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1.
Thor Grunbaum 《Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences》2008,7(2):243-261
This article is about how to describe an agent’s awareness of her bodily movements when she is aware of executing an action
for a reason. Against current orthodoxy, I want to defend the claim that the agent’s experience of moving has an epistemic
place in the agent’s awareness of her own intentional action. In “The problem,” I describe why this should be thought to be
problematic. In “Motives for denying epistemic role,” I state some of the main motives for denying that bodily awareness has
any epistemic role to play in the content of the agent’s awareness of her own action. In “Kinaesthetic awareness and control,”
I sketch how I think the experience of moving and the bodily sense of agency or control are best described. On this background,
I move on to present, in “Arguments for epistemic role,” three arguments in favour of the claim that normally the experience
of moving is epistemically important to one’s awareness of acting intentionally. In the final “Concluding remarks,” I round
off by raising some of the worries that motivated the denial of my claim in the first place.
相似文献
Thor GrunbaumEmail: |
2.
Christopher Lepock 《Philosophical Studies》2006,129(2):377-391
Ernest Sosa’s virtue perspectivism goes beyond standard reliabilism by requiring that agents with justified beliefs not only
derive their beliefs from virtuous cognitive faculties but have an epistemic perspective that explains the origin of the beliefs
and makes their belief-set coherent. I argue that Sosa’s account of the epistemic perspective does not ensure that the perspective
will confer justification. An adequate epistemic perspective must establish a non-accidental connection between an agent’s
use of a faculty in certain circumstances and its reliability in those circumstances. An agent who is capable of judging the
reliability of her faculties in different situations will have a perspective that meets this requirement. Revising virtue
perspectivism in this way also permits a stronger response to doxastic ascent arguments against the theory. 相似文献
3.
Joshua Sack 《Synthese》2009,169(2):241-257
This paper aims to extend in two directions the probabilistic dynamic epistemic logic provided in Kooi’s paper (J Logic Lang
Inform 12(4):381–408, 2003) and to relate these extensions to ones made in van Benthem et al. (Proceedings of LOFT’06. Liverpool,
2006). Kooi’s probabilistic dynamic epistemic logic adds to probabilistic epistemic logic sentences that express consequences
of public announcements. The paper (van Benthem et al., Proceedings of LOFT’06. Liverpool, 2006) extends (Kooi, J Logic Lang
Inform 12(4):381–408, 2003) to using action models, but in both papers, the probabilities are discrete, and are defined on
trivial σ-algebras over finite sample spaces. The first extension offered in this paper is to add a previous-time operator to a probabilistic
dynamic epistemic logic similar to Kooi’s in (J Logic Lang Inform 12(4):381–408, 2003). The other is to involve non-trivial
σ-algebras and continuous probabilities in probabilistic dynamic epistemic logic. 相似文献
4.
We formalise a notion of dynamic rationality in terms of a logic of conditional beliefs on (doxastic) plausibility models.
Similarly to other epistemic statements (e.g. negations of Moore sentences and of Muddy Children announcements), dynamic rationality
changes its meaning after every act of learning, and it may become true after players learn it is false. Applying this to
extensive games, we “simulate” the play of a game as a succession of dynamic updates of the original plausibility model: the
epistemic situation when a given node is reached can be thought of as the result of a joint act of learning (via public announcements)
that the node is reached. We then use the notion of “stable belief”, i.e. belief that is preserved during the play of the
game, in order to give an epistemic condition for backward induction: rationality and common knowledge of stable belief in
rationality. This condition is weaker than Aumann’s and compatible with the implicit assumptions (the “epistemic openness
of the future”) underlying Stalnaker’s criticism of Aumann’s proof. The “dynamic” nature of our concept of rationality explains
why our condition avoids the apparent circularity of the “backward induction paradox”: it is consistent to (continue to) believe
in a player’s rationality after updating with his irrationality. 相似文献
5.
6.
Eleonora Cresto 《Synthese》2010,177(1):41-66
I develop a strategy for representing epistemic states and epistemic changes that seeks to be sensitive to the difference
between voluntary and involuntary aspects of our epistemic life, as well as to the role of pragmatic factors in epistemology.
