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1.
There is a common-sense view of language, which is held by Wittgenstein, Strawson Dummett, Searle, Putnam, Lewis, Wiggins,
and others. According to this view a language consists of conventions, it is rule-governed, rules are conventionalised, a
language is learnt, there are general learning mechanisms in the brain, and so on. I shall call this view the ‘ordinary language’
view of language. Chomsky’s attitude towards this view of language has been rather negative, and his rejection of it is a
major motivation for the development of his own theory. In this paper I shall review Chomsky’s long-standing criticisms. I
shall show that (1)Chomsky’s argument does not constitute a dismissal of the ‘ordinarylanguage’ view of language, (2) Chomsky’s
conclusions about language do not follow from his argument, and (3) the ‘ordinary language’ view actually points to a promising
way for us to understand the true nature of language and mind.
This revised version was published online in August 2006 with corrections to the Cover Date. 相似文献
2.
Roger Foster 《Continental Philosophy Review》2007,40(2):187-204
I argue that the reflections on language in Adorno and Heidegger have their common root in a modernist problematic that dissected
experience into ordinary experience, and transfiguring experiences that are beyond the capacity for expression of our language.
I argue that Adorno’s solution to this problem is the more resolutely “modernist” one, in that Adorno is more rigorous about
preserving the distinction between what can be said, and what strives for expression in language. After outlining the definitive
statement of this problematic in Nietzsche’s early epistemological writings, I outline Heidegger’s solution and subsequently
Adorno’s critique of Heidegger. Finally, I argue that situating Adorno within the modernist problem of language and expression
is crucial for making sense of his philosophy as a form of critical theory.
相似文献
Roger FosterEmail: |
3.
Clark Glymour 《Journal of Philosophical Logic》2012,41(2):461-469
Various proposals have suggested that an adequate explanatory theory should reduce the number or the cardinality of the set
of logically independent claims that need be accepted in order to entail a body of data. A (and perhaps the only) well-formed
proposal of this kind is William Kneale’s: an explanatory theory should be finitely axiomatizable but it’s set of logical
consequences in the data language should not be finitely axiomatizable. Craig and Vaught showed that Kneale theories (almost)
always exist for any recursively enumerable but not finitely axiomatizable set of data sentences in a first order language
with identity. Kneale’s criterion underdetermines explanation even given all possible data in the data language; gratuitous
axioms may be “tacked on.” Define a Kneale theory, T, to be logically minimal if it is deducible from every Kneale theory
(in the vocabulary of T) that entails the same statements in the data language as does T. If they exist, minimal Kneale theories
are candidates for best explanations: they are “bold” in a sense close to Popper’s; some minimal Kneale theory is true if
any Kneale theory is true; the minimal Kneale theory that is data equivalent to any given Kneale theory is unique; and no
Kneale theory is more probable than some minimal Kneale theory. I show that under the Craig-Vaught conditions, no minimal
Kneale theories exist. 相似文献
4.
In the following I take issue with the allegation that liberalism must inevitably be guilty of ‘abstract individualism’. I
treat Michael Sandel’s well-known claim that there are ‘loyalties and convictions whose moral force consists partly in the
fact that living by them is inseparable from understanding ourselves as the particular persons we are’ as representative of
this widely held view. Specifically, I argue: (i) that Sandel’s account of the manner in which ‘constitutive’ loyalties function
as reasons for action presupposes the possibility of there being (what I call) ‘underivable particular obligations’, but that
such obligations are, in fact, a logical impossibility; and (ii) that Sandel’s account of the self as necessarily ‘encumbered’
presupposes an account of personal identity which confuses identification with definition, and which is, therefore, fundamentally
flawed.
For their constructive and insightful comments on an earlier draft of this paper, I owe a special debt of gratitude to the
following: Clare Chambers, Roger Crisp, Cécile Fabre, Paul Kelly, David Lloyd-Thomas. Thanks also go to Res Publica’s two anonymous referees. 相似文献
5.
