Punishing for your own good: the case of reputation-based cooperation

Contrary to Guala, I claim that several mechanisms can explain punishment in humans. Here I focus on reputation-based cooperation--and I explore how it can lead to punishment under situations that may or may not be perceived as being anonymous. Additionally, no particular mechanism stands out in predicting an excess of punishment under constrained lab conditions.     

Reciprocity: weak or strong? What punishment experiments do (and do not) demonstrate

Economists and biologists have proposed a distinction between two mechanisms--"strong" and "weak" reciprocity--that may explain the evolution of human sociality. Weak reciprocity theorists emphasize the benefits of long-term cooperation and the use of low-cost strategies to deter free-riders. Strong reciprocity theorists, in contrast, claim that cooperation in social dilemma games can be sustained by costly punishment mechanisms, even in one-shot and finitely repeated games. To support this claim, they have generated a large body of evidence concerning the willingness of experimental subjects to punish uncooperative free-riders at a cost to themselves. In this article, I distinguish between a "narrow" and a "wide" reading of the experimental evidence. Under the narrow reading, punishment experiments are just useful devices to measure psychological propensities in controlled laboratory conditions. Under the wide reading, they replicate a mechanism that supports cooperation also in "real-world" situations outside the laboratory. I argue that the wide interpretation must be tested using a combination of laboratory data and evidence about cooperation "in the wild." In spite of some often-repeated claims, there is no evidence that cooperation in the small egalitarian societies studied by anthropologists is enforced by means of costly punishment. Moreover, studies by economic and social historians show that social dilemmas in the wild are typically solved by institutions that coordinate punishment, reduce its cost, and extend the horizon of cooperation. The lack of field evidence for costly punishment suggests important constraints about what forms of cooperation can or cannot be sustained by means of decentralised policing.     

The social and psychological costs of punishing

We review evidence of the psychological and social costs associated with punishing. We propose that these psychological and social costs should be considered (in addition to material costs) when searching for evidence of costly punishment "in the wild."     

Punishment under threat: The role of personality in costly punishment

It is often assumed that people engage in costly punishment of third parties for prosocial reasons. In this study, we examined to what extent people engage in costly punishment of third parties in response to a perceived punishment threat rather than due to prosocial reasons. Using a modified public goods game with a punishment stage, we show that personality plays an important role in determining which of these processes drive costly punishment. We found that Honesty-Humility, which is related to prosociality, facilitates costly punishment independent of expected punishment to oneself, while Emotionality, which is related to fearfulness, facilitates punishment that is mediated by expected punishment. Agreeableness, which is related to anger and displaced aggression, had no effect on costly punishment.     

Strong reciprocity is real, but there is no evidence that uncoordinated costly punishment sustains cooperation in the wild

I argue in my target article that field evidence does not support the costly punishment hypothesis. Some commentators object to my reading of the evidence, while others agree that evidence in favour of costly punishment is scant. Most importantly, no rigorous measurement of cost-benefit ratios in the field has been attempted so far. This lack of evidence does not rule out costly punishment as a cause of human cooperation, but it does pre-empt some overconfident claims made in the past. Other commentators have interpreted my article as an anti-experimental pamphlet or as a flat denial of the existence of pro-social motives--which it was not intended to be. While we have enough data to establish the existence (and theoretical relevance) of strong reciprocity motives, I argue in this response that their efficacy (and policy relevance) has not been demonstrated.     

War Crimes and Expressive Theories of Punishment: Communication or Denunciation?

In a paper published in 2006, I argued that the best way of defending something like our current practices of punishing war criminals would be to base the justification of this practice on an expressive theory of punishment. I considered two forms that such a justification could take—a ‘denunciatory’ account, on which the purpose of punishment is supposed to communicate a commitment to certain kinds of standard to individuals other than the criminal and a ‘communicative’ account, on which the purpose of the punishment is to communicate with the perpetrator, and argued for a denunciatory account which I developed at some length. In this paper I would like to reconsider the plausibility of a communicative account. One difficulty that such accounts face is that the punishment of war criminals often involves the inflicting of harsh treatment on them by individuals who are members of states other than their own. On a communicative account this is problematic: on such an account—or at least on the version of it proposed by Duff (2000)—it is essential that those who are punish and those who punish them belong to a single community. When this requirement is not satisfied harsh treatment does not constitute punishment. Duff has argued that the problem can be solved by regarding all human beings as members of a single moral community: here I argue that this suggestion is unsatisfactory and propose an alternative. One consequence of my account is that if it is correct there may limitations on the range of kinds of war criminal that can legitimately be punished by international tribunals.     

