The subjective experience of retrieval-induced forgetting

The objective was to examine whether the lower accessibility of studied items (Rp?) that follows retrieval practice with studied items from the same category (Rp+; retrieval-induced forgetting) is correctly monitored by our cognitive system. If monitored, lower confidence for Rp? items would be expected which, in turn, would allow the control of the retrieval-induced forgetting through the report option. In Experiment 1 the standard retrieval-practice paradigm with categorised word lists was followed by a recognition test with confidence rating and the option to report or withhold the answer. Accuracy showed retrieval-induced forgetting, but there were no differences in confidence. The report option did not affect retrieval-induced forgetting. The confidence–accuracy dissociation could be due to a correct monitoring of the retrieval-induced forgetting joined with a factor that incorrectly increases confidence for Rp? items. Familiarity with the practised category was proposed as this factor and tested in Experiment 2. Despite presenting the categories more times during the retrieval-practice phase to increase their familiarity, confidence ratings were unaffected. In conclusion, this research suggests that retrieval-induced forgetting was not monitored, giving rise to a confidence–accuracy dissociation.     

Critical ethnography and subjective experience

Conclusion I began this essay by advancing three claims with respect to conducting ethnographic research: the analyst should be disposed to engage Other in a genuinely dialogic fashion so as to produce shared understanding; provision should be made for the analyst to disengage from the dialogue for purposes of self-reflection; and there should be some justificatory grounds for ideology critique. At the same time, I noted the problematic status of these claims on conceptual and methodological grounds and pointed to a need for taking account of the analyst as a subject whose being in the world impinges upon the analysis at each stage of research. This awareness, it seems to me, calls for an ethnography which is phenomenologically instigated. This is to say that the ethnographer needs to be no less sensitive to his or her own subjectivity than to the meanings of Other.In order to get clearer as to what might be involved in making the above claims, I discussed critically Gadamer's phenomenological hermeneutics. Although Gadamer is to be commended for his philosophical inquiry into the bases of self-understanding, we saw that his phenomenological hermeneutics suffered a number of limitations, all of which being linked to his inability to adequately free the subject from the limits of self-understanding. Thus, Gadamer's subject-as-analyst is restricted as a participant in dialogue with Other; engages in self-reflection without a firm footing; and is unable thus to mount a justifiable critique either of Other or the subject's own tradition/culture.This critique of Gadamer suggests that once the phenomenological turn is taken, it then requires an additional turn which joins the subject with Other in shared understanding. In this regard I suggested the possible directions that some conceptual emendations of Gadamer's thesis might take us, and gave special reference to the ways in which such emendations might be implemented in ethnographic work. Both my critique and emendation were meant to underscore the need for a joining of subject and Other not merely as this might represent an occasion for understanding Other, nor merely for the understanding of self, but for a shared understanding that opens up a newly formed terrain upon which self-reflection and ideology critique may find suitable and just intersubjective grounding.     

The subjective experience of committed errors and the Discrepancy-Attribution hypothesis

In routine sequential behavior, we sometimes become aware of having committed an error. However, often we do not. Here, we investigated the processes underlying conscious error detection within a typing paradigm. Our assumption according to the Discrepancy-Attribution hypothesis is that the (explicit) judgment of having made an error is due to a perceived discrepancy between expected and actually experienced performance which then is attributed to an error. In 4 experiments, participants were instructed to type single words without seeing what they were typing and, afterwards, to judge whether typing was correct. Experiments 1 through 3 tested the assumption that conscious awareness about an error is due to a perceived discrepancy between an expectation and the experienced performance. Experiment 4 investigated the assumption of a separate attribution process triggered by the perceived discrepancy. The results support the Discrepancy-Attribution hypothesis and argue for a two-stage model of conscious error detection.     