Cheng-hung Tsai 《Philosophia》2010,38(2):331-341
One of the main challenges in the philosophy of language is determining the form of knowledge of the rules of language. Michael Dummett has put forth the view that knowledge of the rules of language is
a kind of implicit knowledge; some philosophers have mistakenly conceived of this type of knowledge as a kind of knowledge-that. In a recent paper in this journal, Patricia Hanna argues against Dummett’s knowledge-that view and proposes instead a knowledge-how
view in which knowledge of the rules of language is a kind of practical knowledge, like an agent’s non-propositional knowledge
of counting. In this paper I argue, first, that Hanna misunderstands Dummett’s conception of knowledge of linguistic rules,
and, second, that Dummett’s considerations of practical knowledge of language pose a problem for Hanna’s knowledge-how view.
At the end of the paper, I briefly sketch an account of practical knowledge of language that meets the requirements set by
Dummett. 相似文献
6.
Ed Pluth 《Continental Philosophy Review》2006,39(3):293-312
I explore Lacan’s theory of the subject by responding to two well-known criticisms of it, found in Borch-Jacobsen’s Lacan and Lacoue-Labarthe and Nancy’s The Title of the Letter. I argue that the relation of the subject to language is an important part of Lacan’s theory, but his conception of the subject
cannot be reduced to language, as the critiques allege. The real must be included in the picture too. I then discuss the situation
of Lacan’s subject between language and the real, and conclude with a contrast of Lacan’s subversion of the subject to a Derridean
paleonymic approach. 相似文献
7.
In this paper I focus on a central phenomenological concept in Michel Henry’s work that has often been neglected: generation.
Generation becomes an especially important conceptual key to understanding not only the relationship between God and human
self but also Henry’s adoption of radical interiority and his critical standpoint with respect to much of the phenomenological
tradition in which he is working. Thus in pursuing the theme of generation, I shall introduce many phenomenological-theological
terms in Henry’s trilogy on Christianity as well as how he understands the relationship between phenomenology and theology.
In the final sections of the paper, I turn to positively defining Henry’s notion of divine generation and examine the theological
implications of it in light of his confrontation and rejection of the doctrine of creation in the book of Genesis found in
his book, Incarnation: une philosophie de la chair. Humans are not created but are eternally generated, a bold claim that brings Henry to the brink of a kind of interiorized
pantheism or Gnostic dualism. Finally, I offer some critical comments specifically about Henry’s doctrine of generation in
light of the tension between auto-affection and hetero-affection and thus how one might think “after Henry” in light of the
basic Augustinian theological distinction between self and God and the intentionality of faith opened up by that distinction. 相似文献
8.
Kyoko Murakami 《Integrative psychological & behavioral science》2010,44(1):30-38
This essay traces my engagement with Michèle Grossen’s ideas of a dialogical perspective on interaction analysis (Grossen
Integrative Psychological and Behavioral Science, 1–22, 2009) and highlights a process account of self in interaction. Firstly I draw on Turner’s concept of liminality with respect to
the transformative, temporal significance in interaction. Secondly I explored further the conversation analytic concepts such
as formulation and reformulation as a viable analytical tool for a dialogical perspective. Lastly, I addressed the issue of
interaction in institutional settings, in particular with interactional asymmetries of interaction, whilst relativising the
I-position dialogical perspective. I explore insights from social anthropology as well as revisiting conversation analysis
and discursive psychology, concluding that a promising direction would be sought through a cross-fertilisation between dialogism
and other sibling perspectives concerning language use, communication, social action and discourse- and narrative-based analyses. 相似文献
9.