The model relies on a particular understanding of the distinction between full belief and acceptance, which makes room for the idea that our reasoning on both practical and theoretical matters typically proceeds in a contextual
way. Within this framework, I discuss how agents can rationally shift their credal probability functions so as to consciously
modify some of their contextual acceptances; the present account also allows us to represent how the very set of contexts
evolves. Voluntary credal shifts, in turn, might provoke changes in the agent’s beliefs, but I show that this is actually
a side effect of performing multiple adjustments in the total lot of the agent’s acceptance sets. In this way we obtain a
model that preserves many pre-theoretical intuitions about what counts as adequate rationality constraints on our actual practices—and
hence about what counts as an adequate, normative epistemological perspective. 相似文献
7.
This paper investigates the role of conditionals in hypothetical reasoning and rational decision making. Its main result is
a proof of a representation theorem for preferences defined on sets of sentences (and, in particular, conditional sentences),
where an agent’s preference for one sentence over another is understood to be a preference for receiving the news conveyed
by the former. The theorem shows that a rational preference ordering of conditional sentences determines probability and desirability
representations of the agent’s degrees of belief and desire that satisfy, in the case of non-conditional sentences, the axioms
of Jeffrey’s decision theory and, in the case of conditional sentences, Adams’ expression for the probabilities of conditionals.
Furthermore, the probability representation is shown to be unique and the desirability representation unique up to positive
linear transformation.
This revised version was published online in June 2006 with corrections to the Cover Date. 相似文献
8.
Timothy Chan 《Synthese》2010,173(3):211-229
One version of Moore’s Paradox is the challenge to account for the absurdity of beliefs purportedly expressed by someone who
asserts sentences of the form ‘p & I do not believe that p’ (‘Moorean sentences’). The absurdity of these beliefs is philosophically puzzling, given that Moorean sentences (i) are
contingent and often true; and (ii) express contents that are unproblematic when presented in the third-person. In this paper
I critically examine the most popular proposed solution to these two puzzles, according to which Moorean beliefs are absurd
because Moorean sentences are instances of pragmatic paradox; that is to say, the propositions they express are necessarily false-when-believed. My conclusion is that while a Moorean
belief is a pragmatic paradox, it is not
just another pragmatic paradox, because this diagnosis does not explain all the puzzling features of Moorean beliefs. In particularly,
while this analysis is plausible in relation to the puzzle posed by characteristic (i) of Moorean sentences, I argue that
it fails to account for (ii). I do so in the course of an attempt to formulate the definition of a pragmatic paradox in more
precise formal terms, in order to see whether the definition is satisfied by Moorean sentences, but not by their third-person
transpositions. For only an account which can do so could address (ii) adequately. After rejecting a number of attempted formalizations,
I arrive at a definition which delivers the right results. The problem with this definition, however, is that it has to be
couched in first-person terms, making an essential use of ‘I’. Thus the problem of accounting for first-/third-person asymmetry
recurs at a higher order, which shows that the Pragmatic Paradox Resolution fails to identify the source of such asymmetry
highlighted by Moore’s Paradox. 相似文献
9.
Marc Alspector-Kelly 《Erkenntnis》2006,64(3):371-379
Bas van Fraassen claims that constructive empiricism strikes a balance between the empiricist’s commitments to epistemic modesty
– that one’s opinion should extend no further beyond the deliverances of experience than is necessary – and to the rationality
of science. In “Should the Empiricist be a Constructive Empiricist?” I argued that if the constructive empiricist follows
through on her commitment to epistemic modesty she will find herself adopting a much more extreme position than van Fraassen
suggests. Van Fraassen and Bradley Monton have recently responded. My purpose here is to contest their response. The goal
is not merely the rebuttal of a rebuttal; there is a lesson to learn concerning the realist/anti-realist dialectic generated
by van Fraassen’s view. 相似文献
10.
Sebastian Enqvist 《Erkenntnis》2010,72(3):315-335
In the paper “On the role of the research agenda in epistemic change”, Olsson and Westlund have suggested that the notion
of epistemic state employed in the standard framework of belief revision (Alchourrón et al. 1985; G?rdenfors 1988) should be extended to include a representation of the agent’s research agenda (Olsson and Westlund 2006). The resulting framework will here be referred to as interrogative belief revision. In this paper, I attempt to deal with the problem of how research agendas should change in contraction, a problem largely left open by Olsson and Westlund. Two desiderata of an appropriate solution are suggested: one is a principle of continuity, stating that changes in the research agenda should somehow reflect that certain long term research interests are kept fixed. The other desideratum, which is based on part of Olsson and Westlund’s motivation for
adding research agendas to the epistemic states, is that we should be able to account for how contraction may serve to open
up new, fruitful hypotheses for investigation. In order to achieve these desiderata, I base my solution on a revised version of Olsson and Westlund’s notion of epistemic state. 相似文献
11.
