The social structure of cooperation and punishment

The standard theories of cooperation in humans, which depend on repeated interaction and reputation effects among self-regarding agents, are inadequate. Strong reciprocity, a predisposition to participate in costly cooperation and the punishment, fosters cooperation where self-regarding behaviors fail. The effectiveness of socially coordinated punishment depends on individual motivations to participate, which are based on strong reciprocity motives. The relative infrequency of high-cost punishment is a result of the ubiquity of strong reciprocity, not its absence.     

The social and psychological costs of punishing

We review evidence of the psychological and social costs associated with punishing. We propose that these psychological and social costs should be considered (in addition to material costs) when searching for evidence of costly punishment "in the wild."     

主观社会阶层正向预测利他性惩罚

利他性惩罚是指个体自行承担成本来惩罚违规者的行为, 它受到社会阶层的影响。研究1利用2013年中国综合社会调查数据发现阶层显著正向预测利他性惩罚。研究2 (N = 450)基于真实生活事件的调查表明, 惩罚成本调节了阶层对惩罚的影响：在成本较高的直接惩罚中, 阶层正向预测惩罚; 而在成本较低的间接惩罚中, 这种作用不再显著。研究3 (N = 232)通过操纵阶层与成本进一步证实惩罚成本的调节作用：高阶层者比低阶层者更有可能做出利他性惩罚, 但两者的差距在高成本条件下更突出。研究4 (N = 125)综合考察了阶层影响惩罚的心理机制, 多层线性分析显示：惩罚成本较低时, 阶层通过公正世界信念来间接影响惩罚, 而成本较高时, 阶层直接正向影响了惩罚。上述结果意味着利他性惩罚受到个体社会阶层的影响, 同时也在一定程度上说明在利他性惩罚中基于成本-收益的策略性考虑并非完全缺席。     

A motivational perspective on punishment in social dilemmas

In social dilemma situations, individuals benefit from uncooperative behaviour while exploiting resources of the collective. One prominent solution to prevent uncooperative behaviour and to increase cooperation is to establish a sanction system in that private resources are invested by individuals to punish uncooperative interaction partners. The present review is intended to provide an overview concerning motivational determinants of punishment in social dilemma situations. Specifically, we (a) outline that fairness concerns and revenge motivate individuals to punish uncooperative other individuals, (b) show that this is done especially when they possess the basic motivational orientation of a prevention focus. We (c) illustrate that individuals do not punish to acquire a good reputation in the eyes of others, and (d) elaborate on whether individuals punish to regulate satisfaction. Finally, we present empirically neglected motivational factors in studies on punishment in social dilemmas and discuss limitations and possible future directions in this field of research.     

The enemy between us: The psychological and social costs of inequality

There is now substantial evidence that larger income differences in a society increase the prevalence of most of the health and social problems that tend to occur more frequently lower down the social ladder. The pathways through which human beings are sensitive to inequality are however less clear. This paper outlines the explanatory theory that we think best fits the growing but incomplete body of evidence available. Inequality appears to have its most fundamental effects on the quality of social relations—with implications affecting the prevalence of a number of psychopathologies. We suggest that human beings have two contrasting evolved social strategies: one that is adaptive to living in a dominance hierarchy and the other appropriate to more egalitarian societies based on reciprocity and cooperation. Although both strategies are used in all societies, we hypothesise that the balance between them changes with the extent of material inequality.     

When the strong punish: why net costs of punishment are often negligible

In small-scale societies, punishment of adults is infrequent and employed when the anticipated cost-to-benefit ratio is low, such as when punishment is collectively justified and administered. In addition, benefits may exceed costs when punishers have relatively greater physical and social capital and gain more from cooperation. We provide examples from the Tsimane horticulturalists of Bolivia to support our claims.     

Effects of vicarious reward and punishment on social imitation in chronic psychotics

Despite considerable evidence that modeling procedures provide effective methods for the acquisition and change of behavior, there is very little research on the effects of vicarious reward, and none on the effects of vicarious punishment, on social imitation in chronic psychotics. Two studies (Goldstein et al., 1973: Gutride, Goldstein and Hunter, 1973) demonstrated the superiority of vicarious reward over no-treatment with adult psychotics. However, in neither study was a model no-consequences group included in order to control for the effects of observation per se; therefore, such findings cannot be clearly attributed to vicarious reinforcement (Thelen and Rennie, 1972). The only other study known to bear on this issue revealed no differences in initial learning between a model-rewarded and a model no-consequences group (Olson, 1971).The present study included model no-consequences control groups in an attempt to examine the effects of vicarious reward and punishment on subsequent interview behavior in chronic psychotics. Drawing on the larger body of vicarious learning research (Bandura, 1969). it was hypothesized that such patients demonstrate higher levels of socially appropriate behavior after observation of a model who is (a) rewarded for appropriate behavior or (b) punished for inappropriate responses, and lower levels of appropriate behavior after exposure to a model who is (c) rewarded for inappropriate behavior or (d) punished for appropriate responses, relative to conditions in which the same modeled behaviors elicit no contingent consequences.     