In this paper, I take up the problem of the self through bringing together the insights, while correcting some of the shortcomings,
of Indo–Tibetan Buddhist and enactivist accounts of the self. I begin with an examination of the Buddhist theory of non-self
(anātman) and the rigorously reductionist interpretation of this doctrine developed by the Abhidharma school of Buddhism. After discussing
some of the fundamental problems for Buddhist reductionism, I turn to the enactive approach to philosophy of mind and cognitive
science. I argue that human beings, as dynamic systems, are characterized by a high degree of self-organizing autonomy. Therefore,
human beings are not reducible to the more basic mental and physical events that constitute them. I critically examine Francisco
Varela’s enactivist account of the self as virtual and his use of Buddhist ideas in support of this view. I argue, in contrast,
that while the self is emergent and constructed, it is not merely virtual. Finally I sketch a Buddhist-enactivist account
of the self. I argue for a non-reductionist view of the self as an active, embodied, embedded, self-organizing process—what
the Buddhists call ‘I’-making (ahaṃkāra). This emergent process of self-making is grounded in the fundamentally recursive processes that characterize lived experience:
autopoiesis at the biological level, temporalization and self-reference at the level of conscious experience, and conceptual and narrative construction at the level of intersubjectivity. In Buddhist terms, I will develop an account of the self as dependently originated and
empty, but nevertheless real. 相似文献
10.
Changchi Hao 《Frontiers of Philosophy in China》2006,1(3):382-400
In this essay I argue that Mozi’s philosophy is anything but utilitarianism by way of analysing four ethical theories. Utilitarianism
is an ethics in which the moral subject is an atomic individual human being, and its concern is how to fulfill the interests
of the individual self and the social majority. Confucian ethics is centered on the notion of the family and its basic question
is that of priority in the relationship between the small self and the enlarged or collective self. Opposite to these two
moral theories is Mozi’s ethics: The interests that Mozi is primarily concerned with are not the interests of my individual
self or my collective self, but the interests of the other. The fulfillment of the material needs of the other is my moral
obligation. The arguments are centered on the three basic concepts, “the I,” “the we,” and “the other.” The significance of
Mozi’s thought in modern or postmodern context lies in its striking resemblance to the philosophy of a contemporary western
philosopher, Levinas. In both Mozi and Levinas, there is a suspension of utilitarianism.
__________
Translated from Zhongguo Zhexue Shi 中国哲学史 (History of Chinese Philosophy), 2005 (1) 相似文献
11.
Despite the affirmation below from a chapter entitled “The Moral Self” in his Ethics (1932), Deweyseems not to have used the
term “moralself” outside that context. Perhaps he didn’t think it that crucial in his overall philosophy. I argue, on the
contrary, that the concept ofthe moralself is fundamental to Deweyan moral psychology and that it provides an illuminating
lens through which to view his philosophy of education. This paper explicates Dewey’s perspective on moral education as education
of the moral self. 相似文献
12.
Kevin Falvey 《Philosophia》2010,38(2):297-312
Years ago, Michael Dummett defended McTaggart’s argument for the unreality of time, arguing that it cannot be dismissed as
guilty of an “indexical fallacy.” Recently, E. J. Lowe has disputed Dummett’s claims for the cogency of the argument. I offer
an elaboration and defense of Dummett’s interpretation of the argument (though not of its soundness). I bring to bear some
work on tense from the philosophy of language, and some recent work on the concept of the past as it occurs in memory, in
an effort to support the claim that McTaggart is not guilty of any simple indexical fallacy. Along the way I criticize an
account of what is at stake in disputes about the reality of tense due to A. W. Moore, and I argue for the superiority of
the conception of tense-realism that is implicit in McTaggart’s work. The paper is intended to prepare the ground for a substantive
defense of the reality of tense. 相似文献
13.