Effects of Gender on Costly Punishment

Women are often believed to be more cooperative and less egoistic than men. In the present study, we examined whether people punish women for failing to live up to these benevolent gender stereotypes. Participants played a prisoner's dilemma game with female and male partners who either cooperated or defected. Participants were offered a costly punishment option. They could spend money to decrease the payment of their partners. In Experiment 1, participants spent more money to punish the defection of female in comparison to male partners, but this effect of partner gender on punishment was indirect rather than direct: Participants were more likely to cooperate with female partners than with male partners, which gave them more opportunity for moralistic punishment. In Experiments 2 and 3, we examined the effects of the participants' own gender on cooperation and punishment of female and male partners. Female participants cooperated more with female partners than with male partners while male participants treated female and male partners equally. We conclude that the effect of facial gender on punishment are indirect rather than direct. The results also showed that women, in contrast to men, tended to make decisions that can be considered more social and less rational from an economic point of view, consistent with social‐role theory and evolutionary accounts. Copyright © 2017 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Amount of altruistic punishment accounts for subsequent emotional gratification in participants with primary psychopathy

We are often willing to incur personal costs in order to punish people that violate group norms. Previous studies have suggested that high-psychopathy participants may engage in more such “altruistic punishment behaviors” than those with lower levels of psychopathy. Although this finding could suggest that psychopathy is in fact associated with prosocial behavior, high-psychopathy participants show clear evidence of various decision-making and emotional deficits. It is therefore possible that the increased altruistic punishment behavior observed in psychopathy participants is in some fashion related to such deficits. To address this possibility, we administered the altruistic punishment paradigm to a group of university students with low and high levels of psychopathy (N = 50). We found that high-psychopathy participants (n = 24) gave defectors significantly more punishment than did low psychopathy participants (n = 26), under personally costly conditions. Furthermore, a mediational analysis revealed that the amount of altruistic punishment administered completely mediated the relationship between primary psychopathy and a person’s emotional gratification subsequent to performing the altruistic punishment behavior. These findings suggest that while high psychopathy participants do appear to engage in greater levels of altruistic punishment behavior, they may do this largely for their own emotional gratification.     

Understanding the Dark Side of Costly Punishment: The Impact of Individual Differences in Everyday Sadism and Existential Threat

In public goods situations, a specific destructive behaviour reliably emerges when individuals face the possibility of costly punishing others: antisocial punishment, that is, costly punishing cooperative individuals. So far, however, little is known about the individual differences and situational factors that are associated with the dark side of costly punishment. This research deals with this shortcoming. We argue that antisocial punishment reflects the basic characteristics of sadism, namely, aggressive behaviour to dominate and to harm other individuals. We further argue that antisocial punishment may reflect a type of behaviour that allows for the maintenance of self‐esteem (through aggressively dominating others). Therefore, we expect that individuals who report a disposition for everyday sadism are particularly likely to engage in antisocial punishment when their self has been threatened (by thinking about one's own death). In a study (N = 99), we found empirical support for this assumption. The present research contributes to a better understanding of antisocial punishment and suggests that sadistic tendencies play a crucial role, especially when the self is (existentially) threatened. Copyright © 2015 European Association of Personality Psychology     