The language of anxiety: The subjective experience of vulnerability

The experience of anxiety is a condition known to mankind from time immemorial. In contemporary clinical practice anxiety is the driving force behind some of the most difficult and seemingly intractable clinical syndromes presented to clinicians today. It presents a major challenge to non-clinical populations as well. This paper discusses the problem of anxiety from the perspective of language —the primitive roots of language. How understanding these roots helps therapists to better grasp their patients' inner experience and some suggestions for anxiety management are discussed.     

Two conceptions of subjective experience

Do philosophers and ordinary people conceive of subjective experience in the same way? In this article, we argue that they do not and that the philosophical concept of phenomenal consciousness does not coincide with the folk conception. We first offer experimental support for the hypothesis that philosophers and ordinary people conceive of subjective experience in markedly different ways. We then explore experimentally the folk conception, proposing that for the folk, subjective experience is closely linked to valence. We conclude by considering the implications of our findings for a central issue in the philosophy of mind, the hard problem of consciousness.     

The subjective experience of remembering in artificial grammar learning

The question of what processes are involved in artificial grammar learning has been the subject of a great deal of debate for nearly four decades. Neuropsychological and some behavioural data have found evidence for episodic memory processes such as recollection and familiarity in artificial grammar learning. To date all of this evidence has been found using objective techniques that do not rely on subjective reports. However, recollection and familiarity are associated with distinct phenomenal states that can be measured using the well-known “remember”–“know” procedure. This paper reports three experiments in which evidence was found for recollection and familiarity-based influences in artificial grammar learning using subjective reports of the experience of remembering. Subjective reports were not related to the similarity of the test items to the study items, suggesting that they do not merely reflect levels of confidence. The data are discussed with reference to multiple process models and a modified signal-detection model.     

The word and us: Implications of linguistic design for subjective experience and for the experience of subjectivity

As language evolved in the history of civilization, a verbal form of communication became not only possible but prevalent. Inherent in the linguistic communication system is symbolization, the representation, by means of words, of what exists or occurs.The subject addressed in the present work involves the implications of the linguistic symbol system, first, for the subjective experiences of emotion and consciousness, and second, for the experience of subjectivity, that is, the experience of being somebody psychologically. Further considerations are those regarding solutions to the psychological consequences of verbal symbolization.In the process of sorting out issues and avenues of approach to the subjects mentioned, the thought occurred that I and myself and me were taking a journey into the field of language, in order to find out whatthe word might mean forus. This thought is reflected in the main title of this paper.Francina Middelman, M.D., is a retired (September 1984) psychiatrist. She received her medical education at the University of Amsterdam, The Netherlands, and her psychiatric training in the Department of Psychiatry, College of Medicine, University of Cincinnati. Her last position was that of medical director, Athens Mental Health Center, Athens, Ohio.     

The subjective experience of subjects diagnosed with celiac disease in adulthood

Introduction

Celiac disease is estimated to affect between 1 in 100 and 1 in 300 Caucasian subjects. Many quantitative studies have explored the issues encountered by these subjects; however, few studies have addressed the subjective and experiential dimensions of celiac disease.

Representationalism and the perspectival character of perceptual experience

Perceptual experiences inform us about objective properties of things in our environment. But they also have perspectival character in the sense that they differ phenomenally when objects are viewed from different points of view. Contemporary representationalists hold, at a minimum, that phenomenal character supervenes on representational content. Thus, in order to account for perspectival character, they need to indentify a type of representational content that changes in appropriate ways with the perceiver’s point of view. Many representationlists, including Shoemaker and Lycan, argue that such contents are best construed in terms of mind-dependent properties. Other representationalists, including Tye and Dretske, hold that these contents involve only mind-independent properties. Susanna Schellenberg has recently developed an account of perceptual experience that would serve these latter representationalists extremely well. She suggests that we can do justice to the perspectival character of perceptual experience by appeal to representations of a certain type of relational properties, so-called ‘situation-dependent properties.’ In this paper, I critically engage with Schellenberg’s proposal in order to show how mind-independent representationalists can explain perspectival character. I argue that appeal to situation-dependent properties is problematic. I then show that mind-independent representationalists can account for perspectical character by means of scenario contents in Christopher Peacocke’s sense.     