Benjamin McMyler 《Erkenntnis》2012,76(3):337-352
According to so-called “credit views of knowledge,” knowledge is an achievement of an epistemic agent, something for which
an agent is creditable or responsible. One influential criticism of the credit view of knowledge holds that the credit view
has difficulty making sense of knowledge acquired from testimony. As Jennifer Lackey has argued, in many ordinary cases of
the acquisition of testimonial knowledge, if anyone deserves credit for the truth of the audience’s belief it is the testimonial
speaker rather than the audience, and so it isn’t clear that testimonial knowers are appropriately creditable for the truth of their
beliefs. I argue that the credit view of knowledge can be saved from Lackey’s objection by focusing on the way in which testimonial
knowledge is the result of an essentially social epistemic ability. While there is indeed a sense in which a testimonial knower
is only partially epistemically responsible for her testimonial belief, this is consistent with the truth of her belief being
creditable to her in another sense. The truth of her belief is most saliently explained by, and hence is fully creditable
to, an essentially social epistemic ability, an ability that is only partially seated in the knowing subject. 相似文献
12.
This study sought to establish the relevance of mothers’ epistemic beliefs to their parenting style and preferred academic
goals for their child. College mothers (N = 163) from primarily working class families completed a variety of self-report measures including a modified version of
Schommer’s [(1990). Journal of Educational Psychology, 82, 498–504] Epistemological Beliefs Questionnaire, the Parental Attitudes Questionnaire-Revised [Reitman, Rhode, Hupp, & Altobello
(2002). Journal of Psychopathology and Behavioral Assessment, 24(2), 119–127], and several goal orientation scales. Results indicated that a view of learning as effortful and under the
learner’s control and a view of knowledge as actively constructed were associated with an authoritative parenting style and
with a preference for their child to focus on learning, improvement, and effort in approaching academic tasks. By contrast,
a view of learning as quick, straightforward, relatively passive and as based in innate constraints and a view of knowledge
as consisting of discreet, unambiguous facts were associated with authoritarian and permissive styles and the adoption of
performance goals for one’s child.
Portions of this study were presented at the annual meeting of the Society for Research in Child Development in Atlanta, April,
2005. 相似文献
13.
Andrés Perea 《Synthese》2007,158(2):251-271
Within a formal epistemic model for simultaneous-move games, we present the following conditions: (1) belief in the opponents’ rationality (BOR), stating that a player believes that every opponent chooses an optimal strategy, (2) self-referential beliefs (SRB), stating that a player believes that his opponents hold correct beliefs about his own beliefs, (3) projective beliefs (PB), stating that i believes that j’s belief about k’s choice is the same as i’s belief about k’s choice, and (4) conditionally independent beliefs (CIB), stating that a player believes that opponents’ types choose their strategies independently. We show that, if a player
satisfies BOR, SRB and CIB, and believes that every opponent satisfies BOR, SRB, PB and CIB, then he will choose a Nash strategy
(that is, a strategy that is optimal in some Nash equilibrium). We thus provide a sufficient collection of one-person conditions
for Nash strategy choice. We also show that none of these seven conditions can be dropped. 相似文献
14.
Steven L. Reynolds 《Erkenntnis》2011,75(1):19-35
Control of our own beliefs is allegedly required for the truth of epistemic evaluations, such as “S ought to believe that p”, or “S ought to suspend judgment (and so refrain from any belief) whether p”. However, we cannot usually believe or refrain from believing at will. I agree with a number of recent authors in thinking
that this apparent conflict is to be resolved by distinguishing reasons for believing that give evidence that p from reasons
that make it desirable to believe that p whether or not p is true. I argue however that there is a different problem, one that becomes clearer in light of this solution to the first
problem. Someone’s approval of our beliefs is at least often a non-evidential reason to believe, and as such cannot change
our beliefs. Ought judgments aim to change the world. But ‘ought to believe’ judgments can’t do that by changing the belief,
if they don’t give evidence. So I argue that we should instead regard epistemic ought judgments as aimed mainly at influencing
assertions that express the belief and other actions based on the belief, in accord with recent philosophical claims that
we have epistemic norms for assertion and action. 相似文献
15.