Nam-In Lee 《Husserl Studies》2010,26(2):131-145
In this paper, I will examine the possibility of first philosophy from a phenomenological point of view. I will do this by
assessing Levinas’s criticism of Husserl’s conception of first philosophy. In Sect. 1, I will delineate Husserl’s conception of first philosophy. In Sect. 2, I will introduce Levinas’s conception of ethics as first philosophy and sketch out his criticism of Husserl’s conception
of first philosophy. In Sect. 3, I will assess Levinas’s criticism of Husserl’s conception and show that from a phenomenological point of view, it is possible
to develop first philosophy only in a relative sense and not in an absolute sense. The possibility of first philosophy in
a relative sense implies that both Husserl’s and Levinas’s conceptions of first philosophy have some limitations and should
be revised, since in a certain way, they are each conceived from an absolute point of view. In Sect. 4, I will show that the conception of first philosophy in a relative sense is a phenomenological one and sketch out some basic
features of first philosophy in a relative sense. 相似文献
14.
Chen-kuo Lin 《Dao》2008,7(4):381-392
This article argues that, as far as the problem of Confucian religiosity is concerned, there is an interpretative turn from
Mou Zongsan’s moral metaphysics to Tu Weiming’s religious hermeneutics. Some concluding remarks are made: First, Tu’s hermeneutics is rooted in the ontology of
self as interrelatedness, which is completely different from Mou’s theory of true self as transcendental subjectivity. Second,
Tu’s hermeneutics of self can be better illuminated with the help of Heidegger’s notion of Dasein as Being-with (Mitsein). For Tu and Heidegger, self cannot be seen as something separate from community. This article also points out that the paradigmatic
shift is evidenced in another similarity between the four categories of self, community, nature, and the transcendent in Tu’s
hermeneutics on the one hand, and the four symbols of earth, sky, divinities, and mortals employed by Heidegger to interpret
the meaning of dwelling, on the other. In such a primordial situation of dwelling, gods are not supposed to be intellectually known; they are rather to be neighbors in community. 相似文献
15.
Giorgio Agamben and Alain Badiou have both recently made central use of set-theoretic results in their political and ontological
projects. As I argue in the paper, one of the most important of these to both thinkers is the paradox of set membership discovered
by Russell in 1901. Russell’s paradox demonstrates the fundamentally paradoxical status of the totality of language itself,
in its concrete occurrence or taking-place in the world. The paradoxical status of language is essential to Agamben’s discussions
of the “coming community,” “whatever being,” sovereignty, law and its force, and the possibility of a reconfiguration of political
life, as well as to Badiou’s notions of representation, political intervention, the nature of the subject, and the event.
I document these implications of Russell’s paradox in the texts of Agamben and Badiou and suggest that they point the way
toward a reconfigured political life, grounded in a radical reflective experience of language. 相似文献
16.
Matteo Bonotti 《Res Publica》2011,17(2):107-123
Political parties have only recently become a subject of investigation in political theory. In this paper I analyse religious
political parties in the context of John Rawls’s political liberalism. Rawlsian political liberalism, I argue, overly constrains
the scope of democratic political contestation and especially for the kind of contestation channelled by parties. This restriction
imposed upon political contestation risks undermining democracy and the development of the kind of democratic ethos that political
liberalism cherishes. In this paper I therefore aim to provide a broader and more inclusive understanding of ‘reasonable’
political contestation, able to accommodate those parties (including religious ones) that political liberalism, as customarily
understood, would exclude from the democratic realm. More specifically, I first embrace Muirhead and Rosenblum’s (Perspectives
on Politics 4: 99–108 2006) idea that parties are ‘bilingual’ links between state and civil society and I draw its normative
implications for party politics. Subsequently, I assess whether Rawls’s political liberalism is sufficiently inclusive to
allow the presence of parties conveying religious and other comprehensive values. Due to Rawls’s thick conceptions of reasonableness
and public reason, I argue, political liberalism risks seriously limiting the number and kinds of comprehensive values which
may be channelled by political parties into the public political realm, and this may render it particularly inhospitable to
religious political parties. Nevertheless, I claim, Rawls’s theory does offer some scope for reinterpreting the concepts of
reasonableness and public reason in a thinner and less restrictive sense and this may render it more inclusive towards religious
partisanship. 相似文献
17.