The costs of benefits: help-refusals highlight key trade-offs of social life.

Social living provides opportunities for cooperative interdependence and concomitant opportunities to obtain help from others in times of need. Nevertheless, people frequently refuse help from others, even when it would be beneficial. Decisions to accept or reject aid offers may provide a window into the adaptive trade-offs recipients make between costs and benefits in different key domains of social life. Following from evolutionary and ecological perspectives, we consider how help-recipient decision making might reflect qualitatively different threats to goal attainment within six fundamental domains of social life (coalition formation, status, self-protection, mate acquisition, mate retention, and familial care). Accepting help from another person is likely to involve very different threats and opportunities depending on which domains are currently active. This approach can generate a variety of novel empirical predictions and suggest new implications for the delivery of aid.     

The overshadowing and blocking of punishment

Two experiments were undertaken to test the assumption that the outcome of an instrumental contingency depends on the acquisition of signalling properties by the response in the same sense that the acquisition of signalling properties by a stimulus is viewed as determining the outcome of a Pavlovian contingency. The presence coincident with a punished response of a stimulus either previously or preferentially correlated with shock was found to reduce the extent to which punishment suppressed the rate of responding. It was argued that these results, interpreted as indicating the blocking and overshadowing of the response-shock association, were consistent with the assumption tested.     

Equality as a benchmark for third-party punishment and reward: The moderating role of uncertainty in social dilemmas

The present paper focuses on third-parties’ decisions to punish and reward in social dilemmas, and on the moderating role of environmental uncertainty (i.e., uncertainty about the size of the common resource). We argue and demonstrate that in social dilemmas third-parties use the equality rule as a strict benchmark to determine punishments (Study 1) as well as rewards (Study 2), but only under environmental certainty. Under environmental uncertainty, third-parties do not apply such a strict benchmark to distinguish cooperators from defectors. Instead, they appear to use the following rule: the more an individual group member has cooperated the less he/she should be punished (Study 1) and the more he/she should be rewarded (Study 2). As such, these findings are the first to demonstrate that third-party sanctioning decisions are moderated by environmental uncertainty.     

Experiments combining communication with punishment options demonstrate how individuals can overcome social dilemmas

Guala raises important questions about the misinterpretation of experimental studies that have found that subjects engage in costly punishment. Instead of positing that punishment is the solution for social dilemmas, earlier research posited that when individuals facing a social dilemma agreed on their own rules and used graduated sanctions, they were more likely to have robust solutions over time.     

The empowering effect of punishment on forgiveness

We examined the process by which punishment enables forgiveness, testing the proposition that punishment restores a sense of justice to victims, an experience that is empowering. In Study 1 (N = 69), university students received insulting feedback and were given the opportunity (or not) to sanction the offender. In Study 2 (N = 91), participants imagined having the opportunity (or not) to recommend punishment for a person who had vandalized their house. A two‐step mediation model (punishment justice restoration empowerment forgiveness) was supported in these two studies. In Study 3 (N = 227), punishment options were expanded to test the role of victim voice in the context of third‐party and personal retributive and restorative justice responses to workplace bullying, as well as taking into account revenge as an alternative to justice restoration. When victims had voice, empowerment again played a central indirect role in relations between punishment and forgiveness.     

The social costs of extrinsic relative to intrinsic goal pursuits: their relation with social dominance and racial and ethnic prejudice

Self-determination theory's distinction between extrinsic and intrinsic goal pursuits offers a possible explanation for ethnic and racial prejudice. Because extrinsic relative to intrinsic goal pursuits (E/I) stimulate interpersonal competition, they were expected to predict social dominance orientation (SDO), which, in turn, would predict racial and ethnic prejudice. Results of a first cross-sectional study showed that E/I goal pursuits are positively associated with prejudice and that SDO partially mediates this association. In a second longitudinal study, we replicated these results. In addition, however, we found evidence for a reciprocal relationship between E/I goal pursuit and SDO. Moreover, both E/I goal pursuit and SDO had an independent effect on increases in prejudice. Implications of these findings are discussed.     

Retributive justice and social categorizations: the perceived fairness of punishment depends on intergroup status

In the current research, the authors investigate the influence of intergroup status and social categorizations on retributive justice judgments, that is, the extent to which observers perceive punishment as fair. Building on social identity theory and the model of subjective group dynamics, it is predicted that when the ingroup has higher status than the outgroup, people are relatively less concerned about punishment of an outgroup offender than when the ingroup has lower status than the outgroup. Two experiments revealed that participants are more punitive towards an ingroup than an outgroup offender when ingroup status is high but not when ingroup status is low. Furthermore, in correspondence with our line of reasoning, this finding emerged because participants were less punitive towards outgroup offenders when ingroup status is high than when ingroup status was low. It is concluded that the perceived fairness of punishment depends on the offender's social categorization and intergroup status. Copyright © 2007 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.