Do explicit memory manipulations affect the memory blocking effect?

The memory blocking effect (MBE) occurs when people are prevented from completing word fragments because they studied orthographically similar words. Across 3 experiments, we investigated how manipulations that influence explicit memory tasks would influence the MBE. Although a significant MBE was observed in all 3 experiments, manipulating depth of processing (Experiment 1), time to complete the fragments (Experiment 2), and awareness of the MBE (Experiment 3) did not change the magnitude of the MBE. We discuss these results in the context of a suppression mechanism involved in retrieval-induced forgetting.     

Is the brain a memory box?

Bickle argues for both a narrow causal reductionism, and a broader ontological-explanatory reductionism. The former is more successful than the latter. I argue that the central and unsolved problem in Bickle's approach to reductionism involves the nature of psychological terms. Investigating why the broader reductionism fails indicates ways in which phenomenology remains more than a handmaiden of neuroscience.     

Underestimating the duration of future events: memory incorrectly used or memory bias?

People frequently underestimate how long it will take them to complete a task. The prevailing view is that during the prediction process, people incorrectly use their memories of how long similar tasks have taken in the past because they take an overly optimistic outlook. A variety of evidence is reviewed in this article that points to a different, although not mutually exclusive, explanation: People base predictions of future duration on their memories of how long past events have taken, but these memories are systematic underestimates of past duration. People appear to underestimate future event duration because they underestimate past event duration.     

How does the hippocampus contribute to memory?

Recently, Wirth et al. reported that hippocampal neurons signal the acquisition of new associations by altering the selectivity of their responses to crucial stimuli. The course of these changes was gradual, with some neurons recruited before, others at the time of, and yet others shortly after learning. These observations suggest the hippocampus might contribute to memory by identifying consistencies across experiences that constitute important new associations.     

Adaptive memory: Is the animacy effect on memory due to emotional arousal?

Animate entities are often better remembered than inanimate ones. The proximal mechanisms underlying this animacy effect on recall are unclear. In two experiments, we tested whether the animacy effect is due to emotional arousal. Experiment 1 revealed that translations of the animate words used in the pioneering study of Nairne et al. (Psychological science, 24, 2099–2105, 2013) were perceived as being more arousing than translations of the inanimate words, suggesting that animacy might have been confounded with arousal in previous studies. In Experiment 2, new word lists were created in which the animate and inanimate words were matched on arousal (amongst several other dimensions), and participants were required to reproduce the animate and inanimate words in a free recall task. There was a tendency towards better memory for arousing items, but robust animacy effects were obtained even though animate and inanimate words were matched on arousal. Thus, while arousal may contribute to the animacy effect when it is not carefully controlled for, it cannot explain the memory advantage of animate items.     

Do the mentally retarded have poor memory?

The hypothesis that mentally retarded persons have a short-term memory deficit whixh is due to inadequate rehearsal strategies is reexamined. A reevaluation of results of a number of experiments suggests that normal and retarded persons differ on short-term memory tasks, and the superiority of normals is present from the time of initial stimulus exposure. While some evidence for slope differences in retention curves is found in a few tasks, it is not strong support for memory differences. The hypothesis that “memory” differences are due to differential encoding as a result of more adequate rehearsal by the normal subjects is unacceptable. If this were the case, some differences in slope of retention curves could be expected unless rehearsal beyond the encoding stage was totally precluded. The review points to a need for an empirical reevaluation of the issue with a full recognition that deficits in particular processes may characterize some retarded persons and not others.     

Does strategic memory training improve the working memory performance of younger and older adults?

The paper examines the effect of strategic training on the performance of younger and older adults in an immediate list-recall and a working memory task. The experimental groups of younger and older adults received three sessions of memory training, teaching the use of mental images to improve the memorization of word lists. In contrast, the control groups were not instructed to use any particular strategy, but they were requested to carry out the memory exercises. The results showed that strategic training improved performance of both the younger and older experimental groups in the immediate list recall and in the working memory task. Of particular interest, the improvement in working memory performance of the older experimental group was comparable to that of the younger experimental group.     

Does working memory training promote the use of strategies on untrained working memory tasks?