Taxing behavioral control diminishes sharing and costly punishment in childhood

Instances of altruism in children are well documented. However, the underlying mechanisms of such altruistic behavior are still under considerable debate. While some claim that altruistic acts occur automatically and spontaneously, others argue that they require behavioral control. This study focuses on the mechanisms that give rise to prosocial decisions such as sharing and costly punishment. In two studies it is shown in 124 children aged 6–9 years that behavioral control plays a critical role for both prosocial decisions and costly punishment. Specifically, the studies assess the influence of taxing aspects of self‐regulation, such as behavioral control (Study 1) and emotion regulation (Study 2) on subsequent decisions in a Dictator and an Ultimatum Game. Further, children's perception of fairness norms and emotional experience were measured. Taxing children's behavioral control prior to making their decisions reduced sharing and costly punishment of unfair offers, without changing perception of fairness norms or the emotional experience. Conversely, taxing children's emotion regulation prior to making their decisions only led to increased experience of anger at seeing unfair offers, but left sharing, costly punishment and the perception of fairness norms unchanged. These findings stress the critical role of behavioral control in prosocial giving and costly punishment in childhood.     

The Advantage of Democratic Peer Punishment in Sustaining Cooperation within Groups

In social dilemma situations, individuals benefit from uncooperative behavior while exploiting resources of the collective. One prominent solution to prevent uncooperative behavior and to increase cooperation is to establish a system of costly peer punishment, that is, the possibility for every individual involved in the dilemma to impose costly punishment on interaction partners. However, recent research revealed that, in contrast to a situation without punishment, peer punishment is inefficient and maladaptive in the sense that the total payoff is reduced and punishment of cooperative individuals (i.e., antisocial punishment) is possible. In the present work, we propose that a system of democratic peer punishment, that is, direct and equal participation of each individual in the punishment decision‐making process with punishment only executed when a majority has voted for its execution, can address the shortcomings of a peer punishment system. Using iterated public goods games, we show higher cooperation levels, higher total payoffs, and reduced executed punishment in the democratic compared with a peer punishment system. Moreover, we document that fairness perceptions, satisfaction, and interpersonal trust are increased in the democratic punishment system. Implications for how cooperation and democratic punishment systems may evolve are discussed. Copyright © 2018 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Anger motivates costly punishment of unfair behavior

In this article we provide empirical support for anger as an underlying mechanism of costly punishment in three studies. A first study showed that participants punished other players more the less these players cooperated in a Public Goods Game and that this effect was mediated by experienced anger. A second study showed that participants appraised non-cooperation in a Sequential Trust Game (STG) as more unfair than cooperation and that they imposed more costly punishment on unfair others as compared to fair others. The effect of appraised unfairness on imposed punishment was mediated by anger. Moreover, a third study showed that following an anger induction in an unrelated task, participants imposed more costly punishment on unfair players in a subsequent STG.     

A Political Account of Corporate Moral Responsibility

Should we conceive of corporations as entities to which moral responsibility can be attributed? This contribution presents what we will call a political account of corporate moral responsibility. We argue that in modern, liberal democratic societies, there is an underlying political need to attribute greater levels of moral responsibility to corporations. Corporate moral responsibility is essential to the maintenance of social coordination that both advances social welfare and protects citizens’ moral entitlements. This political account posits a special capacity of self-governance that corporations can intelligibly be said to possess. Corporations can be said to be “administrators of duty” in that they can voluntarily incorporate moral principles into their decision-making processes about how to conduct business. This account supplements and partly transforms earlier pragmatic accounts of corporate moral responsibility by disentangling responsibility from its conventional linkages with accountability, blame and punishment. It thereby represents a distinctive way to defend corporate moral responsibility and shows how Kantian thinking can be helpful in disentangling the problems surrounding the concept.     

Retaliation and antisocial punishment are overlooked in many theoretical models as well as behavioral experiments

Guala argues that there is a mismatch between most laboratory experiments on costly punishment and behavior in the field. In the lab, experimental designs typically suppress retaliation. The same is true for most theoretical models of the co-evolution of costly punishment and cooperation, which a priori exclude the possibility of defectors punishing cooperators.     

