honest responding and thereby provides less biased estimates of sensitive attributes. In a large‐scale study with 2043 respondents we maximized anonymity in a one‐shot prisoner's dilemma game through use of the RRT. Comparing the prevalence rates for cooperation obtained via the RRT with those from direct self‐report showed that traditional direct questioning formats overestimate cooperation rates, with a relative bias of 18%. This finding suggests that to a considerable extent, self‐reported cooperation is due to socially desirable responding, rather than actual cooperativeness. However, our results also demonstrate that cooperation remains substantial even under conditions of maximized anonymity. Copyright © 2011 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

The benefits of empathy: When empathy may sustain cooperation in social dilemmas

Cooperation in social dilemmas is often challenged by negative noise, or unintended errors, such that the actual behavior is less cooperative than intended—for example, arriving later than intended for a meeting due to an unusual traffic jam. The present research was inspired by the notion that doing a little more for one's interaction partner, which may be movitvated by empathetic feelings, can effectively reduce the detrimental effects of “negative noise,” or unintended incidents of noncooperation. Consistent with hypotheses, negative noise exhibited detrimental effects on cooperation, but such effects were absent when empathy‐motivated cooperation was present. We conclude that empathy has broad benefits for social interaction, in that it can be an effective tool for coping with misinterpreted behaviors, thereby maintaining or enhancing cooperation. Copyright © 2009 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

The Temporal Dynamics of Cooperation

Parties in real-world conflicts often attempt to punish each other's behavior. If this strategy fails to produce mutual cooperation, they may increase punishment magnitude. The present experiment investigated whether delay-reduction - potentially less harmful than magnitude increase - would generate mutual cooperation as interactions are repeated. Participants played a prisoner's dilemma game against a computer that played a tit-for-tat strategy, cooperating after a participant cooperated, defecting after a participant defected. For half of the participants, the delay between their choice and the computer's next choice was long relative to the delay between the computer's choice and their next choice. For the other half, long and short delays were reversed. The tit-for-tat contingency reinforces the other player's cooperation (by cooperating) and punishes the other player's defection (by defecting). Both rewards and punishers are discounted by delay. Consistent with delay discounting, participants cooperated more when the delay between their choice and the computer's cooperation (reward) or defection (punishment) was relatively short. These results suggest that, in real-world tit-for-tat conflicts, decreasing delay of reciprocation or retaliation may foster mutual cooperation as effectively as (or more effectively than) the more usual tactic of increasing magnitude of reciprocation or retaliation.