Adaptive computerized training has been associated with significant enhancements in untrained working memory tasks, but the nature of the cognitive changes that underpin these improvements are not yet fully understood. Here, we investigate the possibility that training stimulates the use of memory-related strategies. In a randomized controlled trial, participants completed four tests of working memory before receiving adaptive working memory training, nonadaptive working memory training with low memory loads, or no training. Open-ended interviews about strategy use were conducted after the administration of untrained working memory tasks at two time points. Those in the adaptive and nonadaptive groups completed the assessments before (T1) and after (T2) 10 training sessions. The no-training group completed the same set of tasks at T1 and T2, without any training between assessment points. Adaptive training was associated with selective improvements in untrained tests of working memory, accompanied by a significant increase in the use of a grouping strategy for visuospatial short-term memory and verbal working memory tasks. These results indicate that training-related improvements in working memory may be mediated by implicit and spontaneous changes in the use of strategies to subsegment sequences of information into groups for recall when the tasks used at test overlap with those used during training.     

Can the memory enhancement of the survival judgment task be explained by the elaboration hypothesis?: Evidence from a memory load paradigm1

Many reports have described a survival judgment task that requires participants to judge words according to their relevance to a survival situation, eliciting better recall than that obtained in other judgment tasks (e.g., semantic or self‐judgment tasks). Two explanatory hypotheses (the adaptive hypothesis and the elaboration hypothesis) have been proposed. Here we used the memory load paradigm to investigate whether the adaptive hypothesis or the combination hypothesis can better account for the memory enhancement of the survival judgment task. We used a survival judgment task and an autobiographical recall task with the condition of no memory load or memory load. The 48 participants performed four encoding conditions (memory load—survival, no memory load—survival, memory load—autobiographical, and no memory load—autobiographical). The results showed that memory enhancement of the survival judgment task occurred only in the no memory load condition, but not in the memory load condition. Our results support the elaboration hypothesis. We also discuss the validity of the elaboration hypothesis and future directions to be pursued in this research field.     

Is external memory memory? Biological memory and extended mind

Clark and Chalmers (1998) claim that an external resource satisfying the following criteria counts as a memory: (1) the agent has constant access to the resource; (2) the information in the resource is directly available; (3) retrieved information is automatically endorsed; (4) information is stored as a consequence of past endorsement. Research on forgetting and metamemory shows that most of these criteria are not satisfied by biological memory, so they are inadequate. More psychologically realistic criteria generate a similar classification of standard putative external memories, but the criteria still do not capture the function of memory. An adequate account of memory function, compatible with its evolution and its roles in prospection and imagination, suggests that external memory performs a function not performed by biological memory systems. External memory is thus not memory. This has implications for: extended mind theorizing, ecological validity of memory research, the causal theory of memory.     

Cogmed working memory training: Does the evidence support the claims?

Cogmed working memory training is sold as a tool for improving cognitive abilities, such as attention and reasoning. At present, this program is marketed to schools as a means of improving underperforming students’ scholastic performance, and is also available at clinical practices as a treatment for ADHD. We review research conducted with Cogmed software and highlight several concerns regarding methodology and replicability of findings. We conclude that the claims made by Cogmed are largely unsubstantiated, and recommend that future research place greater emphasis on developing theoretically motivated accounts of working memory training.     

What's in a name for memory errors? Implications and ethical issues arising from the use of the term "false memory" for errors in memory for details

The term "false memories" has been used to refer to suggestibility experiments in which whole events are apparently confabulated and in media accounts of contested memories of childhood abuse. Since 1992 psychologists have increasingly used the term "false memory" when discussing memory errors for details, such as specific words within lists. Use of the term to refer to errors in details is a shift in language away from other terms used historically (e.g., "memory intrusions"). We empirically examine this shift in language and discuss implications of the new use of the term "false memories." Use of the term presents serious ethical challenges to the data-interpretation process by encouraging over-generalization and misapplication of research findings on word memory to social issues.     

There’s more to the working memory capacity—fluid intelligence relationship than just secondary memory

The present study examined the claim that secondary memory processes account for the correlation between working memory capacity and fluid intelligence via a latent variable analysis. In the present study, participants performed multiple measures of secondary memory, working memory capacity, and fluid intelligence. Structural equation modeling suggested that both secondary memory and working memory capacity account for unique variance in fluid intelligence. These results are inconsistent with recent claims that working memory capacity does not account for variance in fluid intelligence over and above what is accounted for by secondary memory. Rather, the results are consistent with models of working memory capacity that suggest that both maintenance and retrieval processes are needed to account for the substantial relation between working memory capacity and fluid intelligence.     

Is the attentional blink effect located in short-term memory?