Robert Jubb 《Res Publica》2011,17(3):245-260
In this paper I try to illuminate the Rawlsian architectonic through an interpretation of what Rawls’ Lectures on the History of Political Philosophy say about Rousseau. I argue that Rawls’ emphasis there when discussing Rousseau on interpreting amour-propre so as to make it compatible with a life in at least some societies draws attention to, and helps explicate, an analogous
feature of his own work, the strains of commitment broadly conceived. Both are centrally connected with protecting a sense
of self which is vital for one’s own agency. This allows us to appreciate better than much of the literature presently does
the requirement for Rawls that justice and the good are congruent, that a society of justice does not disfigure citizens’
ability to live out lives relatively unmarked by relations of domination. Some comments on G. A. Cohen’s critiques of Rawls
are made. 相似文献
18.
Educators, not to mention philosophers of education, find themselves in a difficult position nowadays. With the disappearance
of the so-called metanarratives, it seems that the secular society has made it difficult, not to say almost impossible, to
justify a particular idea of the good life that can be shared by all or at least many. The paper draws attention to some of
the postmodernist critiques and thus identifies how we have ended up at this point; it then argues for a different balance
between the self and the other. What is offered can be seen as an extension of Benhabib’s cosmopolitan view that the self
and others should iteratively and hospitably engage in deliberation. Although we agree with her that iterations (as arguing
over and over again and talking back) are worthwhile in themselves, as well as with Smith’s view that spaces should be created
for adaptable practical judgements in considering the other and its relation with the self, we find Cavell’s idea of ‘living
with scepticism’—particularly, acknowledging humanity in the Other and oneself as apposite to extend the theoretical premises
of cosmopolitanism. Such a cosmopolitanism of scepticism is different from the universalist notions of cosmopolitanism developed
so far. 相似文献
19.
Barbara Gabriella Renzi 《Journal for General Philosophy of Science》2009,40(2):311-336
In this paper I propose a type-hierarchy approach to provide an intersubjective framework for the evaluation of evolutionary
analogies. This approach develops David Hull’s and others’ attempts to provide full generalisation for selection processes,
in order to show that sociocultural development and, particularly, scientific change can be considered as an instance of Darwinian
selection. I argue that the recent work by Eileen Cornell Way on type hierarchies can offer the kind of generalisation needed
to solve the main problems that still affect Hull’s theory and to show that the evolutionary analogy is, after all, only a
particular way of grouping phenomena together. If Hull’s main objective is a unified theory of selection, which supports the
idea that science selection and natural selection obey the same laws, I also argue that the type hierarchy approach to models
shows that this objective is unsustainable as it stands, and is in need of further development. I will firstly introduce the
general outline of the type hierarchy approach to models. Then, after a brief recapitulation of Hull’s main points and difficulties,
I will try and construct a hierarchy for a general abstraction of selection processes. Finally I will introduce the main criticisms
that Hull’s work has faced from philosophers and scientists, and show how they compare with my proposal. 相似文献
20.
Emer O’Hagan 《Ethical Theory and Moral Practice》2009,12(5):525-537
Kant’s duty of self-knowledge demands that one know one’s heart—the quality of one’s will in relation to duty. Self-knowledge
requires that an agent subvert feelings which fuel self-aggrandizing narratives and increase self-conceit; she must adopt
the standpoint of the rational agent constrained by the requirements of reason in order to gain information about her moral
constitution. This is not I argue, contra Nancy Sherman, in order to assess the moral goodness of her conduct. Insofar as
sound moral practice requires moral self-knowledge and moral self-knowledge requires a theoretical commitment to a conception
of the moral self, sound moral agency is for Kant crucially tied to theory. Kant plausibly holds that self-knowledge is a
protection against moral confusion and self-deception. I conclude that although his account relies too heavily on the awareness
of moral law to explain its connection to moral development, it is insightful and important in Kantian ethics. 相似文献