Allen Wood 《International Journal for Philosophy of Religion》2008,63(1-3):7-24
‘Evidentialism’ is the conventional name (given mainly by its opponents) for the view that there is a moral duty to proportion
one’s beliefs to evidence, proof or other epistemic justifications for belief. This essay defends evidentialism against objections
based on the alleged involuntariness of belief, on the claim that evidentialism assumes a doubtful epistemology, that epistemically
unsupported beliefs can be beneficial, that there are significant classes of exceptions to the evidentialist principle, and
other shabby evasions and alibis (as I take them to be) for disregarding the duty to believe according to the evidence. Evidentialism
is also supported by arguments based on both self-regarding and other-regarding considerations. 相似文献
16.
17.
Richard Feldman 《Synthese》2008,161(3):339-355
Deontologism in epistemology holds that epistemic justification may be understood in terms of “deontological” sentences about
what one ought to believe or is permitted to believe, or what one deserves praise for believing, or in some similar way. If
deonotologism is true, and people have justified beliefs, then the deontological sentences can be true. However, some say,
these deontological sentences can be true only if people have a kind of freedom or control over their beliefs that they do
not in fact have. Thus, deontologism in epistemology, combined with anti-skepticism, has implausible implications. I first
describe one sort of control that people typically have over ordinary actions but do not have over typical beliefs. I then
argue that there is a paradigmatic type of epistemic evaluation that does properly apply to beliefs even though we lack this
sort of control over them. Finally, I argue that these paradigmatic epistemic evaluations are sufficient to make true some
of the deontological sentences. 相似文献
18.
Logics for Epistemic Programs 总被引:1,自引:0,他引:1
We construct logical languages which allow one to represent a variety of possible types of changes affecting the information
states of agents in a multi-agent setting. We formalize these changes by defining a notion of epistemic program. The languages are two-sorted sets that contain not only sentences but also actions or programs. This is as in dynamic logic,
and indeed our languages are not significantly more complicated than dynamic logics. But the semantics is more complicated.
In general, the semantics of an epistemic program is what we call aprogram model. This is a Kripke model of ‘actions’,representing the agents' uncertainty about the current action in a similar way that Kripke models of ‘states’ are commonly used in epistemic logic to represent the agents' uncertainty about the current state of the system. Program models induce changes affecting agents' information, which we represent as changes of the state model,
called epistemic updates. Formally, an update consists of two operations: the first is called the update map, and it takes every state model to another
state model, called the updated model; the second gives, for each input state model, a transition relation between the states of that model and the states of the
updated model.
Each variety of epistemic actions, such as public announcements or completely private announcements to groups, gives what
we call an action signature, and then each family of action signatures gives a logical language. The construction of these languages is the main topic
of this paper. We also mention the systems that capture the valid sentences of our logics. But we defer to a separate paper
the completeness proof.
The basic operation used in the semantics is called the update product. A version of this was introduced in Baltag et al. (1998), and the presentation here improves on the earlier one. The update
product is used to obtain from any program model the corresponding epistemic update, thus allowing us to compute changes of information or belief. This point is of interest independently of our logical languages. We illustrate the update
product and our logical languages with many examples throughout the paper. 相似文献
19.
Bryan Pickel 《Philosophical Studies》2010,147(2):193-211
I defend the view that ordinary objects like statues are identical to the pieces of matter from which they are made. I argue
that ordinary speakers assert sentences such as ‘this statue is a molded piece of clay’. This suggests that speakers believe
propositions which entail that ordinary objects such as statues are the pieces matter from which they are made, and therefore
pluralism contradicts ordinary beliefs. The dominant response to this argument purports to find an ambiguity in the word ‘is’,
such that ‘is’ in these sentences means the same as ‘constitutes or is constituted by’. I will use standard tests for ambiguity
to argue that this strategy fails. I then explore and reject other responses to the argument. 相似文献
20.
James Kennedy Chase 《Synthese》2012,184(3):357-373
W.V. Quine is committed to the claim that all beliefs are rationally revisable; Jerrold Katz has argued that this commitment
is unstable on grounds of self-application. The subsequent discussion of this issue has largely proceeded in terms of the
logic of belief revision, but there is also an issue here for the treatment of Quine’s views in a doxastic modal system. In
this paper I explore the treatment of Quinean epistemology in modal terms. I argue that a set of formal revisability desiderata
can be distilled from Quine’s epistemic writings, and that there are demonstrably coherent and non-trivial systems that meet
these conditions. 相似文献