The subjective experience of problem irresolvability and suicidal behavior: dynamics and measurement.

This article presents the dynamics and measurement of a relatively unstudied concept in children's and adolescents' suicidal behavior: the subjective experience of problem irresolvability (SEPI). This concept relates to the youngsters' sense of lack of control due to being pressured to resolve irresolvable problems within the family circle. The first study describes the construction and factor analysis of the SEPI scale as well as its relationship to suicidal tendencies, perceived parental care, and self-esteem. The second study presents a repeated factor analysis and the association between the SEPI scale and suicidal tendencies, hopelessness, depression, anxiety, and commitment to parents. The results suggest that the scale has a 4-factor structure with sound psychometric properties that distinguish successfully between suicidal adolescents on the one hand, and psychiatric and normal adolescents on the other. The SEPI was also found to be associated with the various studied variables.     

The subjective quality of episodic future thought and the experience of meaning in life

Two studies assessed whether mentally simulating specific future events to occur in familiar (vs. unfamiliar) settings indirectly increases meaning life via the subjective quality of the simulations. Participants in both studies (N = 344) were randomly assigned to visualize themselves doing something in familiar (e.g. home) or unfamiliar (e.g. fantasy world) settings in the future. They then rated the subjective quality of these visualizations and completed a measure of meaning in life. We replicated previous findings by showing that mental simulations involving familiar settings were of greater subjective quality than simulations involving unfamiliar settings. However, we also found that simulating future events in familiar (vs. unfamiliar) settings indirectly increased the perceived meaningfulness of life. These findings integrate research in cognitive psychology with research on the psychology of well-being and reveal how mental time travel contributes to the perception that one’s life has meaning.     

Trauma as an objective or subjective experience: The association between types of traumatic events,personality traits,subjective experience of the event,and posttraumatic symptoms

The study aimed to examine the discrete effect of objective (type of trauma and demographic characteristics) and subjective (proximity to the trauma, subjective experience of the trauma as a threat, the Big Five personality traits, and dissociative symptoms) factors on the risk for PTSD among 1,210 undergraduate students. The findings indicate that survivors of physical/sexual assault scored the highest on proximity to the trauma, subjective experience of the trauma as a threat, neuroticism, dissociation, and PTSD symptoms. In addition, subjective experience of the trauma, proximity to it, type of trauma, dissociation, and neuroticism were associated with the risk for PTSD symptoms. The findings point to the significance of both subjective and objective variables in the risk for PTSD symptoms.     

The subjective experience of intimacy,passion, and commitment in heterosexual loving relationships

Lovers’responses to open-ended questions concerning the experience and communication of intimacy, passion, and commitment were content- and factor-analyzed. These analyses resulted in six ways of experiencing intimacy (openness, sex, affection, supportiveness, togetherness, and quiet company); two ways of experiencing passion (romance and sexual intimacy); and five ways of experiencing commitment (supportiveness, expressions of love, fidelity, expressions of commitment, and consideration and devotion). These results suggest that love, intimacy, passion, and commitment are best conceived as related, overlapping gestalts in the subjective experiences of actual lovers.     

Reclaiming the value of assessing unconscious and subjective psychological experience

The Psychodynamic Diagnostic Manual provides a model of the individual that emphasizes the prominence of unconscious subjective experience in shaping personality and psychopathology. Yet, modern psychiatry and psychology have avoided reference to and assessment of such processes. In this article, I review evidence from the cognitive neuroscience literature that supports the relationship of unconscious subjective experience to personality and behavior. Suggestions are made for how these findings should affect clinical assessment practice and how research methodology could be employed to further evaluate and enhance current assessment practice.