The attentional blink (AB) effect is characterized by a failure to detect a second target following the identification of a previous target in a RSVP stream. This effect has been attributed to capacity limitations at a central level of visual information processes. Postperceptual models suppose that the AB locus is located in short-term memory. To test this hypothesis, we investigated the influence of a short-term memory deficit on the AB effect in a patient with such a deficit. The three main results of this study are (1) the persistence of an AB effect, (2) a large number of T1 missed identifications and (3) a T2 detection deficit for a specific delay (367 ms). These results indicate that a short-term memory deficit disrupts the processing of each target (T1 and T2) but does not product an abolition of the AB effect.     

Reconsidering ‘spatial memory’ and the Morris water maze

The Morris water maze has been put forward in the philosophy of neuroscience as an example of an experimental arrangement that may be used to delineate the cognitive faculty of spatial memory (e.g., Craver and Darden, Theory and method in the neurosciences, University of Pittsburgh Press, Pittsburgh, 2001; Craver, Explaining the brain: Mechanisms and the mosaic unity of neuroscience, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2007). However, in the experimental and review literature on the water maze throughout the history of its use, we encounter numerous responses to the question of “what” phenomenon it circumscribes ranging from cognitive functions (e.g., “spatial learning”, “spatial navigation”), to representational changes (e.g., “cognitive map formation”) to terms that appear to refer exclusively to observable changes in behavior (e.g., “water maze performance”). To date philosophical analyses of the water maze have not been directed at sorting out what phenomenon the device delineates nor the sources of the different answers to the question of what. I undertake both of these tasks in this paper. I begin with an analysis of Morris’s first published research study using the water maze and demonstrate that he emerged from it with an experimental learning paradigm that at best circumscribed a discrete set of observable changes in behavior. However, it delineated neither a discrete set of representational changes nor a discrete cognitive function. I cite this in combination with a reductionist-oriented research agenda in cellular and molecular neurobiology dating back to the 1980s as two sources of the lack of consistency across the history of the experimental and review literature as to what is under study in the water maze.     

Does the radial arm maze necessarily test spatial memory?

Since its design 25 years ago (Olton & Samuelson, 1976), the eight-arm radial maze has become very popular and is now widely used to assess spatial memory in rodents. Two versions of the full-baited maze protocol are present in the literature: with or without confinement between the visit of each arm. The confinement was introduced by Olton himself as early as 1977 (Olton, Collison, & Werz, 1977) to eliminate stereotypic behaviors that he had previously observed. It is widely regarded that the confinement prevents rodents from developing these response patterns, and as such it is considered an improved procedure to test spatial memory. Surprisingly, to the best of our knowledge, no study has been especially designed to demonstrate the efficacy of the confinement in blocking the stereotypic behaviors of the animals. The present study compares the strategies of rats trained with or without a confinement procedure. The results show that, after nine days of training, rats submitted to a 5- or a 10-s confinement reach the same level of performance as rats without confinement. The confinement totally prevents stereotypic behaviors like clockwise serial searching strategies which are often observed without confinement. Even a 0-s confinement is sufficient to prevent clockwise strategies, but rats seem to develop other stratagems which do not imply spatial memory. Furthermore, rats previously trained without confinement are unable to perform the task when confinement is introduced on a test day. In contrast, rats previously trained with confinement perform the task correctly when the confinement is no longer present. Thus, without confinement, good levels of performance can be achieved without precise spatial representations.     

Enhanced memory for the wolf in sheep’s clothing:: Facial trustworthiness modulates face-trait associative memory

Our decision about whether to trust and cooperate with someone is influenced by the individual’s facial appearance despite its limited predictive power. Thus, remembering trustworthy-looking cheaters is more important than remembering untrustworthy-looking cheaters because we are more likely to trust and cooperate with the former, resulting in a higher risk of unreciprocated cooperation. The present study investigated whether our mind adaptively copes with this problem by enhancing memory for trustworthy-looking cheaters. Participants played a debt game, wherein they learned to discriminate among good, neutral, and bad lenders, who respectively charged no, moderate, and high interest on the debt. Each lender had either a trustworthy- or untrustworthy-looking face. A subsequent memory test revealed that participants remembered the bad traits of trustworthy-looking lenders more accurately than those of untrustworthy-looking lenders. The results demonstrate enhanced memory for trustworthy-looking cheaters, or wolves in sheep’s clothing, implying that humans are equipped with protective mechanisms against disguised, unfaithful signs of trustworthiness.