Individual Differences in Antisocial Punishment in Public Goods Situations: The Interplay of Cortisol with Testosterone and Dominance

This research investigates which endocrinological and psychological factors are associated with individuals' tendency to engage in destructive antisocial punishment, that is, to costly punish cooperative individuals in public goods situations. In this work, we focus on the interplay of endogenous cortisol with testosterone and dominance. We applied the dual‐hormone hypothesis according to which testosterone is positively associated with destructive and dominant behavior but only in individuals with low levels of cortisol. Study 1 shows that individuals are more likely to engage in destructive antisocial punishment in a public goods game with the option to punish when their testosterone level is high, given that their level of cortisol is low, which bolsters the dual‐hormone hypothesis. In contrast, no significant interaction effect of testosterone and cortisol emerges for the punishment of uncooperative free‐riders (altruistic punishment). In a second study, we build on these findings and document that self‐reported dominance is only positively associated with antisocial punishment (but not with altruistic punishment) when cortisol is low. In sum, the results indicate the importance of taking endocrinological and psychological factors (and their interactions) into account in order to reach a comprehensive understanding of individuals' behavior in social dilemma situations. Copyright © 2013 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

The strategic logic of costly punishment necessitates natural field experiments, and at least one such experiment exists

Costly punishment's scarcity "in the wild" does not belie strong reciprocity theory as Guala claims. In the presence of strong reciprocators, strategic defectors will cooperate and sanctioning will not occur. Accordingly, natural field experiments are necessary to assess a "wide" reading of costly punishment experiments. One such field experiment exists, and it supports the hypothesis that costly punishment promotes cooperation.     

Rational Redundancy in Referring Expressions: Evidence from Event-related Potentials

In referential communication, Grice's Maxim of Quantity is thought to imply that utterances conveying unnecessary information should incur comprehension difficulties. There is, however, considerable evidence that speakers frequently encode redundant information in their referring expressions, raising the question as to whether such overspecifications hinder listeners’ processing. Evidence from previous work is inconclusive, and mostly comes from offline studies. In this article, we present two event-related potential (ERP) experiments, investigating the real-time comprehension of referring expressions that contain redundant adjectives in complex visual contexts. Our findings provide support for both Gricean and bounded-rational accounts. We argue that these seemingly incompatible results can be reconciled if common ground is taken into account. We propose a bounded-rational account of overspecification, according to which even redundant words can be beneficial to comprehension to the extent that they facilitate the reduction of listeners’ uncertainty regarding the target referent.     

Weak reciprocity alone cannot explain peer punishment

The claims about (1) the lack of empirical support for a model of strong reciprocation and (2) the irrelevant empirical role of costly punishment to support cooperation in the field need qualifications. The interpretation of field evidence is not straightforward, and other-regarding preferences are also likely to play a role in the field.     

公共物品困境中惩罚的形式与作用

公共物品困境中对惩罚的操纵表明：惩罚搭便车可以维持群体内的合作行为。早期研究表明, 惩罚的设置有助于建立社会合作规范, 有代价惩罚、利他惩罚和第三方惩罚等惩罚形式为间接互惠提供了合理的解释。随着实证研究的进一步深入, 惩罚表现出新的形式, 如自私惩罚和反社会惩罚, 被惩罚者的威胁报复将使合作者不再继续惩罚搭便车行为, 导致合作行为的减少直至消失。正当性理论、道德情感理论和文化基因协同进化理论表明惩罚的存在具有一定的必要性和价值, 惩罚的作用存在框架效应。本文介绍了一些有关的中介变量, 如利他、信任、声誉、文化、期望等, 可以对惩罚作用的积极面和破坏性予以适当的解释, 也为合作的心理机制研究提供新的视角。     

With a Sword Pointing to the East,West, South,and North

In his In Defense of War, Nigel Biggar argues for an account of war based in Christian love. In the process, he opposes Christian pacifists, the British Left, liberal accounts of just‐war, and accounts of just‐war based on self‐defense. Although framed in terms of love, his account pivots around punishment, which is further explicated by a thorough review of the recent war in Iraq, the invasion of which he deems justified. This review compares Biggar's monograph to prior iterations of a love‐based approach to just war by Paul Ramsey and Oliver O'Donovan. Biggar's contributions regarding love, punishment, and policy analysis are recognized, as well as his attempt to carry on the tradition of the ‘mournful warrior’. As a model for the kind of scrutiny that Christian ethicists should bring to bear on serious social issues, Biggar's monograph is excellent. However, the political stance and – largely implicit and unstated – political theology operating behind this book are, in the end, disconcerting.